Judgment S. K. Choudhuri, J. 1. In this writ application the petitioners challenged the orders contained in annexure 3 dated the 7th June, 1975 passed by the commissioner of Bhagalpur Division (respondent no.1) and annexure 2 dated the 30th January, 1973, passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Santhal Parganas, dumka, (respondent no.2 ). The Deputy Commissioner by annexure 2 allowed the appeal of the 16 annas raiyats of mouza Gormala, police station Masilia, after setting aside the order of the Sub-divisional Officer, Dumka (respondent no.3) contained in Annexure 1 dated 17.3.71 and directing eviction of the petitioners from the lands in dispute. In second appeal the learned Commissioner has affirmed the said order. 2. The relevant facts necessary to appreciate the points raised in this writ application may be stated here. According to the writ application the petitioners father took settlement of 26-B, 4-K, 11-D of land of village Golmara, Sub-division, dumka from the landlord on 6.7.1949 on an annual jama of Rs.12. The settleses were recorded in the last settlement operation as Bakast malik. After the settlement 16 annas raiyats filed an objection challenging the said settlement. It appears that there was a compromise between the parties in which Ramranjan mandal father of the petitioners agreed to donate 2-B 12-K 3-D out of the aforesaid land to the deities Siri Siri Kali and Siri Siri Durga. According to the petitioners the Sub-divisional Officer, therefore, confirmed the said settlement less the land donated to the two deities by his order dated 17.2.1951. There was an appeal by Raiyats of the village which was registered as Miscellaneous appeal no.297 of 1950-51. The learned Deputy Commissioner who heard the appeal remanded the same to the Sub-divisional Officer. After remand there was a further enquiry as per direction of the appellate court and ultimately the settlement in favour of the aforesaid Ramranjan Mandal was cancelled by the Subdivisional officer by his order dated 28.4.1954. The said order of cancellation was affirmed in appeal being the revenue miscellaneous appeal no.34 of 1958-59 by the deputy Commissioner on 9.3.1960. Revision against the said order was also dismissed by the learned Commissioner. 3. It appears that the matter rested there and the aforesaid cancellation order as affirmed in appeal by the learned Deputy Commissioner and thereafter by the learned Commissioner was not challenged. Revision against the said order was also dismissed by the learned Commissioner. 3. It appears that the matter rested there and the aforesaid cancellation order as affirmed in appeal by the learned Deputy Commissioner and thereafter by the learned Commissioner was not challenged. Some time in 1961 the father of the petitioners filed a suit which was numbered as title suit no.3 of 1961 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge for declaration of their title and for injunction restraining the defendant-raiyats of that suit from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. This suit was compromised with the defendants-raiyats and the suit was accordingly decreed in terms of the compromise by an order dated 7.10.1961. In 1964, on the basis of the aforesaid compromise decree the father of the petitioners obtained rent receipts in his name from the State of bihar. Some time in 1970 some of the raiyats thereafter filed a petition before the Sub-divisional Officer for eviction of Ramranjan Mandal from the disputed land which was registered as revenue Miscellaneous Appeal no.142 of 1970. The learned Sub-divisional Officer passed an order dated 17.3.1971 rejected the said petition. A copy of the said order has been made annexuro I to the writ application. Thereafter there was an appeal filed by the raiyats including respondents 4 and 5 which was registered as revenue miscellaneous appeal no.57 of 1971-72. The said appeal was allowed by the order dated 31.1.1973 (anuexure 2) and the order for eviction was passed against the settlee Ramranjan Mandal. The said order was affirmed in second appeal by the Commissioner by the order dated 7.6.1975 (annexure 3 ). 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Sub-divisional Officer. In the said counter-affidavit it has been stated that the petitioners lost before the highest revenue court and the said order was not challenged by filing a title suit in which the 16 annas raiyats of the village were not represented but after gaining over the raiyats who were made parties to that suit obtained a compromise decree. It has been stated that the said compromise decree is not binding upon the whole body of jamabandi raiyats and it was always open to the revenue court to evict the petitioners under section 42 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisional) Act 1949 (Bihar Act 14 of 1949), (hereinafter called the Act ). 5. It has been stated that the said compromise decree is not binding upon the whole body of jamabandi raiyats and it was always open to the revenue court to evict the petitioners under section 42 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisional) Act 1949 (Bihar Act 14 of 1949), (hereinafter called the Act ). 5. A reply has been filed by the petitioners in which they have reiterated their stand taken in the main writ application. In this reply the petitioners inserted a new fact not pleaded in the main writ application that they are cultivating possession of the disputed land since 1935 and have acquired perfect right over the property. 6. Mr. Sudhir Chandra Ghose, learned counsel appealing in support of this application contended that there was no prohibition in law upon the landlord to settle his bakast land with any body even with the petitioners father who was not one amongst the sixteen annas raiyat and therefore, the settlement taken in 1149 by the petitioners father was a valid settlement and the learned Deputy commissioner and the learned Commissioner had no jurisdiction to cancel the settlement in appeal preferred against the order of the Sub-divisional Officer. He further contended that the petitioners have acquired a perfect title in disputed land having remained in possession for the more than 12 years after the settlement of 1949. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State on the other hand supported the order contained in annexures 2 and 3 in his argument and contended that the settlement with the petitioners father who was admittedly not one out of the sixteen annas raiyat was illegal. 7. It is not disputed that the lands are recorded in the last survey as bakast malik. According to the Survey and Settlement Report by Mr. H. Me. Pherson at page 73. ". . . . . . Both in Pradhani and in khas villagcs there is a jamabandi roll which includes all the agricultural lands in which the village community has a reversionary interest. In a few village there are agricultural lands which formerly belonged to raiyats but have come into the hands of proprietors usually by purchase at auction sale in the days when the courts were selling raiyati jots for arrears of rent. These lands now entered as "bakast malik" occur both in Pradhani and khas villages". In a few village there are agricultural lands which formerly belonged to raiyats but have come into the hands of proprietors usually by purchase at auction sale in the days when the courts were selling raiyati jots for arrears of rent. These lands now entered as "bakast malik" occur both in Pradhani and khas villages". In the footnote "bakast malik lands" has been stated to mean lands "in the cultivating possession of landlords but not privileged". At page 122 of the aforesaid report it is stated as follows : "a proprietor cannot acquire absolute or exclusive rights over lands originally raiyati which have come into his possession and been recorded as bakast malik. In Commissioners Settlement Revision no.4 of 1902-3, it was held that if raiyati land comes into the possession of a proprietor, it retains its raiyati character. The proprietor cannot sell it along with his proprietary right. Lands recorded as bakast malik are raiyati lands and the village community has the usual rights over them". 8. At this stage I shall refer to a decision of Supreme Court in Joytish thakur and others V/s. Tarakant Jhi and others, (1963 BLJR 267 ). This was an appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of our High Court in Letters patent Appeal. The question for consideration in that case was : "if a raiyat of lands in the district of Santhal Parganas acquires the entire superior landlords interest, docs his raiyati interest cease to exist or does he continue to be a raiyat in addition to becoming a superior landlord ?". While deciding the said question their Lordships of the Supreme Court noticed the Final Report of the Survey and the Settlement Operation in the District of santhal Parganas. The relevant portion from the said decision I quote : "to this general statement of law in India it is necessary to add that there are special features in the land tenure in Santhal Parganas which make it difficult for the law of merger to apply there. The santhal way of life favoured the emergence of a powerful village community with its special rights over all lands of the village. This community of village raiyat, has preferential and reversionary rights over all lands of the village whether cultivated or uncultivated. (Vide Final Report on the Survey and Settlement operations in the District of Santhal Parganas ). The santhal way of life favoured the emergence of a powerful village community with its special rights over all lands of the village. This community of village raiyat, has preferential and reversionary rights over all lands of the village whether cultivated or uncultivated. (Vide Final Report on the Survey and Settlement operations in the District of Santhal Parganas ). There is also in the majority of the villages of this district a head man who in addition to performing certain village duties collects rents from the raiyats and pays it to the proprietor. The head man is not however a tenure-holder. One of his duties in that capacity is to arrange for settlement of lands in his village which may fall vacant and available for settlement. All the raiyats in the village are included in the jamabandi prepared for the village and it is the head mans duty to settle the available land to one jamabandi raiyats. It does not require much imagination to see that the interests of the village community as also of the headman are likely to suffer if the land which as raiyati land would be included in the jamabandi is allowed to be taken out of the total quantity of the raiyati lands. If once raiyati lands arc allowed to lose their character as such a village may find in the course of a few years the total stock of land available for settlement to resident raiyats dwindling before their eyes it was in this state of things that the alienation of raiyats holdings in any form was interdicted by Government orders in 1887. These had the immediate effect of checking the practice of open transfer which had sprung up during the first years of Woods settlement but transfers in a disguised form continued and the officers had to be constantly on watch to check the passage of village lands into the hands of persons whose intrusion within the village community was considered pernicious. (Appendix XV of the Settlement Report of the Santhal Pargnas) in his note on the subject of the alienation policy of lands in the Santhal Parganas Mr. Mcpherson, expressed himself stongly against any sales in any form being allowed. "to allow sales in any form will, I think" runs the note "tend to weaken the communal system of the Santhal Parganas and the position of the Pradhan. Mcpherson, expressed himself stongly against any sales in any form being allowed. "to allow sales in any form will, I think" runs the note "tend to weaken the communal system of the Santhal Parganas and the position of the Pradhan. The root idea of the system in that all the cultivated lands of the village belong in a way to the whole community". His recommendation was accepted by the Government and the result was the amendment of the prohibition of transfer in Regulation III of 1872". Thus it is clear from the discussions made above that the lands which have been recorded as bakast in the last settlement report have their origin as raiyati and the 16 annas raiyats have a right over such lands and take settlement of the same. It appears for this reason the petitioners father after objection was filed by 16 annas raiyats against his settlement dated 6.7.1949 compromised with them but unfortunately for the petitioner the said proceeding ultimately ended on remand in favour of the 16 annas raiyats and the settlement in favour of the petitioners father was cancelled. In the present fresh proceeding which was initiated some time in 1970 the stand taken by the petitioners father was that he brought a title suit against the 16 annas raiyats and obtained a compromise decree. It appears that the meaning of bakast malik as noted in the settlement report of Mr. Mcpherson was not disputed at any stage in either the previous proceeding or in the present proceeding nor character of the disputed land was challenged any stage of the proceeding or in the suit. Therefore, it has to bs held that it only the 16 annas raiyats who had a right to take settlement of the disputed land when the landlord settled them with the petitioners father. Mr. Ghose was, therefore, not at all right in contending that there was no restriction in settling his bakast and therefore, settlement in favour of the petitioners father was legal. In view of the position noticed above it becomes clear that the settlement made in the year 1949 in favour of the petitioners father was not valid being contrary to aforesaid paragraphs of the settlement report, which it cannot be disputed, has the force of law. 9. In view of the position noticed above it becomes clear that the settlement made in the year 1949 in favour of the petitioners father was not valid being contrary to aforesaid paragraphs of the settlement report, which it cannot be disputed, has the force of law. 9. That being the position the question arises as to whether the Deputy commissioner had power under section 42 of the Act to cancel such settlement and evict the settlee. Sec.42 reads thus : "ejectment of a person in unauthorised possession of agricultural land.-The Deputy Commissioner may at any time either of his own motion or on an application made to him pass an order for ejectment of any person who has encroached upon, reclaimed, acquired or come into possession of agricultural land in contravention of the provisions of this Act or any law or anything having the force of law in the santhal Parganas". It may be relevant to state here that previous to the Act cases used to be governed by Regulation III of 1872 (hereinafter called the regulation ). Under subsection (3) of section 27 of the Regulation where there has been a transfer in contravention of sub-section (1) of that section the Deputy Commissioner was given discretionary power to evict a transferee and restore possession of the raiyat-transfer or any of his heirs. There was a proviso in that section which however put a limitation upon the power of the Deputy Commissioner in respect of the case of a transferee who was in continuous possession for 12 years or more. In that Act however there is no such proviso. The similar provision like section 27 of the Regulation is section 20 of the Act. The fetter on the discretion of the Deputy Commissioner however has been removed by the Act, by deleting the aforesaid proviso and now the Deputy Commissioner can evict any transferee even if he is in continuous possession of more than 12 years. 10. It is true that in the present case section 20 is not attracted as the said provision applies in respect of a transfer by raiyats of his holding or any portion thereof. In the present case I have already pointed out above that the settlement transfer was made by the landlord of his bakast land in which the raiyats of the 16 annas jamabandi have right to take settlement of the same. In the present case I have already pointed out above that the settlement transfer was made by the landlord of his bakast land in which the raiyats of the 16 annas jamabandi have right to take settlement of the same. Therefore such settlement of 1949 in favour of the petitioners father was illegal and section 42 of the Act will be attracted. For making an application under section 42 no limitation is provided as it is clearly stated in the proviso to section 64 "that there shall be no period of limitation for an application under section 42". I have already quoted the said section. It is wider in scope than section 20 (5) of the Act which now stands substituted by new sub-section under the Bihar Schedule Area Regulation 1969 which however is not relevant for this case. Under section 42 a very wide power has been given to the Deputy commissioner to evict any person in unauthorised possession of the agricultural land at any time either on his own motion or on the application made to him if it is shown that the person has come in possession of the agricultural land in contravention of any of the provision of the Act or any law or anything having the force of law in Santhal Parganas. It cannot be disputed that the paragraphs quoted from the aforesaid Settlement Report, in the absence of a specific provision in the Act has the force of law and will govern the present case. In view of the aforesaid position it is manifest that the petitioners can be evicted from the disputed land even if it be assumed in their favour that they were in possession for more than 12 years as on coming into force of the Act of 1949 the title of the petition was in choate. Of course it would have been otherwise ifit could have been proved that the petitioners of their father had perfected the ir title by remaining in possession for more than 12 years before the 1949 Act had come in force (it has come in force on the 1st of November, 1949) Mr. Ghpse fairly did not put forward this argument but relied on the Full Bench decision in the case of Bhauri Lal Jain V/s. The Sub-divisional Officer, Jamatara (1972 bljr 897) for the broad proposition that title by adverse possession can be acquired. Ghpse fairly did not put forward this argument but relied on the Full Bench decision in the case of Bhauri Lal Jain V/s. The Sub-divisional Officer, Jamatara (1972 bljr 897) for the broad proposition that title by adverse possession can be acquired. This case relates to transfer in contravention of section 20 (1) of the act. In that case the virus of sections 20 (1) and 42 of the Act was questioned. It has been held in that case that those provision of law are valid and not hit by any of the provision of constitution. This case instead of supporting the contention of Mr. Ghose goes against him. It rather supports the contention of the respondents inasmuch as it has been held in that case that title by adverse possession cannot be acquired under the Act if the transfer was in contravention of section 20. 11. The view that I have taken is fully supported by a recent decision of the supreme Court (published in June issue) in Yeswantrao Laxmanrao Ghatge and another V/s. Baburao Bala Yadav ( AIR 1978 SC 941 ). Paragraph 6 of the said judgment is relevant for the present case. Untwalia, J. speaking for the court in paragraph 6 quoted section 52-A of Bombay Public Trust Act (29 of 1950) and stated the law wherein Mahanth Bisheswar Das V/s. Sashinath Jha (AIR 1943 patna 289) a Bench decision of this court has been stated to have b.-en correctly decided. It is, therefore, necessary to quote paragraph 6 in whole : "section 52-A reads as follows. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, no suit against an assignee for valuable consideration of any immovable property of the Public Trust which has been registered or is deemed to have been registered under this Act for the purpose of following in his hands, such property or the proceeds thereof or for an account of such property or pro.-eeds shall be barred by any length of time". "it is well-established proposition of law that the law- of limitation fixing a period of limitation for the initiation of any suit or proceeding is a procedural law and not a substantive one, Sec.52-A had, by no stretch of imagination the effect of reviving an extinguished and lost claim and giving life to a dead horse. "it is well-established proposition of law that the law- of limitation fixing a period of limitation for the initiation of any suit or proceeding is a procedural law and not a substantive one, Sec.52-A had, by no stretch of imagination the effect of reviving an extinguished and lost claim and giving life to a dead horse. If the claim was not barred and the right to the property was not extinguished when section 52-A came into force then a suit instituted thereafter could not be defeated under any of the Articles of the Limitation Act of 1908 or even of the new Limitation Act of 1963. In express terms it overrides the provisions of the Limitation Act including the provision in section 28 of the Limitation Act 1908, But then the overriding effect of section 52-A will have its play and operation only if, by the time it came into force, section 28 had not extinguished the right to the property in question. Otherwise not. In mahanth Biseshwar Dass v, Sashinath Jha (AIR 1943 Pat.289) a bench of the Patna High Court pointed out that where the right of the plaintiff had become barred by limitation before the amending act of 1929 was passed the mere institution of the suit after 1929 cannot have the effect of reviving that right. By the Amending Act of 1929 in section 10 of the Limitation Act it was provided that no suit instituted against a person in whom property had become vested in trust for any specific purpose or against his legal representatives or assignees for the purposes mentioned in the section would be barred by any length of time. From the category of assignees for valuable consideration were left out. The question before the patna High Court in the case referred to above was whether the amendment brought about in the year 1929 could revive a right which was extinguished, dead and gone prior to 1929. In that connection the answer given was in the negative. The view so expressed in the Patna decision is perfectly sound and correct, and no decision to the contrary was brought to our notice. Under section 52-A of the Bombay Act, even assignees for valuable consideration have been roped in to save the suit from the bar of any period of limitation. The view so expressed in the Patna decision is perfectly sound and correct, and no decision to the contrary was brought to our notice. Under section 52-A of the Bombay Act, even assignees for valuable consideration have been roped in to save the suit from the bar of any period of limitation. But then on an application of the principle referred to above it is plain that section 52-A could not have the effect of reviving an extinguished right. " This contention of Mr. Ghose that the petitioners could not have been evicted under section 42 of the Act as they have perfected their title at a time after the 1949 Act had come into force by remaining in possession for more than 12 years under illegal settlement has no substance. 12. Now remains to be considered the effect of the compromise of the civil court decree in title suit no.3 of 1961. It cannot be disputed that the civil court has jurisdiction to decide the question of title and therefore a title suit is cognizable by the civil court. Here it will be relevant to refer to section 63 of the Act which bars certain suits in civil court. It reads thus : "bar to suits.-No suits shall be entertained in any court to vary, modify or set aside either directly or indirectly, any order of the Deputy commissioner in any application which is cognizable by the Deputy commissioner under this Act and every such order shall, subject to the provisions of this Act relating to appeal and revision be final : provided that nothing contained in this section shall bar the jurisdiction of a civil court in matters in which it had jurisdiction immediately before the commencement of this Act. " I may state here that the learned Deputy Commissioner in appeal held that the petitioners in order to grab the disputed land took illegal advantage by entering into the above compromise with some of the raiyats in which 16 annas raiyats were not represented. He further held that there was suppression of the revenue court decision and by gaining over some of the raiyats of the village the petitioners father obtained a compromise decree. He further held that there was suppression of the revenue court decision and by gaining over some of the raiyats of the village the petitioners father obtained a compromise decree. Accordingly he held that in such circumstances it would not be desirable to annul the previous decision of the revenue court dated 9.3.1960 and the effect of the said decision cannot be taken away by such compromise decree. It is true that in spite of the decision of the revenue court and in spite of section 63 quoted above a title suit could be filed in the civil court if the order was ultra vires of the revenue court. In such a case section 63 would not give any protection. But if the order of the revenue court was valid in law then the suit would not lie purely for avoiding such an order. 13 In the present case as already indicated above the appellate revenue authority found that there was complete suppression of the order of cancellation of the settlement in favour of the petitioners father and eviction of the petitioners father from the disputed land in the title suit. It appears that there was no averment or disclosure of this fact in the suit filed in 1961 and without adjudication of the power of the revenue court to pass such an order the petitioners father managed to get the suit compromised by gaining over some raiyats of the village. In view of the finding of the Revenue Appellate authority it has to be held that the title suit was brought for avoiding the previous order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 9.3.1960 as affirmed by the Commissioner which had become final under the Act, Sec.63 therefore, will be a bar to the entertainment of the suit and it has been held rightly by the learned Deputy commissioner that the said compromise in the title suit could not take away the effect of the decision of the Revenue Court dated 9.3.1960. 14. In view of the discussion made above I am of the opinion that there is no merit in this application and it is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case I would make no order as to costs. Application dismissed.