JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the II Additional District Judge, Nainital dated 23rd of July, 1976 allowing the appeal of the respondent no. 3. The dispute in this case is with regard to a shop situate in Kashipur, district. Nainital An application under section 21(l)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 was Bled by the petitioner for release of the aforesaid shop against respondents nos. 3 and 4 on the ground of personal occupation. The petitioner alleged that the aforesaid shop belonged to a joint Hindu family but in a partition held in 1968, the shop was allotted to his share. After the allotment of the said shop, the petitioner became an exclusive owner. He contended that he was unemployed and required the shop for himself for commencing a business. He further asserted that the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were not carrying on business in the said shop and that remains locked most of the time in the year. 2. The application was contested by Ganga Nath, respondent No. 3. He admitted that the petitioner was the owner and landlord of the shop in-question, but denied that the petitioner required the shop for his personal use. He claimed that the petitioner did not need the shop and that the application had been filed with an ulterior motive to evict him. The respondent No. 3 also denied that the shop was mostly kept locked. 3. Before the Prescribed Authority, the parties filed affidavit and adduced evidence. The Prescribed Authority held that the need of the petitioner was bonafide and allowed the application. 4. In appeal taken by the respondent No. 3. the finding of the Prescribed Authority was set aside. The appellate authority found that as the petitioner failed to establish his requirement, the premises could not be released in his favour. Aggrieved, the petitioner landlord filed the present writ petition. 5. One of the findings on which the appeal had been allowed was that as the petitioner had failed to establish his need of the premises in dispute, the application filed by the petitioner could not be allowed. The appellate authority held that it must be backed by extreme want or destitution. This approach of the appellate authority had vitiated the judgment. The appellate authority held that it must be backed by extreme want or destitution. This approach of the appellate authority had vitiated the judgment. In an application filed under section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 a landlord is required to establish two things (1) that he bonafide requires the building for occupation by himself or any member of his family. A landlord is thus required to establish the need for which he wants to occupy the premises. The burden to prove the same lies on him. It is, however, not necessary that he must stand in absolute need of the property. The requirement of law is that the need of a landlord must be honest and in good faith. It is not correct that a landlord cannot succeed unless he is found in an extreme need. The view of the appellate authority, therefore, that unless a landlord had established an extreme need and was found to be a destitute, he could not succeed in an application filed under section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is patently erroneous and cannot be accepted. The statute does not say that it must be an absolute need in the sense that the landlord should not have any accommodation and be must be in the streets before he can have own building. 6. It is no doubt true that the use of word 'required' in clause (a) of sub- section (1) of section 21 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 shows that it must not be a mere wish or desire of the landlord. It must involve an element of need and mere whim and fancy would not show that he requires it. 7. The second aspect of the matter, which is required to be emphasized, is that the appellate authority wrongly held that the petitioner had two other shops and that as he was carrying a business in these two shops, he did not require the disputed one for occupation by himself. I have been taken through the entire evidence, which had been produced before the Prescribed Authority. I did not find any evidence to show that the petitioner was doing business in any shop and the shop in dispute was required by him in addition to that shop. I have been taken through the entire evidence, which had been produced before the Prescribed Authority. I did not find any evidence to show that the petitioner was doing business in any shop and the shop in dispute was required by him in addition to that shop. The truth of the matter appears to be that the case of the respondent No. 3 was that the petitioner was a rich man and that he owned a number of premises. He had further alleged that as the father of the petitioner was doing the same business as respondent No. 3, the petitioner had filed the application against the respondent No. 3 with the malicious intention to evict him. It is not correct to say that the case of the respondent No. 3 was that the petitioner was doing business in two other shops since before. In this view of the matter, the judgment of the appellate authority, that as the petitioner was already doing business he did not require the disputed shop, being based on no evidence, is perverse. 8. Another finding given by the appellate authority was that as the petitioner was engaged in a business along with his father, he did not require the premises for himself. In this connection, the appellate authority observed that as the father of the petitioner was an old man, he required the assistance of the petitioner and that without his assistance, the business could not be transacted in the premises, which was in occupation of the petitioner's father. In coming to this finding also the appellate authority grossly erred. The affidavit of the father of the petitioner, filed in the court below, show that he was about 48 years old. To the same effect averment had been made in paragraph 22 of the writ petition, to which no reply had been given. Accordingly, it was established that the father of the petitioner was only 48 years of age at the time when the application had been granted. A person of 48 years or age cannot be considered to be an old man. As such, the view of the appellate authority that the father of the petitioner was an old man, the need of the petitioner could not be considered to be bonafide is apparently erroneous. 9. A person of 48 years or age cannot be considered to be an old man. As such, the view of the appellate authority that the father of the petitioner was an old man, the need of the petitioner could not be considered to be bonafide is apparently erroneous. 9. The last point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that an affidavit of the petitioner had been wrongly discarded and that the appellate authority should have taken the same into account. Admittedly, the petitioner had filed two affidavits of his own. The appellate authority refused to look at them on the finding that they were in-admissible. The ground on which the affidavit is said to be in-admissible was that it had not been properly verified. The defect in the verification pointed out was that all the paragraphs of the affidavit had been sworn both on personal knowledge and on belief. It may be true that the requirement of law is that swearing should have mentioned which were true to personal knowledge and those which were true to his belief. It cannot be denied that the affidavits filed by the petitioner were defective. The defect was not of a nature, which should have compelled the appellate authority to discard the same and even if the appellate authority thought that the affidavits were in-admissible the proper thing for him was to give him an opportunity to rectify the defects, particularly when those defects had not been pointed out from the side of the respondent No. 3 before the prescribed Authority. In this view of the matter, the finding that the father was and old man was patently erroneous. 10. Moreover, during the pendency of the present writ petition U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, was amended and by that amendment by U. P. Act 18 of 1976, a proviso was added. The said proviso requires that the likely hardship to be caused from the acceptance of the application should be compared as against the likely hardship which may be caused by its refusal. This amendment was retrospective. Accordingly, this also necessitates the quashing of the order of the appellate authority. 11. In the circumstances, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the appellate authority is quashed and he is directed to decide the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made in this judgment.