Judgment.- The plaintiffs in O.S. No. 78 of 1973 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Nagapattinam are the appellants. The plaintiffs have instituted the suit in their capacity as the hereditary trustees of what is known as the private family trust Sri Natarajaswamy Temple, Thillaivilagam. According to the allegations in the plaint seme years ago while digging the field of one S.N. Sambasiva Iyer his farm servant Vaithi Ambalagaran came across one Nataraja Vigraham and two Amman Vigrahams. The Government recognised the finder Vaithi Ambalagaran as the owner of the said Vigrahams under the Treasure Trove Act. Under Exhibit A-1, a document styled as a registered release deed, the said Sambasiva Iyer got the Vigrahams from the said Vaithi Ambalagaran. However, Sambasiva Iyer was not financially in a position to build a temple for installing the Vigrahams and making provisions for the daily pooja and neivedyam of the idols. He therefore gave the idols to one Chockalinga Chettiar, brother of Narayanan Chettiar great grandfather of the plaintiffs. The said brothers constructed a temple for the family business in the hands of the brothers prospered enormously, with the result that they were able to build a small temple at Thillivilagam and installed the idols therein. Subsequently they acquired land out of the money lending business for the unkeep and maintenance of the temple. Under Exhibit A-3 dated 17th February, 1908 they obtained a formal release in respect of the idols from the widow of. Sambasiva Iyer. Again on 8th November, 1922 nine more idols and two peedams were found in a field in Thillaivilagam and those idols were also entrusted to the custody of the plaintiffs’ ancestor Narayanan Chettiar who purchased the same for a sum of Rs. 460-12-0. One of the items so purchased included an Uthsava Vigraham of Sri Natarajaswami. Thereafter, the brothers Chockalinga Chettiar and Narayanan Chettiar spent about two lakhs of rupees and built a stone temple with prakarams and compound walls and performed kumbabishegam at a cost of Rs. 20,000 in 1922. Since then the temple has been in the management of the plaintiff’s family for four generations. About 30 acres of lands were purchased by the plaintiffs’ ancestor for the benefit of the family temple. 20,000 in 1922. Since then the temple has been in the management of the plaintiff’s family for four generations. About 30 acres of lands were purchased by the plaintiffs’ ancestor for the benefit of the family temple. The expenses of pooja and neivedyam for four kalams are being performed and met with from the income of the lands purchased by the plaintiffs’ family. No contribution or donation had ever been obtained from the public either for the building of the temple or for the Kumbabishegam or for the purchase of the lands for the temple. The Gurukkal, the cook, the Meikaval and piper were all appointed by the plaintiffs’ ancestors and by the plaintiffs and their salaries also paid by ancestors of the plaintiffs and by the plaintiffs. There is no Balipeedam or Dwajasthambam in the temple. There is no Uthsavams performed by the temple. In the whole year six abishegams are performed and the entire expenses are met by the plaintiffs’ family. Of the two brothers Chockalinga Chettiar died issueless. Narayanan Chettiar had two sons Meyappa and Annamalai. Narayanan Chettiar died in 1923. Meyappa Chettiar had no issues and his widow adopted one Kannappa Chettiar who also died issueless. Kannappa Chettiar had adopted the second plaintiff. The first plaintiff is the only son of Annamalai. The plaintiffs are the present hereditary. trustees of the suit private family temple. 2. The plaint further proceeds to state that the second defendant, Assistant Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Nagapattinam, (second respondent) sent a notice to the first plaintiff on 27th May, 1969 calling upon the plaintiffs to explain certain matters in the audit reports from fasli 1374 to 1378. The first plaintiff sent an explanation in a letter to the second defendant on 28th June, 1969. Even before completing the enquiry, the second defendant sent a report to the first defendant and appointed an executive officer for management of the suit temple treating the temple as a public temple by his order dated 8th December, 1969. The plaintiffs preferred a revision to the Government. The Government granted an interim stay but by final order dated 18th July, 1970, dismissed the revision petition. The plaintiffs then filed a writ petition in the High Court in W.P. No. 2788 of 1970 to quash the order of the Commissioner dated 8th December, 1969 and the order of the Government dated 18th July, 1970. The Government granted an interim stay but by final order dated 18th July, 1970, dismissed the revision petition. The plaintiffs then filed a writ petition in the High Court in W.P. No. 2788 of 1970 to quash the order of the Commissioner dated 8th December, 1969 and the order of the Government dated 18th July, 1970. The writ petition was allowed setting aside the order of the Commissioner appointing the executive officer. The order of the High Court in the writ petition is exhibited as Exhibit A-39 dated 11th November, 1970. The question regarding the character of the temple etc., were not decided by the High Court in the writ petition. The plaint further proceeds to state that the second defendant is proceeding with the enquiry on the charges levelled against the plaintiffs on the basis of the audit reports from the fasli 1374 to 1378 on the assumption that the suit temple is a public temple. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs have filed the suit for a declaration that the suit temple is a private temple belonging to their family, that they are the hereditary trustees of the same and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 and 2 who are the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment from interfering with the management of the temple. 3. The defendants in their written statement contended that the suit was not maintainable inasmuch as the plaintiffs have not filed any application before the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment under section 63 (a) and 63 (b) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act) for a declaration that the suit temple is a private temple and that they are hereditary trustees. They further stated that the suit was not maintainable under section 108 of the Act. The claim of the plaintiffs that the suit temple is a private temple was challenged. The defendants contended that the pubic were worshipping in the temple as of right. Annual festivals are being conducted and Utsavamoorthy is being taken out from the temple and that the public were worshipping the deity by offering coconuts and planints. Contributions are made by the public to meet the expenses of the annual festivals in the temple. The plaintiffs themselves are paying annual contributions and audit fees to the department under section 92 of the Act. Contributions are made by the public to meet the expenses of the annual festivals in the temple. The plaintiffs themselves are paying annual contributions and audit fees to the department under section 92 of the Act. It was further stated that the value of the land in the name of the temple comes to Rs. 1,50,000 and that proper court-fee had not been paid. The plaintiffs filed a rejoinder traversing the contentions in the written statement. 4. On these relevant pleadings the following issues were raised for consideration: (1) Whether the suit will lie before the Court without exhausting the other remedies provided under the Act XXII of 1959? (2) Whether the court-fee paid in the suit is just and proper? (3) Whether the suit temple is a private one? (4) To what relief? The following additional issues were framed ? (1) Whether the order of the Commissioner, appointing an executive officer declaring the plaintiffs’ right as non-hereditary trustee is illegal and invalid as contended by the plaintiffs? (2) Whether the first defendant must be deemed to have waived his right to raise the plea under section 108 of Hindu Religious and Charitable En dowmen’s Act by reason of his order appointing an executive officer and declaring the plaintiffs as non-hereditary trustees even before the enquiry of the charges framed against the plaintiffs was over? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the order of the Commissioner dated 8th December, 1969 is illegal, null and void and plaintiffs are hereditary trustees of the suit temple ? (4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the enquiry by the Asstistant Commissioner, second defendant herein regarding the charges against the plaintiffs are illegal and beyond the power of the second defendant? (5) Are the plaintiffs the hereditary trustees of the suit temple? (6) Are the plaintiffs entitled to declaration and injunction as prayed for. The Trial Court found that the suit was barred under section 108 of the Act and also that the suit was bad for want of suit notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As regards the character of the temple, the trial Court held that the suit temple is not a private temple of the plaintiffs but a public temple. The findings entered by the trial Court on the other issues are not material. As regards the character of the temple, the trial Court held that the suit temple is not a private temple of the plaintiffs but a public temple. The findings entered by the trial Court on the other issues are not material. In the result, the trial Court dismissed the suit with costs. 5. The defeated plaintiffs have filed the present appeal against the dismissal of the suit by the trial Court. Mr. Gopalaswami Iyengar for the appellants has raised the following three contentions: (i) The finding of the trial Court that the suit is not maintainable under section 108 of the Act is wrong. (ii) In the nature of the relief claimed for in the suit the suit cannot be held to be bad for want of notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, and (iii) The finding of the trial Court on the merits that the suit temple is not a private temple but a public one is not justified by the evidence in the case. Per contra, Miss Vimala for the respondents submitted on the basis of certain decisions which will be referred to later on that the finding of the trial Court that the suit was not maintainable was correct. 6. It is necessary to note the exact prayer in the plaint which is to the following effect. The plaintiffs therefore pray that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to pass a decree : (a) declaring that the suit temple, that is, Sri Nataraja Swamy Temple of Thillaivilagam is the private family temple of the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs are the hereditary trustees thereof; (b) restraining the defendants by means of a permanent injunction from interfering with the, plaintiffs’ management of the suit temple in any manner by appointing an executive officer or otherwise. The other two reliefs asked for in the plaint are not material for consideration in this context. 7. Mr. Gopalaswami Iyengar, contends that under section 108 of the Act the jurisdiction of the civil Court to try a suit of this nature has not been taken away either expressly or by necessary implication. He cited the decision in Dhuhbhai v. State of M.P. 1in this connection. 7. Mr. Gopalaswami Iyengar, contends that under section 108 of the Act the jurisdiction of the civil Court to try a suit of this nature has not been taken away either expressly or by necessary implication. He cited the decision in Dhuhbhai v. State of M.P. 1in this connection. That was a case where in dealing with the question whether a civil suit for a declaration that provisions of law relating to assessment were ultra vires and for refund of tax illegally collected under the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, the Supreme Court laid down the principles regarding the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Court. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court need not be reiterated. 8. Section 6 clause 18 of the Act defines a religious institution as a math, temple or specific endowment. Clause 20 of the section defined temple thus: “a place, by whatever designation known, used as a place of public religious worship, and dedicated to, or for the benefit of or used as of right by the Hindu Community or any section thereof, as a place of public religious worship.” Section 63 so far as is relevant for the purpose of this case provides as follows: Subject to the rights of suit or appeal hereinafter provided, the Deputy Commissioner shall have power to inquire into and decide the following disputes and matters: — (a) Whether an institution is a religious institution, (6) whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee. Section 69 of the Act provides for an appeal against the order of the Deputy Commissioner to the Commissioner. Section 70 enable an aggrieved party to file a suit against the orders of the Commissioner under certain provisions, one of them being an order of the Commissioner passed in an appeal against the order of the Deputy Commissioner under section 63 of the Act. Section 108 of the Act states that no suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of law, except under and in conformity with the provisions of this Act. Section 108 of the Act states that no suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of law, except under and in conformity with the provisions of this Act. In paragraph 7 of the plaint it is stated that the suit temple is the private temple of the plaintiffs’ family and the H.R. & G.E. department of the Government of Tamil Nadu has no jurisdiction whatever to interfere with the management of the plaintiffs as hereditary trustees and to deprive them altogether of the entire powers of management by appointing an executive officer. It is also further stated that the plaintiffs are entitled to have a declaration that the suit temple is the private temple of the plaintiffs’ family and not a public temple and that the plaintiffs are the hereditary trustees of the said family temple and that neither the 1st defendant nor the second defendant has got any right to take proceedings against the plaintiffs or interfere with their management by appointing an executive officer as sought to be done by the first defendant. Therefore, it is clear that what the plaintiffs seek is a declaration that the suit temple is not a religious institution within the meaning of section 63 (a) of the Act. Further they claimed to be holding office as hereditary trustees of the suit temple. Now these two matters are specifically covered by the provisions in section 63 (a) and (b) of the Act and the Deputy Commissioner is given jurisdiction to decide whether the institution is a religious institution and whether a particular person holds office as hereditary trustee or not. Mr. Gopalaswami Iyengar stresses upon the fact that the language used in section 63 (a) and (b) of the Act are only to the effect that the Deputy Commissioner is only given the power to decide a dispute whether an institution is a religious institution and whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee and that the language is not whether the institution is a religious institution or not and whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee or not. I am unable to see any distinction in the words used by the learned counsel and the words used in the section itself and I feel that the distinction suggested is a distinction without any difference. 9. In State of Madras v. K. Melamatam1,the identical question came up for consideration with reference to sections 57, 61, 62 and 93 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. In. that case a suit was instituted praying for an order of injunction restraining the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board from levying any contribution under sections 69 and 70 of the Madras Act II of 1927 on the allegation that the institution was outside the purview of the Act and the levy was otherwise illegal. During the pendency of the suit, the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, came into force and in view of the provisions contained in section 103 (j) of the said Act, the suit was continued against the Commissioner of the Hindu Religious Endowments. The plaint was also amended by including a relief for injunction restraining the authorities from levying any contribution under Madras Act XIX 6f 1951. The Supreme Court addressed itself to two questions for decision. The first was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction restraining the levy of contributions and audit fees under Madras Act II of 1927 and the second was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction restraining the levy of contributions and audit fees under Madras Act XIX of 1951. The Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative on the ground that the authorities had already taken a decision that the institution was outside the purview of Madras Act II of 1927 and that the said order had become final. After extracting the definition of ‘math’ and sections 57, 61, 62 and 93 of Madras Act XIX of 1951, as regards the second question, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Now, one of the disputes in this suit is whether the institution is a religious institution within the meaning of Act XIX of 1951. Specific provision is made in sections 57, 61 and 62 of the Act for determination of that dispute by the Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner and eventually by a suit instituted in a Court under section 62. Specific provision is made in sections 57, 61 and 62 of the Act for determination of that dispute by the Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner and eventually by a suit instituted in a Court under section 62. The present suit is not brought under or in conformity with section 62 and consequently, in so far as the suit claims the relief of injunction restraining the levy of contribution and audit fees under Madras Act XIX of 1951, it is barred by section 93 of the Act.“ In this connection, it may be pointed out that section 61 of the Madras Act XIX of 1951 corresponds to section 69 of the Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959 and section 62 of the Madras Act XIX of 1951 corresponds to section 70 of the Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959, while section 93 of the Madras Act XIX of 1951 corresponds to section 108 of the Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959. 10. This question came up for consideration before Ismail, J., in Santhana Gopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar 1 , in a different situation. There, the suit was filed by the plaintiffs for a declaration that Sri Rajagopalaswami temple and its properties exclusively belonged to Pattusaluvar community residents of Solamaligai village and directing defendants 1 to 3 to put the plaintiffs in possession of the temple and its properties. The maintainability of the suit was challenged by the authorities before this Court. The learned Judge held as follows: ”When the applicability of the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), to a temple is challenged, the Deputy Commissioner has jurisdiction to decide that question under section 63 (a) of the Act. Consequently, a suit filed in a civil Court claiming certain reliefs on the basis that the provision of the Act do not apply to the suit temple and as such is outside the purview of the Act, would be barred by section 63 (a) read with section 108 of the Act. In coming to this conclusion the learned Judge followed the decision in State of Madras v. K. Melamatam 2 . In coming to this conclusion the learned Judge followed the decision in State of Madras v. K. Melamatam 2 . As I have stated already, the case before Ismail, J., was slightly different from the present case in the sense that the declaration that was asked for by the plaintiffs in that case was that Sri Rajagopalaswami Temple and its properties exclusively belonged to Pattusaluvar community of Solamaligai village. Against the judgment of Ismail, J., two appeals were filed in L.P. As. Nos. 58 of 1968 and 31 of 1969 and they were disposed of by a Bench of this Court on 27th June, 1973 and the decision is reported in Santhanagopala Chettiar v. Seetharama ‘Chettiar3. There the Letters Patent Bench took the view that the averments in the plaint went to show that the temple was admitted to be a religious institution as defined in the Act and that the plaint sought a declaration that the temple was one founded by a particular community managed and administered by them and that the temple belonged to that community. There was nothing in the plaint to show that the plaintiffs claimed it as a private temple. On the pleadings, therefore, the substantial question was whether the temple was a denomination temple and the civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the question. The learned Judges held that the question whether the suit temple was a denominational temple and was therefore entitled to protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India was not a matter to be decided by the Deputy Commissioner under section 63 of the Act. Consequently, the Bench held disagreeing with Ismail, J., that the suit in that case was maintainable. Consequently, the Bench held disagreeing with Ismail, J., that the suit in that case was maintainable. At the same time, it is necessary to state the following observation of the Letters Patent Bench which are relevant to the present case: “If the question really is as to whether the temple is a religious institution as defined in the Act or not naturally it would be a question exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner as per the provisions of section 63 of the Act.” It is therefore clear that the Letters Patent Bench was in complete agreement with the dictum laid down by Ismail, J., in Santhana Gopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar1, that when the applicability of the provisions of the Madras Act XXII of 1959 to a temple is challenged, the Deputy Commissioner has jurisdiction to decide that question under section 63 (a) of the Act and that consequently a suit filed in a civil Court claiming certain reliefs on the basis that the provisions of the Act do not apply to the suit temple and as such is outside the purview of the Act, would be barred by section 63 (a) read with section 108 of the Act. 11. Mr. Gopalaswami Iyengar referred to another Bench decision of this Court in Sri Venkataramanaswamy Deity v. Vadugammal1. There, the plaintiff, Sri Venkataramanaswamy Deity, at Kothur village by its trustee Sanjeevi Chetty filed the suit for a declaration of the plaintiff’s title to the suit property and for possession with past and future mesne profits from N.R. Sanjeevi Chetty, who was said to have been appointed trustee by the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board. The suit was opposed by the defendant on the ground that she was in possession of the properties in her own right and had perfected title by adverse possession. In that connection, the defendant also raised the contention that the civil Court was barred from trying the suit by virtue of the provisions contained in the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. The trial Court, the lower appellate Court and the High Court in second appeal took the view that the suit was barred by the provisions of sections 57 and 93 of the Act. The trial Court, the lower appellate Court and the High Court in second appeal took the view that the suit was barred by the provisions of sections 57 and 93 of the Act. The learned Judges held as follows: “It may be noted that the scheme of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act regarding the jurisdiction of the civil Court is different from enactments like the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. Section 93 of the Act would provide that no suit in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in the Act shall be instituted in any Court except under and in conformity with the provisions of the Act. What the Act contemplates is that provision is made for determining or deciding certain matters or disputes that should be followed before a civil Court is approached......As already pointed out, the procedure prescribed under the Act regarding the matters specified in section 57 should be followed before the Deputy Commissioner and in the appeal or revision before the Commissioner, before a suit is filed. A relief which cannot be granted by the Deputy Commissioner can be asked for in a civil Court. If, in deciding whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief asked for, the civil Court also had to decide certain issues which may fall within section 57 of the Act, the civil Court’s jurisdiction is not barred. There is no provision for reference by the civil Court of a particular issue which is within the scope of section 57 of the Deputy Commissioner for determination. Equally, the plaintiff who seeks relief from a civil Court cannot be asked to get adjudication of an incidental question from the Deputy Commissioner before he filed a suit. Therefore the preponderance of authority of our Court is that a civil suit is not barred in respect of a relief which cannot be granted by the Deputy Commissioner and that in such a suit, the civil Court has jurisdiction to decide incidental issues which are within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner.” Mr. Therefore the preponderance of authority of our Court is that a civil suit is not barred in respect of a relief which cannot be granted by the Deputy Commissioner and that in such a suit, the civil Court has jurisdiction to decide incidental issues which are within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner.” Mr. Gopalaswami Iyengar argued that the main relief he has asked for in the suit is for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs’ right to manage the temple and its affairs and that the question whether the temple is a religious institution coming within section 63 (a) of the Act or whether the plaintiffs are hereditary trustees coming within the meaning of section 63 (b) would only be incidental to the relief of injunction prayed for and that consequently the instant case squarely would fall within the dictum laid down in Sri Venkataramanaswamy Deity v. Vadugammal1 , I am unable to agree. I have already extracted passages from the plaint as well as the relief prayed for. The definite case of the plaintiffs is that the suit temple and its properties are outside the purview of Act XXII of 1959 and that consequently the defendants have no right to interfere with the management of the suit temple and its properties by the plaintiffs. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the declaration sought for is only incidental to the relief of injunction. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the same Bench which held in Santhanagopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar,1, that under section 63 of the Act the Deputy Commissioner is given the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question whether an institution is a religious institution, would have intended to lay down a different rule in Sri Venkataramanaswamy Deity v. Vadugammal,2. That was a case where plaintiff sought to recover possession of the property from a, third party and the question of title to the property was an issue between two persons who claimed respectively title over the temple and the properties: I therefore follow the decisions in State of Madras v. K. Melamatam3, Santhana Gopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar,4and Santhanagopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar1and hold that the present suit is barred under section 63 (a) and (b) read with section 108 of the Act. 12. 12. The trial Court has also held that the suit was bad for want of notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code. It is contended by Mr. Gopalaswami Iyengar that the suit is not to set aside any order passed by a public officer and that consequently section 80, Civil Procedure Code, would not be attracted. On this question also the decision of Ismail, J., in Santhana Gopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar4, is a precedent. The learned Judge has held as follows: “The decision of the Supreme Court in Govinda Menon v. Union of India5, and section 12 of the Act make it clear that the Commissioner of Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments while functioning under the provisions of the Act functions only as a public officer or Government servant and as such the provisions contained in section 80, Civil Procedure Code, will apply to him. The argument that when the Commissioner is functioning in relation to matters under the Act he is a judicial officer and consequently no notice to him is necessary under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, is,untenable. Under section 110 of, the Act when the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner makes an enquiry, he is deemed to be a person judicially acting, only for the purposes of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850 and even this protection is available to the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner only when he is conducting an enquiry or hearing an appeal under Chapter V or Chapter VI of the Act.” The Letters Patent Bench in Santhanagopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar1, also confirmed this finding of Ismail, J., in these words: “Notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, is necessary to claim any relief against the Area Committee and the Commissioner of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board in a suit instituted by the plaintiff claiming a declaration that the temple is a denominational temple. In the absence of such notice, the suit will fail as against such defendants.” No doubt, the relief asked for in the suit before Ismail, J., was not only for declaration of title but for recovery of possession. In the absence of such notice, the suit will fail as against such defendants.” No doubt, the relief asked for in the suit before Ismail, J., was not only for declaration of title but for recovery of possession. In State v. Venkata Durga6, it is held as follows: “Section 80 as it stands applied to all suits, whether they are suits for declaration or suits for injunction, mandatory or prohibitory, and suits for damages.” The expression “act purporting to be done” takes in past acts as well as future acts. The expression “in respect of” is of very wide amplitude, as the contemplated suit may be for any relief which flowed from the allegations in the plaint, but must have relation to or must have reference to an act purporting to be done by a public Officer in his official capacity. If the allegations in the plaint relate to acts purporting to be done by such public Officer whatever the relief may be that is prayed, the section is attracted and the notice is mandatory. In the case of a threatened injury which is sought to be restrained by an injunction, it is difficult to imagine a plaint which does not contain allegations on which the fear of the threat complained of could be justified. Hence in a suit where there is a prayer for declaration and for injunction, a notice under section 80 is necessary." 13. Anantanarayanan, CJ., speaking for the Bench in State of Madras v. Ramalinga Reddiar 1stated the law under section 80, Civil Procedure Code thus: "Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code falls into two parts viz., (i) suits against the Government; or (ii) suits against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such officer in his official capacity. Obviously, as far as suits against Government simpliciter are concerned, notice is an essential pre-requisite, and the argument is not available that notice is not required in respect of suits for such acts as require restraint by an injunction which will be acts in future and not past acts to which the section appears to refer." 14. Nor has the contention any force that the words "in respect of any act purporting to be done" in section 80, Civil Procedure Code, include only a past act and have ho reference to a future or contemplated act and that therefore . Nor has the contention any force that the words "in respect of any act purporting to be done" in section 80, Civil Procedure Code, include only a past act and have ho reference to a future or contemplated act and that therefore . a suit for a bare injunction seeking to restrain a public officer from doing something which he threatens to do, will not require notice under that section. It is difficult to conceive of a suit even for an injunction simpliciter against a public officer which does not have reference to some action in the past, upon which that authority has based it, may be a claim of right or a notice, or a threat to do something, within what that authority regards as the scope of its power. After all, there cannot be a suit for an injunction based on a future apprehension, pure and simple, and suspended in the air, so to speak, without the foundation of something that had already occurred or had already been claimed, asserted or denied. Once this is made evident, it will be clear that every suit, including a suit for injunction will have some reference to a past state of right, claim or denial and hence will come within the ambit of the phraseology of section 80, Civil Procedure Code. 15. In the light of the above decisions, I hold that the present suit is not maintainable for want of notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code. I therefore confirm the findings of the trial Court that the suit filed by the plaintiffs for a declaration that the suit temple is a private family temple of the plaintiffs and that therefore they are the hereditary trustees and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their management of the temple and its properties is not maintainable under section 80 (a) and (b) read with section 70 and 108 of the Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959 and also for want of notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code. In view of my finding that the suit itself is not maintainable, it is unnecessary for me to give a finding on the merits whether the suit temple is a private temple or a religious institution coming within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959. In view of my finding that the suit itself is not maintainable, it is unnecessary for me to give a finding on the merits whether the suit temple is a private temple or a religious institution coming within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959. I vacate the finding entered by the Court below on this aspect of the matter. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.