S. ALI AHMAD, J. 1. This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed on behalf of 22 persons. Their prayer is to quash Annexure 2, an order dated the 6th September, 1976 by which these petitioners have been retrenched with effect from 6.9.1976 under the orders of respondent no.2, A further prayer that the respondents be directed to forbear from giving effect to the order (Annexure 2) and to direct them not to terminate the services of the petitioners in pursuance there of and to treat the petitioners as in continuous service has also been made. 2. According to the case, as made out in the writ application, all these petitioners are in continuous service of the respondents for more than one year. It is said that all on a sudden the petitioners and 29 others were picked up for termination of their service by a notice dated 4.2.1976. The order was challenged by a writ application in this Court which was numbered as C.W.J.C. No. 674 of 1976. A prayer for stay of the operation of the order dated 4.2.976 by which the service or the petitioners were terminated was also made in that case. The Bench (to which I was a party) directed stay of the operation of Annexure 3 of that case (the order of termination) by an order dated 4.3.76. That writ application was ultimately allowed by this Court on 11-8-1976 and the order (Annexure 3) terminating the services of the petitioners was quashed. Further, according to the petitioners, they attended the office from 1st September, 1976 up to 6th September, 1976 but they were not given any work. Further it is said that on 6th September, 1976 at about 3 P.M. the petitioners were paid their salary for six months, for the period beginning from 6th March, 1976 to 2nd September, 1976 and there after they were told that they have again been retrenched and that they should not come to works. 3. The order terminating the services of the petitioners has been challenged before us on the ground that they were not paid retrenchment compensation provided under section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and also on the ground that the principle of last come first go was not adhered to. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. According to their case, the petitioners were retrenched as they became surplus due to shrinkage of volume of work with effect from 6.9.1976 after complying fully with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to their case, these petitioners were offered wages from 5th March, 1976 up to 6th September, 1976 besides one month's wage in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation as payable to them under law. But they say that the petitioners accepted only their wages for the period beginning from 6th March, 1976 to 31st August, 1976 and refused to accept the offer made under other beads. In Support of this statement, annexure A, a certificate dated 6.9.1976 signed by several persons had been filed which reads as follows :- "It is certified that the following bills have been produced to the petitioners (names enclosed) for payment on 6.9.1976 in the fore-noon and after noon also. They have refused to receive payment except the wages for the period 6.3.1976 to 31.8.1976 against items I below. The other bills against item (2) (3), (4) and (5) were refused by each petitioner quoted above." The respondents have also denied the allegation that the principle of last come first go bas not been observed. 5. Mr. Bose, learned counsel for respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this application According to him, as the order (Annexure 2) terminating the services of the petitioners was tot said to be in violation of any provision of Chapter III of the Constitution of India and as the petitioners had an alternative remedy under Industrial Disputes Act, the application should be dismissed in view of section 58 of Constitution 42nd Amendment Act. As to whether raising of an Industrial dispute is an alter native remedy within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India was considered by a Bench of this Court in the case of Hari Rai and others v. Union of India and others. It was held in these cases that raising any industrial dispute could not be said to be an alternative remedy it as much as according to the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, the aggrieved individual cannot approach the Tribunal or Labour Court directly for the redress of his grievance without the intervention of the appropriate Govt. The appropriate Govt. It was held in these cases that raising any industrial dispute could not be said to be an alternative remedy it as much as according to the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, the aggrieved individual cannot approach the Tribunal or Labour Court directly for the redress of his grievance without the intervention of the appropriate Govt. The appropriate Govt. may not in its wisdom think it proper to make a reference as section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, confers discretion on the appropriate Government either to refer the dispute or not to refer it for adjudication. I am in respectful agreement with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid cases by Hari Lal Agrawal, J. and I do not feel myself persuaded to accept the contention of Mr. Bose that the matter be referred to a larger Bench to test the correctness of the decision. 6. Mr. B.C. Ghose has strenuously urged that the compensation as contemplated under section 25F of the Industrial Disputes was not paid to these petitioners. He, therefore, submitted that the order terminating the service of these petitioners by Annexure 2 was illegal and should be quashed. In that connection, learned counsel referred to certain paragraphs of the writ application. Mr. Bose on the other hand strongly relied on Annexure A to the counter affidavit. Because of certain inherent weakness in Annexure A, we thought it desirable to examine respondent no. 2 Sri K.N. Dutta who is one of the signatories of Annexure A. He bas deposed that he was present at the time. Annexure A was prepared and he was a party to its preparation. The pay bill that was produced by Mr. Bose during the course of argument was also shown to Shri Dutta and he said that document (payment order) is the original of Annexure A. Shri Dutta is clearly wrong there. Annexure A is a certificate of refusal by these petitioners of the compensation money whereas the payment order contains many other things. The present writ application was filed on 17.9.1976 and Annexure A is dated 6.9.76 when no writ application was pending. Yet these petitioners have been described as petitioners. There is no explanation as to why these persons were described as petitioners on 6.9.1976. The present writ application was filed on 17.9.1976 and Annexure A is dated 6.9.76 when no writ application was pending. Yet these petitioners have been described as petitioners. There is no explanation as to why these persons were described as petitioners on 6.9.1976. Further we find that the names of the petitioners in Annexure A are in the same serial order as they find place in the writ application. This certainly is no coincidence and to me it appears that this Annexure A was manufactured subsequently to support the order of retrenchment as contained in Annexure 2. Further I fail to see as to why a certificate (Annexure A) should have been prepared and signed, besides others by Justice Horo, Head Constable, Local Police, Balldih Out-post, a complete outsider to the establishment. If the version being put forward by the respondents was correct, then the payment order what is maintained in due course of business was the best evidence to show that the petitioners had refused to accept the retrenchment compensation. For reasons best known to the respondent that document was not brought on record of this case and was produced during the course of hearing of this application. We examined Shri Dutta with reference to that document also but I must say that his answers were not quite satisfactory. But as that document is not on record, I am not placing reliance on that and I am confining to the counter affidavit and annexures filed on behalf of the respondents. On a careful consideration of all the materials, I come to the conclusion that the petitioners were not paid retrenchment compensation as required under section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Once it is held so then there is no difficulty in allowing the writ application and quashing Annexure 2 to the writ application as it is now well established that non-compliance of the provision of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, makes the order of retrenchment bad. If any authority is required fur that purpose, a reference may be made to the case of M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vs. The Presiding Office Labour Court and others. 7. If any authority is required fur that purpose, a reference may be made to the case of M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vs. The Presiding Office Labour Court and others. 7. Since I have held the order of retrenchment to be bad on account of non-compliance of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, It is not necessary to look into other allegations of the petitioners, namely, that the principle of last come first go has not been observed. I, therefore, do not decide that matter. 8. In the result the application succeeds and the order contained in Annexure 2 is quashed. The petitioners will be deemed to be in continuous service and will be entitled to their pay and other benefits in accordance with law. Hearing fee Rs, 200/-. I entirely agree. Application allowed.