JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) BY this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner seeks to challenge the order, dated 30 8-1977 (Annexure-E), passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. ( 2. ) ONE of the questions that arose in the petition was whether the adverse operational record of a partnership firm could be considered against the partner or the partners of that firm when he or they apply for grant of a permit. In view of the decision in Sardar Dharam Singh v. Regional Transport Authority, gwalior (Miscellaneous Petition No. 436 of 1963, decided on 3-3-1964.), the Division Bench felt that the point deserved to be considered by a larger Bench. Accordingly, that question was heard by a larger Bench and the opinion given by that Bench is that "the bad operational record of a partnership firm is a relevant fact when any of the partner or partners of that firm applies for a grant of permit. The weight, however, to be attached to that bad record would be a question of fact depending upon the circumstances of each case. The decision in Sardar Dharam Singhs Case, in our opinion, does not lay down the correct law on the point. ( 3. ) MOTOR Transport Worker, Ambikapur, held a permit on route ambikapur-Nandamali via Darima. The Regional Transport Authority, vide its order, dated 6-2-1976, cancelled it on account of non-operation. In pursuance of a Notification, published in the Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra, dated 9-4-1976, declaring scope for grant of a stage carriage permit on the aforesaid route, the petitioner, respondent No. 3 Harbans Singh and the earlier permit-holder, Motor Transport Worker, applied for the grant. These applications were published in the Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra, dated 6-7-1976 inviting objections. After hearing all the parties, the Regional Transport Authority granted the permit to the petitioner for a period of three years on the condition that he shall ply on the route a vehicle of the model of 1972 or of a later year to be put on the route within one year. ( 4. ) AGGRIEVED by this, respondent No. 3 Harbans Singh filed an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority whereby it had granted the permit to the petitioner. ( 4. ) AGGRIEVED by this, respondent No. 3 Harbans Singh filed an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority whereby it had granted the permit to the petitioner. The tribunal granted the permit to respondent No. 3 Harbans Singh on the condition that he shall ply a 1977-model bus on that route. ( 5. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, firstly, urged that the documents, which were filed before the Tribunal, were not considered by it. According to him, from these documents it was clear that there were convictions of respondent No. 3 Harbans Singh under the Motor Vehicles Act. He also urged that respondent No. 3 had earlier in respect to other permits failed to fulfil the conditions of putting the vehicles of later models on that route. On the basis of these documents his argument, in short, was that it was the petitioner who, in fact, was entitled to the grant of permit and because the Tribunal did not consider these documents, the impugned order is vitiated. So far as the question of filing of the documents (collectively marked as Annexures-C and d) is concerned, respondent No. 3 in his return has stated that "the petitioner has not submitted any material to his notice before any authority as contained Annexures c, d and he also did not raise any such question before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. " Respondent No. 3 Harbans Singh has sworn an affidavit in support of the return. ( 6. ) ADMITTEDLY, there is no reference of the documents included in annexures-C and D in the order of the Tribunal. It would be reasonable to infer from the absence of any reference of these documents or the facts stated therein in the order of the Tribunal that either the documents were not on record or even if they were, no reference was made to any of them at the time of hearing. This is further supported by the affidavit sworn by respondent no. 3, as has been referred to above. No further counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioner challenging that assertion of respondent No. 3. This is further supported by the affidavit sworn by respondent no. 3, as has been referred to above. No further counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioner challenging that assertion of respondent No. 3. Thus, to us, it is clear that these documents, even if they had been filed, were neither referred to nor relied upon by the petitioner at the time of hearing of the appeal. In Virchand Singh v. State Transport Appellate Authority, Gwalior (1971 MPLJ Note l06= (Miscelianeous Petition No. 367 of 1967, decided on 21-1-1970.)a Division Bench of this Court has held that the Appellate Authority was right in not considering the documents filed by the respondent on the date of hearing of the appeal as the other side had no opportunity to meet them. ( 7. ) THIS question may alsoj!be looked at from yet another angle. In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub section (2) of section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and in supersession of all rules previously made in this behalf, the State Government has made the "madhya Pradesh state Transport Appellate Tribunal (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1972". It was not disputed that these are the rules which would be applicable to the appeal before the Tribunal. Sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 4 of these Rules are as follows:- " (4) The Tribunal may after following the procedure prescribed in sections 64 and 64-A of the Act and after further enquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, confirm, vary or set aside the order against which the appeal or revision is preferred or may pass such other order in relation thereto as it deems fit and shall make an order accordingly. (5) Unless otherwise expressly provided in the Act or in these rules the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) shall, so far as may be, followed in all proceedings under these Rules. " Admittedly, neither of these two sub-rules was invoked on behalf of the petitioner for placing these documents on record in accordance with the Rules so that they could be considered by the Tribunal. In Arvind Kumar v. Nand kishore ( AIR 1968 SC 1227 .) their Lordships of the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider a somewhat similar situation. In Arvind Kumar v. Nand kishore ( AIR 1968 SC 1227 .) their Lordships of the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider a somewhat similar situation. It has been observed that "there is no bar in the Act or the rules against an appellate or the revising authority taking into consideration additional evidence brought on the record, if the authority requires additional evidence to be brought on the record or allows it to be brought on the record to do complete justice between the parties. " It has further been said that "the evidence must undoubtedly be disclosed to the parties and they must be given an opportunity to meet an inference that may arise from such additional evidence. " In that case there was absence of the rules in that behalf while here we have the rules which empower the Tribunal to hold a further enquiry, if any, as he may consider necessary. Sub-rule (5)of rule 4, as has been reproduced above, makes the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, so far as it may be, applicable to the proceedings under these rules unless otherwise expressly provided in the Act or the rules. Both on the principle of fair play as also on the principles contained in Order 41, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it would necessary for the Tribunal to hear the parties with regard to the additional evidence sought to be produced at the appellate stage. It is not even the case of the petitioner that he had filed any application for permitting him to use this additional evidence or even if he had so filed, had requested the Tribunal to consider and decide that application. Contrary to this, what the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 states is that these documents were filed without notice to respondent No. 3 and no reference of these documents was made at the time of hearing. ( 8. ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme Court in B. Prubhakara Rao v. Desari pankala Rao and others (1976 (3) SC C 550) had an occasion to consider Rule 15 of the Andhra pradesh State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1971, which relates to additional evidence. ( 8. ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme Court in B. Prubhakara Rao v. Desari pankala Rao and others (1976 (3) SC C 550) had an occasion to consider Rule 15 of the Andhra pradesh State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1971, which relates to additional evidence. Their Lordships set down five propositions, one of which is that "an activist tribunal (R. T. A. and, in exceptional cases, even the s. T. A. T.) may even collect useful information bearing on consideration set out in section 47 and, after public exposure of such information at the hearing and reasonable opportunity to meet it, if anyone is adversely affected, put it into the crucible of judgment. " ( 9. ) THUS, for the aforesaid reasons, both independently as also taken together, we find that no error was committed by the Tribunal in not having looked into the documents (Annexures-C and D) said to have been filed by the petitioner before it. This submission, therefore, fails. ( 10. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner then urged that the order of the tribunal is vitiated because he did not consider the relevant principles while considering the question of grant. He in support of his contentions referred to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M. Nains Mohammed v. K. A. Natarajan and others ( (1975) 2 SC C 352 ). This decision hardly supports the petitioner. In this case in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Tribunal, learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court, while disagreeing with the conclusions of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, instead of sending the case back for a fresh look at the merits of the matter, set aside the permit granted by the Tribunal and affirmed the award in favour of the appellant. Thereupon the respondent moved the matter before a division Bench of that Court which took the view that "a fullscale reappraisal of the points for and against each claimant was in excess of the jurisdiction of the Single Judge under Article 226, although it noticed that certain factors not relevant to the adjudication had been taken into consideration by the s. T. A. T. Consequently, the order of the learned Judge was set aside, the result being that the respondents permit was restored. " In this context their lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that "the boundaries of the High courts jurisdiction under Article 226 are clearly and strongly built and cannot be breached without risking jurisprudential confusion Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd v. C. Chandrasekaran (AIR 1968 SC 107 ). The power is supervisory in nature, although the Judges as both the tiers, in the instant case, have unwittingly slipped into the subtle, but fatal, error of exercising a kind of appellate review. " In the circumstances as they were, their Lordships thought it fair to set aside the judgment under appeal and send the whole case back to the S. T. A. T. to hear it afresh and dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. ( 11. ) ANOTHER decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in p. Kumarswami v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras and another ( (1976) 1 SC C 373) was also referred to in an attempt to persuade us that in exercise of the writ jurisdiction an interference could be made in the instant case. This was a case from Madras and from the report it appears that there was some system of giving marks under the rules framed under the Act by the Tamil Nadu Government laying down the various qualifications for applicants for permits of passenger transport. Rule 155-A of those Rules crystalizes these considerations and describes them as guiding principles for the grant of stage carriage permits. What has been observed by their Lordships is that "the error that has crept into the order of the Appellate Tribunal consists in thinking that the rules or guidelines could be discarded in the name of section 47 (1 ). Actually, rule 155-A is in implementation of section 47 (1), but is not exhaustive of all the considerations that will prevail in a given situation. " In this context it was observed that "the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal that because the permit is for a passenger transport, lorry service experience, even if it falls under Rule 155-A (3) (D), can be ignored, is, therefore, illegal. A relevant factor has thus been wrongly excluded. " Connected with this, another flaw was also noticed by their Lordships. It was in that context that the case was remanded to the Appellate Tribunal for being heard de novo. A relevant factor has thus been wrongly excluded. " Connected with this, another flaw was also noticed by their Lordships. It was in that context that the case was remanded to the Appellate Tribunal for being heard de novo. It is, therefore, clear that in the said decision there was a contravention of the statutory rules. So far as this State is concerned, no such similar rules have been framed under the Motor Vehicles Act. The question of violation of any statutory rules does not, therefore, arise. ( 12. ) YET another decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in ajanta Transports (P) Ltd. , Coimbatore v. M/s T. V. K. Transports, Pulampatti (8. AIR 1975 SC123.)was referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner. This decision itself lays down that "by itself, a recent grant or the possession of other permits is neither a qualification nor a disqualification divorced from the other circumstances which could indicate how such a fact is related to the interests of the public generally. It is only if there are other facts establishing the co-relationship and indicate its advantages or disadvantages to the public generally that it will become a relevant circumstance. " In view of this, the contention that respondent No. 3 had reached the optimum capacity and so on that ground permit should not have been granted to him cannot be considered divorced from the other facts and circumstances which are relevant for purposes of section 47 of the Act. ( 13. ) THE grievance that the petitioner was not the sole proprietor of the motor Transport Worker has no consequence. Even if we accept that it was a partnership firm and consider the partnership-deed, which forms part of the documents (Annexure-C), what we find is that it was the petitioner who was responsible for plying the buses after when the permits had been granted. In view of the opinion of the larger Bench, he at least has no escape from the bad operational record of that firm. ( 14. ) FROM the impugned order we find that the Tribunal was quite alive to the principles that have to be followed while granting permits. He has also referred to the different decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court on that question. ( 14. ) FROM the impugned order we find that the Tribunal was quite alive to the principles that have to be followed while granting permits. He has also referred to the different decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court on that question. He has dealt with the different considerations as are relevant for purposes of deciding as to who in the public interest is better and suitable. He has also discussed the different circumstances which it cannot be disputed are relevant and has come to a conclusion that it would be present respondent no. 3 who has for more facilities to offer to the travelling public as against the present petitioner. We do not find that the order of the Tribunal suffers from any illegality or stands vitiated for any reason so as to call for an interference in the present petition. ( 15. ) THE petition is, therefore, dismissed. Respondent No. 3 shall get the costs of this petition from the petitioner who shall bear his own. Counsels fee shall be Rs. 150. The balance, if any, of the security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.