JUDGMENT - M.L. PENDSE, J.:---The Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Poona, made a reference under Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for adjudication of an industrial dispute to the Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Poona, and the First Labour Court has passed an Award on June 30, 1976, directing reinstatement of respondent No. 1 and has also awarded back wages from May 11, 1973 onwards. The Award is being challenged in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the employer company. The employer company Ayurved Rasashala is in the custody of the Receiver appointed by the Civil Court and the Receiver has filed the present petition. 2. The respondent No. 1 was employed as a Clerk on July 16, 1968 by the petitioner on a total emolument of Rs. 75/- per month. On January 1, 1970, the respondent No. 1 was confirmed in service as a clerk. It is the case of the petitioner that on April 1, 1970, the respondent No. 1 was promoted as a Junior Officer on a scale of Rs. 150-8-230-EB-10-330-EB-15-405. The services of the respondent No. 1 were retrenched by an order dated May 11, 1973. The respondent No. 1 was paid the retrenchment compensation and all other dues as contemplated by the provisions of the law. It is not in dispute the respondent No. 1 received an amount of Rs. 2500.70 on May 11, 1973 from the petitioner company. 3. On June 11, 1973, the respondent No. 1 served a demand notice on the petitioner claiming that the order of retrenchment was bad and she is entitled to reinstatement in service. On the failure of the petitioner, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour has made a reference on February 27, 1974. In her statement of claim filed by respondent No. 1 before the Labour Court, the respondent No. 1 has specifically stated that the order of retrenchment was wrong and contrary to the provisions of law as the employees who were appointed subsequent to the date of her appointment as clerks were retained in service, while she was retrenched and thereby the employer has contravened the provisions of section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4. 4. The proceedings were resisted by the company contending that the respondent No. 1 was holding the post of a Junior Officer and she was the only Junior Officer in the company and the order of retrenchment was passed after following the procedure prescribed by the law and she was also paid retrenchment compensation. The employer disputed the claim made by the respondent No. 1 that she was working as a clerk on the date of retrenchment. 5. Before the Labour Court, the respondent No. 1 examined herself and on behalf of the petitioner, the General Manager and Supervisor Mr. Thipse was examined. On consideration of the evidence led by the petitioner and respondent No. 1, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the reference made to the Labour Court was legal and the termination of services of respondent No. 1 was improper. The Labour Court recorded a finding that the respondent No. 1 was performing the duties of the clerk on the date of her retrenchment from service and the employer company has failed to establish that the provisions of section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act were complied with. In view of these findings, the Labour Court directed the reinstatement of respondent No. 1. Before the Labour Court, evidence was led by the respondent No. 1 for her claim of back wages and the Labour Court has awarded back wages from the date when the respondent No. 1 was retrenched. 6. Mr. Govilkar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, has raised three contentions before us. It was argued that the order of reference made by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Poona, was illegal, inasmuch as the order of retrenchment which is in dispute falls in Item No. 10 in the Third Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the dispute could be referred only to the Industrial Court and not to the Labour Court. The contention of the learned Advocate cannot be entertained as the submission over-looks the clear cut provisions of section 10(1)(d) proviso. The proviso to section 10(1)(d) enables the appropriate Government to make a reference to the Labour Court under Clause (c) if the dispute relates to any matter specified in Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than 100 workmen. The proviso to section 10(1)(d) enables the appropriate Government to make a reference to the Labour Court under Clause (c) if the dispute relates to any matter specified in Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than 100 workmen. In the present case, there is no dispute that the matter before the Labour Court is not likely to affect more than 100 workmen. In the face of clerk-cut provisions of law and in absence of any challenge to the compliance of the provisions before the Labour Court, the contention raised by the learned Advocate must be rejected. 7. The second contention raised by the learned Advocate is that the Labour Court was in error in holding that the order of retrenchment is illegal as the Labour Court overlooked that the respondent No. 1 was in employment on the date of retrenchment as a Junior Officer and not as a clerk. The learned Advocate invited our attention to the duties performed by the respondent No. 1 on the date of retrenchment. From the evidence led before the Labour Court both of respondent No. 1 and of Mr. Thipse, the General Manager of the Company, there is hardly any doubt in our mind that the respondent No. 1 was performing the duties of clerk on the date of retrenchment. The evidence unmistakably indicates that the respondent No. 1 was doing the work of consolidating the accounts of the branches, controlling the stock of the branches and taking the stock of the Head Office. In addition to this work, the respondent No. 1 has stated that she was preparing drafts of the replies to the letters received from the branches and customers and also doing the typing work. The duties performed by the respondent No. 1 are those of clerk and merely because the employer chooses to designate respondent No. 1 as partly responsible Officer, it will be difficult to hold that she was an Officer and not a clerk on the date of retrenchment. In this connection, it is also necessary to note that the petitioner has not produced a gradation list of its employees, nor the seniority list of the Officers and the Clerk and the wages drawn by each of them. In this connection, it is also necessary to note that the petitioner has not produced a gradation list of its employees, nor the seniority list of the Officers and the Clerk and the wages drawn by each of them. The employer has also not led evidence to establish what was the wages drawn by respondent No. 1, on the date when she was designated as a Junior Officer. In absence of any material on record, we are not inclined to accept the submission made by the learned Advocate. There is no dispute that respondent No. 1 if held to be a clerk then provisions of section 25-G are not complied with. In our judgment, the order directing the reinstatement of respondent No. 1 in the petitioner company must be upheld. 8. The last contention raised by the learned Advocate has some merit. It was urged by Mr. Govilkar that the order passed by the Labour Court awarding back wages from the date of removal, i.e. May 11, 1973, onwards is erroneous. Mr. Govilkar argues that the respondent No. 1 was married on October 6, 1973 and the evidence indicates that on her marriage she went to reside at Parbhani. The respondent No. 1 has admitted in her cross-examination that since her marriage she has been staying at Parbhani and she did not make any attempt to get employed at Parbhani. The learned Advocate argues that the respondent No. 1 has to desire to serve at Parbhani and if she had made no attempt to secure employment at Parbhani, the Labour Court was not justified in awarding back wages from the period commencing October 6, 1973 onwards. We find substance in this submission of the learned Advocate. 9. Mr. Kamerkar, the learned Advocate for respondent No. 1, very strenuously urged that the statement made by respondent No. 1 in her cross-examination that she did not intend to serve at Parbhani was due to the fact that her stay at Parbhani was for a temporary duration as her husband who is serving as a Telephone Operator is being transferred from place to place. Mr. Kamerkar also invited our attention to the fact that the respondent No. 1 has registered her name with the employment Exchange at Poona and has also made application for employment in the University of Poona and in the District Court at Poona. Mr. Kamerkar also invited our attention to the fact that the respondent No. 1 has registered her name with the employment Exchange at Poona and has also made application for employment in the University of Poona and in the District Court at Poona. It is undoubtedly true that the respondent No. 1 was invited for interview at Poona but was not selected. We have considered the evidence on record and we find it difficult to uphold that part of the order of the Labour Court awarding back wages to respondent No. 1 from October 6, 1973 onwards in face of clear cut statement made by the respondent No. 1 that she did not make any attempt to secure employment at Parbhani. In our judgment, the Labour Court was not justified in awarding back wages from the period commencing from October 6, 1973 onwards. It would be necessary to set aside that part of the Award. 10. In the result, we will confirm the award ordering reinstatement of respondent No. 1 in the service. In respect of back wages, the respondent No. 1 is entitled to receive back wages from the period commencing from May 11, 1973, till October 6, 1973 and also for the period commencing from June 30, 1976 onwards. The order awarding back wages for the period between October 16, 1973 and June 30, 1976 is set aside. The respondent No. 1 is entitled to the wages from June 30, 1976 onwards. The petitioner has deposited certain amount in this Court which the respondent No. 1 has withdrawn on furnishing Bank guarantee. In view of our judgment, it would be necessary to make calculations as to what amount the respondent No. 1 is entitled to. We were told at the bar that the learned Counsel for the parties would make necessary calculations and if it is found that the respondent No. 1 has withdrawn the amount in excess, of what she would be entitled to, she would refund the difference of the said amount. 11. With this modification, we discharge the Rule, but in the circumstances of the case we will make no order as to costs. -----