JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal against a judgment of reversal. The plaintiffs instituted the suit on January 10, 1968 for recovery of possession of the suit premises comprising three rooms, kitchen, bath, privy and balcony of the Second floor of premises 23/a, Justice Chandra Madhab Road, calcutta, held by the defendant under the plaintiffs as a monthly tenant. The rent of the suit premises was Rs. 68/-per month according to English calendar month. The tenancy was determined by a notice to quit determining the tenancy with the expiry of May, 1967 which was duly received by the defendant. The grounds for eviction which are now material were that the defendant was a def0ulter in payment of rent from January, 1960 and further he had sub-let the suit premises to one J. C. Khosla without knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs and with his family and belongings shifted to 27, Rowland Road, Calcutta. As the requisition under the notice was not complied with the suit was instituted for the recovery of possession and for mesne profits. 2. THE defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement, stating inter alia that he was a tenant under the plaintiff No. 1 Provabati Das and paid rent to her directly. On her refusal to receive rent on due tender he deposited the monthly rent as and when the same became due, with the Rent controller to the credit of the said landlady till the institution of the suit. It was accordingly denied that he was a defaulter in payment of rent. As to subletting it was stated by the defendant that he did not shift with all his belongings and J. C. Khosla, his near relation, was residing there with his permission, but there was no subletting. It was accordingly submitted that the suit should be dismissed. On a trial an evidence, the learned munsif found that the notice was valid, legal and sufficient both under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as also under Section 13 (6) of the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and was duly served. It was however found that the defendant was defaulter from January 1960 to June 1967 but it was not possible to hold on evidence adduced that the defendant had sublet the premises as he had possession of one room and had not removed all his belongings. It was however found that the defendant was defaulter from January 1960 to June 1967 but it was not possible to hold on evidence adduced that the defendant had sublet the premises as he had possession of one room and had not removed all his belongings. The suit was accordingly decreed. 3. ON appeal, it was held that provabati Das was entitled to receive the rent on her account as also on account of her sons then minors as their natural guardian and under the provisions of law, as contained in Section 2 of the Act, she was the landlady and as such deposits in her name were valid and legal. In regard to subletting, the defendant's evidence that the premises were not sub-let but his relative J. C. Khosla was permitted to live there while some of his belongings were kept in the suit premises, was accepted. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the suit was dismissed. 4. IN support of the appeal, Mr. Das submitted that both findings are unsustainable in law. The deposits of rent were invalid being in name of provabati only in her personal name and not in any other capacity while the defence case in the written statement was that Provabati was the only landlady, a case not given up during trial. As to sub-letting in view of the admitted position, the onus was on the defendant to establish that there was no subletting in the absence whereof the courts should have made adverse presumption against him. Mr. Ghosh on the other hand contended that the deposits were made bonafide on her representation and accordingly, as all rent was duly deposited nothing was due. The defendant should not be held a defaulter on technical grounds. Further payment to one landlord is payment to all as has been held by judicial authorities. He referred to the decision in Ahamudeen vs. Girish chunder ILR 4 Cal. 350 in which it was held that a co-sharer was not entitled to his share of the rent from the tenant when he had paid according to the system of joint collection of rent to other co-sharers. He referred to the decision in Ahamudeen vs. Girish chunder ILR 4 Cal. 350 in which it was held that a co-sharer was not entitled to his share of the rent from the tenant when he had paid according to the system of joint collection of rent to other co-sharers. Reliance was placed on the decision in Kanji Manji vs. Trustees of the Port of Bombay AIR 1963 S. C. 468, where the court observed that when once it is held that the tenancy was joint, notice to one of the joint tenants was sufficient and the suit for the same reason was also good. It was submitted that on this principle, payment of rent to one landlord was also valid and legal. Certain other decisions were cited which do not appear to be relevant to the controversy. 5. AS will appear from the written statement, the defence case was that provabati, plaintiff No. 1, was the landlord of the suit premises. In evidence d. W. 1 the defendant stated that after the death of the predecessor landlord, only provabati became his landlady and other plaintiffs did not become his landlords. The rent receipts were not produced by the defendant to support his case but in the rent counterfoil book ext. 2 the counterfoil of rent receipts for some months in 1959 in printed form describe owners as Sri Provabati Das and 'ors' while the signature of Provabati Das describes her as 'self and for minor sons'. It is thus obvious that the defendant had notice that Provabati and her minor sons, the present plaintiffs were his landlords even in 1959. Notwithstanding such receipts as indicated in the counterfoil book kept in usual course of business, the defendant persisted in his case that Provabati alone was his landlady in his application for deposit of rent filed on February 10, 1960 (Ext. 10) and deposited rent accordingly till about June 1966 in the same manner. Thereafter, it appears, in his application dated July 19, 1967 for month of July 1967, the defendant stated that the plaintiffs were his landlords and deposits thereafter were made in the name of the plaintiffs. 6. IT is obvious that such deposits upto June 1966 prima facie were invalid being in the name of Provabati alone. There is no dispute that the husband of Provabati, Dr. 6. IT is obvious that such deposits upto June 1966 prima facie were invalid being in the name of Provabati alone. There is no dispute that the husband of Provabati, Dr. M. Das was the original landlord and after his death his heirs and legal representatives became the landlords which was indicated in the rent receipts. The defendant had not pleaded or proved that any fresh tenancy was created by Provabati after the death of the predecessor landlord so that it was obvious that the original tenancy continued. It is true that the rent receipts did not disclose the names of other plaintiffs describing them only as "others" or "minor sons," even so the defendant even if he had no obligation to enquire, could deposit the rent in the name of Provabati, stating in the application further that he had bonafide doubts as to the person or persons to whom rent was payable as provided in section 21 (1) of the Act. Instead, the deposits were made in the name of provabati alone who, according to the defendant was his only landlady. In this state of affairs, the principles laid down in the above decisions have no relevance. The appellate court had held that even so the deposits were valid as provabati was entitled to receive the rent whether or not on her own account even as a natural guardian of minor sons who were co-sharer landlords. Apart from the fact that such position was contrary to the defence case, the person contemplated under Clause (d)of section 2 may be a trustee a guardian as authorised representative or a manager, receiver and the like. Even so person in such a situation, is entitled to receive rent on behalf of landlords in such capacity and not in his personal name or capacity. Such capacity of a person to receive rent as landlord must be disclosed in the application, for deposit of rent and the deposit is to be made accordingly to the credit of the person in such capacity and cannot be made in the personal name of such person. Such capacity of a person to receive rent as landlord must be disclosed in the application, for deposit of rent and the deposit is to be made accordingly to the credit of the person in such capacity and cannot be made in the personal name of such person. Accordingly there is no escape from the position that the defendant must be deemed to be a defaulter in payment of rent up to June 1966 up to which date the deposits were made in the name of Provabati as the sole landlady in her personal name and not in any other capacity (Ext. D series). Further there is no excuse for his not depositing rent in names of all the plaintiffs for May and June, 1967 as was done for subsequent months when he was made aware of all landlords by the notice to quit, as will appear from his letter of May 27, 1967 (Ext. 1 b)which he ultimately did in name of all plaintiffs for July 1967 (Ext. 10 a). 7. AS to sub letting Mr. Ghosh has submitted that the finding of the courts below on this issue is conclusive. As a pure question of fact the position is undoubtedly so but it is also admitted by the defendant that the suit premises, except one room, had been in possession of a relation of his who had been residing there with his family. It is not disclosed what is the consideration for the accommodation as it would be inconceivable that the defendant would indulge in the charity of payment of rent for long span of years from 1935-70 while it is also the admitted position that the defendant shifted from the suit premises since the end of 1959. Further it is not necessary that the entirety of the suit premises should be sub-let as a sub-letting in whole or in part of the tenanted premises would attract the operation of clause (a) of section 13 (1) while it is also not the case or evidence of the defendant that he at the material time had any control or could exercise any act of possession in respect of the portion in the suit premises in occupation of the alleged licensee. In the context of the attending circumstances, it is obvious that exclusive possession of part of the premises was given to the alleged licensee while there is no evidence from either side about the consideration for such accommodation though it was the defendant to establish his special defence affirmatively on this aspect. 8. SUB-LETTING like lease is a transfer by the lessee of a right to enjoy the leased property in whole or in part for a certain time or in perpetuity in consideration of a price paid or promised or money, share of crop service or other thing of value. If a person is given an exclusive right of enjoyment of property or a portion thereof for consideration of any thing of value, such right may amount to an interest in property as sub-lease or sub-letting. When a person is found to be in possession of property apparently exclusive under a tenant it may not always be possible for the landlord to establish that such parting of possession amounts to sub-letting. In such case, when possession by any person under a tenant is not disputed, it will for the tenant to establish that inspite of the possession of the premises or portion thereof by such person under him, there is no sub-letting as contemplated in law, as the relevant facts are within his special knowledge. Failure to produce relevant evidence on this aspect may entitle the court to make an adverse inference against him. In the case before us, the defendant did not establish by evidence that there is no transfer of exclusive possession to his alleged licensee for any consideration of value on the face of the admitted possession of at least a portion of the suit premises by a relation of his. The court accordingly was entitled to draw adverse inference against the defendant which has not alone on a mistaken notion of onus which in the context of the admitted position shifted on the defendant as observed in Kumbhan Laksmanna v. Tangirala Venkateswaralu and others. AIR 1949 P. C. 278. However as the result of the litigation is also equally dependent on the issue of default, it is not necessary to express a final opinion on a mixed question of law and fact for the first time in this Court. 9. AIR 1949 P. C. 278. However as the result of the litigation is also equally dependent on the issue of default, it is not necessary to express a final opinion on a mixed question of law and fact for the first time in this Court. 9. AS we have seen, the defendant had been a defaulter in payment of rent as the deposits made by him are invalid in law and there is no scope for an equitable consideration even though all amounts on account of arrear rent had been deposited, and as the defendant had not been residing in the suit premises over 8/9 years prior to the institution of the suit, The plaintiffs accordingly are entitled to a decree on this ground and the suit was rightly decreed by the trial court. 10. MR. Ghosh submitted that the plaintiffs obtained possession of the suit premises in execution of the decree of the trial court even before the period for filing the appeal expired. This fact has no bearing on the questions in controversy in this appeal. The appeal accordingly succeeds and is allowed and the judgment and decree of the first appellate court are set aside and those of the trial court restored. There will be no order for costs in the appeal in the circumstances. Appeal allowed.