Gokulakrishnan, J.-This is a petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus for the production of the petitioner’s daughter Gul Mohideen Fatimal Beevi before this Court. 2. The case of the petitioner is: He is the father of Gul Mohideen Fatimal Beevi who was born on 7th April, 1963. Respondents 3 to 5 are the maternal uncles of the said Gul Mohideen Fatimal Beevi. A marriage was arranged between Gul Mohideen Fatimal Beevi (hereinafter referred to as the detainee) and the second respondent during June, 1977. The said marriage arrangement was subsequently revoked in July, 1977 on account of the fact that the petitioner was not satisfied with the conduct of the second respondent. Accordingly the revocation was accepted by respondent and the ‘sural’ money of Rs. 1,001 which was received earlier in token of the settlement of the marriage, was returned by respondents 2 to 5. 3. The petitioner has further alleged that on 26th December, 1977 at about 1-30 p.m., while the petitioner and his family members were away for shopping, leaving the detainee and a small servant girl in the house, respondents 2 to 5 by deceitful means and force, took away the detainee without his consent. On returning from the shop, the petitioner understood that the detainee was kidnapped in a black car for the purpose of compelling her to marry the second respondent. 4. It has been further alleged that the detainee is only fourteen years old and has studied upto the VIII standard. But for the deceitful means practised by the respondents, the detainee would not have gone out of the house of her own accord. 5. On 26th December, 1977, at 10-15 p.m. a case under section 366, Indian Penal Code has been registered in Crime No. 275 of 1977 by the Pettai Police Station. Respondents 2 to 5 apprehending arrest, moved the High Court of Madras, under section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, and obtained orders in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 2 of 1978 on 2nd January, 1978 granting anticipatory bail. When the petitioner’s wife contacted respondents 3 to 5 on 5th January, 1978 and 6th January, 1978, respondents 2 to 5 admitted that the detainee was with them and they promised to. send her immediately on 6th January, 1978 itself. So far. the detainee has not been sent back. 6. When the petitioner’s wife contacted respondents 3 to 5 on 5th January, 1978 and 6th January, 1978, respondents 2 to 5 admitted that the detainee was with them and they promised to. send her immediately on 6th January, 1978 itself. So far. the detainee has not been sent back. 6. It has been further averred that on 7th January, 1978, the petitioner filed an application under section 97 of the Criminal Procedure Code, before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tirunelveli, in Criminal Misc. Petition No. 27 of 1978, to get the custody of the detainee and for issue of warrant to search certain suspected premises. In that connection, respondents 2 to 5 filed a counter through their advocate admitting the factum of taking and alleging that the detainee was married to the second respondent and also making an averment that the detainee was not in their custody subsequent to the alleged marriage. The respondents 2 to 5 also averred therein that the detainee is fifteen years of age. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 27 of 1978 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tirunelveli was subsequently dismissed on the ground that there is a police investigation. 7. The petitioner has stated in the affidavit that the purpose of kidnapping the detainee was to grab at the properties of the value of Rs. 2 lakhs which stand in her name. It has been further stated that even at the time of taking the detainee she was wearing jewels weighing twenty sovereigns. 8. The petitioner apprehends that the girl is under illegal custody of respondents 2 to 5 and she is being tortured. In these circumstances, since the petitioner is not having an alternative remedy except to approach this Hon’ble Court, he has filed the present petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus. 9. A counter-affidavit was filed by Mohammed Gani who is now the first respondent, since the first respondent as originally impleaded in the petition, viz., the State represented by the Inspector of Police, Tirunelveli Town, Tirunelveli District, was deleted. The counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the other respondents also. According to these respondents, the detainee girl Gul Mohideen Fatimal Beevi is not a minor and she is now aged fifteen years, her date of birth being 8th April, 1963. The counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the other respondents also. According to these respondents, the detainee girl Gul Mohideen Fatimal Beevi is not a minor and she is now aged fifteen years, her date of birth being 8th April, 1963. As per the Muslim personal law, the age of majority for the purpose of marriage is the date of attainment of puberty of the girl. The detainee attained puberty on 10th July, 1977 and she has every right and liberty to choose her husband. The alleged betrothal was accepted by the respondents. They further state that Gul Mohideen Fatimal Beevi on 26th December, 1977 left the house of her own accord and came to Mohammed Gani, who is her maternal uncle’s son and a practising advocate at Tirunelveli. When advised to go back to her house, the detainee declined saying that if Mohammed Gani refused to marry her immediately she will commit suicide. Failing to convince her, Mohammed Gani (first respondent) married her on 26th December, 1977 at Kothappa Pallivasal at Melapalayam as per the religious rites, customs and conventions. 10. The counter-affidavit filed by the respondents further, inter alia, alleges that there is no contradiction in the averments in the counter-affidavits filed by these respondents in various proceedings taken by the writ petitioner and that the respondents never practised deceitful means as alleged in the affidavit of the writ petitioner. The allegations to the effect that the respondents are bent upon grabbing at the properties of the detainee and that the detainee had twenty sovereigns of jewels at the time she left the the house are denied. 11. It has been further alleged in the counter-affidavit that the first respondent now on record has filed Original Petition No. 53 of 1978 before the High Court of Madras and the High Court, in the injunction petition filed along with Original Petition No. 53 of 1978, was pleased to order the status quo and directed the detainee to reside with one Nazir Hussain, a native of Maharaja Nagar, Palayamcottah. In that original petition, the detainee has also filed an affidavit and the same was attested by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Tirunelveli. It has been alleged in the counter that in the affidavit the detainee has categorically stated that she was not willing to go to her father’s house and she is happy with her husband in the present place. It has been alleged in the counter that in the affidavit the detainee has categorically stated that she was not willing to go to her father’s house and she is happy with her husband in the present place. Hence, according to the respondents, the present habeas corpus petition has been infructuous. 12. In the counter-affidavit it has also been averred that a right for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus against a private individual is not available to the petitioner according to the Constitution of India. It has been further contended that the petitioner has effective alternative remedies and as such the present petition to issue of a writ of habeas corpus is not maintainable in law. 13. Finally, the respondents have stated that the present writ petition itself is an off-shoot of the failure of the petitioner to harass the respondents by other means in which he has attempted and failed, and therefore the petition has to be dismissed. 14. The petitioner filed a reply-affidavit inter alia denying many of the allegations made in the counter-affidavit and stating that an ex-parte order had been snatched from this Hon’ble Court by suppressing material facts and that the petitioner is taking steps to vacate the ex-parte order in Original Petition No. 53 of 1978. It has also been alleged in the reply-affidavit that the respondents’ act in making the girl reside with one Nazir Hussain of Tirunelveli after the filing of this writ petition against the respondents, by the petitioner was only with sinister motive to get rid of the custody and thereby they committed a plain contempt of Court for which they are answerable. The further averment in the reply affidavit is that the petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that the respondents filed Original Petition No. 53 of 1978 only after the petitioner had filed this habeas corpus petition. 15. Mr. Alagumalai, the learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, after stating the facts of the case, contended that the alternative remedy is no bar to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, that the minor detainee is under the custody of the respondents and that they filed Original Petition No. 53 of 1978 only to circumvent the orders that may be passed in this habeas corpus petition. Mr. Mr. Alagumalai further argued that this Court has ample power to issue a writ of habeas corpus and that Original Petition No. 53 of 1978 filed by the respondents cannot be a bar to the issue of such a writ in this case. 16. Mr.G. Ramaswami, the learned Counsel for the respondents, submitted that a substantive petition has been filed before the original side of this High Court for the appointment of a guardian for the detainee and as such there is no need to have a parallel proceeding by way of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. Mr. G. Ramaswami further submitted that it is under the orders of this High Court the detainee was placed under the care and custody of Nazir Hussain, and therefore the petitioner cannot have any grievance over the said matter. In any event, the petitioner can as well invoke the jurisdiction of this Court in O.P.No.53 of 1978 and get appropriate orders in that proceeding, since it is a comprehensive proceeding wherein both the parties can have opportunity to let in evidence and agitate the matter. 17. We have carefully gone through the pleadings in this case and also the decisions cited by the learned Counsel on either side. Mr. Alagumalai cited Gohar Begam v. Suggi alias Nazma Begam and others1 . That was a case in which the High Court granted the custody of the child to a third person in preference to the mother of the child. No doubt, the paternity of the child was in dispute in that case. The Supreme Court, considering the facts of that case held: “Under the Muhammedan Law the mother of an illegitimate female infant child is entitled to its custody. The refusal to restore such a child to the custody of its mother would result in an illegal detention of the child within the meaning of section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. A dispute as to the paternity of the child is irrelevant for the purpose of the application. The refusal to restore such a child to the custody of its mother would result in an illegal detention of the child within the meaning of section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. A dispute as to the paternity of the child is irrelevant for the purpose of the application. The Supreme Court will interfere with the discretionary powers of the High Court if the discretion was not judicially exercised.” The Supreme Court, in that case, has further held: “Before making the order for the custody of the child the Court is called upon to consider its welfare.” “The fact that a person has a remedy under the Guardian and Wards Act, is no justification for denying him the remedy under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code.” The Supreme Court has further said- “In issuing writs of habeas corpus the Courts have power in the case of an infant to direct its custody to be placed with a certain person”. In the abovesaid case, the High Court (of Bombay), when considering the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, observed that the proper forum for the applicant was to move a Civil Court under the Guardian and Wards Act for the custody of the child. Only with regard to this observation made by the High Court, the Supreme Court has held that “the fact that person has a remedy under the Guardian and Wards Act, is no justification for denying him the remedy under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code.‘‘ 18. As far as the present case is concerned, a petition under the Guardian and Wards Act has been already filed before the original side of this Court on 3rd February, 1978, itself and the said petition has been admitted and numbered as O.P.No. 53 of 1978. In the said O.P.No. 53 of 1978, an application has also been filed by the present first respondent herein i.e., Application No. 467 of 1978, for grant of an injunction restraining the writ petitioner from interfering or causing harm to the minor Gul Mohideen Fathima Beevi in any way in her married life with the first respondent herein, pending disposal of O.P. No. 53 of 1978. Natarajan, J., has passed the following order on 6th February, 1978: ”(1) That T.M.G. Mohammed Abdul Safoor Rowther, the respondent herein, his men, servants, agents and representatives be and are hereby restrained by an injunction until the further orders of this Court from interfering or causing harm to the minor abovenamed, viz., Gul Mohideen Fathima Beevi in any way in her married life with the petitioner applicant herein; (2) That the status quo do continue and that the said minor shall be directed to stay With her relation Nazir Hussain residing in Justice Devadoss Road, Maharaja Nagar, Tirunelveli-11. (3) That notice of this application returnable on or before 15th February, 1978, Be served on the respondent herein; and (4) That the further hearing of this application to stand adjourned to the said 15th February, 1978." Thus, from the abovesaid order, it is clear that the original side of this Court is seized of the matter wherein the parties can have ample opportunity to agitate their contentions as regards the custody of the detainee herein. From the Supreme Court decision above-cited, it is clear that at the time when the writ petition was pending before the High Court there was no petition under the Guardian and Wards Act pending before any Court. Hence, we cannot take that decision as an analogy. 19. Mr. Alagumalai, the learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, next contended that the respondents herein have committed contempt by approaching the original side of this High Court and handing over the custody of the minor girl to one Nazir Hussain despite the fact that the petitioner had filed a writ petition into this High Court as early as 30th January, 1978. To substantiate his contention, the learned Counsel cited the decision reported in Thomas John Bernardo v. Mary Ford1. The House of Lords considered the case for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the parent of a minor child, directed to the head of an institution for destitute children in which the child had been placed. It appeared that before the proceedings started the head of the institution had, without the authority from the parent, handed over the child to another person to be taken to Canada, and he alleged that he did not know the address of such person or where he or the child was. It appeared that before the proceedings started the head of the institution had, without the authority from the parent, handed over the child to another person to be taken to Canada, and he alleged that he did not know the address of such person or where he or the child was. In that case, the Court of Appeal affirmed an order absolute of the Queen’s Bench Division. While affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal, but without expressing any opinion as to the circumstances under which the child was sent to Canada, the House of Lords, held that the writ ought to issue on the ground that the applicant was entitled to require a return to be made to the writ, in order that the facts might be more fully investigated. Lord Watson observed as follows: "Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the person charged with unlawfully detaining a child or adult had de facto ceased to have any custody or control, I am of opinion that the writ ought not to issue. A man who parts with the custody of a child after he is served with the process of the Court, or who evades service in order that he may get rid of such custody, commits a plain contempt, for which he is answerable to the Court. Even in that case I doubt whether it is competent, and I do not doubt that it is inexpedient to enforce the writ de plano. The case ought to be dealt with, in such circumstances, as one of contempt and the Court has power to pronounce an order which will compel the quondam custodian to choose between placing himself in a position which will make him liable to the writ and bearing the consequences of his contumacy. The case ought to be dealt with, in such circumstances, as one of contempt and the Court has power to pronounce an order which will compel the quondam custodian to choose between placing himself in a position which will make him liable to the writ and bearing the consequences of his contumacy. I think it right to add that in my opinion, no contempt is committed by a person who, lawfully or unlawfully, absolutely gives up the custody and control of a child from the mere apprehension that by retaining it he may become liable to a writ of habeas corpus, and without any notice that such a proceeding will be taken." From the abovesaid observations it is clear that no contempt is committed by the person who lawfully or unlawfully absolutely gives up the custody and control of a child from the mere apprehension that by retaining it he may become liable to a writ of habeas corpus, and without any notice that such a proceeding will be taken. Admittedly, the notice in this writ petition was received by the respondents only on 4th February, 1978, even though the writ petition was filed as early as 30th January, 1978 and admitted on 31st January, 1978. It is only by the order of the Court that the respondents handed over the minor girl to Nazir Hussain residing in Justice Devadoss Road, Maharaja Nagar, Tirunelveli-11. O.P.No.53 of 1978, which has been filed for appointment of a guardian for the minor who is involved in this writ petition was filed on 3rd February, 1978 itself. Thus, it is clear from these facts that no contempt has been committed by the respondents here in-Such a conclusion is also supported by the very same decision cited by Mr. Alagumalai, which is referred to above. 20. Mr.G. Ramaswami, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that there is a comprehensive petition pending before the original side of this High Court in the shape of O.P. No. 53 of 1978 and that the petitioner herein has effective and efficacious remedies to agitate his rights in those proceedings. The learned Counsel also submitted that as on date the minor girl is in the custody of Nazir Hussain as per the orders of this High Court, dated 6th February, 1978 made in Application No. 467 of 1978 in the said original petition. To substantiate this proposition Mr. The learned Counsel also submitted that as on date the minor girl is in the custody of Nazir Hussain as per the orders of this High Court, dated 6th February, 1978 made in Application No. 467 of 1978 in the said original petition. To substantiate this proposition Mr. G. Ramaswami also cited the decision reported in Talib Hussain v. State of J. & K.1, wherein the Supreme Court has pointed out- “In habeas corpus proceedings the Court has to consider the legality of the detention on the date of hearing. If on the date of hearing it cannot be said that the aggrieved party has been wrongfully deprived of his personal liberty and his detention is contrary to law, a writ of habeas corpus cannot issue.” As observed already, the minor girl is under the care and custody of Nazir Hussain pursuant to orders of this High Court on the original side in Application No. 467 of 1978 in the aforesaid proceedings, and if the petitioner is aggrieved with regard to the person with whom the custody of the minor has been placed, he can as well move the original side of this Court in the aforesaid O.P. No. 53 of 1978 proceedings and get appropriate relief. 21. We do not think it necessary to elaborately notice the decisions which hold that if there is an effective and efficacious remedy available by way of other proceedings, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be normally invoked. Mr. Alagumalai, the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that an alternative remedy is no bar for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court in writ proceedings in order to get speedy and effective remedy. We can usefully quote the decision reported in Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P.2, which holds that when all the issues of fact can be tried in other proceedings, the writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy, since the writ of habeas corpus is festinum remedium and that the power can only be exercised in a clear case. In that case, a husband filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to get custody of his wife. The Supreme Court held- “A writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a man to obtain possession of a woman alleged. to be his wife does not issue as a matter of course. In that case, a husband filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to get custody of his wife. The Supreme Court held- “A writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a man to obtain possession of a woman alleged. to be his wife does not issue as a matter of course. Though a writ of right, it is not a writ of course, especially when a man seeks the assistance of the Court to regain the custody of a woman. Before a Court accedes to his request, it must satisfy itself at least prima facie that the person claiming the writ is in fact the husband and whether a valid marriage between him and the woman could at all have taken place.” We find there is a dispute as regards the right of the minor girl to get married and the factum of the marriage alleged to have been contracted with her and the paramount interests of the minor to be in the custody of a particular person in this case. More than that, in the present case, a petition under the Guardian and Wards Act filed in the original side of this High Court is pending, and interim orders have been passed as early as on 6th February, 1978, regarding the custody of the detainee. Drawing the analogy from the case reported in Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P.2 , though we are of the view that the petitioner may have a right to file the writ petition, we are reluctant to issue the writ as a matter of course, especially when the subject-matter of this writ petition can be agitated effectively and efficaciously in the proceedings pending before the original side of this High Court in O.P.No.53 of 1978, in which the petitioner herein is a party. 22. As it is, it is not necessary for us to go into the validity of the marriage of the minor alleged to have been performed by the respondents or the validity of the placing of the minor girl in the custody of Nazir Hussain, in the present writ proceeding, since these matters can be comprehensively agitated in O.P.No. 53 of 1978 now pending on the original side of this High Court. As on date, the minor girl is not in the custody of the respondents herein, and she has been placed under the care and custody of Nazir Hussain as per the orders of this High Court passed on the original side in Application No. 467 of 1978 in O.P.No. 53 of 1978. 23. Inasmuch as the petitioner has effective and larger remedy before the original side of this High Court in O.P. No. 53 of 1978, in which he is a party, and in view of the fact that the minor girl, to the knowledge of the petitioner, has been placed in the custody of Nazir Hussain pursuant to the orders dated 6th February, 1978 passed by this High Court on the original side in the above O.P.No. 53 of 1978, we are of the view that the present writ petition has to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.