JUDGMENT M. P. Mehrotra, J. This petition raised out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. The facts in brief, are these: The petitioner was issued notice under section 10(2, and he filed objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority, Thereafter an appeal was filed and the same was dismissed by the 1st Additional District & Sessions Judge, Gonda. A certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court has been annexed to the petition and marked as annexure 6. A true copy of the order of the Prescribed Authority has been annexed to the petition and marked as annexure 2. Now, the petitioner has come up in the instant petition and in support thereof L have heard Shri H. S. Sahai learned counsel for the petitioner. The controversy is about certain sale deeds which were ignored by the Prescribed Authority and also by the appellate court. Admittedly, "the sale deeds were executed after 24th January, 1971, and, therefore, the authorities below were bound, in view of the language of section 5(6), to ignore the said documents. However, if clause (b) of the proviso was held to be applicable then the documents could be accepted. It should be seen that the language used in clause (b) of the proviso to section 5(6) speaks of the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority. The Division Bench in Ram Agyan Singh's case (1969 A.LJ, 1060), laid down as under; "..................it is well settled that where it is the satisfaction of a statutory authority which affects the determination of a question it is not open to the court on a petition for oertiorari to interfere with that determination unless the satisfaction of the statutory authority can be shown to be perverse or vitiated by mala fide." This Division Bench pronouncement was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Murlidhar v. State of U. P. (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1924). It is, therefore, important that it is the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority which has been made the crux of the matter. It is true that such satisfaction cannot merely be subjective. It is, therefore, important that it is the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority which has been made the crux of the matter. It is true that such satisfaction cannot merely be subjective. Still, it has to be emphasised that in view of the aforesaid Division Benoh pronouncement, it is the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority which is important and which has been made a prerequisite before the benefit of clause (b) of the proviso can be extended to any transfer deed. The Division Bench clearly laid down that if certain results follow from the satisfaction of an authority then unless such satisfaction is shown to be perverse or mala fide, the court in its writ jurisdiction cannot interfere. Learned counsel however, contended that the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court were bound to go into the question of possession and if the vendees were found to be in possession then the benefit of clause (b) of the proviso to section 5(6) was bound to be extended to the petitioner. He placed reliance on two authorities which are as under: Mangali Singh v. Prescribed Authority.( 1977 (3) A.L.R. 352) It should be seen that in this pronouncement no question was involved in respect of a deed under section 5 (6). The learned Single Judge who decided the said controversy was concerned only with the controversy with reference to Explanations I and II of section 5(1) and in respect of a sale deed which had been executed before January 24, 1971. Therefore, this case obviously will not apply to the instant case. Ahmad Husain v. State (1978 (4) A.L.R. 357). So far as this case is concerned, the facts were different. There the entire holding had been transferred and the learned single Judge held that in view of the fact that the tenure holder had ceased to be so on the material date, therefore, section 5 (6) would not be applicable In the instant case, it is admittedly the position that the entire holding had not been sold by the petitioner. Therefore, undoubtedly the petitioner was a tenure holder on the material date and therefore, section 5(6) was applicable to him. Therefore, in my view, these two authorities do not support the contention which has been rnised on behalf of the petitioner. Therefore, undoubtedly the petitioner was a tenure holder on the material date and therefore, section 5(6) was applicable to him. Therefore, in my view, these two authorities do not support the contention which has been rnised on behalf of the petitioner. It should be seen that the background in which section 5(6) was enacted was that in view of the impleading changes in the ceiling law, transfers were being effected with a view to forestall the corning amendments and, therefore, the legislature wanted to undo this kind of exercise and gave a retrospective date as 24th January, 1971. It is obvious that the legislature thought that sale deeds which were executed after the said date were substantially executed with a view to circumvent the pending amendments in the ceiling law. In this view of the matter, the legislature laid down that it was for the tenureholder to satisfy the Prescribed Authority that the sale deed was in good faith which obviously meant that it was not with a view to circumvent the ceiling legislation. It is obvious that in such a situation even if possession has been given to the vendee, still, that will not mean that the transaction must be held to be in good faith. It is quite conceivable that with a view to escape the ceiling law the vendor would be willing to get the money and give up possession to the vendee. However, if the said exercise is in the nature of circumventing the ceiling law, in my opinion, the transaction will be hit by section 5(6) and will not be saved by the proviso. In my opinion, the mere fact that possession in a given case has passed, will not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the transaction is saved by the proviso. In the instant case, of course, I find that even on the question of possession the authorities did not believe the petitioner's version but that is rather secondary and, therefore, so far as this case is concerned, relying on the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench, I hold that no interference is called for. Learned counsel next contended that the choice of the petitioner has not been given full effect to which was bound to be given to under section 12A of the Act. Learned counsel next contended that the choice of the petitioner has not been given full effect to which was bound to be given to under section 12A of the Act. It seems that this contention is correct because in the grounds of appeal I find that in ground no. 6 certain plots have been mentioned which should have been considered when the question of choice was being dealt with by the appellate court. A true copy of the grounds of appeal filed before the appellate court has been annexed and marked as annexure no. 5 to the petition. The petition is partly allowed and the order of the appellate court is quashed to the extent and in the manner that it deals with the question of choice given by the petitioner. The said controversy is remanded to the appellate court with a direction that an effect shall be made to give effect to the choice, as far as possible, in accordance with section 12A given by the petitioner in para 6 of the memorandum of appeal, a true copy whereof is annexure no. 5. No other controversy shall be allowed to be raised before the said court. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.