JUDGMENT : A.N. Surti J. 1. The petitioner-plaintiff was aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1974 of the court of the learned District Judge, Jamnagar, and which had arisen out of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 32 of 1972 of the Court of the Civil Judge, J.D., at Kalavad. Both the Courts dismissed the plaintiff's suit for possession. 2. It is under these circumstances that the present revision application is filed by the plaintiff in this Court. 3. In the instant case, it may be noted that the opponent is paying the monthly rent of Rs.8-50 for occupying the suit premises as a tenant. It was the grievance of Mr. Nanavati, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, that both the subordinate Courts erred in not passing a decree for eviction under Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. In order to substantiate the point Mr. Nanavati brought to my notice the fact that the petitioner-plaintiff purchased the suit property on February 2, 1972, and that when he purchased the property he had a right in law to recover all the arrears of rent from the opponent-tenant. In the context of these premises, Mr. Nanavati urged that the plaintiff gave the suit notice on April 1, 1972, to the defendant-tenant and called upon him to pay all the arrears of rent from November 1, 1969 to March 31, 1972. He stated, that in this way, the tenant was in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months. That the defendant had to pay rent to the plaintiff from month to month; and that there was no dispute in regard to the standard rent of the suit premises; and as there was neglect on the part of the tenant to make payment of rent as demanded, both the subordinate Courts oughts to have passed an eviction decree under Section 12(3)(a) of the aforesaid Act. 4. With respect, it is not possible for me to agree or accept the submission of Mr. 4. With respect, it is not possible for me to agree or accept the submission of Mr. Nanavati for the simple reason that, in the instant case, the plaintiff had become the owner of the suit property only on February 2, 1972, and it is possible that the tenant might have thought of paying all arrears of rent prior to February 1, 1972 to the predecessor-in-title of the present plaintiff. Under the circumstances, can it be said that there was any neglect on the part of the defendant to make payment in respect of arrears of rent from November 1, 1969. It is possible that the defendant might have thought of making payments to the predecessor-in-title of the suit property or might have thought of settling his accounts in respect of payment of rent with the plaintiff's predecessor-in-title; but under no circumstances one can come to the conclusion that there was any neglect on the part of the tenant to make payment of the arrears of rent from November 1, 1969 to February 1972, particularly when the present Petitioner was never the owner of the suit property for the relevant period. Thus, for the purposes of finding out as to whether there was any neglect on the part of the tenant, the Court must take into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, and both the subordinate Courts were right in not passing any decree for eviction against the tenant. 5. It may be incidentally observed that, before an eviction decree can be passed under Section 12(3)(a) of the Act, the subordinate Courts must necessarily administer a caution to themselves in order to find out as to whether there was any neglect on the part of the tenant for the purpose of making payment of rent or the arrears of rent due and payable by the tenant to the landlord as provided in Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. Cases do arise, were the tenant after the receipt of notice as contemplated by Section 12(3)(a) of the Act sends money orders to the landlords, but they do not accept such money orders. Under the circumstances can it be said that there was any neglect on the part of the tenant as envisaged by Section 12(3) of the Act? Cases do arise, were the tenant after the receipt of notice as contemplated by Section 12(3)(a) of the Act sends money orders to the landlords, but they do not accept such money orders. Under the circumstances can it be said that there was any neglect on the part of the tenant as envisaged by Section 12(3) of the Act? Cases also arise where it is difficult for a tenant to decide as to whom out of 2 or 3 contesting landlords, he should send the amount of rent. In such cases also, can it be said that there is any neglect on the part of the tenant as provided in Section 12(3) of the Act? Cases also arise where, even before the suit notice, the tenants in terms intimate to the landlords either by separate notices or on the money order coupons that they are having a dispute about the standard rent. Can in such cases a decree of eviction be ever passed under Section 12(3)(a) of the Act? From this point of view it is impossible to incorporate in this judgment an exhaustive list of illustrations, thought illustrations on this point can be multiplied. Suffice it to state that, before a decree of eviction can be passed under Section 12(3)(a) of the Act, the subordinate Courts must fully satisfy themselves that (i) the rent is payable by a month; (2) there is no dispute regarding the standard rent or permitted increases; (3) such rent or increases are in arrears of six months or more; and (1) that the tenant has neglected to pay the rent after the service of the notice referred to in Sub-section (3) of Section 12. Thus, unless all the statutory requirements as provided under Section 12(3)(a) of the Act are present on the record of the case against the tenant, no decree of eviction can ever be passed against a tenant under Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. 6. Experience shows that the subordinate Courts before passing a decree of eviction under Section 12(3)(a) of the Act do not carefully scrutinise the conduct of a tenant prior to the fling of the suit in order to find out whether there was any neglect on the part of a tenant for the purpose of making payments of rent regularly to the landlord. The statutory use of the term 'neglects' in Section 12(3)(a) of the Act is of utmost importance and significance, and the subordinate Courts must necessarily realise the importance and significance of that word statutorily employed in the Section before any decree of eviction is passed against the tenant under Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. 7. As stated above, in the instant case, there is no neglect on the part of the tenant in the matter of making any payment of rent for a period more than six months and if this element of "Neglect" against the tenant in not duly proved by the landlord, both the subordinate Courts were right in not passing a decree of eviction against the tenant. 8. But Mr. Nanavati also urged that the lower appellate Court should have taken into consideration the provisions of Section 12(3)(b) of the Act, and should have come to its own conclusion whether the tenant has regularly deposited the arrears of rent in Court. From this view point the lower appellate Court did not look into the matter, and hence, I am inclined to remand the matter with a direction to the lower appellate Court to give to the parties fullest opportunity to lead evidence in order to prove as to whether the tenant has regularly deposited the rent in the Court or not : and thereafter, the lower appellate Court is directed to come to its own conclusion as to whether the tenant is entitled to statutory protection conferred on him under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act. 9. Mr. Shah resisted the submission of Mr. Nanavati, but to no useful purpose. I may say that, in the instant case, the lower appellate Court did not consider the aforesaid aspect of the matter, and hence I am inclined to remand the case to the lower appellate Court. 10. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, I set aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. The revision application is allowed to the extent indicated above, and I direct the lower appellate court to dispose of the matter in the light of my aforesaid observations. Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above with no order as to costs.