Judgment Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. 1. The main point which arises in this case is, whether the "appropriate Government" within the meaning of the Industrial employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the Standing orders Act) in relation to the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Barauni, is the State of Bihar or the Union of India. " The writ application has been filed by one Shri N. K. Sharma claiming to be the President of the Employees union representing the workmen of the Corporations Pipelines Division, and is directed against certain orders passed under the Standing Orders Act. 2. The management of the Indian Oil Corporation, on 15.5.1971, submitted before the Regional Labour Commissioner, under section 3 of the standing Orders Act, copies of the draft Standing Orders for certification. There was a dispute going on in the Union and, according to the caseof the petitioner. Shri Sharma informed the respondent No.3 that Shri T. N. Pande who was the Secretary of the Union had ceased to continue to be so and Sri sharma should be permitted to participate in the proceeding of certification on behalf of the workmen. A dispute under the Trade Union Act was at that time pending before the Registrar. Trade Union in which Sri T. N. Pandey was claiming to be the General Secretary of the Union. Following a decision, of the Labour Commissioner, Government of Bihar, the respondent No.3 did not recognise Shri Sharma as the Unions representative. None the less he was allowed to take part in the proceeding. On 19.9.1973. Sbri Sharma, instead of putting his point of view, prayed for an adjournment which was refused. The matter was heard on 19th and 20th September, 1973 and by order dated 31st October, 1973, as continued in Annexure 2, the respondent No.3 certified the Standing Orders. According to the petitioners case, he was not informed of this order, and he learnt about it in 1975, when a notice of the appeal filed by the management under section 6 of the Act was served on him. On his request, a copy of the order (Annexure 2) was given to him and he once more unsuccessfully prayed for adjournment before the appellate authority, Chief labour Commissioner, Central New Delhi, the present respondent No.2. On his request, a copy of the order (Annexure 2) was given to him and he once more unsuccessfully prayed for adjournment before the appellate authority, Chief labour Commissioner, Central New Delhi, the present respondent No.2. Sri T. N. Pandey, Union Secretary, was contesting the case on behalf of the workmen all through and after hearing the parties, the respondent No.2 disposed of the appeal by his order as mentioned in annexure 4. The petitioner has prayed for quashing both the orders in Annexures 2 and 4 and has further challenged the Standing Order No.20 which has been attached to the writ application as Annexure 5. 3. Mr. Gupta, appearing for the petitioner, has pressed the following points :- (a) The orders contained in Annexures 2 and 4 are wholly without jurisdiction since Central Regional Labour Commissioner could not be the certifying officer in the present case ; and (b) The 20th clause of the Standing Orders (Annexure 5) is, in any event, illegal. The learned counsel also faintly mentioned that there had been violation of principles of natural justice as Shri Sharma was not given proper opportunity to place his point of view, but later the point was not pressed. 4 Shri N. K. Sharma was not recognised as the Union representative but still he was permitted to take part in the proceeding. Instead of co-operating in the matter he prayed for time which was rejected at both the stages. The recognised Union Secretary Sri T. N. Pandey contested the case on behalf of the workmen and the decision was thereafter given on merits. In these circumstances, I do not think that the petitioner can be permitted to challenge the 20th clause of the Standing Orders as contained in Annexure 5 nor can he legitimately demand for re-hearing of the proceeding. I, therefore, reject the second point raised on behalf of the petitioner. So far as the question regarding the jurisdiction of the respondents No 2 and 3 is concerned, the position is different. If the objection taken by the petitioner in this regard is upheld, it would lead to the inference that the orders passed in the case certifying the standing Orders are completely without jurisdiction and void. It has, therefore, been conceded by the learned counsel for the respondents that this question should be decided on merits. 5. If the objection taken by the petitioner in this regard is upheld, it would lead to the inference that the orders passed in the case certifying the standing Orders are completely without jurisdiction and void. It has, therefore, been conceded by the learned counsel for the respondents that this question should be decided on merits. 5. The answer to the first question depends on the interpretation of the expression" appropriate Government" defined in section 2 (b) of the Standing orders Act. section 2 (c) says that the "certifying Officer" means the regional Labour Commissioner (etc.) appointed by an appropriate Government and the section 2 (b) defines the expression in the following terms (excluding words which are not relevant in the present context):- "appropriate Government means in respect of industrial establishment under the control of the Central Government. . . . . . . . . . . . the Central government, and in all other case, the State Government. " it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that in the case of Indian Oil corporation, the appropriate Government is the State of Bihar, and the central Regional Labour Commissioner (respondent No.3) therefore is not the certifying Officer. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Bijay Cotton Mills ltd. V/s. Its Workmen and others, ( AIR 1960 SC 692 ). Heavy Engineering Mazdoor union V/s. The State of Bihar, ( AIR 1970 SC 82 ) and M/s. Hindustan Aeronautics ltd. V/s. The Workmen and others, AIR 1976 SC 1737 ). 6 The decisions referred to by Mr. Gupta and mentioned above arose under the Industrial Disputes Act. In that Act also, the expression "appropriate government" has been used, but section 2 (a), which is quoted below (omitting the words which are not relevant in the present context) will show that the expression has been differently defined : " (a) "appropriate Government" means- (i) in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. . . . . . . . . the Central government, and (ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute the State Government. . . . . . . . . the Central government, and (ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute the State Government. " the main difference in the definition of the term given in the two Acts is that while in the Industrial Disputes Act, the words "carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government" have been used with reference to the industry in question, in the Standing Orders Act, the relevant part of the section refers to the "industrial establishment under the control of the Central Government". Mr. Gupta urged that, in substance, there is no difference in the two difinitions and the decisions cited by him must be applied. 7. Mr. S. B. Sanyal appearing for the management, contended that the difference in the language used in the two Acts cannot be ignored and the decisions under the Industrial Disputes Act are of no help. He relied on the decision of this Court in Sindri Workers Union V. Commissioner of Labour, (AIR 1959 Patna 36), in interpreting the expression "appropriate Government" within the meaning of the Standing Orders Act. He further emphasised the desirability of an authoritative decision on this question so that both sides, that is, the management and the workmen may not be left in doubt about the jurisdiction of the authority in this regard, a doubt which is naturally a source of waste of time and money, and harassment of all concerned. 8. The Standing Orders Act was passed in 1946 and within a year thereof the enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 took place and it is not reasonable to assume that the legislature defined the expression "appropriate government" differently by i nadvertance. The difference in the language of the two definitions should not be ignored. While defining the expression in the Industrial Disputes Act, it must be assumed that the legislature was not trying to give precisely the same meaning as has been given to it under the standing Orders Act. The plain grammatical meaning the words "carried on or by under the authority of the Central Government" cannot be equated with that of the expression "industrial establishment under the control of the Central government". Under the Industrial Disputes Act a closer relationship between the industry and the Government concerned is envisaged. The plain grammatical meaning the words "carried on or by under the authority of the Central Government" cannot be equated with that of the expression "industrial establishment under the control of the Central government". Under the Industrial Disputes Act a closer relationship between the industry and the Government concerned is envisaged. The industry itself has to be carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. An industry cannot be deemed to be carried on by the the Government unless it is so carried on directly by a department of the Government, and an illustration of the same is the Posts and Telegraphs Department as mentioned in heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union V/s. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1970 SC 82 .)Similarly an industry which can be said to be carried on under the authority of the Government must be one which is managed through the instrumentality of an agent. For those reasons the Supreme Court in AIR 1970 SC 82 , held that the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. , a company incorporated under the Companies Act could not be characterised as an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. This decision was followed in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. V/s. The Workmen and others, ( AIR 1975 SC 1737 .)In the decision of Bijoy Cotton Mills Ltd V/s. Its Workmen, ( AIR 1960 SC 692 )relied upon by the petitioner, it was argued on behalf of the appellant that since the textile industry was controlled by the provisions of the Industrial (Development and Regulation) Act, 195l. it should be considered to be an, industry carried on under the authority of the Central Government. The argument was rejected and it was hold that although the Textile Industry could be considered to be a controlled industry in one sense, but that did not attract the application of section 2 (a) (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. For the application of section 2 (b) of the Standing Orders Act, what is essential is merely the control of the Central Government which can be an indirect but effective control. The matter has, however, to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case but on account of the vital difference in the definitions under the two Acts. I am of the view that the decision given under the industrial Disputes Act are not at all applicable. 9. The matter has, however, to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case but on account of the vital difference in the definitions under the two Acts. I am of the view that the decision given under the industrial Disputes Act are not at all applicable. 9. This question is whether in present case the Indian Oil Corporation "ltd. can be said to be under the control of the Central Government. The point does not appear to have been canvassed before the respondents 2 and 3. In paragraph 10 of the writ application, it has been mentioned that the "appropriate government" under the Act is the Government of Bihar and not the central Government, as the management and the control of the Corporation is in the hands of the Board of Directors headed by a Chairman who is assisted by the Managing Director. In the counter-affidavit of the respondent No.4, indian Oil Corporation Ltd. it has been asserted that the establishment is under the control of the Central Government. In paragraphs 10, 11 12 and 13 of the counter-affidavit reference has been made to the Articles of Association of the Company and their relevant matters in support of the plea. Article 94 (a) of the Articles of Association says that it is the President of India who has to appoint the Directors, Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors and the power to remove them is also with the President. Article 95 (a) further deals with the Presidents power in this regard. Under Article 141 (a), the appointment of Auditor or Auditors has to be made by the Central government on the advise of the Controller and Auditor-General of India. The comptroller and Auditor-General of India have the power to direct the manner in which the company accounts have to be audited and they have further power to conduct a supplementary or test audit of the company account. Finally, the article 144 which reads as follows clearly indicates that the company is under the control of the Central Government. "144. Notwithstanding anything contained in any of these Articles the president may, from time to time, issue such directives or instructions as may be considered necessary in regard to the finance, conduct of business and affairs of the company. The Company shall give immediate effect to the directives or instructions so issued. " 10. "144. Notwithstanding anything contained in any of these Articles the president may, from time to time, issue such directives or instructions as may be considered necessary in regard to the finance, conduct of business and affairs of the company. The Company shall give immediate effect to the directives or instructions so issued. " 10. I, therefore, do not have any doubt that the Indian Oil Corporation ltd. is under the control of the Central Government within the meaning of section 2 (b) of the Standing Orders Act and the respondents no.2 and 3 had full jurisdiction to pass the impugned orders. The argument of the petitioner on this question is also, therefore, rejected. In the result the writ application falls and is dismissed but without costs. Application dismissed.