S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) (THE plaintiff Corporation filed suit against the defendants for recovering more than rupees one lac fortyfive thousand alleging that there was a conspiracy between defendant Nos. 2 to 6 on one hand and defendant No. 7 on the other hand and that as a result of that conspiracy fraud was committed and the corporation was defrauded. The trial court recorded the finding that the defendant No. 1 or for that matter defendants Nos. 1 to 6 had not delivered the goods to the plaintiff Corporation and that they had received payments from time to time under bogus bills. However a large part of the claim was barred by time under Art. 113 of the Limitation Act. He therefore passed a decree for a small amount dismissing the rest of the plaintiffs claim. In appeal His Lordship confirmed the finding of the trial court that the defendant No. 1 had not delivered the goods to the plaintiff corporation under 118 bogus bills. His Lordship further observed :) ( 2 ) THE next contention which has been raised by Mr. Pandya on behalf of the plaintiff-Corporation is that the learned trial Judge was in error in recording a finding that the suit was barred by time. Mr. Amin has tried to support that finding. The learned trial Judge applied Art. 113 of the Limitation Act 1963 to the instant case. It is the residuary article which provides that any suit for which no period of limitation is prescribed elsewhere in the Schedule shall be filed within three years from the date when the right to sue accrues. Art. 95 of the repealed Limitation Act made a specific provision for a suit in which relief was claimed on the ground of fraud. It provided for a period of three years from the date when the fraud became known to the party wronged. What was provided by Art. 95 of the repealed Limitation Act is new the subject-matter of the residuary Art. 113. Both the learned Advocates agree that it is Art. 113 which governs the present suit. When relief is claimed on the ground of fraud the right to sue will accrue when the fraud becomes known to the party who has been wronged. It is not in dispute before us that the fraud came to light on 29th May 1965. Both the learned Advocates agree that it is Art. 113 which governs the present suit. When relief is claimed on the ground of fraud the right to sue will accrue when the fraud becomes known to the party who has been wronged. It is not in dispute before us that the fraud came to light on 29th May 1965. The suit was filed on 2nd May 1968. The payments under 118 bogus bills were made prior to 2nd May 1965. Since the fraud was discovered for the first time on 29th May 1965 the suit would prima facie be within time. However sec. 17 of the Limitation Act has been pressed into service by Mr. Amin to make good his contention that even under Art. 113 the suit would be barred by time. Sub-sec. (i) of sec. 17 of the Limitation Act 1963 inter alia provides that where in the case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act the suit or application is based upon the fraud of the defendant or respondent or his agent the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. Emphasis has been laid on the expression with reasonable diligence. What is material therefore in a case of this type is not the actual date of discovery of fraud but the date when the fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff Mr. Pandya has argued that the concept of reasonable diligence comes into play after the fraud has been perpetrated or committed and that in the name of reasonable diligence what the plaintiff could have done or should have done before the fraud was committed cannot be taken into account. In other words the distinction which he has tried to draw is between prefraud vigilance and postfraud diligence. The argument which Mr. Pandya has raised has some substance. If reasonable diligence of the plaintiff is to be tested on the anvil of what he ought to have done before the fraud was committed probably there would be no case of fraud at all and in such a case there would be no need for relief on the ground of fraud. Pandya has raised has some substance. If reasonable diligence of the plaintiff is to be tested on the anvil of what he ought to have done before the fraud was committed probably there would be no case of fraud at all and in such a case there would be no need for relief on the ground of fraud. He has justifiably argued that reasonable diligence which the plaintiff ought to have taken is to discover the fraud and not to prevent it. If every plaintiff is supposed to take meticulous care in order to avoid the prevention of fraud and if that is the test to be applied for enforcing the bar of limitation no plaintiff would ever succeed nor would there be any need to file a suit for relief on the ground of fraud. Therefore no doubt is left in our minds that what the plaintiff is required by sec. 17 to do is to take reasonable diligence to discover the fraud after it has been committed. In the instant case fraudulent payments were obtained from the plaintiff-Corporation from time to time spread over a period of two years. The evidence with which we have dealt in extenso in this judgment clearly shows that there are a series of checks which are applied at different stages in the matters of purchase of goods by the plaintiff-Corporation sanctioning the bills and payment thereof. In spite of the elaborate system of checks which the plaintiff-Corporation had introduced the fraud could not be detected. The result was that over a period of time moneys were paid from time to time by the plaintiff-Corporation under the bogus bills to defendant 1. The last of such payments was made on 2nd May 1965. On 29th May 1965 there was unconfirmed information from a stranger that payments were received by defendant 1 from the plaintiff-Corporation fraudulently under bogus bills. The time lag between 2nd May 1965 and 29 May 1965 is only of 27 days. Thereafter as the evidence shows the Corporation made thorough enquiry and instituted the present suit. Unless a thorough investigation had been made into the reported scandal and facts were prima facie established by the Corporation to prove its claim it cannot succeed. The time lag between 2nd May 1965 and 29 May 1965 is only of 27 days. Thereafter as the evidence shows the Corporation made thorough enquiry and instituted the present suit. Unless a thorough investigation had been made into the reported scandal and facts were prima facie established by the Corporation to prove its claim it cannot succeed. Detection of fraud in the affairs of a public Corporation cannot he as simple as the detection of fraud in the case of an indivisional because in a public body a number of persons are concerned at different stages in a particular transaction. One transaction is attended to by several persons. In the instant case there were 118 such bogus transactions alleged to have been attended to by different persons at different stages. A thorough inquiry was therefore required to be made by the plaintiff-Corporation before it could institute the present suit. As evidence shows it was done by the plaintiff-Corporation and when the plaintiff Corporation found that it had been cheated by the defendants it instituted the present claim. ( 3 ) IT has been argued by Mr. Amin that all the 118 bogus bills were sanctioned by post audit. Sanction recorded by post audit does not rule out the perpetration of fraud. An out or audits and verifies what is written on a bill. He does not carry on investigation He has also argued that the accounts of the plaintiff-Corporation were audited every year by the Accountant General and also by the the party deputed by the central office of the plaintiff-Corporation. He has thereafter submitted that 118 bogus bills were not audited either by the Accountant general or by the audit party. It only shows the meticulous care with which fraud was concealed and does not exonerate the defendants from the liability of making good the claim which the plaintiff-Corporation has made. He has also argued that the Accounts officer ought to have taken full care to check up the goods as well as the documents. Want of this precaution does not help the defendants in invoking the bar of limitation because this is not a matter of postfraud diligence It is a matter of prefraud vigilance. ( 4 ) IT has also been argued by Mr. Amin that the cashier ought to have checked up whether the bills were entered in the budget control register or not. ( 4 ) IT has also been argued by Mr. Amin that the cashier ought to have checked up whether the bills were entered in the budget control register or not. Budget control register come into play when purchase order is prepared. This argument raised by Mr. Amin suffers from the stand infirmity from which his earlier argument suffers. ( 5 ) THE next argument which he has raised is that the plaintiff-Corporation ought not have made purchases of the goods through their men. Such an argument cannot be raised because every public Corpora tion functions through some individual or another. Secondly this argument assumes without justification that the goods were not supplied earlier by defendant 1 to the men of the plaintiff-Corporation. It was also argued that the Corporation should have introduced double check which it introduced after the present fraud came to light. This argument also falls in the realm of prefraud vigilance and has nothing to do with the period of limitation which is conditioned by sec. 17 by the doctrine of reasonable diligence. ( 6 ) THE last argument which he has raised is that some particular person ought to have been empowered to check the bills. This argument also falls within the realm of prefraud vigilance and has nothing to do with the bar of limitation the applicability of which depends upon the reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff. ( 7 ) THE learned trial Judge took the view that plaintiff had not taken reasonable diligence because the plaintiff ought to have done what it did in the matter of checks after the present fraud was discovered. According to the learned trial Judge the system of double check ought to have been introduced by the Corporation before the fraud was committed. This is not the test which can be applied for invoking the bar of limitation. What the plaintiff could have done or could not have done to prevent the commission of fraud is not the test for deciding whether the bar of limitation under Art. 113 read with sec. 17 of the Limitation Act is attracted to a case. The real test is. What did the plaintiff do or what amount of reasonable diligence did it take to discover the fraud after it was committed? 17 of the Limitation Act is attracted to a case. The real test is. What did the plaintiff do or what amount of reasonable diligence did it take to discover the fraud after it was committed? In our opinion the evidence which we have summarized shows that the plaintiff did what it could do to bring to light the real state of affairs and to know how public moneys were fraudulently usurped by the defendants. Within three years from the date they came to know of such state of affairs they filed the present suit. The learned trial Judge was in error in recording the finding that the plaintiffs suit was barred by Art. 113 of the Limitation Act 1963 In our opinion the suit was within time. We therefore set aside the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge in that behalf. Appeal allowed .