Judgment Madan Mohan Prasad, J. 1. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for striking down two orders contained in annexures 1 and 2 passed by the Government of Bihar-the first one constituting a new Gram Panchayat and including therein the village to which the petitioners belong, after having taken it out of another Gram Panchayat to which it appertained : the second an order of the Block Development Officer directing preparation of the Electoral Roll of the Gram Panchayat to which the petitioners village originally appertained, after excluding it thereform. 2. Briefly stated, the case of the petitioners is that village Andehara to which the petitioners belong, was part of a Gram Pranchayat called the Parsauni gram Panchayat. By the aforesaid order the said village has been excluded from that Panchayat and has been made part of a new Gram Panchayat called the Madanpur Gram Panchayat. It may be relevant to mention that village madanpur itself was a part of another Gram Panchayat called Baikunthpur kataur Gram Panchayat. Thus, Madanpur having been taken out of that Gram panchayat and Andehara having been taken out of the other, alongwith another village Benipur which also was originally pertaining to Baikunthpur Katuar gram Panchayat, constitute now the aforesaid Panchayat called the Madanpur gram Panchayat. 3. It has been stated in this petition that the people of the area concerned were not consulted by publication of notice and beating of drums as required by law. Secondly, that Madanpur and Andehara villages are not contiguous to each other. It is also said that objections were made by the petitioners and there also was a resolution of the Block Development Committee stating its objection to the exclusion of village Andehara from the Parsauni Gram Panchayat and its being attached to the Madanpur Gram Panchayat. The Government, it is said, without consideration of the objections rules otherwise resulting in the order aforesaid. The Block Development Officer also as a logical corollary, ordered Electoral Roll to be prepared accordingly. Hence the grievance of the petitioners. 4. On behalf of the State counter-affidavit has been sworn and filed denying the allegations stated above. The Government, it is said, without consideration of the objections rules otherwise resulting in the order aforesaid. The Block Development Officer also as a logical corollary, ordered Electoral Roll to be prepared accordingly. Hence the grievance of the petitioners. 4. On behalf of the State counter-affidavit has been sworn and filed denying the allegations stated above. It has been said that there was proper compliance with the requirement of law so far as notification and beating of drums is concerned ; that the two villages are contiguous and that the objection was considered but overruled. 5. Counsel for the petitioners initially raised two points before me. Firstly, that the procedure required by section 3 with regard to ascertaining the opinion of the people of the locality has not been complied with and secondly that apart from that, in view of the requirement of law and the two villages not being contiguous, the village of the petitioners could not be tagged to Madanpur. His attention having been drawn to the denial in the counter-affidavit with regard to the publication of notices and beating of drums and the annexures in counter-affidavit to that effect, the learned counsel gave up that point and limited himself only to the second question, namely, whether the order is bad on account of the two villages not being contiguous. This was the position when the case argued yesterday. 6. Today, however, learned counsel for the petitioners raised a preliminary objection with regard to the admissibility of the counter-affidavit itself. Even so he said that as he had given up the plaint with regard to the publication of notices and the procedure dictated by sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Bihar panchayat Raj Act (hereinafter called the Act), he would not raise it even today, but his effort was only directed at getting rid of the denial made in the counter-affidavit with regard to the question of contiguity. The point raised is that the counter-affidavit having been filed beyond a certain time it is not admissible. Counsel states that the present application was admitted on the 27th of April, 1978 and that counsel for the State had accepted notice and that the date for hearing had been fixed with the consent of the parties. The point raised is that the counter-affidavit having been filed beyond a certain time it is not admissible. Counsel states that the present application was admitted on the 27th of April, 1978 and that counsel for the State had accepted notice and that the date for hearing had been fixed with the consent of the parties. On the basis of these facts it is stated that in view of the last proviso to rule 6 of Chapter XXI-C of the Patna High Court Rules, the counter-affidavit should have been filed "not later than twenty-four hours before the date fixed for hearing "the aforesaid rule is as follows: "6. An answer to the rule nisi or to the notice to show cause or to the notice of the application showing cause against such rule, show cause or application, shall, except with the leave of the court, be made by filing an affidavit and by serving a copy thereof along with the copy of annexurs, if any. upon the applicant or his Advocate, as the case may be, not later than the date fixed for showing cause : provided that answer showing cause filed beyond the period prescribed by this rule shall be placed for orders before the Bench at the time of hearing of the application and the Bench may pass such order on the affidavit as it thinks fit: provided further that if notice of the writ application is accepted in court and a date is fixed for hearing with consent of the parties without issuing formal notice, an answer showing cause must be made by filing an affidavit and by serving a copy thereof with annexures, if any, upon the Advocate for the applicant not, later than twenty-four hours before the date fixed for hearing". Counsel for the State has, however, controverted the statement of fact with regard to the fixing up of the date of hearing with his consent. He says that the date of hearing was fixed in spite of his objection. Be that as it may, in this date of affairs I would limit myself to the order as it is contained in the order-sheet of the 27th April, 1978 which is as follows : "this application will be heard. Let this case be placed for hearing on the 15th of Mav, 1978. Mr. Be that as it may, in this date of affairs I would limit myself to the order as it is contained in the order-sheet of the 27th April, 1978 which is as follows : "this application will be heard. Let this case be placed for hearing on the 15th of Mav, 1978. Mr. Shrinandan Singh appears on behalf of respondent nos, 1 and 2 and states that he accepts notice on behalf of the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioners must serve copy of the writ application on Mr. Shrinandan Singh and file receipt thereof by tomorrow, failing which the application shall stand dismissed without further reference to a Bench. There is nothing in this order which suggests that the date was fixed with the consent of both the patties. On the other hand, it appears that the first paragraph contains the order with regard to the admitting of the application and for the case to be placed for hearing on the 15 th of May, 1978. It is well known that a date of hearing may be fixed by a court on its own or may be on the request of the petitioner, or may be with the consent of both parties. The mere fact that the counsel for the respondents accepted notice cannot be taken to be conclusive proof that he also consented to the particular date of hearing. The order passed by this court does not show either that the date was fixed with the consent of parties. For that reason alone, the proviso to rule 6 is not attracted and the objection must be overruled. " 7. In that view of the matter, the simple question which remains to be answered is whether there has been a violation of section 3 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of section 3 enables the Government to establish one Gram Panchayat "for a group of contiguous" villages. In the present case firstly the petitioners say that the two villages are not contiguous. This is controverted by the State of bihar. There is thus an allegation and its denial and no further proof on either side in support of its statement. There is no doubt that the onus to prove the statement lay on the petitioners who are challenging the order on that ground. No map has been filed. This is controverted by the State of bihar. There is thus an allegation and its denial and no further proof on either side in support of its statement. There is no doubt that the onus to prove the statement lay on the petitioners who are challenging the order on that ground. No map has been filed. No other papers has been filed either, in this court, to show that the two villages are not contiguous. It has, however, been stated in the writ petition that the two villages are 2 miles wide apart and that there is a chhaur intervening called the nanhak Chhaur having an area of 2 miles where all the time water remains. The question then reduces itself to the meaning of the word "contiguous". Even though the word is so well understood, one may refer to Chambers Dictionary wherein it is defined as "touching", "adjoining" etc. It is not difficult to see that two villages which are not intervened by a third one can be said to be contiguous to each other. Contiguity does not depend upon distance. A village may be one mile long and another may also be one mile long but both may have a common border. Even they may be two miles apart, they would still be contiguous. If there is an Ahar or reservoir in between the two villages, they would not cease to become contiguous only on that account. The simple meaning of the term suggests that two villages must be in contiguity of each other. The distance between the two or the existence of any reservior in between the two will not affect the question of their contiguity. The villages in such circumstances may be still contiguous to each other. In the present case, at any rate, it has not been said that any other village intervenes between villages Madanpur and Andehara. In the absence of any evidence to show that the two villages are not contiguous and in view of the denial of the allegation by the State, there is no circumstance which would dictate conclusively in the present case the truth of the statement made by the petitioners in this respect. 8. As I have said earlier, the onus lay on the petitioners. There is no explanation given at all as to why they did not produce any evidence along with their writ application. 8. As I have said earlier, the onus lay on the petitioners. There is no explanation given at all as to why they did not produce any evidence along with their writ application. They could have as well filed the survey map which could have made the position clear. Obviously the petitioners have not done, that they could have done if at all truth be on their side, to establish the same. In such circumstances, it is not possible to say that the State Government have violated the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act. 9. Counsel for the petitioners further urged that the opinion of the Block development Committee was in favour of his objection and since the prder is against that it follows that the State Government have not considered the same. The argument is fallacious. It has been stated in so many words that the objection has been overruled. The mere fact that an objection has been accepted cannot be said to suggest that the objection has been considered. It is clearly stated by the State that it was considered but rejected. In this respect also, the petitioners have no materials to place before this court to show non-consideration of the wishes of the people of the locality. In fact, as it appears from the letter of the Block Development Officer contained in Annexure A to the counter-affidavit, the petitioners objection and the Committees resolution were the only voices of objection raised and there was no other objection by any body else. 10. In the result I find no merit in this application. It is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there would be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.