JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a tenant's writ petition against the judgment dated 20.1.1977 of the IV Additional District Judge, Pilibhit. Rais Uddin the father of the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 was the owner of the disputed house situated in Mohalla Bisalpur Mohalla Habib Khan South, Pilibhit. It was let out to the petitioner on 1.1.1963, on a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- for business purposes. Rais Uddin filed an application under section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 for obtaining permission to eject the petitioner. The application was resisted by the petitioner. On 30th July, 1969, the application was rejected. Against the said order, no revision was preferred. On 26th February, 1970, Rais Uddin executed a gift-deed of the house in favour of the respondents Nos. 3 and 4. At the time of the execution of the gift-deed, Rais Uddin had only two sons, namely, Fasiuddin and Raziauddin, respondents Nos. 3 and 4, who were aged about 16 or 17 years respectively. 2. On 20.2.1975 the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 filed an application under section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 for release of the house against the petitioner on the ground of their personal need. In paragraph 4, the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 alleged that they had no residential house of their own at Pilibhit and they stood in an urgent need of the house of their residential purposes. In paragraph 5 the said respondents had also claimed that the building was in a dilapidated condition. 3. The application was contested by the petitioner. He denied that the premises was needed by the respondents Nos. 3 and 4. The allegations were that after the application filed under section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 had been rejected, Rais Uddin executed the said gift-deed for the purposes of availing another ground to evict the petitioner. The petitioner also claimed that be had taken the premises for business purpose and was carrying on the business of Khandar etc. 4. On the evidence of the parties, the Prescribed Authority held that the need of the landlord was not bonafide. He found that the gift-deed executed in favour of the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 was not a bona fide transaction and that the respondents nos. 4. On the evidence of the parties, the Prescribed Authority held that the need of the landlord was not bonafide. He found that the gift-deed executed in favour of the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 was not a bona fide transaction and that the respondents nos. 3 and 4 could occupy another house of their father, which bad been vacated by his tenant. The Prescribed Authority also held that the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 did not require or need the premises. 5. The respondents Nos. 3 and 4 preferred an appeal. The appeal was allowed. Hence the writ. 6. The first question that needs consideration is about the bonafide requirement of the premises. The respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were the sons of Rais Uddin. It appears from paragraph 14 of the writ petition that the family of Rais Uddin consisted of himself, his wife, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and a daughter. It was also alleged that Rais Uddin was living on a big house and that the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were residing therein comfortably. The appellate authority allowed the application of the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 on the finding that as they wanted to reside separately, they were entitled to get the release made in their favour. In an application filed under section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, a landlord can not succeed unless he establishes his bonafide requirement. A mere wish or desire is not sufficient to justify a finding of bonafide requirement. It was, therefore, necessary for the appellate authority to have found whether the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 required the premises. The appellate authority was not right in accepting the need mentioned in the application as correct without objectively determining the same. It is a settled law that in an application under section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, the court is required to determine objectively about the need of the landlord. 7. Sri V.N. Khare appearing on behalf of the respondents pointed out that as the relations between the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and the petitioner were strained, the said respondents required the premises for living separately from their father. There is nothing in the application filed under section 21(l)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, which could support his contention. Sri V.N. Khare appearing on behalf of the respondents pointed out that as the relations between the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and the petitioner were strained, the said respondents required the premises for living separately from their father. There is nothing in the application filed under section 21(l)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, which could support his contention. Ever the appellate authority did not record any finding on the aforesaid aspect in favour of the landlords. 8. As already observed, the application was allowed merely on the finding that since the landlords wanted to occupy their own house, they were entitled to get it. 9. Another feature of the case worthy of being noticed is that one of the houses of the father of the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 had been vacated by his tenant. The Prescribed Authority found that if the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 wanted to live separately from their father, they could reside therein. In the writ petition also, allegation had been made stating that the said house was lying vacant. There is no effective denial to the aforesaid averment. The appellate authority also did not reverse the finding of the Prescribed Authority. Hence, the appellate authority was not justified in setting aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority and in holding that the need of the landlords was bonafide. 10. The question of comparative hardship also does not appear to have been correctly decided. The petitioner had claimed that he was doing Khandar business and that the premises was required by him for the same. The allegations made further were that in case he was evicted he was likely to suffer. It appears that the Prescribed Authority himself visited the house and did not find any material or the machine, which could show that the petitioner was engaged in Khandar business. It may be noted that Khandar is a seasonal business, which is seasonally done in this part of this country from December to May. Accordingly, the appellate authority was not justified in relying on the report and holding that the petitioner was not using the premises for the said business purpose. 11. For all these reasons, the writ petition, succeeds and is allowed. The appellate authority is directed to decide the appeal afresh and will also permit the parties to adduce evidence. There shall be no order as to costs.