ORDER.- In this writ petition, the order of compulsory retirement made in the impugned G.O. Ms. No. 875 dated 22nd September, 1975 which is to the following effect:- “Under Fundamental Rules 56 (d) Thiru R. Srinivasan, Assistant Director of Fisheries, in the Tamil Nadu Fisheries Service, Tamil Nadu General Service shall retire from service from the date of this order. He shall be paid three months pay and allowances admissible to him on the date of retirement, in lieu of three months notice,” is questioned. 2. The matter was heard originally by a Divisional Bench of this Court, consisting of Ramaprasada Rao, J., and Ratnavel Pandian, J. Several questions of law were raised before the Division Bench and the Bench negatived all of them and ultimately relegated the case for my consideration in the following terms:- "The next head of attack is that the order of compulsory retirement casts a stigma on the officer and is, therefore, violative of Article 311 of the Constitution. Though, in the first instance, it appeared as if the review committee was obliged to review cases of officers against whom corruption charges were levelled, by the time the review committee met on 5th September, 1975, the rule had been amended so as to include, besides officers suspected of corruption, officers, whose work was not upto the normal standard. Thus, it is not as if the order terminating the petitioner’s services necessarily and solely carried with it an implication that he was corrupt. Further there is abundant authority for the proposition that the stigma must stem from the order itself and not be drawn out by a speculative process by reasoning into the order any innuendo from other circumstances or possibilities or suspicions. Vide the decisions in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sri Shyam Lal Sharma1 and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Chandra2; Tara Singh v. State of Rajasthan3 and Sreshta v. Commissioner of Income-tax4. On a conjoint reading of G.O. Ms. No. 761 dated 19th March, 1972, G.O. Ms, No. 3321, dated 17th December, 1973 and G.O. Ms. No. 2850, dated 5th September, 1975, it does not appear to us that the review committees were formed with the sole purpose and intention of weeding out officers against whom complaints of corruption have been made. In public interest inefficient officers could also be weeded out. No. 2850, dated 5th September, 1975, it does not appear to us that the review committees were formed with the sole purpose and intention of weeding out officers against whom complaints of corruption have been made. In public interest inefficient officers could also be weeded out. If the records disclose a fair examination of the material to form in the minds-eye the opinion that in public interest such officers should be retired, then there can be no complaint. The invocation of the surrounding circumstances should not be done as a matter of course. There should be compelling reasons for doing so. It has been repeatedly pointed out by the Supreme Court that Courts cannot delve into the records and pierce the veil of the order for discovering a stigma. What is open to the Court is that it could find out a stigma if it is apparent on the record or otherwise clear, and springs from the order. Vide the decisions in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sughar Singh5; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Chandra2 and State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra.6 Unless the Court is satisfied that such a stigma stems out from the order, an interference with an order of compulsory retirement is not envisaged while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. "We began by saying that at the request of counsel and in order to save the time of the Division Bench we were called upon to express our opinion on the questions argued before us. In the light of our views expressed above, these writ petitions are relegated back to the learned single Judge exercising writ jurisdiction for him to consider each of the writ petitions on their merits and dispose of the same in the light of our judgment as above". 3. Therefore, what remains to be considered by me are:- (i) whether the records disclose enough material to hold in public interest that the petitioner should be retired ; (ii) whether a stigma stems from the order? 4. One of the grounds which was not put forth, earlier, is urged before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner, viz., mala fides of the then Director of Fisheries as stated in paragraph 5 of the affidavit. Learned counsel for the petitioner urges that there are not enough materials to warrant the compulsory retirement of the petitioner. 4. One of the grounds which was not put forth, earlier, is urged before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner, viz., mala fides of the then Director of Fisheries as stated in paragraph 5 of the affidavit. Learned counsel for the petitioner urges that there are not enough materials to warrant the compulsory retirement of the petitioner. Further, the then Director of Fisheries, who was actuated by mala fides, was a member of the Review Committee, which recommended the compulsory retirement. Therefore the order is bad. 5. Learned Government Pleader, after producing the relevant records submits that the records do disclose that there were enough materials to hold that the petitioner should be compulsorily retired. 6. No doubt, in paragraph 5 of the affidavit certain mala fides are attributed to the Director of Fisheries, who was named in that paragraph. But, the petitioner had not chosen to take care to implead him as a party, so that that particular officer could have filed a counter affidavit. Naturally, therefore, the counter affidavit could be by a person who happens to hold that office and his knowledge will be based on records. The failure to implead that Director of Fisheries by name prevents the petitioner from agitating any question of mala fides. Even otherwise, there were two other members of the Committee, who took up not only the case of the petitioner, but the other officers who had either attained 50 years of age or put in 25 years qualifying service and whose pay was not less than Rs. 11,000 and each case was considered with reference to the records and the recommendation was made in an unbiased manner. It cannot even be contended that the petitioner had been singled out because of any mala fide intention. It may also be said that the Review Committee was merely recommending and the ultimate decision is that of the Government. Not only that. The petitioner went before the high level Standing Committee and his case was considered on merits. That Committee found no case for interference. A review petition is pending before the Government and the decision taken thereon could not be communicated, owing to the pendency of the writ petition. 7. The order, which I have extracted, above, is plain in its terms. No stigma could ever arise from that order. That Committee found no case for interference. A review petition is pending before the Government and the decision taken thereon could not be communicated, owing to the pendency of the writ petition. 7. The order, which I have extracted, above, is plain in its terms. No stigma could ever arise from that order. Nor again, can I say that there are not enough materials to warrant compulsory retirement. I find from the records that the Review Committee consisting of high ranking officers of the Government, considered each of the cases objectively. As a matter of fact, in certain cases the Committee was of the view that there were not enough grounds to warrant compulsory retirement. This recommendation of the Review Committee ultimately came to be accepted by the Government. It also examined the case independently, as seen from the file. The matter went to the high level committee, on a representation made by the petitioner. The high level standing committee also, on perusing the representations, was of the view that no interference was called for. Then again a review was made to the Government. In that review application, not one word about mala fides against the then Director of Fisheries had been alleged. On the contrary, mala fides were attributed to a Minister. If really these grounds of mala fides as alleged in paragraph 5 of the affidavit were true, the petitioner would have raised the same before the Government, especially when that application for review before the Government was after the writ petition. But that is not the ground on which I am disposing of, i.e., on the ground of mala fides. 8. First of all, the petitioner had not chosen . to implead the Director of Fisheries by name, in which event it was incumbent upon that Officer to have answered that charge. Be that so. There were two other members of the Committee, which recommended the compulsory retirement. It is not said that they were also actuated by mala fides. I do not think that the other two members surrendered their judgments to the opinion of the Director of Fisheries, nor is there any warrant for such an argument. More than above this, the Committee was merely recommending and the decision is that of the Government. It is not said that they were also actuated by mala fides. I do not think that the other two members surrendered their judgments to the opinion of the Director of Fisheries, nor is there any warrant for such an argument. More than above this, the Committee was merely recommending and the decision is that of the Government. Therefore, whatsoever might have been the mala fides or the bias of the Director of Fisheries, the same cannot be attributed to the Government. 9. It is not for this Court to delve into the files and find out whether on the materials placed before the Committee, the decision to compulsorily retire the petitioner could be arrived at. At this juncture I have got to necessarily stress the law on this aspect. The relationship between the Government and of its servant is essentially that of a master and servant, excepting that certain protections are afforded under Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution of India. From that it cannot be contended that the law of ‘master and servant’ would in any way cease to have application. The employee entered service on the specific condition that either on attaining the age of 50 years or on completion of 25 years of qualifying service, he would be compulsorily retired if the employer comes to such a decision. Where, therefore, the employer on certain materials comes to that conclusion, certainly this Court cannot say that the order of compulsory retirement casts a stigma or is in any way unjustified and therefore should not have been made. It is well known as the Division Bench pointed out, if the order does not cast any stigma, there cannot be a search for the stigma by delving into the files. Nor again would this Court be justified in saying that notwithstanding the materials, the petitioner should be continued in employment. If that were so, the freedom of employment would certainly be-curtailed by this Court and that cannot be done. 10. For all these reasons, this writ petition is hereby dismissed as meritless. No costs.