JUDGMENT T. U. Metha, Actg. C. J. (oral).-In this case the court of the Rent Controller passed an order for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent due from the respondent-tenant. That order was passed in favour of the petitioner who is the landlord. The learned Rent Controller, at the time of passing the said order, made further order as under in accordance with the second proviso attached to clause (2) (ii) of section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 : "In view of my findings on Issue No. 1 above, I pass an eviction order against the respondent from the premises known as a portion of upper flat Moti Villa, Lower Kaithu, Simla, consisting of two rooms, kitchen, bath and latrine. However, the respondent shall not be evicted as a result of this order if he pays to the petitioner a sum of Rs. 200/- being arrears of rent from 1-7-76 to 30-11-76 along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent p r annum and cost of the petition which has been assessed at Rs. 35/- within a period of 30 days from today." This order was passed on 5th January, 1971. It is an admitted fact that thereafter within two days the respondent-tenant deposited the amount of rent in arrears together with interest and cost in courts. As a result of this deposit, the learned Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition as having become infructuous pursuant to the second proviso attached to sub-section (2) (ii) of section 14 of the Act. This second proviso is in the following terms :— "Provided further that the tenant against whom the Controller has made an order for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent due from him shall not be evicted as a result of this order if the tenant pays the amount due within a period of thirty days from the date of order. 2. Now, the contention of the learned Advocate of the petitioner- landlord is that if a reference is made to the above quoted proviso, it stipulates "payment" and not "a deposit" in court. 2. Now, the contention of the learned Advocate of the petitioner- landlord is that if a reference is made to the above quoted proviso, it stipulates "payment" and not "a deposit" in court. According to the petitioners learned Advocate, therefore, when the respondent-tenant made the deposit of the amount of rent in arrears together with cost and interest pursuant to the above quoted order of the court, he did not comply with the terms of the proviso which, according to the learned Advocate of the petitioner, contemplates payment directly to the landlord himself. Basing his argument on this contention it was urged that the learned Rent Controller was not justified in taking the deposit in court as payment to the landlord and in dismissing the eviction petition of the landlord accordingly. 3. In my opinion, the above contention cannot be accepted as correct because the deposit in court is the deposit in the proceedings between the parties and said deposit has been obviously made in the court which has received the same on behalf of the petitioner-landlord. It need not be said that every deposit is a method of payment and, therefore, amounts to payment. But the second proviso, on which reliance is placed, does not specifically prescribe that the payment should be made personally to the landlord and therefore payment to a landlords agent would obviously be payment to the landlord. When the court accepts deposits in the proceedings between the landlord and tenant, the said deposit would be for the rightful owner of the amount and, therefore, when in eviction proceedings between landlord and tenant the tenant makes any deposit of the amount of rent in arrears and when the court accepts the said deposits it can be said that by making that deposit that tenant has made payment to the landlord through court or tribunal concerned. Under the circumstances, I find that the deposit of the arrears of rent together with cost and interest made by the respondent-tenant in this case amounted to payment as stipulated by the above quoted second proviso of sub-section (2) (ii) of section 14 of the Act. 4. Under the circumstances, I find that the deposit of the arrears of rent together with cost and interest made by the respondent-tenant in this case amounted to payment as stipulated by the above quoted second proviso of sub-section (2) (ii) of section 14 of the Act. 4. Shri Vaid, learned Advocate of the petitioner, contended that deposit of rent by tenant is contemplated only by section 18 of the Act and, therefore, it should be held that the deposit of the type made by the respondent-tenant in this case was not contemplated by the Act and was expressly prohibited by the Legislature. Reference to section 18 shows that it contemplates deposit of the rent which though tendered by the tenant is not accepted by the landl jrd. This section is an elabling section which enables the tenant to make deposit in court under certain circumstances, but that does not mean that the Legislature has prohibited deposits of other type. In proceedings between landlord and tenant payment to the landlord of the rent in arrears can be made by depositing the rent in court. The payment of that deposit cannot be construed as payment made to a third party as contended by Shri Vaid. Under the circumstances, reference to section 18 of the Act is not helpful to the petitioner in this case. 5. Shri vaid had also drawn my attention to the decision given by the Supreme Court in Shri Vidya Prachar Trust v. Pandit Basant Ram reported in 1969 (1) Supreme Court Cases 835. That was a case arising under the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The tenant in that case had made part payment of rent in arrears to the landlord and relied upon the previous deposits made in the court of Senior Sub-Judge in proceedings under East Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 19 j4. He relied upon these previous deposits as amounting to the payments to the landlord and contended that the landlord was paid up the total amount of rent in arrears if these previous deposits made in the proceedings under the Relief Indebtedness Act were taken into account. He relied upon these previous deposits as amounting to the payments to the landlord and contended that the landlord was paid up the total amount of rent in arrears if these previous deposits made in the proceedings under the Relief Indebtedness Act were taken into account. The Supreme Court rejected this contention holding that the deposit made in the proceedings under East Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934 cannot be construed as payment under East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, because the East Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act was not intended to operate between landlords and tenants and the court of senior Sub-Judge, acting under the East Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, was not created into a clearing house for rent 6. obviously, the above referred decision of the Supreme Court has no application to the facts of the present case, because the tenant in the case before the Supreme Court wanted to avail of the advantage of the deposits made by him in altogether other proceedings. So far as the present case is concerned, he has made the deposits in the Proceedings inter parties arising out of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971. In my opinion, therefore, the Supreme Court decision relied upon does not apply to the facts of the present case. 7. Shri Vaid contended that the Court of the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to accept the deposits in question and, therefore, the said deposit cannot amount to payment in law. Even this contention is not acceptable because there is no prohibition in the Act debarring the court from accepting the deposits of the type made by the respondent-tenant. 8. There was no other contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. The petition is therefore rejected. Petition rejected.