Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the plaintiff in an unnumbered Small Cause Suit filed before the Munsiff, Perinthalmanna, for recovery of Rs. 412/- under a pronote dated 10th December, 1972. The suit was filed on 4-2-1977. The plaintiff claimed that eventhough more than three years had elapsed since the execution of the pronote, the suit was not barred in view of the provisions of Act 30 of 1975 read with S.15 of the Limitation Act. S.3 of Act 30 of 1975 reads: "Bar of suits and applications and other proceedings: No suit for recovery of a debt shall be instituted, no application for execution of a decree in respect of a debt shall be made and no appeal, revision petition or application for review against any decree or order in any such suit or application shall be presented or made in any civil or revenue court before the expiry of one year from the commencement of this Act or such longer period as may be specified by the Government by notification in the Gazette; and all such suits, applications, appeals and petitions instituted, made or presented before such commencement and pending at such commencement stand stayed for the said period." The explanation to the section is not relevant for the purpose of this petition. S.6 reads: "Limitation: In computing the period of limitation for a suit for recovery of a debt or an application for the execution of a decree in respect of a debt or an appeal, revision petition or application for review against any decree or order in any such suit or application, the time during which the institution of the suit or the making of the application or the presentation of the appeal or petition was barred under S.3 shall be excluded." Act 30 of 1975 came into force on 1410 75. It is the admitted case that a notification had been issued as mentioned in S.3 of the Act extending the period mentioned therein by three months. The plaintiff claimed that he is entitled to an extension of time by one year and 3 months under S 6 in view of the above notification, that the suit would have got barred only after 1 year and 3 months from 10121975 and, therefore, there was no limitation. The plaintiff claimed that he is entitled to an extension of time by one year and 3 months under S 6 in view of the above notification, that the suit would have got barred only after 1 year and 3 months from 10121975 and, therefore, there was no limitation. The Munsiff upheld the plaintiff's contention that he could file the suit within the extended period mentioned in S.3 and 6 of Act 30 of 1975; but according to him, the period excluded should be calculated from 14101975, the date of commencement of the Act. The plaint being one presented beyond that period was accordingly rejected. The order rejecting the plaint is challenged in this revision petition 2. Even though notice was issued to the respondents, there was no appearance on their behalf. 3. It is the admitted case that but for the intervention of Act 30 of 1975, the suit would have got barred on 1012 75. The point for decision is whether the petitioner is entitled to extension of time by 1 year and 2 months from 10121975 or whether the said extension should be calculated from 14101975. In the former case, the suit was filed within time; in the latter case, it is barred by limitation. 4. I hold that the correct interpretation is the one canvassed by the revision petitioner. What is stated in S.6 is that in computing the period of limitation, the period of moratorium mentioned in S.3 should be excluded. But for Act 30 of 1975, the time would have run continuously from 10-12-1972 and the suit should have been filed within a period of three years from that date. By virtue of Ss 3 and 6, no suit could be filed during the period of 1 year and 3 months from 14101975 and this period should be excluded to arrive at the last date for filing the suit. In other words, there was a suspension of the running of time on 14101975 on which date Act 30 of 1975 came into force and the running of time for purposes of limitation resumed only after 1 year and 3 months from that date. In calculating the three years available for the filing of the suit, the above period should not he taken into account. In calculating the three years available for the filing of the suit, the above period should not he taken into account. If so calculated, the suit could be filed within one year and 3 months from 10121975 on which date the suit would have otherwise got barred. 5. A similar question arose for consideration in Kunhappu v. Chintan (1958 KLT. 804). That was a suit based on a promissory note dated 7-7-1952 filed on 30-5-56. The plaintiff claimed exclusion of period between 5-12-53 and 1-7-55 under certain legislative enactments which prohibited suits against agricultural debtors. Provisions similar to S.6 were available in those enactments. The question arose as to how the exclusion has to be worked out. The learned judge who decided the case relied upon the following observations in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap (AIR. 1935 P. C. 85): "Where there is ground for excluding certain periods under S.14, in order to ascertain what is the date of the expiration of the prescribed period, the days excluded from operating by way of limitation have to be added to what is primarily the prescribed period; that is to say if the prescribed period is three years, and 20 days ought to be excluded in order to determine when the prescribed period expires, 20 days have to be added to the three years, and the date of the expiration of the prescribed period is thus ascertained." The suit in the case mentioned was held to be not barred. 6. It is unnecessary to refer to other rulings wherein the same principles are followed. 7. The position is explained in Ha1sbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 24, Page 198: " If an enactment renders a payment irrecoverable for a certain period, there may be a consequence, in default of express statutory provision, that the running of time under the appropriate limitation enactment is suspended while the payment is irrecoverable. In respect of debts provable in bankruptcy, time ceases to run during the bankruptcy, but will continue to run afresh if and when the bankruptcy is annulled " 8. The rejection of the plaint in the instant case, assuming that the suit is in respect of debt falling under Act 30 of 1975, is unsustainable. The order passed by the Munsiff is set aside. The Court will restore the case to file and dispose of it according to law. The rejection of the plaint in the instant case, assuming that the suit is in respect of debt falling under Act 30 of 1975, is unsustainable. The order passed by the Munsiff is set aside. The Court will restore the case to file and dispose of it according to law. The revision petition is allowed. I make no order as to costs. Allowed.