Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1978 DIGILAW 148 (ALL)

Abdul Gani v. Union of India

1978-02-03

K.S.VARMA

body1978
JUDGMENT K.S. Varma, J. - This is a plaintiffs appeal arising out of a suit brought by the appellant for a declaration that his removal from service is illegal. He has also prayed for recovery of arrears of salary and allowance. The appellant claims to be a semi-skilled fitter at the Loco Workshop, Northern Railway, Charbagh, Lucknow having 14 years service to his credit. Certain charges of misconduct were levelled against him. These charges were enquired into by means of a departmental enquiry. The charge-sheet dated 16-10-1961 was issued to the appellant. He submitted his explanation. The Inquiry Officer gave his findings against the appellant on 20-6-1962. A show cause notice was issued. The appellant submitted his explanation but was ultimately removed from his service by an order dated 31-8-1962. The appellant preferred a departmental appeal against the order of removal but the same was dismissed. On these allegations the appellant filed a suit and claimed a declaration that his removal from service was illegal. 2. The defendant contested the suit and pleaded that the Departmental Inquiry was held in accordance with the Discipline and Appeal Rules for Non-Gazetted Railway Servants. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff was required to show cause against the proposed punishment after he was found guilty in a departmental proceedings. The plaintiff-appellant submitted his explanation and after his explanation was considered, he was removed from service. According to the respondent, the order of removal from service is legal and valid. On the above pleadings only two issues arise for the consideration of the Court; (1) whether the dismissal of the plaintiff is illegal for the reasons given in para. 12 of the plaint? and (2) To what relief, or amount, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 3. The trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 24-5-1968 dismissed the suit. Against the decree passed by the trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the District Judge which came up for hearing before the Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, Lucknow. The lower appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 6-11-1973 upheld the decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff aggrieved by the decree passed by the lower appellate Court has come up in second appeal before this Court. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant Mr. The lower appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 6-11-1973 upheld the decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff aggrieved by the decree passed by the lower appellate Court has come up in second appeal before this Court. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Hargovind Dayal Srivastava contended that the order of removal was liable to be set aside as there was non-compliance of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Departmental Inquiry was in violation of principles of natural justice. He elaborated his submissions by contending that the charge-sheet Ext. 1 mentions that the appellant is charged with misconduct in attempting to take out Railway material while passing through Time Office Gate No. 7 on 29-9-1961 and was caught red-handed by the Railway Protection Force Personnel. The charge-sheet further goes on to state: "You are hereby called upon to show cause why you should not be removed from service or punished with any of the lesser penalties specified in Rula 10007. Indian Railways Establishment Code, Vol. 1............." 5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that Ext. 1 indicates that the authorities have prejudged the matter and have decided to inflict the punishment mentioned in Ext. 1 without affording opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that R. 21 of the Northern Railway Discipline and Appeal Rules for Non-Gazetted Railway Servants under which Ext. 1 has been issued is violative of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and, accordingly, deserves to be struck down. 6. On the other hand, Mr. A. B. Nigam, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the rule is intra vires and does not in any manner contravene the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. He further submitted that the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution have been complied with and that the order of removal is perfectly legal. 7. In support of the submission that the Departmental proceedings were in violation of principles, of natural justice, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Gouri Pr. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (1968 Lab IC 735) (Cal). By reference to this decision, he submitted that at the stage of framing a charge, no question of punishment can arise. 7. In support of the submission that the Departmental proceedings were in violation of principles, of natural justice, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Gouri Pr. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (1968 Lab IC 735) (Cal). By reference to this decision, he submitted that at the stage of framing a charge, no question of punishment can arise. He contended that if inquiry against a delinquent officer is conducted on the basis of a notice consisting of charges as well as the proposed punishment, the notice itself would be invalid. The inquiry will be illegal, and the order of punishment based on such inquiry would also be illegal. He also relied upon Ram Gopal Nigam v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1968 Lab IC 1476) (All) in support of the said argument. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant in the first place appears to find support from the aforesaid decisions but on a closer scrutiny it appears that these decisions have no application to the instant case. A perusal of the said decisions would indicate that the principle underlying the decisions was that the Inquiry Officer should have an open mind while determining whether the delinquent officer is guilty of the charges or not. The learned Judges deciding the two cases were influenced by the facts of those cases when they decided to set aside the order of dismissal on the ground that the facts of the case indicated that the Departmental authorities had made up their mind on the question of the guilt of the delinquent officer. The facts of the instant case clearly indicate that the Departmental authorities had not prejudged the issue and that they conducted the inquiry with an open mind. This would be clear from the way the Departmental authorities proceeded to conduct inquiry. The charge-sheet Ext. 1 has been framed in accordance with R. 21 of th+ Discipline and Appeal Rules for Non-Gazetted Railway Servants. A perusal of R. 21 indicates that Appendix B is the form in which charge-sheet is required to be framed. A perusal of the said Form would indicate that it has to be mentioned what punishment, was proposed to be inflicted on the delinquent officer. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that R. 21 is in conflict with Art. 311 of the Constitution. This point shall be dealt with later. A perusal of the said Form would indicate that it has to be mentioned what punishment, was proposed to be inflicted on the delinquent officer. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that R. 21 is in conflict with Art. 311 of the Constitution. This point shall be dealt with later. As the Rule stands it is obvious that the charge-sheet is required to be framed in the manner indicated in Appendix B, After the charge-sheet was served the appellant submitted his reply. The reply is dated 25-10-1961. The reply was considered by the Railway authorities and in their letter dated 30-11-1961 the Railway authorities informed the appellant that his explanation dated 25-10-1961 had been considered and that it was decided to hold a Departmental inquiry which would be conducted by the Assistant Works Manager. After that the inquiry was conducted and the Inquiry Officer examined a number of witnesses produced on behalf of delinquent officer. After the inquiry had been concluded the opposite party issued a show cause notice to the appellant requiring him to show cause why he should not be removed from service. Ext. 4 is the show cause notice. Along with the show cause notice a copy of the proceedings of the Inquiry Officer and the statements of witnesses were supplied to the appellant to enable him to submit his explanation. The appellant submitted his reply to show cause notice. The reply was considered by the authorities concerned and by Ext. 15 dated 31-8-1962 the appellant was removed from service. Against this order an appeal was preferred and the appeal has also been dismissed. 8. The documents referred to above clearly indicate that the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution were complied with. A Departmental Inquiry was launched in which the appellant was informed of the charges levelled against him. He was given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of `hose charges and after the consideration of his reply to show cause notice the appellant was removed from service. From a perusal of the documents referred to above, it is clear that the Departmental authorities were not in any manner prejudiced against the appellant. He was given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of `hose charges and after the consideration of his reply to show cause notice the appellant was removed from service. From a perusal of the documents referred to above, it is clear that the Departmental authorities were not in any manner prejudiced against the appellant. The manner in which the inquiry was conducted indicates that the punishing authority had inflicted the punishment j of removal after considering the evidence j led by the delinquent officer and after j having applied its mind to the facts, brought out in the inquiry proceedings.] The conclusion reached by the punishing authority was an objective determination. In my opinion, having regard to the facts of the instant case it cannot be said that the inquiry conducted against the appellant was, in any manner, defective in the sense that the punishing authority had proceeded in the matter with a made up mind. That being the position, the decision given by the Calcutta High Court reported in Gouri Pr. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. The said case was decided primarily on the ground that on the facts of that case it was not possible for the Court to come to a conclusion that the inquiry was conducted with an open mind. In the instant case, as I have stated earlier, the inquiry was conducted with an open mind. 9. The case reported in Ram Gopal Nigam v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1968 Lab IC 1476) (All) (supra) is also distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. A perusal of para. 13 of the report would indicate that the charge-sheet dated 15-11-1966 contained a tentative conclusion that the delinquent officer be removed. It is clear from a perusal of the said paragraph that the notice dated 15-11-1966 was withdrawn and a subsequent notice dated 21-9-1967 was issued in which he was only required to file a written statement in answer to the charges. That notice was served on the petitioner after he had already submitted his explanation to the charges. The stand taken on behalf of the State was that the notice dated 15-11-1966 should be taken to have been withdrawn in view of the letter dated 21-9-1967. That notice was served on the petitioner after he had already submitted his explanation to the charges. The stand taken on behalf of the State was that the notice dated 15-11-1966 should be taken to have been withdrawn in view of the letter dated 21-9-1967. The learned Judge deciding the case, on those farts concluded, that the notice dated 15-11-1966 was still pending against the petitioner. Since action had already been taken on the subsequent notice, the learned Judge deciding the case formally quashed the notice dated 15-11-1966. From the report it is apparent that no steps were taken against the delinquent officer on the basis of the notice dated 15-11-1966. On these facts, the observations of the learned Judge making comments upon the legality of the notice dated 15-11-1966 were wholly uncalled for. His decision, in my opinion, is of no avail to the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant further relied upon S. Manickam v. Supdt. of Police, Nilgiris ( AIR 1964 Mad 375 ). A perusal of the judgment would indicate that no reasons had been indicated in the order. The learned Judge quashed the charge-sheet on the ground that the petitioner had been prejudged. In the instant case, I have already recorded a finding that there is no basis on which it can be said that the punishing authority had prejudged the case. As a matter of fact, the way the inquiry was conducted indicates that the authorities enquired into the charges with an open mind and the appellant was not in any manner prejudiced during the course of the trial. This decision is also of no avail to the appellant. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent invited my attention to the decision reported in Bibhuti Bhusan Paul v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1967 Cal 29 ). A perusal of the case would indicate that the learned Judge recorded a finding that in every respect the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution had been complied with in dealing with the case of the delinquent officer. After that he concluded that the inquiry proceedings were not tainted either by bias or by want of good faith or that the rules of natural justice were not complied with merely because the charge-sheet also indicated the punishment proposed to be inflicted. After that he concluded that the inquiry proceedings were not tainted either by bias or by want of good faith or that the rules of natural justice were not complied with merely because the charge-sheet also indicated the punishment proposed to be inflicted. In my opinion, the facts of the instant case are similar to the one reported in Bibhuti Bhusan Paul v. State of West Bengal (supra). 11. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that R. 21 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules for Non-Gazetted Railway Servants is liable to be struck down as it is in violation of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. In support of his submissions, he relied upon Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager North-East Frontier Railway ( AIR 1964 SC 600 ) in which Rr. 148 (3) and 149 (3) of the Railway Establishment Code. 1959 were struck down as invalid on the ground that they were hit by Ad. 311 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the appellant also referred to Ram Narain v. Union of India ( AIR 1965 Pat 374 ) and Ramlal v. Union of India ( AIR 1963 Raj 57 ) in order to substantiate his argument that R. 21 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules for Non-Gazetted Railway Servants was invalid and was liable to be struck down. Rule 21 runs as follows :- "The observance of the following procedure is necessary as a pre-requisite for dismissal of a railway servant from service :- (a) A charge-sheet (on form at Appendix `B) shall be presented to the railway servant detailing the charge or charges against him and calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed or punished with any of the lesser penalties specified in R. 2. He shall be required to submit a written explanation by a fixed date, which shall ordinarily allow him an interval of seven clear days from the date he receives the charge-sheet. If the Railway servant is illiterate or semi-literate, the charge-sheet shall be read out and explained to him by a Gazetted Officer or a senior non-gazetted railway servant, who shall record the railway servants explanation. If the Railway servant is illiterate or semi-literate, the charge-sheet shall be read out and explained to him by a Gazetted Officer or a senior non-gazetted railway servant, who shall record the railway servants explanation. (b) On receipt of the explanation of the Railway servant in reply to the charge-sheet referred to in (a) above all relevant papers will be put up to the competent authority which shall pass such orders as it thinks fit having regard to the provisions of sub-cl. (c) of this rule. (c) It shall be necessary to hold a departmental inquiry in all cases where the maximum proposed penalty is dismissal from service in respect of the charges not admitted by the accused employee except in the circumstances stated below:- (i) When dismissal is ordered on the strength of the facts and conclusions arrived at by a judicial trial or by Court Martial; or (ii) When the accused is absconding; or (iii) Where the competent authority records for reasons to be specified in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. At such an inquiry the Railway servant, if he so desires, may be accompanied by another railway servant of this Railway or by an official of a recognised Railway Trade Union (who is not a professional lawyer) of this railway and the officer or the committee of inquiry shall give the railway servant all reasonable facilities for the conduct of his defence including the cross-examination of witnesses. The rules regulating constitution of and the procedure to be observed at the Departmental Inquiry Committee which are laid down in Chap. V should be strictly followed. (d) (i) The result of the departmental inquiry, with the recommendation of the officer or the committee holding the inquiry, shall be placed before the officer competent to pass an order of dismissal, who shall thereupon pass such orders as he thinks fit keeping in view the provisions of cl. (d) (ii) of this rule. (ii) If the competent authority on consideration of the report of Inquiry comes to the provisional conclusion that the penalty of dismissal should be imposed or even where in terms of cl. `C such a tentative conclusion is reached without holding an inquiry, the railway servant concerned shall be given a further opportunity to show cause why this penalty should not be inflicted on him. `C such a tentative conclusion is reached without holding an inquiry, the railway servant concerned shall be given a further opportunity to show cause why this penalty should not be inflicted on him. This `show cause notice should be issued in the form given in Appendix `E'. (e) copy of the Inquiry Report in full or in an adequately summarised form should also be supplied to the accused employee along with the `show cause notice. Further, if the competent authority does not agree with the findings arrived at in the Inquiry Report, a brief but clear statement of reasons for such disagreement should also be supplied. (f) On receipt of the reply to the `show cause notice, the competent authority may issue such orders as he considers necessary imposing the penalty warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case and these orders should be communicated in the form at Appendix `F" 12. A perusal of the said Rule would .Indicate that it has laid down the manner in which a charge-sheet has to be drafted. The form of charge-sheet is mentioned in Appendix B. It is true that Appendix B requires to mention tentatively the action proposed to be taken but a reading of the entire rule would indicate that the procedure to be followed in Departmental proceedings is the same as is prescribed by Art. 311 of the Constitution. The only defect in the notice that was pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant was that it mentioned the punishment proposed to be inflicted. The learned counsel for the appellant was unable to point out that the procedure laid down in R. 21 was, in any manner, different from the one prescribed by Art. 311 of the Constitution. He also could not point out to this Court how the procedure laid down in R. 21 violated the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. The legal position is indisputable that any rule which deprives the delinquent j officer of the benefits available to him j under Art. 311 has to be struck down as invalid. The question that arises in this case is whether R. 21 is such a Rule which prescribes a procedure which runs counter to what has been prescribed by Art. 311 of the Constitution. The question that arises in this case is whether R. 21 is such a Rule which prescribes a procedure which runs counter to what has been prescribed by Art. 311 of the Constitution. On an analysis of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Patna High Court and the Rajasthan High Court referred to above, I find that in those cases the rules were struck down on the ground that they prescribed a procedure which was at variance with the one prescribed by Art. 311 of the Constitution. In the case in hand, the position is different. ` In the instant case, the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution have been complied with but the order passed by the punishing authority is challenged on the ground that the mention of the provisional punishment in the charge-sheet evidences that the Departmental authorities had decided to punish the appellant. On a consideration of the evidence on record, I have already recorded a finding that although Ext. 1 mentions the provisional punishment, the Departmental authorities in other respects complied with the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. I have also recorded a finding on an appraisement of the evidence on record that there is nothing on record to indicate that the Departmental authorities had prejudged the matter. 13. It is not possible to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that mention of the provisional punishment in Ex. 1 is by Itself enough to show that the authorities were prejudiced. The conduct of the authorities during the course of the proceedings clearly indicates that they dealt with the case with an open mind and afforded the appellant all possible opportunity in defending his case. In my opinion, R. 21 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules for Non-Gazetted Railway Servants is not liable to be struck down on the ground that it is violative of1 Art. 311 of the Constitution. 14. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appeal L filed by the appellant was disposed of by a non-speaking order. A perusal of Ext. 6 would indicate that the appellate j authority had upheld the decision taken, by the subordinate authority. In my opinion, when the appellate authority affirms the decision given by the lower authority, it is not necessary to record a detailed order disposing of the appeal. A perusal of Ext. 6 would indicate that the appellate j authority had upheld the decision taken, by the subordinate authority. In my opinion, when the appellate authority affirms the decision given by the lower authority, it is not necessary to record a detailed order disposing of the appeal. If the appellate authority after a perusal of the record comes to the conclusion that the order does not call for any interference, a short order disposing of the appeal is enough. 15. As a result of the findings recorded above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. In/the circumstances of the case, I direct/that the parties shall bear their own/costs throughout.