Judgment M. P. Singh, J. 1. The only question in this appeal is whether the Durga mandir of village Kulhariya in Bhabua Subdivision in the district of Arrah is a private or public temple and whether the case properties are the personal properties of the plaintiff-appellant who is the Mahanth of the same. The issue arises in a suit filed by the plaintiff for a declaration that the order dated the 22nd January, 1965 (Ext,f) passed by the Authority under section 43 of the Bihar hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1951 (briefly the Act) is illegal and without jurisdiction and that the Durga Mandir is a private temple and does not come within the purview of the Act. This appeal is against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Arrah in its appellate jurisdiction dated the 7th june, 1975 by which he has reversed the judgment of the Second Additional subordinate Judge, Sasaram, dated the 29th May, 1971 who had decreed the suit as regards the above declaration. 2. The plaintiff Dinesh Dutta Giri is the Mahanth of the temple. He is descendant of one Debi Gir an eminent Fakir and a saint endowed with spiritual powers to whom a grant (Est.7) in Tamrapatra was made on 13th Fagun 1153 fasli of 135 bighas by Hindu Singh and Puran Singh and 35 bighas by one Asami khan for his maintenance. The grant runs as follows : "hindu Singh and Puran Singh, gave in Kisnarpan to Devi Gir Gosain for his maintenance. What is left will be fed to Sadhusant Brahmins. We give 135 bighas of land to Devi Gir Gosain of Mouza Kulharia, taluka Ubhawanas, Pergana Chainpur, Thana Mohenia, district sahabad on executing this danpatra, so that it may be of use when required. The zamindars have no concern with it. We ceased to have power and right in this land given in dan from today. Both hindus and Muslims are given oath by swearing in the name of cow and pig, lest they should cause any kind of loss to this land.--------I, asami Khan, resident of Chhata gave 35 bighas of land to Devi Gir gosain for his maintenance and have executed this Kisnarpan, so that it may be of use when required. Both hindus and Muslims are given oath by swearing in the name of cow and pig, lest they should cause any kind of loss to this land.--------I, asami Khan, resident of Chhata gave 35 bighas of land to Devi Gir gosain for his maintenance and have executed this Kisnarpan, so that it may be of use when required. " This grant of 170 bighas to Fakir Debi Gir was construed by the Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Sasaram as making the gift personally to Debi Gir and not to the temple of the idol of Durga. It noticed that there was no mention of any idol or any temple in the grant and the gift was in the individual name of the gosain. The lower appellate court did not construe the grant (Ext.7) separately but read it along with other oral and documentary evidence and held that the temple was a public one and the property was not the personal property of Debi gir, that it was a public trust and it came within the purview of the Act. 3. In my opinion, the lower appellate court committed a grave error in reading Ext.7 together with the other oral and documentary evidence on record and then construing Ext.7 to mean that the endowment was a public religious trust. It is well settled that when the language of the document is plain and clear, the intention of the executant must be gathered from the words used ; the surrounding circumstances may be considered but that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed. In the present case the language of Ext.7 is clear and unambiguous. No aid from the surrounding circumstances or from any other evidence is necessary to construe this document. In express terms the grant is in favour of Debi Gir. There is no mention of any idol or any temple. The use of the word Kisnarpan in Ext.7 is merely a word of respect for Debi Gir in making the gift. I fail to understand as to how the lower appellate court could not appreciate this simple fact. It is expressly said in the document that the lands ware being given to Dabi Gir for his maintenance and it was only if anything was left that the Sadhus and brahmins were to be fed. I fail to understand as to how the lower appellate court could not appreciate this simple fact. It is expressly said in the document that the lands ware being given to Dabi Gir for his maintenance and it was only if anything was left that the Sadhus and brahmins were to be fed. I, accordingly, hold that the grant was not to any temple or idol but to Debi Gir personally for his maintenance and the lands became his individual property by virtue of the grant. I agree with the trial court in holding that the grant of deed (Ext.7) was a grant to Debi Gir in his individual capacity and not to any temple or any idol. This point will not be open to the parties to re-agitate it in the court of appeal below to which court the case is being sent back for fresh decision on other matters. The origin of the idol is obscure. It could not be traced as to when it was installed in the temple by Debi Gir and whether it was intended to be worshipped by the multitude of the Hindu and Muslim public. But the origin of the grant to Debi Gir is known. The subsequent history of the little temple must be looked into in the light to the grant The court of appeal should not have mixed up the contents of the grant with other evidence in considering the nature of the endowment. 4. The real point, now, to be determined is whether in course of years the endowment which was originally private was so dealt with by the succeeding mahanths as to become dedicated to the benefit of the public. The court of appeal below has not approached the case from this point of view. It had to consider the general effect of the evidence on record as to whether the succeeding mahanths so treated the temple and the properties in such a way as amounted to holding out and representing to the public that it was a public religious trust. It has no doubt referred to oral evidence and to some documents, as for example, Exts. F (1), F (2), G, G (1) and I in paragraph II of his judgment but the discussion is most unsatisfactory and jt appears that he has ignored to consider them analytically or critically. It has no doubt referred to oral evidence and to some documents, as for example, Exts. F (1), F (2), G, G (1) and I in paragraph II of his judgment but the discussion is most unsatisfactory and jt appears that he has ignored to consider them analytically or critically. It has merely referred to the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff but has given no reasons to discard them. It has not discussed them fully. It refers to certain admissions made by previous Mahanths but does not say what were the actual admissions and in what manner it affected the private character of the endowment. It has not considered the explanations given by the plaintiff explaining the circumstances in which those statements were made. It has referred to certain arguments advanced on behalf of the defendant without making any comment on them, though the same were against the terms of the document, for example, reference has been made in paragraph 15 of the Judgment of the lower appellate court to the argument of the defendant that the property was donated to deviji, that the grant was in perpetuity and for the upkeep of the temple. 5. Counsel for the appellant has mainly relied upon the following cases : (1) Babu Bhagwan Din V/s. Gir Har Saroop, AIR 1940 Privy Council 7, (2) Poohari fakir Sadavarthy V/s. Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, air 1963 Supreme Court 510, (3) The Bihar State Board of Religious Trust V. Mahanth Sri Biseshwar Das, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 2057 : 1972 PLJR 16 and (4) Ram Saran Das V/s. Jairam Das, AIR 1943 Patna 135. Some other decisions were also cited. On the basis of these authorities it was contended that the evidence to the effect that Sadhus and other persons visiting the temple are given food and shelter is not indicative of the temple being a public temple or its property being subject to a public trust ; that even the evidence that the Mahanths used to celebrate festivals when the members of the public used to attend the temple and were admitted to temple freely cannot mean that the endowment was a public one. My attention was particularly drawn to the following passage in babu Bhagwan Din V/s. Gir Har Saroop, AIR 1940 Privy Council 7 (supra) : ". . . . . . . . . . . My attention was particularly drawn to the following passage in babu Bhagwan Din V/s. Gir Har Saroop, AIR 1940 Privy Council 7 (supra) : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . dedication to the public is not to be readily inferred when it is known that the temple property was acquired by grant to an individual or family. Such an inference if made from the fact of user by the public is hazardous, since it would not in general be consonant with Hindu sentiments or practice that worshippers should be turned away ; and as worship generally implies offerings of some kind it is not to be expected that the managers of a private temple should in all circumstances desire to discourage popularity. " 6. Counsel for the respondent mainly relied on (1) G. S. Mahalaxmt vahuji V/s. Sah Ranchhoddas Kalidas, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 2025, and (2)Dhaneshwarbuwa V/s. Charity Commissioner, Bombay, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 871 and contended that Ext.7 read with other evidence on record clearly went to show that the temple and the case properties were public trust and came within the ambit of that Act. In my opinion, it is unnecessary to go into these questions. I have already pointed out that the approach of the lower appellate court to the case is wholly erroneous. It must proceed on the footing that the suit properties originally belonged to Debi Gir personally and then it will decide whether the defendant has satisfactorily proved by reliable evidence that the private character of the endowment changed into public character. 7. Counsel for the respondent also argued that the question as to whether the religious trust was public or private was a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, the question could not be raised in second appeal. It is true that this is a mixed question of law and fact but the present case involves other questions which, in my opinion, are substantial questions of law. The question of the construction of the deed of grant (Ext.7) is a substantital question of law. So also the question as to whether in the course of years the private character of the endowment was destroyed and they became a public religious trust is a substantial question of law. This contention, therefore, is without any force. 8. The question of the construction of the deed of grant (Ext.7) is a substantital question of law. So also the question as to whether in the course of years the private character of the endowment was destroyed and they became a public religious trust is a substantial question of law. This contention, therefore, is without any force. 8. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the 3rd Additional District Judge, Arrah, dated 7th June, 1975 are set aside and the case is sent back to him for fresh decision in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. No costs. Appeal allowed.