Judgment Anil Kumar Sen, J. This Rule was issued on an application made under S. 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The wife is the petitioner and she claims that this court should lodge a complaint as against her husband for having committed an offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-s. 1 of S. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It will be necessary to refer to the facts in brief. 2. A matrimonial suit was instituted by the wife as against the husband. In that suit, she filed an application under S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 claiming maintenance pendente lite and litigation costs. This application was contested by the husband who pleaded unchastity on the part of the wife disentitling her to claim any maintenance. Husband claimed that the wife had been in love with a young man named Mrinal Dey and was promise-bound to marry him after passing the Matriculation examination and that they were subsequently married and lived as husband and wife disowning the marriage with him altogether. The husband also contested the amount claimed by way of maintenance and litigation costs. 3. That application was heard on evidence and in disposing the same the learned judge in the trial court overruled the claim of the husband that the wife was not entitled to have any maintenance on the ground of unchastity. Learned judge found that the appellant was getting a sum of Rs.280/- per month as a teacher and he, therefore, allowed maintenance pendente Lite with effect from March 1973, at the rate of Rs.65/- per month and further directed payment of Rs.60/- to her as litigation cost. 4. The husband preferred an appeal to this court and in the appeal he filed an application for stay of operation of the order on which a Rule was issued. The Rule and the appeal have both been disposed of and the order as passed by the learned judge in the trial court has been substantially affirmed save and except a slight variation. 5. After the disposal of the Rule and the appeal, the wife presented the present application, inter alia, pleading that the husband in his evidence before the court below had falsely stated that he was getting a sum of Rs.167/- as pay and Rs.90/- as dearness allowance in all. 5. After the disposal of the Rule and the appeal, the wife presented the present application, inter alia, pleading that the husband in his evidence before the court below had falsely stated that he was getting a sum of Rs.167/- as pay and Rs.90/- as dearness allowance in all. It was further claimed that the husband made a similar false statement in his affidavit in support of the application for stay filed in this court in the appeal. With reference to certain circular's issued by the State Government regarding fixation of pay and allowances of teachers it was sought to be pointed out by the wife that her husband's total income' as teacher would be above Rs.400/- and in any event would be no less than Rs.390/- since in an attachment a sum of Rs.260/- was sent representing 2/3rd of his pay and allowance. It was, therefore, claimed that the husband in his deposition before the court below and in his affidavit before this court had clearly adduced false evidence in respect of the quantum of pay he derived as teacher. This was the first falsehood alleged as against the husband. 6. The second falsehood ascribed to the husband by the wife was his allegation regarding unchastity and being in love with and subsequently being married to the said Mrinal Dey. It is claimed that suchan allegation is false and has been deliberately made by the husband knowing it to be false. In view of such false evidence led by the husband both before the trial court and in his affidavit in this court, the wife claims that a complaint should be lodged as against the husband for having given false evidence punishable under S. 191 read with S. 193 or 199 of the Indian Penal Code. The Rule is being contested by the husband. 7. It is no doubt true that the husband did assert both in his deposition before the court below and in his affidavit before this court that he was drawing a monthly salary of Rs.280/- and such was also the finding which, was arrived at by the learned trial judge. This claim on the part of the husband is said to be so false that the wife/petitioner asks us to prosecute the husband in the interest of justice for having led false evidence before the court. This claim on the part of the husband is said to be so false that the wife/petitioner asks us to prosecute the husband in the interest of justice for having led false evidence before the court. It is true that the wife refers to certain circulars. Such circulars by themselves would not establish the fact that the husband was drawing by way of salary anything more than Rs.280/-. The realisation by attachment also does not establish clearly what exactly is the salary of the husband. So far as the other allegation of unchastity is concerned, it is true that such a defence taken both before the trial court and in this court failed when both the courts came to the conclusion that the husband had not been able to prove this part of his case at this stage. We have looked into the judgment and order of this court disposing of the appeal and therein we do not find any positive finding that such a defence was so grossly false that such a defence could not have been taken at all. Such a defence was taken on the basis of certain letters which the court ultimately refused to accept or believe and for deciding the interim application came to the conclusion that the husband had failed to substantiate that defence of his. The suit is yet to be disposed of. In such circumstances, it is necessary for us to consider whether we should concede the claim of the wife that the husband should be prosecuted for causing false evidence to be led in his deposition before the court below and in his affidavit in this court. 8. It should be noted that on both the points on which the husband is said to have indulged in falsehood they were really part of his defence, to the application. On the first point for reasons given hereinbefore, it cannot be said beyond doubt that this part of his defence or the evidence in support thereof is false. So far as the other point is concerned it would appear that such a defence was taken by the husband in view of certain letters which the court at this stage have considered to be unacceptable. There is no finding, however, that those letters were, falsely fabricated. So far as the other point is concerned it would appear that such a defence was taken by the husband in view of certain letters which the court at this stage have considered to be unacceptable. There is no finding, however, that those letters were, falsely fabricated. If the husband honestly believing the case of unchastity on the basis of such letters, had taken such a defence and led evidence to that effect it cannot be said that he is guilty of any gross misconduct of intentionally indulging in perjury. Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes it clear that the court is not to lodge a complaint in respect of any or every statement made in evidence. Such a complaint should be lodged only when the court is of the opinion that lodging of such a complaint is expedient in the interest of justice. It was pointed out by this court in the case of Rash Behari v. Emperor (AIR 1930 Cal 639) that the court must be very cautious in its approach in prosecuting a person for making any statement claimed to be false in regard to a pleading so that party's right to plead freely is not curtailed and he can take appropriate pleading throwing the burden on the opponent to prove the case to the contrary. It will be pertinent here to refer to the following observations, made by Holroyd, J. "Although you may believe that on one or other occasion she swore that which was not true, it is not a necessary consequence that she committed perjury; for there are cases in which a person might very honestly and conscientiously swear to a particular fact from the best of his recollection and belief and from other circumstances at a subsequent time be convinced that he was wrong and swear to the reverse without meaning to swear falsely either time." (Lewin's Crown Cases p. 270) Such being the standard of approch for us, we cannot lodge a complaint for prosecuting the husband for having led evidence in support of the defence taken by him one of which was accepted by both the courts and other was rejected. In our considered opinion, on the facts and circumstances we do not feel that it would be expedient on our part in the interest of justice to prosecute the husband and that being the primary requirement of the provision as pointed out by this court in Keramat Ali v. Emperor (ILR 55 Cal 1312) we reject the prayer made in the present application. The application therefore fails. The Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. B.C. Ray, J :- I agree. Rule discharged.