JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---A short question as to whether the courts below committed an illegality in not releasing petitioner No. 2 in this petition under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act has arisen in this petition. 2. The prosecution from which this petition arises was started in Criminal Case No. 53 of 1974 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Satana. In that case there was three accused charged with offences punishable under sections 451, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. Ultimately by his judgment and order dated 6th May, 1977, the learned Magistrate convicted all the accused for the offences punishable under sections 451 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. Accused Nos. 1 and 3 were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month on each count and to a fine of Rs. 200/- also on each count. In default of the payment of fine, rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one month on each count was directed. Accused No. 2, however was sentenced to fine alone with the usual provisions for the default of payment of fine. All the accused were acquitted of the offence punishable under section 504 of the Indian Penal Code. It may in passing be mentioned that conviction under sections 323 was under section 323 simpliciter and not read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. There is material to show that the accused No. 3 at the time of the commission of the offence was 19 years old. In the charge-sheet which was filed in the year 1974 that is that age which has been shown. 4. The order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial magistrate was confirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Nasik in Criminal Appeal No. 77 of 1977 by his judgment and order dated 5th December, 1977. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, original accused Nos. 2 and 3 have preferred the present revision application. At the time of the admission of the petition my brother Dighe, J. issued rule only in so far as petitioner No. 2 (original accused No. 3) was concerned. The petition of petitioner No. 1 (original accused No. 2) was, however, rejected. 6. It is unnecessary for me to refer to the prosecution case in any detail. At the time of the admission of the petition my brother Dighe, J. issued rule only in so far as petitioner No. 2 (original accused No. 3) was concerned. The petition of petitioner No. 1 (original accused No. 2) was, however, rejected. 6. It is unnecessary for me to refer to the prosecution case in any detail. Sitting as a Court of revision, the concurrent findings which have been recorded by two courts below that accused Nos. 2 and 3 beat complainants father and wife with fist blows and kicks will have to be accepted as binding upon me. Nor has Mr. Agarwal, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, been able to show any material why that finding could be held to be wrong. In the result, petitioner No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as accused No. 3) must be held to have been rightly convicted under section 451, I part, and section 323 of the Indian Penal Code. 7. Mr. Agarwal then proceeded to canvass that the courts below have committed an illegality in not following the mandatory provisions of section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. According to him, the accused was 19 years old at the time when the Court had to pass the judgment upon him and if it is so, says Mr. Agarwal, then it is now well established by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court that the Court must resort to the provisions of section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act. 8. I have already mentioned above that the material on record shows that accused No. 3 was about 19 year old at the time when the offence was committed or at any rate when the charge sheet was filed. The judgment of the Court of first instance was delivered on 6th May, 1977 which must be held to be the date when the Court was to deal him. On that day, therefore, it must be held that accused No. 3 was over 21 years of age. In my opinion, therefore, the contention of Mr. Agarwal that the provisions of section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act ought to have been followed cannot be accepted. He, however, referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in (Darshan Kumar v. Secretary)1, A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 906, wherein, according to Mr. In my opinion, therefore, the contention of Mr. Agarwal that the provisions of section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act ought to have been followed cannot be accepted. He, however, referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in (Darshan Kumar v. Secretary)1, A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 906, wherein, according to Mr. Agarwal, it has been held that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act can be invoked in the accused was below 21 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence. It may be appropriate to reproduce the first paragraph of the said judgment which is in the following terms: "After hearing Counsel for the parties the following order must be made in this case in view of the decision of this Court in 1964(7) S.C.R. 676 when the birth certificate produced shows that the appellant was below 21 years of age at the time of the commission of the offences". 9. Reliance placed upon by Mr. Agarwal on the judgment in Darshan Kumars case is, in my opinion, is misplaced. Though the observations contained in the judgment in Darshan Kumars which is of only in one paragraph to some extend supports the submission of Mr. Agarwal, on a proper reading of the judgment of Rattan Lal itself on which reliance was placed on Darshan Kumars case, it is not possible to hold that the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act are applicable to a person who is not below the age of 21 years at the time of his conviction though he may be so at the time of the commission of the offence. 10. In (Rattan Lal v. The State of Punjab)2, A.I.R. 1965 Supreme Court 444, the majority judgment delivered by Subba Rao, J., took note of the fact that the appellant before the Supreme Court was 16 years old at the time of his conviction, that is at the time when the Court had to deal with the accused he was below the age of 21 years. Rest of the judgment deals with the exposition of the law under the Probation of Offenders Act and points out that the power conferred under sections 3, 4 and 6 can be exercised by the High Court in appeal or in revision because of the provisions contained in section 11 of the Act. Rest of the judgment deals with the exposition of the law under the Probation of Offenders Act and points out that the power conferred under sections 3, 4 and 6 can be exercised by the High Court in appeal or in revision because of the provisions contained in section 11 of the Act. The question of what should be the age of the offender when the time arises for the exercise of the powers contained in section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act directly arose in (Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar)3, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 1088. In that case it was held that the crucial date for reckoning the age was the date on which the trial Court had to deal with offender. In Ramaji Missars case the question of the exercise of the powers of the Appellate Court under section 11 had arisen and even at that stage the date which was to be considered was the date upon which the trial Court had to deal with the offender. A very useful summary of the propositions laid down in Ramji Missars case is given in (Daulat Ram v. The State of Haryana)4, A.I.R. 1972 Supreme Court 2434. They are as follows : "(1) the age referred to in section 6(1) of the Act is that when the Court is dealing with the offender, that being the point of time when the Court has to choose between the two alternatives whether to sentence the offender to imprisonment or to apply to him the provision of section 6(1) of the Act. (2) the courts mentioned in section 11 are empowered to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on courts not only under sections 3 and 4 and the consequential provisions but also under section 6. (3) the power conferred on appellate or other courts by section 11(1) of the Act is of the same nature and character and subject to the same criteria and limitations as that conferred on the courts under sections 3 and 4. (3) the power conferred on appellate or other courts by section 11(1) of the Act is of the same nature and character and subject to the same criteria and limitations as that conferred on the courts under sections 3 and 4. (4) the provisions of section 6(1) restrict the absolute and unfettered discretion implied by the word "may" in section 11(1) and the entirety of section 6(1) applies to guide or condition the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 11(1); and (5) the crucial date for reckoning the age where an Appellate Court modified the judgment of the trial Judges when section 6 becomes applicable to a person only on the decision of an appellate or a revisional Court, is that upon which the trial Court had to deal with the offender." The first of the propositions above mentioned clearly shows that the age referred to in section 6(1) of the Act is that age when the Court had to make a choice between the two alternatives- one of sentencing to imprisonment and the other of applying the provisions of section 6(1) to his case. There is thus no difficulty in holding that on the facts of the present case the question of invoking what have been held to be the mandatory provisions of sections 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act does not arise at all. 11. Mr. Agarwal then suggested that the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, enable me to release accused No. 3 after admonition. It is true that the said provisions read with sub-section (4) allow the High Court even in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to release after admonition of an offender who has committed an offence punishable with not more than two years imprisonment. This power is, however, to be exercised having regard to the age, character, antecedents of physical or mental condition of the offender and having regard also to the nature of the offence or any extenuating circumstances. No material was produced in the courts below, nor has any material been produced before me regarding the character, antecedents or other relevant circumstances mentioned in sub-section (3) to enable me to exercise the power of admonition as mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 360. No material was produced in the courts below, nor has any material been produced before me regarding the character, antecedents or other relevant circumstances mentioned in sub-section (3) to enable me to exercise the power of admonition as mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 360. That power cannot be exercised blindly especially when the evidence in the instant case shows that the offence was committed by the three persons not on the spur of the moment, but after some deliberation. Trespass was committed at night time with the object of beating the complainant and other inmates of his house. In my opinion, this is not a case where the benefit of due admonition or of releasing the accused on a bond can be given. 12. Despite the fact that I am not satisfied that accused No. 3 was below the age of 21 years at the time of conviction by the trial Court, still it can be recorded that he is young enough to be released now after reducing the sentence of imprisonment to the term already undergone. 13. In the result, this revision application is partly allowed. The rigorous imprisonment on each count, recorded against petitioner No. 2 original accused No. 3 is reduced to the terms of imprisonment which he has already undergone. The sentence of fine as well as the sentence in default of the payment of fine is retained. The bail bond of accused No. 3 shall stand cancelled. -----