Judgment Shamshul Hasan, J. 1. This is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter to be referred to as the Code) against the order of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, dated 13.6.1978 as well as the order dated 16.6.78, said to be contained in Annexures 1 and 2 respectively to the petition (it may be stated that although the copies have been annexed to the petition as anncxures, they have not been marked as such ). This application has been filed by the State of Bihar through Batkeshwar Chandra Verma, Deputy superintendent of Police, Vigilance Department, government of Bihar against the only opposite-party, Hardwar Pandey, the accused in the case. 2. The opposite-party is an accused in a case under section 5 (1) (e) of the prevention of Corruption Act, being Vigilance P. S. Case no.37 (4)78. The impugned orders were passed in course of investigation which is still pending. 3. Since the State was the applicant in this case, after hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, I thought it advisable and in the interest of justice to notice the opposite party to show cause as to why the application should not bo admitted. This procedure adopted by mo is also in accordance with tho practice under which notice is given to the Public Prosecutor in the High Court when similar applications are tiled by tho private parties against the State. Notice was accepted on behalf of the opposite party on the same day in court and the case was adjourned to the following day for hearing of the admission matter. On that day after hearing learned counsel for both parties. It considered it expedient and advisable to call for the record of the Court of the Chief Judicial magistrate, Patna, on receipt of which the matter was heard today, (11.7.1978 ). 4. The facts, as stated in the petition, which have given rise to this application, are that on receipt of confidential information that Hardwar Panday, the opposite-party, had amassed wealth disproprtionate to his known source of income, a case was instituted by Shri B. C. Verma Deputy S. P. Vigilance department, in Vigilance P. S. on 31.4.1978. 4. The facts, as stated in the petition, which have given rise to this application, are that on receipt of confidential information that Hardwar Panday, the opposite-party, had amassed wealth disproprtionate to his known source of income, a case was instituted by Shri B. C. Verma Deputy S. P. Vigilance department, in Vigilance P. S. on 31.4.1978. During the course of investigation of this case simultaneous raids were conducted at tho houses of the opposite party at Darbhanga, in Pataliputra Colony, Patna, Hazaribagh and at his village home bagahsa, and it is said that in course of those raids largo quantities of incriminating articles, documents, papers, huge amount of cash and ornaments were seized. In this application wo arc concerned with the search conducted at the house in Pataliputra Colony, Patna. On 1-5-78 this search was conducted in presenpe of two Magistrates and two local independent witnesses and the son of the opposite-party, Vijoy Kumar Pandey. It may be stated that the accused was absent from the premises. In the course of search that continued till late at night certain papers and documents were also seized but it is stated in the petition that due to frequent failure of electric supply in the house the seized documents and papers were put in a box, supplied by Vijoy Kumar Pandey, and after locking the same it was scaled in his presence and in the presence of two Magistrates. The box was put in the custody of the Vigilance Department. 5. It is further stated in the petition that the said Vijoy Kumar Pandey was informed by letter no.5218, dated 11.5.78 that he should be present on 20.5.78 when an inventory of the papers, kept in the sealed box, will be prepared. Since Vijoy Kumar Pandey did not turn upon 20.5.78, another letter was sent to him bearing no.6839, dated 31.5.78, asking him to be present for the aforesaid purpose on 3.6.78. Since Vijoy Kumar Pandey did not turn upon 20.5.78, another letter was sent to him bearing no.6839, dated 31.5.78, asking him to be present for the aforesaid purpose on 3.6.78. In the meantime, on 31.5.78 the learned Chief Judicial magistrate directed the prosecution to submit a report and in compliance of that order and for the purpose of submitting a report and for the purpose of investigation the box was opened in presence of a magistrate on 8-6-78 and an inventory of the articles kept in that box was prepared, and, accordingly, the report along with a copy of the inventory list was sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, on 8.6.78. A copy of the said inventory was also supplied to the accused. 6. The opposite party filed two petitions, one on 31.5.78 and the other on 13.6.78, under sections 461/467 of the Code, for production of the documents seized and kept in the box and by orders, dated 13.6.78 and 16.6.78 the Chief judicial Magistrate directed the Offier-in-charge of Vigilance P. S. for production of documents along with their contents. The facts stated above are all from the petition failed in this Court and T have repeated the words found therein. 7. During the course of submision I was taken through of the entire record by learned counsel of both parties certain important facts were found in the original record which are not in the petition. The need to be stated here. The search in question in the Pataliputra house of the opposite party was on the basis of an order of the Court dated 1.5.78 passed on the application of the prosecution. On 31.5.78 a petition was filed by the opposite party to the effect that the search was stated in the absence of the opposite party and other members of his family. The son of the opposite party arrived at about 1 p. m. and the search continued till late at night when search and seizure lists were prepared. It is further stated in the petition that large number of documents and papers belonging to the wife of the opposite party and the opposite party himself were taken charge of by the raiding party and as it was getting late, they were not entered in the inventory but put in a scaled box, as stated above. It is further stated in the petition that large number of documents and papers belonging to the wife of the opposite party and the opposite party himself were taken charge of by the raiding party and as it was getting late, they were not entered in the inventory but put in a scaled box, as stated above. The officers of the raiding party, it is stated, assured the son of the opposite party that the box will be opened in the following morning in the Vigilance Department and asked Vijoy Kumar pandey to come to the office, which he did on 2.5,78, but he was told by the officers that they were not free on that day and that he would be duly informed. It is further stated that the opposite party requested the Vigilance Department to open the box several times It was also stated in the petition that the box included certain hand notes and documents of the wife of the opposite party and his mother, which required examination because it was feared that some of them might have become time-barred. It was further submitted that certain papers important and vital for defence of the opposite party were in that box and an apprehension that the box may be tampered with by the Vigilance Department was also expressed therein. 8. On the aforesaid petition an order was passed by the Chief Judicial magistrate on 31.5.78 after hearing learned counsel for the opposite party and sri Ramanuj Singh, Additional P. P. for the State. The operative position of the said order reads as follows : -". . . . . . In the circumstances let a report be called for in this regard from the o/c, P. S. concerned. The report to reach this court latest by 2nd june, 1978, when put up this petition for hearing in presence of the parties on 3.6.1978. The facts stated in the petitioner were also set out in the said order. On 3.6.78 since no report was received, the matter was adjourned to 7.6.78 and a reminder was sent for the report. On 7.6.78 also no report was received and a reminder was sent for the same. On 9.6.78 also no report had been received and the additional P. P. appearing for the State had played for adjourning the hearing of the matter and calling for the report. On 7.6.78 also no report was received and a reminder was sent for the same. On 9.6.78 also no report had been received and the additional P. P. appearing for the State had played for adjourning the hearing of the matter and calling for the report. The matter was adjourned to 13.6.78 on which date the Addl. P. P. was requested to take all possible steps to ensure the receipt of the called for report and the seizure list, which had not been submitted in the case so far. An explanation was also called for from the officer-in-charge, vigilance P. S. as to why no seizure list had so far been furnished in that court as required by law. He was also directed to submit the wanted report and the original seizure list of the case forthwith and the Court directed that no further adjournment would bo granted and orders would be passed on the materials already available on the record. On 9.6.78 at 11.30 a. m. an inventory of the papers found in the box received in court. The matter was taken up on 13.6.78 on which date another application was filed by the opposite party praying that he be allowed to inspect the contents of the box that was reported to have been opened and an inventory list was prepared on 3.6.78. It was further prayed that a copy of the inventory and seizure list b e supplied to the opposite party. 9. The matter was heard. A copy of the petition was also served on the additioaal P. P. who made no objection to the prayer of the opposite party, which was allowed and the officer-in-charge, Vigilance P. S. , was directed to produce the box containing the papers and seizure list which were prepared on 3.6.78, before the Court on 16.6.78, when the contents of the box would be inspected in the presence of the parties. The Officer-in-charge, Vigilance, was further directed to furnish a copy of the seizure list to the accused. 10. On 16.6.78 a box was not produced but a petition was filed on behalf of the State wherein the following prayer was made: it is, therefore, prayed that your honour would be pleased to recall the order if any for production of the box in court and reject the petition of the accused dated 31.5.78 and 13 6.78. 10. On 16.6.78 a box was not produced but a petition was filed on behalf of the State wherein the following prayer was made: it is, therefore, prayed that your honour would be pleased to recall the order if any for production of the box in court and reject the petition of the accused dated 31.5.78 and 13 6.78. " in this petition surprisingly the fact that the addl. P. P. did not object to the order of the production of the box in court was not denied, as is now being done before me. I may also state here incidentally that in course of argument learned counsel for the State submitted that he would file an affidavit sworn by the Addl. P. P. that he did not agree to the order which was not done. 11. On 16.6.78 Shri M. R. Sahay, Advocate, appeared for the prosecution and the impugned order was passed. I may also state here that while going through the record I found that the seizure list made on 1.5.78 significantly does not mention the box containing the documents as being seized. In the seizure list four persons are mentioned as witneses for the seizure but out of them only one member of the public had signed the seizure list and the signature of the second member of the public, Rameshwar Singh, is absent. It will also be relevant to state that when the box was opened, the two Magistrates, who were present at the time of seizure and when the box was sealed, were not present because, it is stated one of them was unwell, and the two independent witnesses said to be present at the initial search and seizure were absent and the box was opened before a third Magistrate. All these Magistrates concerned, it may be stated, were Executive Magistrates. 12. At this stage it will not be relevant for me to say anything in regard to the manner of search and seizure but it will be relevant for the scope of this inquiry to state that the prosecution was not justified in opening the box on 3.6.78 when the court only wanted a report and the lawyer for the prosecution was aware of the contents of the petition filed by the opposite-party and the suspicion indicated therein. Calling of a report did not mean that the court wanted to know the contents of the box. The court only wanted a report on the contents of the petition and the situation then prevailing in relation thereto. It would have been fit and proper for the prosecution to have produced the box in court and followed the order of the Magistrate or if they had any objection to the accused inspecting the documents, which order was passed later, the prosecution should have made this prayer before opening the box before the court. The procedure adopted, in my view, by the prosecution, to say the least, was not justified. This much I have stated only to indicate that in making the prayer for inspection of the documents the apprehension of the opposite party, as stated in his petition, seems to be justified. This much was essential in order to appreciate the view that I am going to take in this case. 13. After hearing the submissions of the parties at great length and examining the records I feel that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye V/s. State of Maharashtra, (Alr 1978 SC 47) the impugned orders of the Chief Judicial Magistrate do not warrant any interference as they are interlocutory orders. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner was submitted that the impugned orders of the Magistrate amount to abuse of the process of the court and this court would be perfectly justified in interfering with the same. It was further submitted that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not envisage a situation in which the Court would be justified in passing an order for the production of the box containing the documents and papers and allowing the accused to inspect the same. It was also submitted that this would amount to tampering with the evidence because once the accused inspects the documents, he will create evidence to counteract the effect of the documents that are detrimental to his interest. It was also stated that the petition filed by the opposite party in the trial court was under section 451 of the Code, which becomes applicable only when an inquiry or trial has commenced. It was also stated that the petition filed by the opposite party in the trial court was under section 451 of the Code, which becomes applicable only when an inquiry or trial has commenced. I may indicate here that in the petition before the court the petitioner has described the petition of the opposite-party filed in the court below as being under section 451/45 /. On behalf of the opposite-party it was stated that the impugned orders do not amount to abuse of the process of the court and arc interlocutory orders. The Court was fully empowered in law to pass orders for production and inspection of the documents in court. It is further submitted that there is no question of tampering of the evidence as a result of the inspection of the documents because the documents have already been mentioned in the inventory furnished to the opposite-party but the opposite party is entitled to inspect the documents because in the very nature of this case under section 5 (2) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act the onus shifts on the accused to explain the disproportionate assests and if any inspection is denied it will really amount to obstructing the defence of the opposite-party. It was further submitted in reply that the petition was under section 457 and that mention of the section in the petition is not material but the substance of the petition has to be examined. 15. In paragraph 10 of the decision in the case of Madhu Limaye (supra)it has been hold by the Supreme Court as follows : - "as pointed out in Amar Naths case ( AIR 1977 SC 2185 ) the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally. More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in Sec.397. More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in Sec.397. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the sessions Judge) for exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory orders, on the other, the power has been conferred in almost the same terms "as it was in the 1898 Code. On a plain reading of Sec.482, however, it would follow that nothing in the coda which would include sub-section (2) of Sec.397 also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. But, if we were to ,say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of thj inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional power. In such a situation what is the. harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Sec.397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of corruption Act without a sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of autre fois acquit. Even assuming although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused upto the end The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The high Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Sec.482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible. " 16. It will now have to be examined whether the order of :the Court amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. Unless that is shown, the aforesaid decision will stand in the way of my interfering with the impugned orders. In my view, the abuse of the process of the court means that repeated proceedings are started in matters that have already been decided against a person by such person or by starting a proceeding which is wanting in bona fides and is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. The application of the accused does not, in my view, come within any of the categories mentioned above or in similar situation that i may have not mentioned above. The application of the accused does not, in my view, come within any of the categories mentioned above or in similar situation that i may have not mentioned above. The accused opposite-party, in my view was perfectly justified in claiming inspection of the documents particularly when he was not present when the documents and papers were seized and sealed in a box, which was opened behind his back and not produced in court in accordance with the direction issued by it and above all, in view of the fact that he has to explain the accumulation of the alleged assets during the trial. This being the situation the impugned orders and the action of the opposite-party do not amount to abuse of the process of the Court. Orders are interlocutory orders as described in air 1978 SC 47 and the several decisions mentioned therein. This is not one of those instances which come within the exceptions laid down in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court because the orders of the learned court below do not amount to abuse of the process of the Court nor quashing of the orders is essential to secure the ends of justice. In fact, the orders of the flearned magistrate, do not in any way create such a situation as envisaged in the decision in view of what I have stated above, justifying the interference. 17. In regard to the submission that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide the procedure adopted by the Court. Suffice it to state that under section 457of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Court would have been justified if it thought fit to direct the return of the documents to the opposite-party and therefore, there could be no difficulty in ordering such an inspection, which, in my view, is justified also to secure the ends of justice. The Court was neither lacking in jurisdiction nor was there any jurisdictional impediment in the way of the court in passing the impugned orders. 18. The submission of the learned counsel for the opposite-party is correct in regard to the objection of the counsel for the petitioner that the petition filed in the lower court by the opposite-party is purported to have been filed under section 451 of the Code. 18. The submission of the learned counsel for the opposite-party is correct in regard to the objection of the counsel for the petitioner that the petition filed in the lower court by the opposite-party is purported to have been filed under section 451 of the Code. The substance of the petition and not its form is the material thing and the order cannot be set aside on the ground that the petition has been incorrectly described. In regard to the submission that the accused would tamper with the prosecution evidence and the orders amount to an interference with the course of investigation, suffice it to say that if tampering is feard due to the knowledge of the opposite party in regard to the contents of the documents seized, then the copy of the inventory itself has already provided the instrument and materials to the opposite-party and, therfore, there can be no harm in the documents being inspected and if the inventory is either cryptie or suffering from deliberate concealment of details, then the inventory itself is contrary to law thus inspection would not in any way add to the risk of tampering. In fact, by resisting the inspection of the documents the prosecution is rendering itself liable to extreme suspicion. The orders of the court also do not amouut to interfering with the investigation because the court is not in any way directing or obstructing the process of investigation or interfering in the manner in which the prosecution proposes to deal with the documents nor is it in any way trying to obstruct the course of investigation. In my view, therefore, the orders do not call for any interference. 19. The detailed order became necessary at the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 20. In the result, the application is dismissed. Application dismissed.