JUDGMENT C. R. Thakur, J.—This writ petition under Articles 22/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Simla passed in Case No. 250/3 entitled Shrimati Shakuntala Kochhar v. Municipal Corporation, Simla, as contained in Annexure PA, and also for issue of a direction to the Deputy Commissioner, Simla to assess the gross rental value of the premises at Rs. 4,281/-. 2. The facts for the filing of the petition are that Smt. Shakuntala Kochhar is the owner of the main building and an annexe known as the Cential Hotel, Simla. In fact, the property known as Central Hotel, Simla was owned by one Khan Bahadur Mehdi Ali Khan. It consists of the main building, an annexe, additional houses, stables and servants quarters. On the migration of Shri Khan Bahadur Mehdhi Ali Khan to Pakistan the property became evacuee property and subsequently it was allotted to Shri M. L. Kochhar the husband of the petitioner by the Custodian, Evacuee Property. Shri M. L. Kochhar was required to pay a rental of Rs. 416-11 annas per month for the entire property to the Custodian. In 1955 the property was sold by public auction by the Regional Settlement Commissioner, Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India in four lots. The additional houses comprised in the property were purchased by one Shri J. K. Bakshi, and the stables and the servants quarters were purchased by Shri Dina Nath. The remaining property consisting of the main building and the annexe was purchased by Shri Kala Ram Khanna as benamidar of the petitioner. 3. After the purchase of the building by the petitioner, the rent payable by Shri M. L. Kochhar was assessed at Rs. 386.83 per month by the District Rent and Managing Officer, Ambala which was conveyed to Shri Kala Ram Khanna. In 1963 Shri Kala Ram Kbanna relinquished his rights as benamidar in respect of the property in favour of the petitioner. 4 On 12th March, 1964 the property purchased by the petitioner was assessed by the Municipal Committee to house, water and sanitation taxes at Rs. 7,425/-from the date of its purchase in the year 1962. For the year 1963 the Municipal Committee assessed the property at Rs. 4 On 12th March, 1964 the property purchased by the petitioner was assessed by the Municipal Committee to house, water and sanitation taxes at Rs. 7,425/-from the date of its purchase in the year 1962. For the year 1963 the Municipal Committee assessed the property at Rs. 21,525/-on the assumption that the amount representing the income derived by Shri M. L. Kochhar the husband of the petitioner was the income of the petitioner. Against this order of assessment made by the Committee, the petitioner went in appeal to the Deputy Commissioner, Simla who remanded the case to the Municipal Committee for fresh assessment But the Committee maintained the assessment. Thereafter another appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Deputy Commissioner which was again accepted and the case was remanded. But the assessment already made by the Committee was still maintained at the very old assessment. The appellant again filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner. It was contended before the Deputy Commissioner by the respondent that Shri M. L. Kochhar had originally been allotted the entire property in 1948 for a sum of Rs. 5,000/- pet annum and that after the sale he remained in possession of the main building and the annexe only, and therefore the District Rent and Managing Officer, Ambala reduced the rent to Rs. 3:> .83 per month. The petitioners contention was that the rent amounting to Rs. 4281 96 per annum was being paid by Shri M. L. Kochhar to her in respect of the leased premises. A contention was raised before the Deputy Commissioner by the respondent to the effect that the lease between the petitioner and Shri Kala Ram Khanna was one between husband and wife and it was only a camouflage and that actually the rental paid by the various lodgers to Shri M. L. Kochhar represented the income from the property. On this, the Deputy Commissioner referred the following question for the decision of this Court under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 84 of the Punjab Municipal Act (.hereinafter called the Act) .— "Whether the relationship of the appellant and Shri M. L. Kochhar should be treated as that of lessor and lessee." The High Court held that the appellant, that is the present petitioner, was the lessor and Shii Kochhar her lessee on a monthly basis. 5. 5. When the case came up before the Deputy Commissioner after the order made by the High Court on the reference made by him, according to the petitioner he ignored the decision of the High Court and again confirmed the assessment of Rs. 26,558/- holding that the rent realised by the husband of the petitioner was Rs. 21,-25/-and that was the reasonable rental value and consequently he dismissed the appeal on December 30, 1975 vide his order Annexure PA appended to the petition. 6. The petitioner challenged this order Annexure PA on the grounds that the Deputy Commissioner ignored the decision of the High Court which he was bound to accept. It had been held by the High Court that Shri Kochbar was a tenant o the petitioner, that the petitioner was entitled to the rent which had been fixed by the District Rent and Managing Officer, and that the Deputy Commissioner did not consider the rental value in terms of the Restriction Act. She also assailed the order of the Deputy Commissioner on other grounds too, and prayed for the reliefs already set out in the earlier part of this judgment. 7. The respondents in their return raised some preliminary objections. One of the objections was that the petition was not maintainable under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1968 and that this Court had no jurisdiction to assess the tax amount. Further, it was contended that the petitioner had not paid the arrears of the taxes for the last about thirteen years and as such the petition could not be entertained. 8. On merits, the respondents contended that the petitioner had failed to prove as to whether the District Rent and Manging Officer fixed this figure under the provisions of any rent enactment or simply as a Managing Officer. Further it was contended that the purchase of the premises by Kala Ram Khanna on behalf of the petitioner put an end to the previous arrangement and the relationship of the new lessor with the lessee created a fresh lease. Although the High Court found that the relationship of landlord and tenant exits between the petitioner and Shri M. L. Kochhar, but the High Court was not concerned with the reasonableness of the rent amount. It is the Municipal Corporation which is concerned with the reasonable letting value as required under the Municipal Act. Although the High Court found that the relationship of landlord and tenant exits between the petitioner and Shri M. L. Kochhar, but the High Court was not concerned with the reasonableness of the rent amount. It is the Municipal Corporation which is concerned with the reasonable letting value as required under the Municipal Act. It was averred that in the present case, the relationship of lessor and lessee is so close that a false figure of rent is being shown by the owner. The same cannot be taken as reasonable when on spot inspection the statutory Authority has arrived at a different figure on the basis of its legal prob through its inspection agencies. According to the respondents, this rent figure is based on fraud because of relationship. 9. So, on the basis of these pleadings, the point that arises for consideration is as to what should be the basis for the determination of the same. 10. Before I deal with the merits of the case, it would be better to dispose of the preliminary objection taken by the respondents with regard to the maintainability of this petition. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, this Court has got no jurisdiction in view of the provisions of section 6 of the Act. This section says, "no objection shall be taken to any valuation or assessment, nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned, in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act". On the basis of this, he contends that the civil court has got no jurisdiction to challenge the assessment, but the learned counsel for the respondents is quite oblivious of the fact that it is not a civil suit but it is the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 2 6 of the Constitution. This provision does not exclude cases where the statutory provision has not been complied with. In the present case, the petitioner challenges the assessment on the ground that it is not done in accordance with the statutory provisions, and, therefore, it cannot be said that this assessment cannot be questioned by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. In the present case, the petitioner challenges the assessment on the ground that it is not done in accordance with the statutory provisions, and, therefore, it cannot be said that this assessment cannot be questioned by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. Further the learned counsel has referred me to section 85 (2) of the Act which says that "no appeal shall be entertained unless the appellant has paid all other municipal taxes due from him to the committee upto the date of such appeal". This argument is also misconceived inasmuch as it speaks of an appeal. The attack in this petition is made on the ground that the assessment is illegal and is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Therefore, this submission also has got no force. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on a reference made by the Deputy Commissioner under section 84 (2) of the Act to the High Court, two points have been settled in the reference order : firstly, the lease in favour of Shri M. L. Kochhar is a genuine lease, and secondly, the petitioner was getting only Rs. 356.83 as the monthly rent from her husband Shri Kochhar. Though Shri Kochhar was running a business in the premises but the petitioner did not derive any benefit out of that. The income of the husband cannot be treated as the income of the petitioner out of the business by her husband and therefore that cannot be made the basis for assessment. I have seen the order passed in the reference case, and it shows that this point has been decided that there is a relationship between the petitioner and her husband Shri M. L. Kochhar, and be is paying rent to the petitioner and that the business is run by the husband in the demised premises on a monthly rental of Rs. 356.83. la view of the fact that this point stands already adjudicated by this Court on a reference, the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the lease was fraudulent or based on extraneous considerations because of the close relationship of husband and wife, cannot be entertained. la view of the fact that this is already decided by this Court, the authorities cited by the learned counsel need not be referred. la view of the fact that this is already decided by this Court, the authorities cited by the learned counsel need not be referred. These authorities had been cited to show that where there is a relationship between the parties to a lease then that lease must be presumed to be fraudulent and based on extraneous considerations. However, the further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner does not appear to be correct that it had also been decided on this reference by the High Court that the true and reasonable rent was the one that was being paid by Shri M. L. Kochhar to the petitioner. It only decided that question of relationship of lessor and lessee between the present petitioner and her husband. The Court was concerned only with this point and not about the quantum of rent. It. however, decided that Shri M. L. Kochhar had been paying monthly rent of so much to the petitioner. And it has not been decided whether the rental is reasonable, or what should be the basis of assessment of valuation for purposes of municipal taxes. 13. The learned counsel has urged that the annual value for purposes of taxation as defined under section 3(1) (b) must, be, in the case of any house or building, the gross annual rent at which such house or building that may be let for use or enjoyment therewith, may reasonably be expected to let from year to year, subject to the following deductions.... Therefore, according to him the assessment made by the Committee and upheld by the Deputy Commissioner which is on the higher side cannot be said to be the gross annual rent that may reasonably be expected to let from year to year. The rental value, according to the learned counsel, should not exceed the standard rent as determined or which may be determined under the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act, and in support of his argument he has placed reliance on The Corporation of Calcutta—Appellant v. Sm. Padma Debi and others—Respondents, AIR 1962 SC 151 wherein it has been held that under section 127 (a), Calcutta Municipal Act, the value of the property to the owner is the standard in making the assessment thereunder. Though the word reasonably in section 127 (a) is not capable of precise definition, it signifies "in accordance with reason. Padma Debi and others—Respondents, AIR 1962 SC 151 wherein it has been held that under section 127 (a), Calcutta Municipal Act, the value of the property to the owner is the standard in making the assessment thereunder. Though the word reasonably in section 127 (a) is not capable of precise definition, it signifies "in accordance with reason. In the animate analysis it is a question of fact. Whether a particular act is reasonable or not depends on the circumstances in a given situation. It is true that section 127 (a) does not contemplate the actual rent received by a landlord but a hypothetical rent which he can reasonably be expected to receive if the building is let But hypothetical rent may be described as a rent which a landlord may reasonably be expected to get in the open market. In that situation, a statutory limitation of rent circumscribes the scope of the bargain in the market. In no circumstances the hypothetical rent can exceed that limit. It has also been observed by their Lordships in para 5 that the criterion, therefore, is the rent realisable by the landlord and not the value of the holding in the hands of the tenant. The relevant section which gives the power to impose taxes is section 61 of the Act and procedure for the same is provided under section 63 onwards of the Act. Section 61 (1) (a) mentions the various taxes that may be imposed by the municipality at the rates given therein. The definition as given under section 3 (1) (b) as already mentioned above is that in the case of house or building the gross annual rent is the annual value that may reasonably be expected to be received from leasing out the property from year to year. In the instant case, the word "reasonably" has not been defined. Therefore, keeping in view the dicta of the Supreme Court the criterion is the rent realisable by the landlord and not the value of the holding in the hands of the tenant. The petitioner, as already stated, is not deriving any benefit from the business run by her husband from the premises. What she gets is the rent at Rs. 35683 per month and this rent was fixed by the District Rent and Managing Officer, Ambala. The petitioner, as already stated, is not deriving any benefit from the business run by her husband from the premises. What she gets is the rent at Rs. 35683 per month and this rent was fixed by the District Rent and Managing Officer, Ambala. It is an admitted case of the parties that the standard rent has not been fixed under the Rent Restriction Act and there is no other proof as to what is the standard rent. The rent fixed by the District Rent and Managing Officer, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, cannot represent the standard rent or the gross rental value of the premises. The correct gross rental valuation is the one that has rightly been made by the Committee and affirmed in appeal by the Deputy Commissioner. According to the learned counsel the Rent Restriction Act for assessment of the value of the property for purposes of taxation is not applicable. In a similar case, the Himachal Bench of the Delhi High Court at Simla decided in Vidya Parkash, Petitioner v. Municipal Committee, Simla and another. Respondent, reported at page 283 of the Delhi Law Times 1969, that Rent Restriction Act is not applicable. But no standard rent under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Rules or under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act was fixed. However, there was an agreed rent and the Court held that the contractual rent to be charged is the fair rent and it is thereafter that the standard rent which has been fixed in accordance with the Rent Restriction Act will be the rental value and which would be binding but until that time it is the agreed or the contractual rent which should be the rental value. In Guntur Municipal Council, Appellant v. Guntur Town Rate Payers, Association, Respondents, AIR 1971 SC 353 it was held that section 82 (2) of the Madras District Municipalities Act makes provision for the fixation of annual value of lands and buildings. The test essentially is what rent the premises can lawfully fetch if let out to hypothetical tenant. The municipality is thus not free to assess any arbitrary annual value and has to look to and is bound by the fair or standaid rent which would be payable for a particular premises under the Rent Control Act in force during the assessment year. The municipality is thus not free to assess any arbitrary annual value and has to look to and is bound by the fair or standaid rent which would be payable for a particular premises under the Rent Control Act in force during the assessment year. There is no distinction between buildings the fair rent of which has actually been fixed by the Rent Controller and those in respect of which no such rent has been fixed. When the Controller has not fixed the fair rent, the municipal authorities will have to arrive at their own figure of fair rent in accordance with the principles laid down in Rent Control Act. In another case Corporation of Calcutta, Appellant v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, Respondent, AIR 1970 SC 1417 also it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in determining the gross annual rent at which the land or building might at the time of assessment reasonably be expected to let from year to year, the statutory limitation of rent circumscribes the scope of the bargain in the market and in no circumstances the hypothetical rent may exceed the limit. In determining the annual value of the land or building for the purpose of ascertaining the consolidated rate, therefore, the standard rent is the maximum amount which can be taken into account. In a recent case New Delhi Municipal Committee v. M. N. Soi etc. reported at page 601 of the Current Law Journal 1976, which was also a case under the Punjab Municipal Act, it was held that in section 3 (1) (b) the expression "may reasonably be expected to be let from year to year" connotes the obligation on assessing authorities not to assess at a higher rental value than the standard rent, and further in para 6 while interpreting the scope of the words "to let" it was held that it implies the rent which the landlord can realise and is the rent which the landlord can reasonably be expected to gee and in no case it should exceed the fair rent or standard rent. 14. 14. Therefore, from the catena of the aforesaid authorities of the highest Court of the land, the only conclusion that can be derived in the present case is that it is the standard rent which should be the reasonable and the rental value for purposes of section 3 (1) (b) of the Act, and if the standard rent has not been fixed, then it must be the contractual rent, and if there is no contractual rent the rental value must be fixed in such a way which can reasonably be expected to b; derived and in no case it should exceed the standard rent or the fair rent. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that it is for the municipality to make the assessment. There can be no dispute that it is the Municipal Committee which is to make the assessment. But what point is involved in the present case is whether the assessment made by the Municipal Committee is arbitrary and it does not represent the fair or the standard rent. The learned counsel for the petitioner has shown that the assessment as made by the Committee is not based on the rental value and which amount is Rs. 356.83 per annum fixed by the District Rent and Managing Officer, Ambala under the provisions of section 29 of the Displaced Persons Com pensation and Rehabilitation) Act The learned counsel for the respondent has also relied on Ram Abhilakh, Decree-holder, Appellant v. Ram Jas and others, Judgment-debtors, Respondents, AIR 1966 Allahabad 218 which authority, in my opinion, has got no relevancy at all. He has further relied on Vidya Parkash, (supra). But in view of the later decision of the Supreme Court, this authority has got no relevanc v. Learned counsel for the Municipality has also relied on a case Filmistan Private Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation Greater Bombay, reported in 1974 Municipalities and Corporation Cases, Part I. at page 6, to show that it is the municipality which has got the right to make any assessment. But this authority also does not assist him. It says that the rateable value to be fixed by the Municipal Corporatio) under section 154 of the Bombay Municipal Act undoubtedly cannot exceed the standard rent of the premises in respect of which the rateable value is fixed. But this authority also does not assist him. It says that the rateable value to be fixed by the Municipal Corporatio) under section 154 of the Bombay Municipal Act undoubtedly cannot exceed the standard rent of the premises in respect of which the rateable value is fixed. This standard rent in respect of the premises which are concerned in these appeals before the Bombay High Court appears to be, on the evidence led before the learned Additional Chief Judge, the agreed rent the rent at which there were let out in 1960-61 by the appellants to the various occupants. If that be so, the objection of the appellants must necessarily fail and be rejected inasmuch as the rateable value fixed is not based on any rent which is in excess of the standard rent. If and when an application is made under the provision of section 11 of the Bombay Rent Act in respect of these premises, then it is possible that such rent may cease to be standard rent. Thereafter the standard of each premises would be the rent which the court may fix on such application. It was because of the fact that for the year 19oO-6l the appellants, i.e. the Filmistan Private Ltd. had been paying the agreed rent in respect of the premises which were let out by the appellants to the various occupants. In the instant case also, the petitioner has let out the premises at Rs. 356.83 right from the date when it was so fixed by the District Rent and Managing Officer, Ambala and she is not deriving beyond that. Therefore, it is thai rent which must represent the standard rent or the fair rent unless it is so fixed under the Rent Restriction Act. And when it is so fixed, then that would be the standard rent. Therefore, the learned counsel cannot derive any benefit out of this authority. He has also referred me to a case decided by the Punjab High Court Sardha Ram Bhola Nath, Appellant v. Paras Ram Mohan Lai, Respondent, AIR 1962 Punjab 147. This authority also has got no applicability to the facts of the present case. Therefore, the learned counsel cannot derive any benefit out of this authority. He has also referred me to a case decided by the Punjab High Court Sardha Ram Bhola Nath, Appellant v. Paras Ram Mohan Lai, Respondent, AIR 1962 Punjab 147. This authority also has got no applicability to the facts of the present case. This authority only says that from section 29 of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 it is clear that the person who is in lawful possession of the immovable property of the class notified in section 29 (2) does not seem to possess the status of a tenant vis-a-vis the properly in his possession, because the legislature has chosen not to so describe it in sub-section (1), and after transfer be is merely to be deemed to be a tenant of the transferee on the same terms and conditions as to payment of rent or otherwise on which he held the property immediately before the transfer, subject to the further proviso that notwithstanding anything contained in any such terms and conditions such a person is not liable to be ejected from the property during a period of two years except on grounds mentioned therein. The whole scheme of the section thus appears to suggest that the rights and liabilities of the transferee and of the person in possession were not intended to be governed by section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Further it has been held that according to section 29 and rule 121 made under the Act, the terms and conditions as to payment of rent, on which the person in lawful possession had been holding the property, have expressly been retained by the deeming provision which in explicit terms overrides all other Jaws. Carrying this fiction to its logical conclusion it must be held that the provisions of the Punjab Rent Restrictions Act are not intended by the Parliament to control the matter of rent and eviction from the premises in question. In this case facts were quite different. Now the property is no longer evacuee property. It has passed bands, and therefore, the rent must not, in any case, exceed the standard rent or the fair rent, or the rent which had been fixed by the District Rent and Managing Officer. In this case facts were quite different. Now the property is no longer evacuee property. It has passed bands, and therefore, the rent must not, in any case, exceed the standard rent or the fair rent, or the rent which had been fixed by the District Rent and Managing Officer. The learned counsel has further relied upon New Delhi Municipal Committee, Appellant v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India, Respondent, AIR Iy77 SC 2134. This authority deals with the jurisdiction of the Municipal Committee to amend assessment lists of previous years, there can be no dispute that the Municipal Committee has got the right to amend the assessment lists. But the only thing is that the rent should not be arbitrary and exorbitant and it should in no case exceed the standard rent, and if not fixed, it should be a fair rental value. He has further relied on Municipal Corporation, Indore and others, Appellants v. Smt. Ratnaprabha and others, respondents, AIR 1977 NC 308 wherein the scope of section 138 (b) of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act fell for interpretation and it was held that if the premises used by the owner are never let and no standard rent was fixed, then the Municipal Commissioner was justified in adopting another suitable criterion for determining the annual value of the building. In fact, there is nothing in the Act to make it obligatory for the Commissioner to follow the provisions of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act in spite of the non-obstante clause and to limit the annual value to any standard rent that the building might fetch under that Act. This authority has got no relevancy to the facts of the present case in view of a clear provision as contained in section 3 (1) (b) which defines the gross rental value of the building. 16. The learned counsel further contended that it is the income in the hands of the tenant which is to be taken for purposes of fixation of the rental value and the rental value, therefore, as fixed by the Committee, is quite valid and reasonable. Under section 61 of the Punjab Municipal Act, it is the owner alone who is liable to be taxed. The occupier cannot be made to pay the tax. The section is quite clear on the point and therefore it does not require any elaborate discussion. Under section 61 of the Punjab Municipal Act, it is the owner alone who is liable to be taxed. The occupier cannot be made to pay the tax. The section is quite clear on the point and therefore it does not require any elaborate discussion. Learned counsel has relied on National and Grinlays Bank Ltd., Appellant v. Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay, Respondent, AIR 1969 SC 1048, but this authority does not support him. It says that the primary liability to pay property taxes, to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay in respect of land owned by a person and let on a monthly basis to a third party who has constructed a building thereon, is on the owner of the land and net on the owner of the building. Therefore, the liability of the present petitioner would be only to the extent of the rent that she actually receives and this ground is not open to the respondent that the transaction is fraudulent and is vitiated because the close relationship of the petitioner with the tenant, because this point stands already concluded by the decision on the reference made by the Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of section 84 (2) of the Punjab Municipal Act. 17. In the light of the above discussion, I an of the view that the assessment purposes of taxation made by the respondent is exorbitant and arbitrary and does not represent the gross rental value as defined under section 3 (1) (b) of the Act. The order, therefore, is hereby quashed and Municipal Corporation (respondent) may make a fresh assessment which must be reasonable and in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Till such time, the rental fixed by the District Rent and Managing Officer shall be the rental value. Parties left to bear their own costs. Order accordingly.