State of Kerala v. P. K. Hussain, Palakuzhi — 1978 DIGILAW 132 (MAD)

Order.- These revision petitions are filed by the State against the order of the Sessions Judge, Palghat, setting aside the proceedings of the District Collector, Palghat, initiated against two persons who are respectively the driver and the owner of the lorry, KLZ 3589 under section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act for violation of clauses 3 and 3-A of the Kerala Rice (Regulation of Movement) Order, 1966 (for short ‘the Order’). Under Clause 3 of the Order, no person shall move or attempt to move or abet movement of rice from any place within a specified area to a place outside that area except in accordance with a permit as mentioned therein. Clause 3-A prohibits transporting as also attempt to transport and abetting the transport of rice to or from a border area and from any place in the border area to any other place in the area, otherwise than in accordance with a permit. 2. On 6th November, 1974, at about 1 a.m. the Taluk Supply Officer, Kozhikode, who was on patrol work in Alathur taluk saw the lorry, KLZ 3589 passing towards the Palghat side. He intercepted the lorry at Pudukode which is situated one mile away from Palghat-Alathur border. The driver of the lorry escaped with the switch key. The lorry was found to contain 35.50 quintals of rice in 50 bags. One Assan, son of Hussain, stated to be the cleaner of the lorry was questioned and it was found that the consignment was loaded from the rice mill of one Kottala Madhavan in Alathur and that it was being transported to Kozhikode. The taluk of Alathur is notified as a specified area under clause 2(b) of the Order. Other specified areas intervene Alathur and Kozhikode which is a non-specified area. There was no permit issued by any competent authority for the transportation of the rice. The G.V.R. of the lorry did not contain any entry regarding the consignment. Prima facie, there was contravention of clauses 3 and 3-A of the Order. The Taluk Supply Officer, therefore, recorded the statement of Assan prepared a mahazar, seized the lorry with rice and reported the fact to the District Collector, Palghat. 3. Notices were issued under section 6-B of the Essential Commodities Act to the owner, the driver and the cleaner of the lorry. Copies of statement recorded and the mahazar were also delivered to the above persons. 3. Notices were issued under section 6-B of the Essential Commodities Act to the owner, the driver and the cleaner of the lorry. Copies of statement recorded and the mahazar were also delivered to the above persons. P. K. Hussain, the owner of the lorry and Alavi, the driver of the lorry filed explanations. In the statement issued by the driver, he contended that the seizure of the lorry was not from Pudukode as mentioned in the notice but from Thrippalur which is 15 miles away from the border. According to him, the lorry was stationed at the place and he was sleeping in the nearby premises. No permit is required for movement of rice inside a specified area and, therefore, according to him, there was no contravention of clauses 3 and 3-A of the Kerala Rice (Regulation of Movement) Order, 1966. He denied that Assan was the cleaner of the lorry and also stated that the owner of the lorry had given strict instructions to him not to carry any contraband articles or any essential commodities in the lorry. He was not aware of the report, statement or other records mentioned in the notice. P. K. Hussain, the owner of the lorry put forward identical contentions. Both of them stated that they had oral and documentary evidence to substantiate their contentions and that they should be given reasonable opportunity to produce the same. The counsel for the two person: was heard and on 27th May, 1975, the District Collector passed orders confiscating the lorry and the rice under section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act. Against the above order, appeals were filed by both the driver and the owner of the lorry. The Sessions Judge, Palghat, who disposed of the appeals adverted to the controversy regarding the place from where the lorry was seized and the denial that Assan was the cleaner of the lorry and held that there were no sufficient materials to support the confiscation ordered. The appeals were accordingly allowed. The revision petitions are preferred against the above order. 4. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents against the maintainability of the revision petition. The appeals were accordingly allowed. The revision petitions are preferred against the above order. 4. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents against the maintainability of the revision petition. The contention is that the judicial authority mentioned in section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act against whose order the revision petitions are filed is not a Court but a persona designata and is, therefore, outside the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. Section 6-C(1) of the Essential Commodities Act reads: ‘Any person aggrieved by an order of confiscation under section 6-A may, within one month from the date of the communication to him of such order, appeal to any judicial authority appointed by the State Government concerned and the judicial authority shall, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, pass such order as it may think fit confirming, modifying or annulling the order appealed against." 6. Under notification dated 9th August, 1968, the District and Sessions Judge of the concerned District has been appointed as the judicial authority to decide appeals filed against orders of confiscation under section 6-A. The question involved is whether the judicial authority so appointed is a Court, the orders of which are revisable under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. So far as this High Court is concerned, the practice has been to entertain revision petitions against the order of the District and Sessions Judge on the criminal side. The maintainability of such a revision petition was raised for the first time in these petitions. Judicial opinion has not been uniform among the other High Courts. 7. The earliest reported case that has been brought to my notice is the decision of a single Judge of the Mysore High Court in State of Mysore v. Pandurang Purusappa Naik1wherein it was held that the judicial authority is a persona designata and not a Court. The above has been overruled by a Division Bench of that Court in Vasundara Traders v. Stale of Karnataka2. 8. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case in L. Ramaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh3, did not decide the question finally but only observed that the better view is that the judicial authority concerned is a Court. The above has been overruled by a Division Bench of that Court in Vasundara Traders v. Stale of Karnataka2. 8. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case in L. Ramaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh3, did not decide the question finally but only observed that the better view is that the judicial authority concerned is a Court. The matter came up before a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the decision is reported in Public Prosecutor (Andhra Pradesh) v. L. Ramayya4. After an exhaustive discussion of the different aspects of the matter, the Full Bench came to the conclusion that the judicial authority mentioned in section 6-C is a Court and not a persona designata. It was, therefore, held that the order of the judicial authority is a proceeding of an inferior criminal Court and as such revisable by the High Court. This ruling is seen followed in Nadeem Nian v. State5decided by a Division Bench of the same Court. 9. The Madras High Court considered the question in the decision in State v. Sriramulu Chettiar6. Somasundaram, J., held that no revision lies to the High Court against the order of the judicial authority under section 6-C since such authority is not an inferior criminal Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The same view was taken by the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat v. C.M. Shah7. 10. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sitaram Deokishan Heda v. State of Madhya Pradesh8, held that the District and Sessions Judge, who is the appellate authority notified by the State Government is a persona designata and no revision, application would lie against the order of confiscation passed under section 6-C(1) of the Essential Commodities Act. The above decision was followed in Dalchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh9. 11. As I said earlier, the practice of this High Court has been to entertain revision petitions against the orders of the judicial authority. It was the divergence of judicial opinion among the other High Courts at the time when the petitions were heard that prompted the respondents in these petitions to raise the preliminary objection. After the petitions were heard and pending decision thereof, the thicket of controversy was cleared by the Supreme Court by its decision in Thakur Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh10. After the petitions were heard and pending decision thereof, the thicket of controversy was cleared by the Supreme Court by its decision in Thakur Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh10. The Supreme Court held as follows: "We are accordingly of the opinion that even though the State Government is authorised to appoint an appellate authority under section 6-C, the Legislature clearly indicated that such appellate authority must of necessity be a judicial authority. Since under the Constitution the Courts being the repository of the judicial power and the officer presiding over the Court derives his designation from the nomenclature of the Court, even if the appointment is made by the designation of the judicial officer the appellate authority indicated is the Court over which he presides discharging functions under the relevant Code and placed in the hierarchy of Courts for the purposes of appeal and revision. Viewed from this angle, the Sessions Judge, though appointed an appellate authority by the notification, what the State Government did was to constitute an appellate authority in the Sessions Court over which the Sessions Judge presides. The Sessions Court is constituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure and indisputably it is an inferior criminal Court in relation to High Court. Therefore, against the order made in exercise of powers conferred by section 6-C a revision application would lie to the High Court and the High Court would be entitled to entertain a revision application under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which was in force at the relevant time and such revision application would be competent." It is not clear from the above decision of the Supreme Court whether the judicial authority appointed by the Madhya Pradesh Government is designated "Sessions Judge" or as the District and Sessions Judge. 12. An argument is advanced that since the notified judicial authority in Kerala is the District and Sessions Judge, a revision petition under section 397 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, will not lie. 13. It is true that an order under section 6-A does not involve a conviction for an offence and to that extent, it may be stated that the proceedings are of a civil nature and a revision petition should have been filed on the civil side before the District Judge. 13. It is true that an order under section 6-A does not involve a conviction for an offence and to that extent, it may be stated that the proceedings are of a civil nature and a revision petition should have been filed on the civil side before the District Judge. But so long as the same person functions as the District Judge and the Sessions Judge, it does not make much of a difference whether the petition is entertained on the civil side or the criminal side and so long as the scope of the appeal as also the revision petition is to see if the provisions of a specified enactment has been contravened justifying confiscation of articles, the aggrieved party may not be prejudiced simply because the decision is on the criminal side. It is also pertinent to note that an order under section 6-A in so far as it involves confiscation of articles is deterrent in nature. Since the violation of orders under the Essential Commodities Act involves penal consequences like confiscation it is only fit and proper that the appeal is entertained by the District and Sessions Judge on the criminal side and the revision petition is disposed of by this Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure. That practice is followed in other High Courts as is seen from the various decisions referred to above and the reasoning in Public Prosecutor (Andhra Pradesh) v. L. Ramayya1. The preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the revision petitions is, therefore, overruled. 14. The further question is whether there are sufficient reasons for interference with the order of the appellate judicial authority. It appears that in the appeal filed by the owner of the vehicle the order of confiscation was assailed before the District and Sessions Judge on the ground that no opportunity was given to the appellant to cross-examine the person who prepared the mahazar and the person whose statement was recorded. The learned District and Sessions Judge in his order adverted to the above contention but did not decide whether the appellant before him was entitled in law to claim that the above said persons should be made available for cross-examination. The Judge proceeded: "If the averments in the mahazar and the alleged statement of the cleaner are ignored, there is no other materia! The Judge proceeded: "If the averments in the mahazar and the alleged statement of the cleaner are ignored, there is no other materia! to show that the seizure was made at a place within the border area of Alathur taluk. Therefore, the order of confiscation of the lorry cannot stand. The same is hereby set aside". The identical reasoning was adopted in the appeal by the owner of the rice. The order of the judicial authority in the two appeals are prima facie defective and are unsustainable. 15. On behalf of the State, it is argued that the scheme of the Essential Commodities Act does not contemplate that the persons on whose statements the Collector acted and decided to issue notice under section 6-B should be made available for cross-examination. It was argued that what is contemplated under section 6-B is only an opportunity of making representation against the confiscation and an opportunity to be heard in the matter. 16. This raises the question of interpretation of sections 6-A and 6-B, whether the Collector should conduct an enquiry and if so what is the scope of the enquiry. 17. Section 6-A does not make mention of any enquiry but states that the Collector should satisfy himself that there has been contravention of an order under section 3. If section 6-A alone is to govern, the subjective satisfaction of the Collector is sufficient and a confiscation effected by the. Collector is not liable to be interfered with unless it is made out that there were no materials on which such subjective satisfaction could have been entered, the absence of material itself leading to the inference that the Collector could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts or that the grounds for confiscation are such that no reasonable man would have reached the impugned decision. But section 6-B which follows section 6-A proceeds to say that before the Collector passes an order for confiscation, he should send a notice to the owner of the goods informing him of the grounds for confiscation that he should give an opportunity to the owner to make representation and should also give him a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the mat:er. The words “opportunity to be heard” may not involve in all cases opportunity to adduce evidence. The words “opportunity to be heard” may not involve in all cases opportunity to adduce evidence. But an effective opportunity of being heard carries with it an enquiry into the merits of the explanation offered by the concerned person. If such person disputes the facts relied upon by the authorities it is consistent with the principles of natural justice that he should be given an opportunity to disprove those facts. If reliance is to be placed on the evidence gathered or other records against a person, those materials should be made available to him so as to enable him to comment on them and disprove their veracity and reliability. It is true that the doctrine of audi alteram partem may not in all cases confer on a person the right to adduce evidence or a right to cross-examine persons whose statements are relied upon by the authorities. But principles of natural justice demand that before any statement made by a person is acted upon against another, the latter should have an opportunity of challenging its veracity. The challenge may be either by cross-examining such person or by way of producing materials which disprove his statement or by adducing counter-evidence. The concept of reasonable hearing has to be understood in the context in which it arises. In cases where the act alleged tantamounts to an offence or where heavy penalties like confiscation of property are involved, proof beyond reasonable doubt should be insisted before imposing the penalty. This is so irrespective of the fact that the authority who imposes the penalty is a Court or a quasi judicial tribunal. 18. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the applicability of the Evidence Act in the case of enquiries by quasi judicial tribunals. In Amba Lal v. Union of India1, a notice was issued to the appellant to show cause and explain why the goods seized from him should not be confiscated under section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and section 7 of the Land Customs Act, 1924. Following the explanation given by the appellant, an enquiry was conducted and the Collector of Central Excise held that the appellant failed to make out his defence. An order of confiscation was issued. After exhausting his remedies under the concerned Statute, the appellant filed a writ petition challenging the order. The matter ultimately came before the Supreme Court. Following the explanation given by the appellant, an enquiry was conducted and the Collector of Central Excise held that the appellant failed to make out his defence. An order of confiscation was issued. After exhausting his remedies under the concerned Statute, the appellant filed a writ petition challenging the order. The matter ultimately came before the Supreme Court. In the absence of satisfactory materials on either side in support of their respective cases, a decision had to be arrived at on the basis of burden of proof. The Supreme Court observes: "This Court has held that a customs officer is not a judicial tribunal and that a proceeding before him is not a prosecution. But it cannot be denied that the relevant provisions of the Sea Customs Act and the Land Customs Act are penal in character. The appropriate customs authority is empowered to make an inquiry in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by a person under the said Acts summon and examine witnesses, decide whether an offence is committed make an order of confiscation of the goods in respect of which the offence is committed and impose penalty on the person concerned, see sections 168 and 171-A of the Sea Customs Act and sections 5 and 7 of the Land Customs Act. To such a situation, though the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Evidence Act may not apply except in so far as they are statutorily made applicable, the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence and of natural justice must necessarily apply. If so, the burden of proof is on the customs authorities and they have to bring home the guilt to the person alleged to have committed a particular offence under the said Acts by adducing satisfactory evidence." 19. In Union of India v. T.R. Varma1 following a preliminary enquiry into allegations of bribery, a show cause notice was issued to the respondent why he should not be dismissed. The respondent complained that he had not been permitted to cross-examine the witnesses who gave evidence against him. The objection was overruled and an order of dismissal from service was passed. The respondent moved the High Court for quashing the said order. The respondent complained that he had not been permitted to cross-examine the witnesses who gave evidence against him. The objection was overruled and an order of dismissal from service was passed. The respondent moved the High Court for quashing the said order. The High Court upheld his objections and held the defect in the enquiry amounted to denial of reasonable opportunity to the respondent to show cause against his dismissal and, therefore, the order of dismissal was bad being in contravention of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The correctness of the above decision was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed: "Now, it is no doubt true that the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses was not taken in the mode prescribed in the Evidence Act; but that Act has no application to enquiries conducted by tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do so, their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a Court of law. Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed." 20. The above ruling is seen followed in B.E. Supply Co. v. The Wort men1, a case arising under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court further clarified the law in the following words: "But the application of principle of natural justice does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. The above ruling is seen followed in B.E. Supply Co. v. The Wort men1, a case arising under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court further clarified the law in the following words: "But the application of principle of natural justice does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. On the other hand what it means is that no materials can be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not spoken to by persons who are competent to speak about them and are subjected to cross-examination by the party against whom they are sought to be used. When a document is produced in a Court or a Tribunal the question that naturally arises is, is it a genuine document, what are its contents and are the statements contained therein true When the appellant produced the balance-sheet and profit and loss account of the company, it does not by its mere production amount to a proof of it or of the truth of the entries therein. If these entries are challenged the appellant must prove each of such entries by producing the books and speaking from the entries made therein. If a letter or other document is produced to establish some fact which is relevant to the enquiry the writer must be produced or his affidavit in respect thereof be filed and opportunity afforded to the opposite party who challenges this fact. This is both in accord with principles of natural justice as also according to the procedure under Order 19, Civil Procedure Code and the Evidence Act both of which incorporate these general principles. Even if all technicalities of the Evidence Act are not strictly applicable except in so far as section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Rules prescribed therein permit it it is inconceivable that the Tribunal can act on what is not evidence such as hearsay, nor can it justify the Tribunal in basing its award on copies of documents when the originals which are in existence are not produced and proved by one of the methods either by affidavit or by witness who have executed them, if they are alive and can be produced. Again if a party wants an inspection, it is incumbent on the Tribunal to give inspection in so far as that is relevant to the enquiry. Again if a party wants an inspection, it is incumbent on the Tribunal to give inspection in so far as that is relevant to the enquiry. The applicability of these principles are well recognised and admit of no doubt." 21. In a recent case, State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh1, the Supreme Court had occasion to comment on the nature of evidence in a domestic enquiry. The following observations are instructive: "It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice." 22. The above rulings generally refer to the applicability of the Indian Evidence Act in proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals Though reference is made to opportunity for cross-examination in Union of India v. T.R. Varma2, that case being one under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the dictum laid down therein may not have application in enquiries under different Statutes. The question regarding the right of cross-examination has been discussed in some of the later decisions of the Supreme Court. In Kanungo & Co. v. Collector, Customs, Calcutta3, the premises of the appellant were searched by the customs authorities and after a preliminary enquiry, a memo, was sent to the appellant to show cause against the seizure of 280 pieces of watches. The result of the enquiry and the evidence on which the charges were framed were mentioned in the show cause notice. The objections filed by the appellant were overruled being not substantiated and the articles were confiscated. The appellant moved the High Court for getting the order quashed. A single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition. But this order was set aside in appeal by a Division Bench of the same Court. The objections filed by the appellant were overruled being not substantiated and the articles were confiscated. The appellant moved the High Court for getting the order quashed. A single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition. But this order was set aside in appeal by a Division Bench of the same Court. The appellant thereupon filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. One of the points raised before the Supreme Court was that the impugned order was made in contravention of natural justice. The Supreme Court observed: "We may first deal with the question of breach of natural justice. On the material on record, in our opinion, there has been no such breach. In the show-cause notice issued on 21st August, 1961, all the material on which the customs authorities have relied was set out and it was then for the appellant to give a suitable explanation. The complaint of the appellant now is that all the persons from whom enquiries were alleged to have been made by the authorities should have been produced to enable it to cross-examine them. In our opinion, the principles of natural justice do not require that in matters like this the persons who have given information should be examined in the presence of the appellant or should be allowed to be cross-examined by them on the statements made before the customs authorities." 23. Reference may also be made to the case Hira Nath v. Rajendra Medical College, Ronchi1. That case arose in connection with an incident in the Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi. Certain male students went without clothes to the Girls’ Hostel attached to the College and pulled the hands of one of the girls. Five of them climbed up along the drain pipe to the terrace of the building. When the girls raised an alarm, the miscreants ran away. The girls could recognise only four of them. They launched a complaint before the Principal. The Principal constituted an enquiry committee which recorded the statements of the girls. The four male students whose names were mentioned by the girls were directed to be present before the Committee. The contents of the complaint were explained to them without disclosing the names of the girls who made the complaint and they were asked to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against them for misconduct. The four male students whose names were mentioned by the girls were directed to be present before the Committee. The contents of the complaint were explained to them without disclosing the names of the girls who made the complaint and they were asked to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against them for misconduct. The students denied in writing the allegations against them and stated that they were in their hostel at the relevant time. On the recommendation of the committee, the Principal expelled the students. The students challenged the order in a writ petition, and contended that the rules of natural justice had not been followed, the enquiry was held behind their back, the witnesses who gave evidence against them were not examined in their presence and there was no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses with a view to test their veracity. The matter ultimately came before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court while disposing of the appeal referred to its dictum in Union of India v. P.K. Ray2, that the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straight jacket of a rigid formula and proceeded to say: "Rules of natural justice cannot remain the same applying to all conditions. We know of statutes it India like the Goonda Acts which permit evidence being collected behind the back of the goonda and the goonda being merely asked to represent against the main charges arising out of the evidence collected. Care is taken to see that the witnesses who gave statements would not be identified. In such cases there is no question of the witnesses being called and the goonda being given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The reason is obvious. No witness will come forward to give evidence in the presence of the goonda. However unsavoury the procedure may appear to a judicial mind, these are facts of life which are to be faced. The girls who were molested that night would not have come forward to give evidence in any regular enquiry and if a strict enquiry like the one conducted in a Court of law were to be imposed in such matters, the girls would have had to go under the constant fear of molestation by the male students who were capable of such indecencies. Under the circumstances the course followed by the Principal was a wise one. 24. Under the circumstances the course followed by the Principal was a wise one. 24. It may not be out of place to quote the following passage from Kishanlal v. Collector, Land Customs1: “There is a good deal of misconception on this question of the right of cross-examination as part of natural justice. Natural justice is fast becoming the most unnatural and artificial justice and for that confusion the Courts are no less responsible than the litigants. Ordinarily, the principle of natural justice is that no man shall be a Judge in his own cause and that no man should be condemned unheard. This latter doctrine is known as audi alterem partem. It is on this principle that natural justice ensures that both sides should be heard fairly and reasonably. A part of this principle is that if any reliance is placed on evidence or record against a person then that evidence or record must be placed before him for his information, comment and criticism. That is all that is meant by the doctrine of audi alterem partem, that no party should be condemned unheard. No natural justice requires that there should be a kind of a formal cross examination. Formal cross-examination is procedural justice. It is governed by rules of evidence. It is the creation of Courts and not a part of natural justice but of legal and statutory justice. Natural justice certainly includes that any statement of a person before it is accepted against somebody else, that somebody else should have an opportunity of meeting it whether it (sic) by way of interrogation or by way of comment does not matter. So long as the party charged has a fair and reasonable opportunity to see, comment and criticise the evidence, statement or record on which the charge is being made against him, the demands and the test of natural justice are satisfied. Cross-examination in that sense is not the technical cross-examination in a Court of law in the witness-box”. 25. From the foregoing authorities, it is clear that the Indian Evidence Act as such is not applicable to enquiries of a quasi-judicial character unless the Statute, governing such proceedings direct otherwise. Cross-examination in that sense is not the technical cross-examination in a Court of law in the witness-box”. 25. From the foregoing authorities, it is clear that the Indian Evidence Act as such is not applicable to enquiries of a quasi-judicial character unless the Statute, governing such proceedings direct otherwise. It is also fairly well-settled that the right to cross-examine a witness in the sense in which it is used in the Evidence Act is not inherent in the rules of natural justice that are to govern enquiries by quasi-judicial tribunals. It will be apposite at this stage to recall the words of Tucker, C.J., in Russel v. Duke of Norfork,2that “the requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with and so forth”. Depending upon the constitution of the tribunal, the nature of the case and the rules governing the enquiry a party may legitimately claim that he is entitled to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements were recorded in his absence. If, however, the examination of witnesses in the presence of the offender involves risks as in Hira Nath’s case3or would sabotage the very purpose of the enquiry the claim for cross-examination, if put forward need not be allowed. If the concerned Statute or the rules of procedure framed in respect of an enquiry provide for examination of witnesses it stands to reason that under ordinary circumstances the person against whom the enquiry is held should be allowed to cross-examine such witnesses. 26. The Essential Commodities Act envisages two kinds of penalties for violation of order under section 3 viz., (1) Confiscation of the essential commodity including the receptacle and the vehicle used for transportation under section 6-A and (2) prosecution of the offender under section 7. No doubt an order of forfeiture of property can also be passed by the Court convicting the offender. A dichotomy is maintained and it is left to the discretion of the State whether the procedure regarding forfeiture alone without recourse to prosecution need be resorted to. No doubt an order of forfeiture of property can also be passed by the Court convicting the offender. A dichotomy is maintained and it is left to the discretion of the State whether the procedure regarding forfeiture alone without recourse to prosecution need be resorted to. A simple procedure is prescribed in the case of forfeiture depending upon the subjective satisfaction of the collector, the executive head of the district that there has been violation of an order under section 3, while for punishing the offender, such violation has to be made out following the procedure for a criminal trial. The summary procedure prescribed in the case of confiscation carries with it the intention of Parliament that action by the officials should be quick and decision by the Collector should be taken expeditiously. Under the scheme of the Statute, the essential commodity seized should be produced before the Collector without unreasonable delay. The Collector will examine the materials made available to him which may include the mahazar prepared and the statements of persons questioned and satisfy himself that there has been contravention of an order under section 3. It is the subjective satisfaction entered by the Collector that there has been violation of an order under section 3 that confers on him the jurisdiction to decide whether there should be confiscation. After reaching the conclusion that there has been contravention of an order under section 3, a notice is to be issued mentioning the grounds for the proposed confiscation. The party will be given an opportunity to make a representation in writing against the grounds of confiscation and also a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. There is no machinery provided for summoning witnesses or for compelling production of documents. Ordinarily, in cases where the Statute and the Rules do not provide for taking evidence, the requirements of natural justice would be satisfied if the concerned person is given a fair opportunity to comment or criticise the materials relied upon by the Collector in order to establish their unreliableness and also to produce other materials to controvert them. It is not the right of an offender that he should be informed of the source of the information on the basis of which a criminal prosecution is launched against him (see sections 124 and 125, Evidence Act). It is not the right of an offender that he should be informed of the source of the information on the basis of which a criminal prosecution is launched against him (see sections 124 and 125, Evidence Act). All the same since the result be the summary enquiry may entail penal consequences, the proceedings may be termed quasi-criminal. But it has to be borne in mind that section 10-C relating to mens rea and section 14 relating to burden of proof are deviations from the ordinary rules of Criminal Law, even in the case of a prosecution under the Act. It is, however, expected that since the order of confiscation is subject to scrutiny by the appellate judicial authority, the Collector would base his conclusions on adequate and reliable materials. On examining the scheme of the Act, I do not find anything in it which confers on the persons whose property is sought to be confiscated a right to cross-examine the persons whose statements were recorded by the authorities at the time of seizure. Of course. the Collector may allow such cross-examination in case he thinks that such cross-examination will enable him to arrive at a correct decision, but that is a matter entirely left to the discretion of the Collector. At the same time, since the proceedings involve penal consequences rules of natural justice demand that in addition to the right to comment and criticise the grounds mentioned in the notice, the concerned persons should be allowed an opportunity to substantiate their defence by producing evidence oral or documentary. Such oral evidence may include eliciting of facts favourable to his defence by examining any of the persons whose statement has been relied upon by the Collector. 27. In the instant case, the learned Sessions Judge erred in setting aside the order of confiscation on the ground that the cleaner and the person who prepared the mahazar were not made available for cross-examination. As a matter of fact, the statements filed by the respondents before the Collector do not contain a request that the above persons should be made available for cross-examination. For reasons already mentioned by me, the Statute does not confer such a right on the respondents. At any rate, it is not incumbent that those persons should be produced for cross-examination unasked. For reasons already mentioned by me, the Statute does not confer such a right on the respondents. At any rate, it is not incumbent that those persons should be produced for cross-examination unasked. It is, however, noted that the respondents in the two revision petitions have mentioned in their statements before the Collector that they have oral and documentary evidence to substantiate their contentions. The Collector has stated in his order that no evidence was produced by the respondents. The respondent’s grievance is that no opportunity was given to them to produce evidence. It cannot be made out from the records which of the above versions is true. In the interest of justice, it is only fair that the matter is enquired into afresh after giving an opportunity to the respondents to adduce evidence or produce documents to substantiate their defence. 28. I allow the revision petitions. The orders passed by the District and Sessions judge in C.M.A. No. 51 of 1975 and C.M.A.No. 62 of 1975 are set aside. ‘The matter is sent back to the District Collector for fresh disposal after allowing an opportunity to the respondents to produce document? or other evidence to substantiate their defence.