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1978 DIGILAW 1267 (ALL)

Smt Chandra Wati Devi v. District Judge, Allahabad

1978-12-21

K.C.AGRAWAL

body1978
JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal J. - This writs petition arises from a judgment of the IX Additional District Judge, Allahabad dated August 30, 1976 dismissing the revision of the petitioner. 2. House No. 1197, Kalyani Devi, Allahabad belongs to Smt. Chandra wati Devi, the petitioner. It is a double storeyed building. On 30.9.75 R.P. Singh respondent No. 3 filed an application for its allotment the ground that he was living in the said portion as a licensee of the petitioner and that the same be allotted to him. After the receipt of the report of the Rent Control Inspector, vacancy was notified and a notice was also ordered to be issued to the petitioner. On 31st Oct., 1975 the ground floor was allotted to respondent no.3. Thereafter, on 15.11.1975, respondent no. 3 filed an application for fixation of rent. While the inquiry pending, the petitioner moved an application for setting aside the allotment order on 12.11.75 before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer stating that the allotment order had been surreptitiously obtained. On 22.11.1975, a complaint with the police was also lodged on 10.11.1976. the petitioner filed an appeal against the order of the allotment dated 31st. October, 1975, before the District Judge. The appeal was accompanied by an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act fort he condonation of delay. The petitioner claimed that as she learnt about the allotment order on 7.1.1976, the delay in filing the appeal was liable to be condoned. 3. Having found that the delay had been sufficiently explained, the District Judge condoned the same on 27.3.1976. Thereafter, the appeal was transferred to the IXth Additional District Judge, who dismissed the same on August 30, 1976. Against the said order the present writ petition was filed. 4. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner had filed an appeal before coming into force of the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 the same should have been decided as an appeal and not as a revision. The submission made has no merits. Sub-section (2) of Section 26 of the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 clearly lays down that appeals pending before the commencement of the aforesaid amending Act under Section 18, would be deemed to be revisions and shall be disposed of accordingly. The submission made has no merits. Sub-section (2) of Section 26 of the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 clearly lays down that appeals pending before the commencement of the aforesaid amending Act under Section 18, would be deemed to be revisions and shall be disposed of accordingly. The mandate of the afore said provision was that every appeal filed under Section 18 had to be treated a revision. There is no scope for any argument that the appeal of the petitioner had to be decided as such. The word used in sub-section (2) of Section 28 of the Act need no scope for argument which was made by the learned counsel. The submission, about the supposed intention of the Legislature made at the Bar, cannot be accepted. It is a first rule of interpretation that intention must be found from the words themselves. The Court should not speculate about the intention of the Legislation when the words are clear, specific and unambiguous. 5. The second submission made was that the petitioner had no notice of the proceedings of allotment and as such the allotment order made on 31st October, 1975 was invalid. 6. After detailed and careful discussion of the evidence, the learned Additional District Judge found that the petitioner had knowledge of the allotment proceedings and she deliberately kept herself behind. The finding of the appellate authority does not suffer from any error which could justify my interference in the present writ petition. It is one of fact. 7. The third submission was that as the delay in filing the appeal has been condoned, the Court should have found that the petitioner had no knowledge of the allotment proceedings. This submission also had no substance. The mere fact of condoning the delay could not be treated as a ground for holding that the allotment made in favour of respondent No. 3 was invalid. The two things were separate and distinct. At the time of the consideration of the application filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court was not called upon to consider the merits of the case. It had no occasion to do so. The order condoning the delay thus could not be pressed into service by the petitioner for arguing that he had no notice of the allotment proceedings. This question had to be decided independently of the condonation of delay. It had no occasion to do so. The order condoning the delay thus could not be pressed into service by the petitioner for arguing that he had no notice of the allotment proceedings. This question had to be decided independently of the condonation of delay. After having examined the same the Additional District Judge found that the allotment was not invalid on the ground suggested above. 8. The last submission was about sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The petitioner's learned counsel contended that the petitioner was residing in a portion of the allotment of the house without consulting her was invalid. The sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act reads as under : "(2) Where a part of a building is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes or is released in his favour under clause (b) of sub-section (1) Section 16 for residential purposes, the allotment of the remaining part there of under clause (a) of the said sub-section (1) shall be made in favour of a person nominated by the landlord. (Explanation-where a building in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes adjoins (whether horizontally of vertically) the building sought to be allotted, and (a) there is a common entrance to or a common passage for both, the buildings: or (b) The two buildings share the sanitary conveniences or other amenities (not including electric connection), then notwithstanding that the two buildings are independently fit for residential purposes, they shall be deemed to be part of each other for the purpose, of this sub- section)." 9. It would be found that sub-section (2) of the Act would apply only if a part of a building is in the occupation of the landlord the remaining portion of which is the subject matter of allotment. The Explanation added to sub-section (2) gives the criteria for deciding the question as to when is a building as a part of the remaining which is the subject matter of allotment. The Additional District Judge considered portion was an independent portion not falling within the scope of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act. It was made out that the portion in question had independent latrine, bath and had no connection with the upper floor which was in occupation of the petitioner. The Additional District Judge considered portion was an independent portion not falling within the scope of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act. It was made out that the portion in question had independent latrine, bath and had no connection with the upper floor which was in occupation of the petitioner. That being so, the Courts below rightly held that petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act. 10. For all the above reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order and to costs.