Judgment S. Narain, J. 1. The sole petitioner Dasai Kandu has been convicted under section 457 of the Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months. He has further been convicted under section 354 of the Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months thereunder also. Both the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. His appeal having been dismissed, the petitioner has come up to this Court in revision. 2. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is that shortly after sunset near about 7 p. m. on 9.8.70, the petitioner entered the house of the informant Babuni devi, that Prem Shila Kumari (P. W.5), the eight year old daughter of the informant, raised an alarm that some one had entered the house and on hearing this the informant Babuni Devi who was in the shop situated in a portion of the same house, rushed inside with a lantern and saw the petitioner inside the house. The petitioner, therefore, it is alleged dragged Babuni towards him, embraced her and kissed both her cheeks and wanted to drag her to a room. The prosecution case further is that the informant raised alarm and on her cry Pachia and Shyama Kumari came and saw the petitioner fleeing away and that the informant related the incident to them. 3. The case against the petitioner was instituted upon a first information report lodged at Sahar Police Station within whose jurisdiction the place of occurrence was situate that very day at 9-30 p. m. 4. The defence of the petitioner was that the proseoution case was false and he had been falsely implicated at the instance of Kamta Sah, brother of the informant, who was annoyed with him as he had contested him in the election for the office of Mukhia. As already stated, both the courts below have held the prosecution to have been proved beyond doubt and convicted and sentenced the petitioner. 5. The learned Advocate for the petitioner contended that the finding that the prosecution case had been proved bsyond doubt is illegal because though it was the definite case of the informant that the petitioner was identified by her in the light of the lantern, the lantern was not produced before the investigating Officer nor was it found by the Investigating Officer when he inspected the place of occurrence. The Investigating Officer (P. W.7), no doubt, stated that he did not find the lantern and further that the lantern was not produced before him, hut I do not think on that because mere omission to produce the lantern, it can be held that the prosecution case that the informant had come there with a lantern is false and that the petitioner could not have been identified. As the appellate court has pointed out, the Investigating Officer did not say that he had looked for and asked for the lantern. We do not know when the Investigating Officer inspected the place of occurrence. The appellate court has further stated that as the petitioner was a person well known to the informant and the two had come in close contact, the petitioner could have been identified even in the absence of lantern. That view cannot be said to be absolutely unreasonable. At any rate, I am not prepared to hold, nor has the appellate court held, that the story of lantern was false. In support of the aforesaid contention reliance was placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of U. P. V/s. Hari Prasad and others, ( AIR 1974 SC 1740 ). That decision can hardly be regarded as an authority for the proposition that if a lantern in the light of which the identification is alleged to have been made is not produced, the prosecution case must be thrown out. In that case it was held that the story of there being a lantern was false and there were other features about the prosecution case which made it doubtful. In the other case relied by the learned advocate for the petitioner reported in 1977 Bihar Bar Council Journal 400 (Amirchand Ahir and others V/s. State of Bihar) also the non-production of the lantern was one of the circumstances relied upon in conjunction with others for doubting the prosecution case. None of the two decisions are, therefore, of any help to the petitioner. I am, therefore, unable to hold that the finding of the courts below that the prosecution version of the occurrence was proved beyond doubt, is vitiated by any error of law. In my opinion, however, on the evidence on record the conviction under section 457 of the Penal Code is not justified. I am, therefore, unable to hold that the finding of the courts below that the prosecution version of the occurrence was proved beyond doubt, is vitiated by any error of law. In my opinion, however, on the evidence on record the conviction under section 457 of the Penal Code is not justified. To sustain the conviction under section 457 it must be proved that the petitioner committed either lurking house trespass or house breaking. On the evidence it cannot be held that the petitioner committed lurking house trespass, because there is no evidence that the petitioner committed the house, trespass having taken precautions to conceal the house trespass from the occupants of that house which, as provided by section 553, is an essential ingredient of the offence of lurking house trespass. There is no evidence as to how and in what manner the petitioner entered in the house. The mere fact of his having come into the house unnoticed by the informant, though it may raise a suspicion that he had entered by scaling or climbing over any wall or building, is no proof of that circumstance. He may have entered unnoticed. On the findings, however, there can be no doubt that he had committed house trespass in order to the committing of an offence under section 354 of the Penal Code and, therefore, he must be held guilty thereof and convicted under section 451 of the Penal Code. It has not been disputed and, in my opinion, rightly that other facts found he is guilty of an offence under section 354 of the Penal Code, for, he used criminal force to outrage the modesty of the informant. I would, therefore, while upholding the conviction under section 354 of the Penal Code, alter the conviction under section 457 of the penal Code into one under section 451 of the Penal Code. 6. Coming to the question of sentence an offence under section 451 of the penal Code is punishable with imprisonment extending upto two years. The. petitioner had attained majority and as the offence of house trespass was committed for the purpose of outraging the modesty of a helpless widow after entering her house, the sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment is by no means excessive. 7. The. petitioner had attained majority and as the offence of house trespass was committed for the purpose of outraging the modesty of a helpless widow after entering her house, the sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment is by no means excessive. 7. It was contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the sentence passed was illegal as it contravened the provisions of section 248 (2) of! the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called the new code) In my opinion, no question of contravention of section 248 (2) can possibly arise in this case. There is no doubt that the trial in which the convictions were recorded was pending on the date of the commencement of the new Code. In view of the provisions of section 484 (2) of the new Code. the trial had to be held in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1898 as in force immediately before such commencement as if the new Code had not come into force. Sec.248 is a mode of trial prescribed by the new Code and, therefore, it can have no application to a case which has to be tried in accordance with the provisions of the old Code, specially as sub-ssction (2) of section 484 of the new Code requires that such pending cases should be tried "as if this Code had not come into force". The trial court had, in connection with this pending trial, to proceed as if section 248 (2) had not come into force. The applicability of the provisions of section 248 (2) to a trial pending on the date of the commencement of the new Code was considered by a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in surya Mani Tewari V/s. State of U. P. , (1977 Cr LJ 848) and the learned Judge after an elaborate consideration of the entire relevant circumstances came to the conclusion that to such a trial the provisions of section 248 (2) do not apply. I respectfully agree. 8. The legality of the sentence passed is also impugned on the ground of contravention of provisions of section 361 of the new Code. I respectfully agree. 8. The legality of the sentence passed is also impugned on the ground of contravention of provisions of section 361 of the new Code. Sec.361 provides inter alia that where a court could have dealt with an accused persons under section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders act, 1958, but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special reasons for not having done so. The provisions of section 361 are mandatory. See the decision of this court in Criminal Revision No.881 of 1977, disposed of on 8.9.1977 and the decisions referred to therein. I will assume for the purposes of this case that the appellate court could have dealt with the petitioner under section 360 or under the Probation of Offenders act, 1958 and that the sentence of imprisonment passed without recording reasons for not having done so is illegal. In my opinion, however, no cause for interference with the sentence in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction has been made out because the illegality has not resulted in any miscarriage of justice. Under section 360 or the provisions of the Probation of Offenders act, 1958, the court has a discretion to release the petitioner upon his executing a bond to be of good behaviour. It could have directed him to be so released if it was of the opinion that he should be so released regard had to his age, character; antecedents and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed. The offence of outraging the modesty in the present case was committed by entering into the house during night and the victim was a helpless widow. The circumstances in which the offence was committed are, in my opinion, such as to render it inexpedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct. Therefore, the failure to record reasons for not dealing with the petitioner under section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of offenders Act, 1958 has not resulted in any miscarriage of justice. This contention must, therefore, also fail. 9. With the aforesaid modification, the application is dismissed. Application dismissed.