JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - This is a defendants appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment filed by the plaintiff from the accommodation in possession of the defendant. 2. The suit for ejectment was decreed. The appellant on the 10th March, 1970 preferred the present second appeal. In this appeal an application was made for the grant of an interim order. The application for the grant of an interim order was also considered by the Court on the 10th March, 1970 and the following order was made: "Issue notice. The appellant shall not be ejected from the accommodation in question meanwhile provided he deposits the entire decretal amount, costs and rent as calculated up to 28th February, 1970. The rent for the subsequent months shall also be deposited by the 15th of the succeeding months, i.e. the rent for the month of March shall be deposited by the 15th of April, and so forth. In case of default of any of the conditions mentioned above, the stay order shall stand automatically discharged." 3. The interim application came up for final hearing on the 7th May, 1973, on which date the following order was made, - "Heard counsel for the parties. The interim order dated 10-3-1970 is confirmed." 4. The appellant has complied with the terms of the interim order. A statement was filed as annexure I to the rejoinder affidavit showing the deposits made by the appellant. The initial deposit was made on 17-3-1970, for Rupees 1393.50 P. which covered rent and the entire decretal amount due till 31-3-1970. The appellant has given details of subsequent payments of rent. 5. The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 came into force on 15th July, 1972. As on that date the entire rent due up to the end of July, 1972 stood paid, even though rent of July, 1972 would have been payable in the succeeding months. 6. After the coming into force of the aforesaid Act an application was made to this Court to amend the grounds of appeal by adding a new ground in the memorandum of appeal. The ground sought to be added was: "Because by virtue of Section 39 read with Section 40 of U. P. Act, 13 of 1972, no decree for ejectment could be passed from the premises in suit." 7. The ground sought to be added was: "Because by virtue of Section 39 read with Section 40 of U. P. Act, 13 of 1972, no decree for ejectment could be passed from the premises in suit." 7. When the hearing of the appeal started, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the house in suit was one which was governed by the provisions of the previous Act, viz., The U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, and as such he was entitled to the benefit of all provisions of Sections 39 and 40 of the 1972 Act. Section 39 of the Act runs as follows: - "39. Pending suits for eviction relating to buildings brought under regulation for the first time. In any suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply, pending on the date of commencement or from the date of his knowledge of the pendency of the suit, whichever be later, deposits in the Court before which the suit is pending, the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlords full cost of the suit, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (1) or in clauses (b) to (h) of sub-section (2) of Sec. 29, and the parties shall be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary: Provided that a tenant the rent payable by whom does not exceed twenty-five rupees per month need not deposit any interest as aforesaid." Thereafter Section 40 of the Act provides as follows: "40. Pending appeals in suits for eviction relating to buildings brought under regulation for the first time. Pending appeals in suits for eviction relating to buildings brought under regulation for the first time. Where an appeal or revision arising out of a suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply is pending on the date of commencement of this Act, it shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 39, which shall mutatis mutandis apply." On the 5th July, 1972 when the 1972 Act came into force, admittedly no amount was due by the appellant and, consequently, there was no question of his making deposits as provided under Section 39 of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that only those tenants are protected by the provisions of Sections 39 and 40 of the new Act from whom some dues were payable to the landlord and where the tenant made the payments within one month of the coming into force of the 1972 Act. 8. It is true that Section 39 of the new Act does not contemplate cases of the same nature as the present one. However, in this case Section 40 has made Section 39 applicable to appeals with suitable modifications. In this case under the interim orders of this Court the entire decretal amount along with the rent up-to-date had been paid when the new Act came into force on 15th July, 1972. The requirement of making a deposit did not arise. It would be a strange construction of the statute that those tenants who had made deposits and from whom nothing remained due under the orders of the Court, were to be deprived of the benefit of the 1972 Act, while those tenants who had failed to make payments were to be given the benefit of the Act. In any case, while applying Section 39 to cases covered by Section 40, the Court is bound to construe Section 39 in a manner which is in consonance with the intention of the Legislature. The intention of the Legislature was to protect a certain class of tenants who were prepared to make good the loss of the landlords by payment of rent along with interest and costs of the suit. All this had been done by the appellant in this case. 9. The intention of the Legislature was to protect a certain class of tenants who were prepared to make good the loss of the landlords by payment of rent along with interest and costs of the suit. All this had been done by the appellant in this case. 9. I asked learned counsel for the parties whether there was any decision of this Court which was similar to the facts of the instant case. I was informed that there is none. I am satisfied that the defendant appellant is entitled to the protection of Section 40 of the new Act. 10. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the suit for eviction will stand dismissed view of the fact that the Appellant has succeeded in this appeal due to a change in the law, he shall pay the costs of the respondent.