JUDGMENT - V.S. DESHPANDE, J.:---In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner challenges the order dated 6-12-1976 compulsorily retiring him from service and the order passed in appeal on 16-2-1977. The petitioner was working as a Superintending Engineer in the pay scale of Rs. 1400-1700 on the date when the impugned order was passed against him. The respondent is a statutory corporate body and the conditions of service of its employees, including the petitioner, are governed by the Employees Service Regulations framed by the respondent in exercise of powers under section 79 of the Indian Electricity Act of 1948. Notwithstanding that the ordinary retirement age of its employees, such as the petitioner is 58 years under Regulation No. 7 the respondent passed Resolution and orders being G.O. No. 78 dated 9-9-76 and No. 78 on 2-1-1976 deciding to compulsorily retire its servants at earlier age. Thus in the event of the employees being found to be below normal, the same were made liable to be compulsorily retired at the age of 50, while in the case of employees, whose service record was unsatisfactory, the same were made liable to be compulsorily retired at the age 55. The petitioners date of birth is 15-7-1926. He reached the age of 50 on or about 14th July, 1976. It appears that in terms of the G.O. under consideration, service records of the petitioner came to be examined by the concerned Review Committee in October 1976 and at the said committee it was decided that the petitioner should be compulsorily retired by giving three months notice in terms of the said G.O. The impugned notice was issued pursuant to the said decision in terms by the final dismissing authority. The petitioner preferred an appeal and as indicated earlier, his appeal also has been rejected . 2. Dr. Kulkarni, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, raised several contentions in support its petition. His first contention is that Regulation No. 17 enables an employee to remain in service till he reaches the age superannuation at 58. It is not permissible for the respondent Board to pass any Resolution or G.O. with regard to the conditions of service of its employees. According to Dr. His first contention is that Regulation No. 17 enables an employee to remain in service till he reaches the age superannuation at 58. It is not permissible for the respondent Board to pass any Resolution or G.O. with regard to the conditions of service of its employees. According to Dr. Kulkarni, any such G.O. is bound to be void because of lack of authority to pass the same, and secondly, because of its being in conflict with Regulation No. 17 In our Judgment, dated 23rd June, (1978 in special Civil Application No. 5228 of 1976)1, we have considered this contention of Dr. Kulkarni with regard to the validity of the identical resolutions of the Electricity Board and we have overruled the same. This point does not require any further consideration in view of our judgment in that case. 3. Dr. Kulkarni also contended that in the case of Government servants identical provisions were made applicable by amendment of Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules, but before the amendment of the said Rule the Government servants were given about five years notice. No such advance intimation of the proposal of the Electricity Board was given to the employees by the Board. Dr. Kulkarni, therefore, contends that the application of the newly introduced G.O. without reasonable notice of its promulgation is violative of the principles of natural justice. Identical point also was raised in the earlier Special Civil Application. We were not impressed with the same. We are unable to see any basis for insisting that five years notice or any resonable notice should be given to the employees before the scheme of compulsory retirement is introduced in their conditions of service. It is indisputable that conditions of service can always be altered. The question of observation of principles of natural justice really not arise in such a situation. All that is relevant is to find out whether the circumstance alleged are true or not and, secondly, whether the same within the purview of the said G.O. or not. Beyond that we are not in position to lay down a rule that any particular notice has to given to the employees of the Board to make such G.Os. effective against them. 4. Dr. Kulkarni then contends that now the rules with regard to the maintenance of confidential records have been changed. Beyond that we are not in position to lay down a rule that any particular notice has to given to the employees of the Board to make such G.Os. effective against them. 4. Dr. Kulkarni then contends that now the rules with regard to the maintenance of confidential records have been changed. Rules make it compulsory on the part of the higher officers to communicate the adverse remarks to the employees and give them an opportunity to explain the same. Dr. Kulkarni contends that in the absence of identical rules prior to the enforcement of the new Rules, the confidential records are as good as non est and cannot be relied on for the purpose of giving effect to Rules as to compulsory retirement. The contention appears to us to be devoid of any substance. We have occassion to consider the scheme of compulsory retirement with regard to Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules in the case of (Vithal Ramchandra v. The State)2, 74 Bom.L.R. 523. Once such Rules are made applicable, after ensuring the security of the service of the employees for a certain period, the material on which such orders can be passed is not required to be shown to the persons who are affected by such orders nor any notice is required to be given to the persons who are affected before the same can be relied on for arriving at such conclusion. It is true that under the then Rules, adequate precautions were not taken to communicate every kind of remark to the employees and the employees could not have had enough opportunity to make representation against the same. It is well settled that orders of compulsory retirement passed under such Rules do not involve any stigma against any person and the order is not considered to be punitive in any sense of the term. This has been now held by the Supreme Court in several reported judgments. In the very above case we have indicated how the confidential records can furnish adequate and dependable basis for passing compulsory retirement orders in situation demanding the same. The circumstance that no precautions were in existence in the earlier Rules, as are brought into the new Rules by itself cannot be a circumstance to vitiate the orders of compulsory retirement. 5. Dr. The circumstance that no precautions were in existence in the earlier Rules, as are brought into the new Rules by itself cannot be a circumstance to vitiate the orders of compulsory retirement. 5. Dr. Kulkarni then contends that under the terms of the G.O. the decision to compulsory retire is based on the five years services record of the employee concerned. In the present case, only four-years record was looked into and the fifth years service record was not available to the said review Committee for no fault of the petitioner. Dr. Kulkarni, therefore, contends that the decision so arrived at by the Review Committee and the order so passed by the dismissing authority on the basis of such decision is defective and liable to be quashed. It is not disputed by Mr. Gurusahani, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent, that the record of immediately preceding year in which the action was taken was actually not before the Review Committee. On our perusal of the said record produced before us by Mr. Gurusahani, the learned Advocate appearing for the Board, it appears to us that remarks made by the then Chairman of the Board Mr. Carriappa could not be before the Review Committee, as the date of the remarks is subsequent to the date of the sitting of the Review Committee. Two questions arise for our consideration firstly, whether absence of the record of one year service by itself would vitiate the decision and secondly, could production of the said record have made any different to the decision arrived at? On the first question, we are unable to trace any authority of principle for the proposition that four years record could not have enabled the Review Committee to make up its mind as to the calibre of the petitioner. In the event of remarks of the proceeding year being exceptionally favourable to the petitioner, one could imagined of some different conclusion of the Review Committee. Absence of the record of one year by itself, in our opinion, cannot vitiate the decision as such. In this context, it is worthwhile nothing that the petitioner was entitled to have a remedy of appeal against the decision made by the dismissing authority relying on the decision of the Review Committee. Absence of the record of one year by itself, in our opinion, cannot vitiate the decision as such. In this context, it is worthwhile nothing that the petitioner was entitled to have a remedy of appeal against the decision made by the dismissing authority relying on the decision of the Review Committee. It is not disputed before us that at any rate when the Appellate Authority formed its final opinion it had the advantage of having the remarks of Mr. Cariappa before it. The Appellate Authority thought it proper not to interfere with the impugned order. The conclusion must necessarily be that the decision could not have been otherwise. Once it is found that the petitioner himself had a right of appeal to the competent authority, the component authority in the very nature of things must also be deemed to have powers to look into such additional relevant material as could have enabled him either to confirm the view taken by subordinate authority or to serve the same. We are not prepared to accept the contention of Dr. Kulkarni that absence of one years report the Review Committee by itself can result in invalidating either the decision of the Review Committee or the action taken thereon by the competent authority. 6. Dr. Kulkarni then contends that the petitioner had already reached the age of 50 long before the Review Committee met on 28-10-1976 and the impugned notice of compulsory retirement was, served on him. According to Dr. Kulkarni, action as to compulsory retirement can be taken only before the incumbent reaches the age of 50, and powers of compulsory retirement as the age of 50 must be deemed to have been exhausted as soon as the incumbent passes the age of 50. Reliance was placed by Dr. Kulkarni in this behalf on para 4 of G.O. No. 76. Now, it is true that the G.O. does contemplate the examining the record of the concerned employee by the Selection Committee for five years and "review the cases of the employees who are expected to attain the age of 50 and 55 years in January-June and July-December period of the following year." When the orders were enforced on 9-9-1975 the first time that the Selection or Review Committee could have met to consider the case of the petitioner could be in the second half of January, 1975. Admittedly no meeting of the Selection Committee took place at that time. Firstly G.O. 76 was modified by G.O. dated 2-1-76. These rules cannot be said to have been in force till 2-1-78. Affidavit filed before us on behalf of the respondent by one Ambardekar, Joint Secretary of the Electricity Board, shows that due to administrative difficulties meeting of the Selection Committee could not take place in the month of January 1976 or till October, 1976. The question that arises for consideration is whether Clause 4 of the G.O. can be held to be so mandatory as to vitiate the action in its entirety merely because the action was not taken before the petitioner reached the age of 50. We are unable to hold that Clause 4 of the G.O. to be that mandatory. We do not think that discussion at page 318 of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statute can have any relevance whatsoever to the point that arises before us. While considering this question it is not possible for us to ignore that they are merely administrative instructions and not the statutory provisions. Obligation to review the cases of the employees who are expected to attain the age of 50 or 55 years cannot be raised to the pedestal of any statutory or constitutional obligation. The Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the identical contention with regard to the corresponding clause of Rule 161 (c-1) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules and the Division Bench over-ruled the said contention. One of us is a party to the said decision. We are unable to take any different view in the matter. 7. The main contention of Dr. Kulkarni is that the impugned decision of the Review Committee as also the decision of the competent authority to compulsorily retire the petitioner is arbitrary and is not only not supported by any material on record, but it is contrary to the remarks and the certificates given to the petitioner from time to time during the course of his service. In para 14 of his petition the petitioner thus refers to how his services were appreciated on 6-11-1971 by the then Chairman of the Board Mr. Bhave with regard to his performance as Chief Load Despatcher at Kalwa. Ignorance with regard to the existence of such record by the State cannot be relied on to do away with its effect. In para 14 of his petition the petitioner thus refers to how his services were appreciated on 6-11-1971 by the then Chairman of the Board Mr. Bhave with regard to his performance as Chief Load Despatcher at Kalwa. Ignorance with regard to the existence of such record by the State cannot be relied on to do away with its effect. We are unable to see any reason why we should doubt the authenticity of the copies of the certificates produced before us. This is bound to have some relevance to the point that consideration as the remarks happened to be of the year which fall within the five years service required to be considered by the review committee. The petitioner has also referred to certain other certificates in para 15 of his petition. Though the same happened to be of the year 1964 and 1966 and no directly relevant to the period under consideration we are not prepared to altogether threat the same as wholly irrelevant. Affidavit of Ambardekar, on the other hand, indicates as to what precisely was relied on by the review committee for coming to the conclusion that it did adversely against the petitioner. The review committee appears to have relied on (1) certain observations made by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nasik, in his judgment dated 11-10-1974 in Special Civil Suit No. 10 of 1970 and connected suit, (2) punishment as to the stoppage of three increments by order dated 17-6-1970 and (3) confidential records of the relevant four years, as indicated earlier. While considering the correctness or otherwise of the conclusion arrived at by the review committee, we shall have to bear in mind that we are not Appellate Authority against the same. All that is relevant for the limited purpose of exercising our jurisdiction under Article 226 is to see whether relevant considerations have weighed with the concerned authority and the decision is not actuated by mala fides or any extraneous consideration. A good remark here or there or even a bad remark here or there cannot be taken into account by us for considering whether the review committee could have reached the conclusion that it has reached and also whether the appointing authority was right in compulsorily retiring the petitioner. A good remark here or there or even a bad remark here or there cannot be taken into account by us for considering whether the review committee could have reached the conclusion that it has reached and also whether the appointing authority was right in compulsorily retiring the petitioner. As details of these remarks were not indicated in the two affidavits filed before us on behalf of the respondent, we thought it proper to look into the service records itself, not with a view to appraise the same as an Appellate Authority, but to find out if any reasonable body of persons could reach the conclusion to which it has reached. On careful perusal of the same, we do not find it possible to hold that the review committee could not have reached the conclusion to which it has reached inspite of good certificates relied on by the petitioner. 8. In this context Dr. Kulkarni also relied on the circumstance that he was promoted as Deputy Chief Engineer on 20-12-1973. The petitioner was confirmed in that post on 15-1-1975. It is not in dispute that this promotion was required to be set aside because of the judgment of this Court in a writ application dated 14th July, 1975. It is, however, not disputed by Mr. Gursahani that this setting aside of the promotion had nothing to do with the calibre or competency of the petitioner. Promotion was set aside because of certain other norms having not been followed by the authority promoting the petitioner. Dr. Kulkarni, is justified in contending that the petitioner could not have been promoted unless his integrity amongst other things was also found to be good. This, however, is merely one of the several circumstances. We have no reason to assume that this was not taken into account by the review committee. If the Review Committee was constrained to arrive at a difference conclusion inspite of this one favourable circumstances the decision cannot be said to be legally bad. 9. Dr. Kulkarni contends that the Review Committee could not have placed any reliance whatsoever on the judgment of the Civil Judge, as he was not a party to the same nor had he any opportunity to explain the circumstances that weighed with the learned Judge in making certain remarks against the petitioner. This contention cannot be properly appreciated unless relevant facts are stated. This contention cannot be properly appreciated unless relevant facts are stated. As the affidavit on both sides did not indicate the entire picture, we thought it better to get the relevant facts by requiring Mr. Gurusahani, the learned Advocate for the State, to supply us the copy of the judgment in Special Civil Suit No. 10 of 1970 dated 10th October, 1974 and enquiry proceedings in which ultimately punishment of stoppages of increments was imposed. This alone would enable us to have a look in facts and in the manner in the Review Committee had a look at it. Facts at the root of the both are practically the same. While the petitioner was posted as an Executive Engineer at Nasik, he had accepted a tender in respect of a contract of carriage. It was alleged that the tender was artificially manipulated to bring it within his jurisdiction, and rates were grossly exorbitant and disproportionate to the rates of the proceedings year, resulting in the loss to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/-. Six charges were framed against the petitioner in departmental proceedings. Inquiry Officer of the rank of Chief Engineer held all the six charges to have been proved. The Chairman of the Board, the competent appointing and dismissing authority, however held five charges to have been proved, including manipulation of figures and loss to the Government, but gave benefit of doubt in respect of charge No. 4 about making false statements and thought it proper to impose the punishment of stoppage increment by his order dated 17-6-1970. The contractors bills for the claim at such blostered up rates were not paid. They filed suits which were dismissed by the Civil Judges on 11-10-1974. It is this judgment in which strong remarks were made against the petitioner and some other Executive Engineers also involved. They were all found by the learned Judge to have acted in league with the contractors. This finding was necessary to decide the six issues before him. The petitioner and other Executive Engineer could not have been party to the suit. Nevertheless, his findings and adverse comments, required to be made for the disposal of the suit, can neither be said to be uncalled for nor could have been lightly ignored. The learned Judge seems to have assumed that the petitioner was exhonerated in the above departmental proceedings. Nevertheless, his findings and adverse comments, required to be made for the disposal of the suit, can neither be said to be uncalled for nor could have been lightly ignored. The learned Judge seems to have assumed that the petitioner was exhonerated in the above departmental proceedings. He, therefore, suggested fresh enquiry in the light of the facts disclosed before him. It is clear that his impression as to petitioners being exhonerated was ill founded and the review committee was justified in ignoring it in view of the actual facts. The finding disclose a sordid affairs and gross misconduct on the part of the petitioner. The review committee could have taken notice of the same notwithstanding the light punishment actually imposed. It is true that the petitioner was not party to the suits. But the findings in the departmental proceedings only confirm the remarks made by the learned Judge. Reliance thereon in the facts of this case cannot be said to be wrong. Even otherwise also it is fell settled that for compulsory retirement, it is permissible to rely on material collected unilaterally without the incumbent having any opportunity to have this say. The action is held not to be punitive. To repeat again, we do not propose to be the Judges of the facts and consider the whole case as if we were hearing an appeal against the order of the competent authority. Suffice it to observe that the Review Committee on the strength of the marks as also the findings and the order passed on this could have arrived to the conclusion to which it has arrived. The Review Committee could have arrived at a such a conclusion notwithstanding his earlier promotion the earlier certificates commanding the services of the petitioner, including the one accorded to him by then Chairman on 6-11-1971. 10. Dr. Kulkarni then draw our attention to another G.O. No. 85 dated 10-10-1977. Obviously this G.O. was made by the respondent Board during the pendency of this application in this Court. Under the G.O. the orders of compulsory retirement passed earlier were intended to be withdrawn in the event of (1) the same not having become effective before 17-8-1977, and (2) they were not persons of doubtful integrity. With regard to the first condition, it was noticed that the petitioners case was covered by it. Under the G.O. the orders of compulsory retirement passed earlier were intended to be withdrawn in the event of (1) the same not having become effective before 17-8-1977, and (2) they were not persons of doubtful integrity. With regard to the first condition, it was noticed that the petitioners case was covered by it. Though the petitioner was compulsorily retired under the impugned order dated 16-2-1977, the petitioner was in leave till 17-3-1977. Under G.O. No. 35 the orders of compulsory retirement becoming effective after 17-8-1977 was liable to be cancelled, excepting when the person concerned appeared to be of doubtful integrity. When the matter was taken up for hearing on 23rd June, 1978, Dr. Kulkarni made an application for amendment of Spl.C.A. for relying on this G.O. No. 85. As prima facie the petitioner appeared to have been covered by the G.O., we thought it proper to allow the amendment application and adjourned the matter to enable the respondent to have their say on the same. After that application was amended, an additional affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent by one Ambardekar on 16th July, 1978. According to this affidavit, the petitioners case appears to have been placed before the Maharashtra State Electricity Board at its meeting on 30-3-1978 and the said board appears to have come to the conclusion that the petitioners case fell within the exception laid down in G.O. 85". The question whether any employee is entitled to the benefit of G.O. 85 or not ordinarily shall have to be decided by the competent authority, i.e. the Electricity Board and by nobody else. If the policy laid down under G.O. 85 of 1977 was not made applicable to each and every person, who was compulsorily retired before 17-8-1977, and if the petitioner was found by the Electricity Board to be falling within the exception indicated in the said policy itself, it will not be possible for us to go behind the same and come to any different conclusion. 11. Dr. Kulkarni, however, contends that G.O. Nos. 76 and 78 contemplated compulsory retirement at the age of 50, only if the employee was found to be of below prescribed normal. According to him, the question of integrity could not be relevant, while considering whether the employee is below normal. 11. Dr. Kulkarni, however, contends that G.O. Nos. 76 and 78 contemplated compulsory retirement at the age of 50, only if the employee was found to be of below prescribed normal. According to him, the question of integrity could not be relevant, while considering whether the employee is below normal. The respondent should not be permitted to justify its order by advancing different reasons than the one on which the same is expressed to have been passed at the relevant time. In support of his contention Dr. Kulkarni relied on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Mohindar Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi)2, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 851. The judgment does lay down that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. We are unable to see any relevance of this ratio to the facts of the present case. The respondent is not trying to justify the earlier order by any fresh reasons. Earlier order was passed on the ground that the petitioners calibre in service was found to be below normal. We are not prepared to exclude lack of integrity altogether from this test. Notwithstanding that G.O. 85 contemplates applying slightly different standards for such compulsory retirement, no attempt is made to furnish additional ground for justifying the earlier order. It cannot be disputed that if the compulsory retirement order is good in law, according to the conditions prescribed under the then existing relevant rule, the same cannot become bad merely because the new different standards are prescribed for such compulsory retirement. We have already indicated how the contention of Dr. Kulkarni that review committees decision of the decision thereon of the competent authority cannot be said to be arbitrary or based on no record whatsoever. Occasion to indicate the some more grounds arose because the petitioner himself wanted to rely on subsequent G.O. 85. Ordinarily the compulsory retirement order passed before the G.O. was contemplated to be effective. The G.O. however, contemplates not giving effect to the orders which had not become effective till 17-8-1977. For this concession the condition that is prescribed by the respondent in the G.O. is that the incumbent should not be of doubtful integrity. Ordinarily the compulsory retirement order passed before the G.O. was contemplated to be effective. The G.O. however, contemplates not giving effect to the orders which had not become effective till 17-8-1977. For this concession the condition that is prescribed by the respondent in the G.O. is that the incumbent should not be of doubtful integrity. This, no doubt, is an additional ground. But it is introduced only for the purposes of auditing the orders already passed earlier. The respondent is driven to rely on this ground only to explain as to why the order against the petitioner cannot be treated as in effective, though orders to that effect in some other cases were actually treated as ineffective. To such a situation the ratio of Mohindar Singh Gills case (supra) can have no application whatsoever. The only question that survives for consideration is whether the respondents conclusion that the petitioner was a person of doubtful integrity is based on any material with them or can be said to have arrived at arbitrary without any materials whatsoever. Suffice it to observe that in the face of the inquiry report and the findings thereon, it should be difficult to hold that the respondent board was not justified in coming to its conclusion to which it arrived. 12. The petition is thus liable to be dismissed. 13. Rule is accordingly discharged with costs. -----