JUDGMENT C. R. Thakur, J.—The petitioner has by this writ petition called in question two orders, Annexure A dated 27th December, 1972 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur whereby he, on appeal by Amarjit Mehta, Octroi Superintendent of the Municipal Committee Bilaspur, modified the sentence imposed by the Committee, and the order dated 1st January, 1973 Annexure B whereby Shri Atnarjit Mehta, on partly accepting the appeal, was reinstated as an Octroi Superintendent. 2. Shri Amar Nath petitioner was appointed as a Clerk in the Small Town Committee, Bilaspur in the year 1947 and Shri Amarjit Mehta was appointed as an Octroi Clerk in the year 1958. In 1962 the status of the Small Town Committee was raised to that of a Municipal Committee, Known as Municipal Committee New Bilaspur Township and both the petitioner as also the respondent No. 4, i. e. Amarjit Mehta, continued to serve in the Committee as Octroi Clerk. In the year 1965, respondent no. 4 was promoted as officiating Octroi Suprintendent. At that time, according to the petitioner though he was senior but he was not considered for promotion. He had also filed a Civil Writ Petition No. 28 ot J966 in the High Court of Delhi (Himachal Bench) at Simla rejecting his representation against the appointment of Shri Amarjit Mehta as Octroi Superintendent in the Municipal Committee, New Bilaspur Township in preference to him. But that writ petition was dismissed on September 21, 1967 by S. N. Shankar, J., holding that the petitioner was not qualified nor were the provisions of Articles 14 and 16, attracted to the case of the petitioner. It was also one of the contentions raised by the present petitioners learned counsel in that petition before the Delhi High Court (Himachal Bench) at Simla that due to the misdeeds, disobedience, negligence and misappropriation of the Municipal Committee funds the respondent no. 4, i. e. Amarjit Mehta, had been suspended by the Committee and which fact was admitted and it was observed that this did not in any way improve the case of the petitioner. It only showed that there was no favouritism shown in favour of the respondent (Amarjit Mehta) and that he was treated like any other employee. 3. The petitioner during the suspension period of Amarjit Mehta was promoted to the post of Octroi Superintendent vide order dated 25th July, 1968 (Annexure F). It only showed that there was no favouritism shown in favour of the respondent (Amarjit Mehta) and that he was treated like any other employee. 3. The petitioner during the suspension period of Amarjit Mehta was promoted to the post of Octroi Superintendent vide order dated 25th July, 1968 (Annexure F). This order is in the following terms :— "Annexure F’ No. MC/PF/68-1015 Office of the Municipal Committee New Bilaspur Township Dated Bilaspur the, 25th July, .968. Shri Amar Nath Gupta, Octroi Clerk, New Bilaspur Township, OFFICE ORDER You are hereby promoted as officiating Octroi Superintendent Municipal Committee, New Bilaspur Township on purely temporary and ad hoc basis on the pay scale of Rs. 75-5-125/5-175 and usual allowances as permissible under rules with immediate effect, till the decision of suspension case of Shri Amarjit Mehta, Octroi Superintendent under suspension. (Sd./-) President." After the reinstatement of Shri Amarjit Mehta, the petitioner was reverted to his original post as an Octroi Clerk and it is thereafter that he filed the present writ petition challenging these orders Annexures A and ‘B’ 4. The first preliminary point that has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is that the petitioner has no locus standi to question these orders Annexures A’ and B’ The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been prejudiced and his chances of promotion are jeopardised because of the setting aside of the reversion order of Shri Amarjit Mehta by the Deputy Commissioner. 5. The order Annexure A purports to be an order passed in appeal of Shri Amarjit Mehta against the penalty imposed by the Municipal Committee. By this order, as already stated above, Shri P. S. Negi who was the Deputy Commissioner on 27th December, 1972 when this order was passed set aside the sentence of reversion and modified the order. The relevant portion of the order may be reproduced as under: "Considering the circumstances of the case I feel that the punishment already imposed is slightly on the higher side, and, therefore, I set aside the order of reversion and impose the following punishments :— (i) Three annual increments of the official in the Superintendent grade falling on 12/67, 12/68 and 12/69 be stopped with cumulative effect. (ii) The period during which the appellant worked as Octroi Clerk will not count towards increments in the Octroi Superintendents grade. (ii) The period during which the appellant worked as Octroi Clerk will not count towards increments in the Octroi Superintendents grade. However, he is allowed to draw the increments which he would have earned, had he continued as Octroi Clerk but for his promotion as Octroi Superintendent. (iii) During the period of suspension he will not be entitled to draw any emoluments more than that he has already drawn or may be entitled to draw according to the existing orders. These orders shall come into force with immediate effect. (P. S. Negi) Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur, H. P. The petitioner wants this order to be set aside, and the second order against which the petitioner feels aggrieved is the order Annexure ‘B’ whereby pursuant to the order as contained in Annexure A he was directed to join his duty as Octroi Superintendent with immediate effect. This order is dated 1st January, 1973. Now it is to be seen whether the petitioner has got any locus standi. He could, however, question his reversion order on some other grounds, but he cannot seek a direction that the orders passed in appeal reinstating the respondent No. 4 (Amarjit Mehta) are wrong. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that these orders are prejudicial to his interest. That may be so, but he has got no right to get these orders set aside. He had no legal right to continue in the post because his appointment to the post was only till such time the case against Amarjit Mehta was not decided. But once the case stood decided in his favour and he was held to be reinstated, then he had no right and he was to be reverted without any formal order or any notice. The learned counsel for the petitioner sought to argue that a show cause notice or an opportunity was necessary to be given to the petitioner before he was reverted. But in the face of this promotion order which says that his appointment was purely a fortuitous and a stop-gap arrangement, he was not to be given a show cause notice, the moment Shri Amarjit Mehta in whose vacancy, due to his suspension, he was promoted purely on ad hoc basis was re-instated. But in the face of this promotion order which says that his appointment was purely a fortuitous and a stop-gap arrangement, he was not to be given a show cause notice, the moment Shri Amarjit Mehta in whose vacancy, due to his suspension, he was promoted purely on ad hoc basis was re-instated. The petitioner cannot be said to have been aggrieved by these orders Annexures A and ‘B’ A person who can be said to be aggrieved is one who had suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which had wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something See : Adi Pherozsah Gandhi v. H. M. Seervai, Advocate-General of Maharashtra, Bombay, MR 1971 SC 385. The petitioner may feel disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some order had been made, but he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved. He was appointed purely as a stop-gap arrangement to which he had no legal rights, It had already been decided in Civil Writ Petition No. 28 of 1966 that in the first place he was not qualified to hold the post and secondly, he could not have any grievance against the promotion of Amarjit Mehta. The learned counsel for the petitioner made a futile attempt to show that he was aggrieved because he had no further chances of promotion because Amarjit Mehta had b en reinstated and that in these circumstances he was entitled to a notice before he was reverted and Amarjit Mehta was reinstated. But that also does not appear to be correct in view of the terms of his appointment. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the order was bad because it was the Deputy Commissioner who passed the order as the President of the Municipal Committee imposing the penalty upon Shri Amarjit Mehta and that again he ordered a fresh enquiry which he was not entitled to do, and further the enquiry was dropped and then on a second appeal the Deputy Commissioner passed the impugned order Annexure A. So, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, he is the same person who had passed the penalty and who had heard the appeal and had also ordered the withdrawal of the second enquiry earlier ordered by him. It is true to this extent that Shri S. S. Guleria was the Deputy Commissioner who was the President of the Municipal Committee and who had imposed the penalty. No doubt the appeal was filed before him and before deciding the appeal he ordered the second enquiry later on was withdrawn and the appeal, therefore, came to for hearing before Shri P. S. Negi who had succeeded him and who was altogether a different person who had decided the appeal. He was not the same person, who passed the impugned order. No doubt he had the same designation. Therefore, these who orders, one imposing the penalty and ordering the fresh enquiry and again withdrawing the same were made by a different person. It is also wrong to say that it was a second or a third appeal. The appeal, it appears, had not been decided by Shri S. S. Guleria when he ordered a fresh enquiry which was later on withdrawn. Therefore, the appeal which was still undecided had revived and had to be decided and which was decided by his successor in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner. The rules also show that an appeal lies to the Deputy Commissioner against any decision of the Municipal Committee. Therefore, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is wholly devoid of force that there were two appeals, and again the same person decided the appeal who had earlier passed the order of revision. I need not refer to the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner to show that before a person is reverted a notice is necessary. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case in hand, the terms of appointment are quite clear which admit of no doubt that it was a stop-gap arrangement and the moment Shri Amarjit Mehta stood exonerated from the disciplinary proceedings and was reinstated, the petitioner was to revert to his original post as Octroi Clerk. 7. On this preliminary point that the petitioner has got no locus standi, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. However, I pass no orders as to costs. Petition dismissed.