JUDGMENT : K.C. AGRAWAL, J. 1. The writ petition is directed against a judgment of the District Judge, Gorakhpur, dated 17-9-1976, allowing an appeal of Respondent. 2. The dispute relates to a shop, situate in Mohalla Purdilpur, district Gorakhpur. It belongs to Ambreshwari Sahai, Respondent 3. An application was filed by the Petitioner for allotment of the said shop on the ground that as it was in illegal possession of Abdul Majid alias Kallu, the premises was vacant, and that the same was open for allotment. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer got an enquiry made, and after the report had been submitted by the Town Rationing Inspector, he held on 24-5-1975 that the shop was lying vacant. Thereafter he passed an allotment order. The date of the allotment order is not to be found on the record. It is, however, the admitted case of the parties that in pursuance of the aforesaid allotment order, the Petitioner obtained possession of the shop on 1-7-1975. 3. Thereafter, Mohammad Yasin, Respondent 1, filed an application u/s 16(5) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 for the review of the allotment order on the ground that the same had been procured by the Petitioner on a false and wrong averment. The case of Respondent I was that be had been a tenant of the aforesaid shop, and that the same was in possession of his servant who was doing the repairing of motor cycles in the disputed premises. 4. The application was resisted by the Petitioner. He alleged that the shop was not in possession of Respondent 1, and that it had been let out to Abdul Majid alias Kallu who had been doing business in his own personal right having no connection with Respondent 1. 5. Before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer the parties adduced evidence After perusal of the evidence, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that the premises had been given to Abdul Majid and as the possession of Abdul Majid was unauthorised, the vacancy was rightly declared, and the allotment order made in favour of the Petitioner could not be set aside. 6. Against the aforesaid order, Respondent 1 filed an appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 were amended by Act No. XXVIII of 1976. 6. Against the aforesaid order, Respondent 1 filed an appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 were amended by Act No. XXVIII of 1976. Accordingly, appeal filed by Respondent 1 was converted into a revision and, thereafter, allowed on 17-9-1976. While allowing the revision the District Judge held that the premises had been let out to Mohammad Yasin, Respondent 1, and that the shop was in his possession. The appellate authority also held that it was one Abdul Mujib who was working at the shop on behalf of the said Respondent and that the claim of the Petitioner that the shop had been let out or given to Abdul Majid was not believable. On the aforesaid finding, the revision was allowed and the order of allotment made in favour of the Petitioner was set aside. Aggrieved, the Petitioner filed the present writ petition. 7. Sri V.M. Sahai, counsel for the Petitioner, pressed two points before me. The first was that as the jurisdiction of the revising authority was a restricted one, the District Judge had no power to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The finding of fact, according to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, was that the premises had been illegally given in possession of Abdul Majid. The submission was countered by Dr. Cyan Prakash, counsel appearing for Respondent 1, on the ground that since the Question of vacancy was one of jurisdiction, the revising court could take a different view from that which had been taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 8. Section 18 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is in the same language as Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For understanding the scope and amplitude of Section 18, assistance can be derived from the authorities of the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 115 CPC Consistently, it has been laid down in several cases by the Supreme Court that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to case of illegal or irregular exercise or non-exercise or illegal assumption of the jurisdiction by the subordinate courts. If a subordinate court is found to possess the jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be said to exercise it illegally or with material irregularity even if it decides the matter wrongly. If a subordinate court is found to possess the jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be said to exercise it illegally or with material irregularity even if it decides the matter wrongly. The revising court cannot interfere with the finding of the subordinate court simply because the finding given by the subordinate court is either illegal or erroneous on facts. 9. In the instant case, as I have shown above, the controversy was whether the premises had been allowed to be occupied by a person other than a tenant. The question as to whether it had been allowed to be occupied or not was that of fact. It had nothing to do with the jurisdiction. Accordingly the revising authority could not interfere with the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and set aside the same. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer had found that the premises had been given in possession of Abdul Majid who was a stranger (and) was not a member of the family of the tenant, Respondent 1. 10. The second submission of Sri V.M. Sahai, counsel appearing for the Petitioner, also appears to be sound. The same was that the revising authority carved out a new case for Respondent 1. He pointed out that the case of the Respondent 1 was that the shop was in possession of one Abdul Mujib and not Abdul Majid alias Kallu, and that this Abdul Mujib was looking after the business of repairing motor cycles. An attempt was made on behalf of Respondent 1 to show that the case of Respondent 1 had been wrongly understood by the Petitioner. It was pointed out that Respondent 1 had claimed that Abdul Mujib was the person acting on his behalf and that he had been doing the business on behalf of Respondent 1. In support of his submission, he also took me through the counter-affidavit and the rejoinder-affidavit. From the statement of Surendra Narain Singh, who appeared as a witness on behalf of the Petitioner with the file of the Electricity Department, it appears that the only question in cross-examination put to him by Respondent 1 was that the electricity connection had not been given to Abdul Majid alias Kallu. From the statement of Surendra Narain Singh, who appeared as a witness on behalf of the Petitioner with the file of the Electricity Department, it appears that the only question in cross-examination put to him by Respondent 1 was that the electricity connection had not been given to Abdul Majid alias Kallu. Respondent 1 did not cross-examine the said witness on the point that the electricity connection had been given to Abdul Mujib, and that the same stood in the name of Abdul Mujib. Had the case of Respondent 1 been that the name of the person who was looking after the business on his behalf was Abdul Mujib, one fails to understand why was the aforesaid witness not cross-examined by the said Respondent. It may be stated that the case of the said Respondent was that the electricity connection had been given to Abdul Mujib, and that the same stood in his name. The statement of the witness shows that the electric connection was in the name of Abdul Mujib. Accordingly, the District Judge carved out a new case in favour of Respondent 1. 11. It is, however, not necessary for me to dilate further on the second point as in my opinion the view taken on the first point is sufficient to quash the order of the District Judge. 12. For these reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the District Judge dated 17-9-1976 is quashed, and that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is restored. The Petitioner will be entitled to get costs from Respondent 1.