Judgment B. S. Sinha, J. 1. The prayer of the petitioner, the Bihar Relief Committee through its General Secretary, Sri Y. K. Lall, in this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, is to quash the order bearing no.3/d1-100/67/75-Sra-Nee-690, dated 27th May, 1975 passed hy sri Lagandeo Singh, Joint Commissioner and Conciliation Officer of the Government of Bihar, respondent no.2, by which, the petitioner was informed that the retrenchment of some of its employees would be referred as an industrial dispute as the petitioner had not participated in the conciliation proceeding relating to such retrenchment. 2. The petitioner, according to its case, is a humanitarian, charitable and social service institution established with the sole object of rendering relief to the suffering humanity caused by natural calamities like Hood, drought epidemic etc. Its objectives be opening of relief centres, importing useful knowledge, publishing informatory literature relating to relief work and bringing about consciousness of social service in the community. 3. Since its inception in the year 1966-67 when the petitioner was registered, as a society, under the Societies Registration Act, it has rendered charitable relief to the victims of famine, drought and diseases, Relying upon (the help and charity of individual association and Government, it participated in rendering succour to the famine striken people of Bihar caused by unprecedented drought in Bihar in 1967. After conducting such famine operation the petitioner continued its activities so as to provide irrigational facilities in certain selected areas of Bihar as a measure of permanent relief and has opened and organised several relief centres throughout the State. It has organised minor irrigation schemes with the help of Government ami voluntary organisations at different places in the State. For the implementation of its programme the petitioner employed a number of employees on a temporary basis with clear indication that services would be terminated without any prior notice. Due to organisational, operational and functional difficulties the Executive Committee of the petitioner, by its resolution dated 2.101974, deciding to wind up its activities relating to minor irrigation schemes. This resulted in 27 employees becoming surplus and hence by orders dated 3.1.1975 and 4.1.1975 and 4.1.1975 copies of which are Annexures 2 and 3 respectively, the services of those employees were terminated. This resulted in 27 employees becoming surplus and hence by orders dated 3.1.1975 and 4.1.1975 and 4.1.1975 copies of which are Annexures 2 and 3 respectively, the services of those employees were terminated. Respondent no.4, Udhan Narain Gupta, Joint Secretary of the Bihar Relief Committee Workers Union, by a letter dated 4.1.1975 protested against the retrenchment of the aforesaid employees as being in violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referrei to as the Industrial Act) and the rules framed thereunder ; copy of the letter is annexure 4 Respondent no 4 represented to the Labour Department government of Bihar, as well against such retrenchment, in pursuance whereof Respondent no.2 in;tiated a conciliation proceeding under the industrial Act of which notice was sent to the petitioner asking it to take part in such conciliation proceeding to be held on 14th February, 1975 ; copy ( f the notice is Annexure 5, Sri Y. K.1. all, the Joint Secretary of the petitioner, requested respondent no 2 for time and also asked for details of the dispute pending before him bv a letter, copy of which is Annexure 6. In reply the respondent no. by a letter dated 20th February, 1975 postponed the conciliation proceeding to 1 3 1975 and sent the petitioner the demands of the Bihar Relief Committee Workers union as contained in their application dated 4.1.1975, Thereafter, Sri Y. K Lall asked for time to consider the legal questions involved and by a letter dated 2.4.1975 requested the respondent no 2 to drop the conciliation propeeding on the ground that the provision of the Industrial Act had no application to the dispute pending before him, copy of which is Annexure 8. It was stated in this letter that the activities of the petitioner are essentially humanitarian in character. It was also pointed out that the petitioner never functioned either as an industry or as an enterprises motivated by profit. By a communication dated 27th May, 1975, copy of which is Annexure 9, the respondent no.2 rejected the contention that the petitioner was not an industry within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Industrial Act. Thereafter, the petitioner applied for time to move this court as an important question of law was involved and filed the application. 4. By a communication dated 27th May, 1975, copy of which is Annexure 9, the respondent no.2 rejected the contention that the petitioner was not an industry within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Industrial Act. Thereafter, the petitioner applied for time to move this court as an important question of law was involved and filed the application. 4. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that its activities have no commercial character and it does not engage in any business or any trace undertaking or manufacture nor is there any motive for earning profit in its operation and execution, It essentially conducts charitable and humanitarian work and hence the provisions of the Industrial Act would not apply to it and the respondent no.2 has no juris liction to proceed with the matter. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents nos.3 and 4 the President and General Secretary of the Bihar Relief Committee Workers union, wherein the position that the petitioner is merely a charitable institution has been disputed and it has been stated that the work of minor irrigation undertaken by the petitioner is on a very large scale with twenty centres from which it earns profit. It is, further, stated that it had other business too In pursuing irrigational work the petitioner undertake open bore construction, dig wells and tanks, install tube-wells, construct dams and perform other irrigational jobs for which it receives payments and makes profit on the plea of supervision charges, rent, storage charges etc. It is also stated that the petitioner renders material service for payment and carries on sale of pipes on profit and it has a regular workshop which carries on various engineering works of machines implements and as such the petitioner is engaged in commercial activities and relief work has become a minor part of its activities. It has, therefore, been asserted that the petitioner is an industry and carries on its work by engagement of its officer and workmen on wages and salaries. 6. Some reference is also made in the counter-affidavit about the agreement which was arrived at with regard to the rules of retrenchment between the petitioner and its workmen. 7. A rejoinder has also been filed on behalf of the petitioner to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents no.3 an 4. 8. 6. Some reference is also made in the counter-affidavit about the agreement which was arrived at with regard to the rules of retrenchment between the petitioner and its workmen. 7. A rejoinder has also been filed on behalf of the petitioner to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents no.3 an 4. 8. The primary question that falls for consideration in this case is whether the petitioner is an industry within the definition of Industry as given in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Act which runs thus : "industry" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or a vocation of workman". There is no gainsaying that Industry, as defined here, has a wide import and has been the subject of various decisions not only by the different High Courts but also of the Supreme Court. 9. The first decision on the point of the Supreme Court is the case of d. N. Banerji V/s. P. R. Mukherjee and others ( AIR 1953 SC 58 ). In that case the i Head Clerk and Sanitary Inspector of the Budge Budge Municipality, who were i also the members of the Municipality Workers Union, were dismissed on certain charges, the propriety of which was questioned by the Municipal Workers Union and the matter was referred by the State of West Bengal to the Industrial tribunal for adjudication under the Industrial Act, which directed the reinstatement of those persons. One of the questions raised before the Supreme Court was that the Industrial Act did not apply to disputes with Municipalities as it was not an industry. In dealing with this question Chandrasekhara Ayiyar, J. , speaking on behalf of the Court, stated that although according to the man in the street industry or business means an undertaking where capital and labour co operate with each other with the object of producing wealth in the shape of goods, machines etc. and for making profits, still there was nothing to prevent a statute from giving the word "industry" and the word "industrial dispute" a wider and more comprehensive import to enable it to meet the requirements of fast industrial progress and bring about a fair and satisfactory adjustment of relations between employers and workmen in a variety of fields of activity in order to promote industrial peace and economy. The result, therefore, is that the word industry now connotes an enormously wider concept. It was further laid down in that case that : "if the public utility service is carried on by a corporation like a municipality which is the creature of a statute, and which functions under the limitations imposed by the statute, does it cease to be an industry for this reason The only ground on which one could say that what would amount to the carrying on of an industry if it is done by a private person ceases to be so if the same work is carried on by a local body like a municipality is that in the letter there is nothing like the investment of any capital or the existence of a profit-earning motive as there generally is in a business. But neither the one nor the other seems a sine qua non or necessary element in the modern conception of industry". My justification for quoting the above passage is to emphasise that the nonexistence of a profit earning motive or the lack of investment of acapital are not necessary elements in whether whether the petitioner is an "industry". 10 It is not necessary to consider, at length, the various other decisions on the point inasmuch as in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and leverage Board v. A. Kajappa and others ( AIR 1978 SC 548 ), section 2 (j) of the Industrial Act again fell for consideration before a Bench of Seven Judges of the Supreme court in which after a review of all the relevant decisions Krishna Aiyar, J. , speaking for the majority has summarsied the law on the point. It has been laid down that for industry three elements are necessary, namely, (1) The enterprises should persue systemetic activity, (2) The systemetic activity should be the result of organised co-operation between the employer and the employee, and (3)The activity should lead to be production and/or distribution. of goods and services which attempt to fulfil human wants and wishes. Such wishes should not be spiritual or religious but would include material things and services such as making large scale parshad or food. of goods and services which attempt to fulfil human wants and wishes. Such wishes should not be spiritual or religious but would include material things and services such as making large scale parshad or food. Non-existence of profit making motive or any other gainful object is an irrelevant consideration in determining whether an enterprise is an industry or not and the most decisive test for such purpose is the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the employer employee relations. It has, further, been laid down that if the enterprise is otherwise a trade or business it does not cease to be so because philanthropy or i charity is the primary object. Where a complex of activities are involved, some of which qualify for exemption while others dont, then the predominant nature of the services and the integrated nature of the departments will be the true test. 11. Applying the above principles it will be seen that the petitioner has undertaken minor irrigation schemes in the State for which it opened various centres for constructing open bore wells, tanks and tube-wells after obtaining the advice of technical experts. It stores articles for such works and maintains plants and machineries for which depreciation, wear and tear and running charges are charged. In supplying pipes to the farmers it charges them the costs incurred in transportation and storage. All these establish that the activities of the petitioner are systematic. 12. For the execution of its enterprises the petitioner employs a number of employees which point out that its activities are the product of an organised co-operation between it, as the employer and its employees. 13. And such activities lead to the distribution of goods and service which in its turn fulfills human wants and wishes. 14. That the petitioner is not impelled by motives of profit, which is disputed by Respondent Nos.3 and 4, even if assumed to be true, is an irrelevant consideration. 15. For the reasons given, I am of the view that the Bihar Relief committee is an "industry" within the meaning of the Industrial Act. I would, accordingly, dismiss this petition but without costs. Petition dismissed.