N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the Gujarat Revenue Tribunals judgment Annexure C dated 7-8-75 passed by the Tribunal in the Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 612 of 1974. The petitioners are the respondents in that petition and they are the three sons and a widow of one Khushalbhai Mavabhai who admittedly was the tenant on three S. Nos. 29/1 34 and 329/2 all situated in village Digas Mahal Hansot of Broach District. ( 2 ) IN order to understand the moot point that has arisen in this petition a few facts require to be clearly stated because the ultimate decision one way or the other depends on the basic but admitted facts. Deceased tenant Khushalbhai admittedly died on 21-5-63. The respondent- landlord admittedly had procured a certificate under sec. 88c of the Bombay Tenancy Act and therefore was a certified landlord and therefore as a necessary corollary deceased Khushalbhai was an excluded tenant. The certificate in question under sec. 88c was procured by the landlord on 17 and he had thereafter filed an application for possession of the lands for personal cultivation by virtue of sec. 32t of the Bombay Tenancy Act. The said section provided that:"32 Notwithstanding anything contained in secs. 31 to 31 B (both inclusive) but subject to the provisions of this section a certified landlord may after giving notice and making an application for possession as provided in sub-sec. (3) terminate the tenancy of any land leased by him to an excluded tenant if he bona fide requires such land for cultivating it personally". During the pendency of that application the tenant had applied to the Govt. under sec. 88d for cancellation of the certificate. During the pendency of those proceedings under sec. 88d the application for possession was required to be kept stayed by the Mamlatdar. The certificate granted to the respondent-landlord was first cancelled by the Government under sec. 88d but that order was set aside by this High Court in a writ petition and the proceedings under sec. 88d stood remanded to the Govt. and the Government had on the second occasion again reached the same conclusion. This order of the State Govt. on the second occasion came to be passed on 8-2-74 and the matter rests there as far as those proceedings are concerned. 88d stood remanded to the Govt. and the Government had on the second occasion again reached the same conclusion. This order of the State Govt. on the second occasion came to be passed on 8-2-74 and the matter rests there as far as those proceedings are concerned. It is obvious that till that date namely 8 the earlier proceedings for possession under sec. 32 T of the Act had remained in abeyance. The crucial facts are now stated. In the intervening period the respondent-landlord had terminated the tenancy of the heirs of the tenant by resorting to sec. 14 of the Act on the ground that the petitioners-tenants had failed to pay rent for six years that is from 1965-66 to 1971-72. After terminating the tenancy the respondent-landlord had filed a suit for possession under sec. 29 and the said suit had come to be registered as the tenancy case No. 22/72 which thereafter had come to be renumbered as case No. 50/73. The Mahalkari Hansot by his order dated 31-10-73 dismissed the respondent-landlords application for possession on the ground that the same was incompetent. It is Annexure A to this petition. The landlords appeal to the Prant Officer being the appeal No. 64/73 also came to be dismissed by the said Officer as per his order Annexure B dated 6-6-74. The respondent-landlord had therefore moved the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by filing a revision application under sec. 76 of the Act. The said application was registered as TEN. B A. 612/74. The Tribunal allowed that application by its order dated 7-8-75 Annexure C to the petition and remanded the matter to the Mahalkari Hansot for its decision on merits because the Mahalkari had dismissed the application on the ground that such an application for possession under sec. 29 read with sec. 14 was incompetent. It is this order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Annexure C which is challenged on behalf of the tenants the petitioners herein on the ground that such an application was not maintainable. Reliance has been placed in this connection on sec. 32u of the Act which is quoted below. I reproduce that section on one side of the paper in juxtaposition with sec. Reliance has been placed in this connection on sec. 32u of the Act which is quoted below. I reproduce that section on one side of the paper in juxtaposition with sec. 32 (1) of the Act because the issue ultimately is required to be decided on the similarity or otherwise between these two provisions:"32 Notwithstanding anything con- 32 (1) On the first day of April 1957 tained in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 88c but (hereinafter referred to as the tillers day) subject to the provisions of this section every tenant shall (subject to the other every excluded tenant holding land from provisions of this section and the provision a certified landlord shall except as other- of) the next succeeding sections be deemed to wise provided in sub-sec. (3) be deemed have purchased from his landlord free of to have purchased from the landlord on all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the the first day of April 1962 free from all said day the land held by him as a tenant if encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day the land held by him as tenant if such land is cultivated by him perso- nally; and (i) the landlord has not given notice (a) such tenant is a permanent tenant of termination of tenancy in accordance thereof and cultivates land personally; with sub-sec. (3) of sec. 32t; or (ii) the landlord has given such notice (b) such tenant is not a permanent has but not made an application there- tenant but cultivates the land leased after under see. 29 for possession as re personally; and quired by the said sub-sec. (3); or ( i )the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy under sec. 32 or (iii) the landlord not being a person (ii) notice has been given under sec. of any of the categories specified in sub- 31 but the landlord has not applied to sec. (4) of sec. 32t has not terminated the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day the tenancy on any of the grounds of March 1957 under sec. 29 for obtaining specified in sec. 14 or has so terminated possession of the land (or) the tenancy but has not applied to the [ (iii) the landlord has not terminated mamlatdar on or before the 31st day or this tenancy on any of the grounds speci -. March 19 under sec. 29 for obtaining specified in sec. 14 or has so terminated possession of the land (or) the tenancy but has not applied to the [ (iii) the landlord has not terminated mamlatdar on or before the 31st day or this tenancy on any of the grounds speci -. March 19 under sec. 2) for possession fied in sec. 14 or has so terminated the of the land: tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 957 under sec. 29 for obtaining possession of the lands ] Provided that where the landlord Provided that if an application made has made such an application for posses- by the landlord under sec 29 for obtaining sion but it is rejected by the Mamlatdar possession of the land has been rejected or in appeal by the Collector or in by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in revision by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal appeal or in revision by the (Gujarat under the provisions of this Act the Revenue Tribunal) under the provisions tenant shall be deemed to have pur- of this Act the tenant shall be deemed chased the land on the date on which to have purchased the land on the date the final order of rejection is passed. on which the final order of rejection is passed. The date on which the final order of rejection is passed is hereinafter referred to as the postponed date from what has been stated above it is clear that the only point that falls for determination in this petition is whether the respondent-landlords application for possession under Sec. 29 read with sec. 14 of the Act filed in the year 1972 was or was not competent. ( 3 ) MR. R. M. Vin the learned advocate for the petitioners urged that Such an application was not maintainable at all and for that purpose he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Another A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1457 (VI G. L. R. (S. C.) 742) which in its turn confirmed the Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in the Case of Ramchandra Anant Joshi v. Junardan Tulshiram Ghuge 64 B. L. R. 635. If the ratio of the Supreme Court applies Mr. Vins Contention will be required to be upheld. If the ratio of the Supreme Court applies Mr. Vins Contention will be required to be upheld. So the first thing to be noted with precision is what the point that had arisen before the Supreme Court was and what was decided by it. ( 4 ) IT was a case from Gujarat. The tillers day in that case ordinarily was to be 1-4-57 but the statutory sale had not taken place because the landlord had availed himself of the intervening opportunity extended to the landlords by sec. 31 of the Act. Sec. 31 (1) gave a final opportunity to the landlords to terminate the tenancy of any land except a permanent tenancy if he bona fide required the land for personal cultivation or for non-agricultural purpose. Sec. 32 (1) as quoted above postpone the tillers day in case the landlord had filed an application under sec. 31 of the Act which obviously he could do on or before 31-3-57 or the landlord had terminated the tenancy of the tenant on any of the grounds specified in sec. 14 and had initiated proceedings for possession on or before 31-3-57. During the pendency of the proceedings under sec. 31 the landlord there was advised to terminate the tenancy of the tenants also under sec. 14 and then initiate proceedings under sec. 29 read with sec. 14. So there were pending against eight tenants there in those eight proceedings under sec. 31 of the Act and also under sec. 29 read with sec. 14 but those latter proceedings had been initiated by the landlords in those eight cases after 1-4-57 or to be exact in statement those proceedings were started on 10-7-57. The proceedings under sec. 31 however lagged behind and the subsequent proceedings under sec. 29 read with sec. 14 stole a march over the former came to be decided and order for possession came to be passed in favour of the landlords. Because of their success in the proceedings under sec. 29 read with sec. 14 the landlords withdrew their earlier proceedings under sec. 31 of the Act. proceedings under sec. 29 read with sec. 14 stole a march over the former came to be decided and order for possession came to be passed in favour of the landlords. Because of their success in the proceedings under sec. 29 read with sec. 14 the landlords withdrew their earlier proceedings under sec. 31 of the Act. proceedings under sec. 29 read with sec. 14 which had at the initial stage been decided in favour of the landlord however came to be set at naught by the Appellate authority and the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which judgment came to be set aside by this High Court in a writ petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution. The tenants therefore filed eight different appeals before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court ultimately held as follows :"20 But the application under sec. 29 read with sec. 14 was not maintainable as it was filed after April 1 1957 On this point we adopt the reasoning and conclusion of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramchandra Anant v. Janardan 74 Bom. L. R. 635. We agree with the following observations of Chainani C. J. in the aforesaid case: It has been contended that as there is no provision in the Act that an application on the grounds mentioned in sec. 14 cannot be made after April 1 1957 such an application is maintainable for since the Legislature has preserved the right to make such an application it could not have intended that it should not be availed of in any case. There is undoubtedly force in this argument but it seems to us that the intention of the legislature in enacting sec. 32 clearly was to transfer the ownership of the lands to the tenants on April 1 1957 except in cases where applications for possession bad been made by the landlords before April 1 1957 Where such an application had been made the right of purchase given to the tenant is postponed until that application is rejected. It is clear from this section that the Legislature did not intend that the right given to a tenant by this section should be destroyed or affected by any application made after April 1 1957 If an application for possession made under sec. 29 read with sec. It is clear from this section that the Legislature did not intend that the right given to a tenant by this section should be destroyed or affected by any application made after April 1 1957 If an application for possession made under sec. 29 read with sec. 14 after April 1 1957 is decided in favour of the landlord before the application made by him prior to April 1 1957 is disposed of it will affect the right of the tenant to become the owner of the land on the postponed date. It seems to us that this was not intended by the Legislature. The fact that the Legislature has provided that only an application made prior to April 1 1957 should affect the right of the tenant to become the purchaser of the land on April 1 1957 clearly indicates that the Legislature contemplated that no such application should be made after April 1 1957 ""21 On this construction of sec. 32 (1) it would appear that the application under sec. 29 read with sec. 14 filed on July 10 1957 was not maintainable since September 22 1957 when the amending Bombay Act No. 35 of 1957 came into force. It is true that on July 10 1957 the other application under sec. 29 read with sec. 31 was pending and consequently the appellant was still a tenant and had not become the purchaser. But sec. 32 bars all applications filed after April 1 1951 and it matters not that the application is made against a person who is till the tenant". ( 5 ) MR. Vin stated that the phraseology of sec. 32 (1) and that of sec. 32u are identical and in his submission what the Supreme Court has observed with respect to sec. 32 (1) (iii) as quoted above would with equal force apply to the provisions of sec. 32u with this difference that in sec. 32 (1); there is reference to the first day of April 1957 whereas in sec. 32 U; reference is to the 1st day of April 1962. I have quoted these provisions side-by-side above in order to have the easy comparison. Barring certain dates which were necessary because of the change in the context the operative part of clause (iii) of sec. 32 U (1) and the operative part of cl. (iii) sec. 32 (1) are identical in all respects. I have quoted these provisions side-by-side above in order to have the easy comparison. Barring certain dates which were necessary because of the change in the context the operative part of clause (iii) of sec. 32 U (1) and the operative part of cl. (iii) sec. 32 (1) are identical in all respects. Under sec. 32 (1) the statutory sale of 1-4-57 stood postponed till the landlords proceedings initiated before that date for obtaining possession of the land came to an end. In the case falling under sec. 32u the statutory sale which would otherwise be operative on 1-4-62 stood postponed till the conclusion of the proceedings under sec. 32 T (4) or the proceedings under sec. 29 read Wi sec. 14 provided they were initiated on or before 31-3-62. Barring this difference of details in these two provisions the rest of the provisions is as I said above on all fours with the scheme as was available in sec. 32. If it be so the interpretation placed by the Supreme Court on cl. (iii) of sec. 32 (1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act must apply proprio vigore to the provisions of sec. 32u. To me there appears no escape from this position though initially to be frank I was against the view submitted by Mr. Vin. As the Bombay High Court in its Full Bench decision itself has observed the question was not free from doubt and something could be stated even in favour of the other view placed vigorously before the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court but on consideration of the scheme of the Act the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court reached that difficult decision and the Supreme Court had no hesitation in confirming the same on the very same grounds. ( 6 ) MR. Shaikh the learned advocate for the respondent-landlord however invited my attention to sec. 32 (3) of the Act under which the tenants continued liability to pay to the landlord the rent of such land is provided for and urged that this particular provision was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court decided this question this particular provision was very much there on the statute book. 32 (3) of the Act under which the tenants continued liability to pay to the landlord the rent of such land is provided for and urged that this particular provision was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court decided this question this particular provision was very much there on the statute book. It is not open to me to sit in judgment over the Supreme Courts judgment on the ground that some such provision was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court or the Lordships of the Supreme Court had not addressed themselves to that particular provision. The ultimate presumption in such cases should be that such a provision was brought to the notice of the Supreme Court and still they did not think it worth while to deal with the same. ( 7 ) MR. Shaikh then invited my attention to the judgment of this High Court in the case of Bai Ganga wd/o. Khoda Chhagan and Ors. v. Bai Kamla daughter of Mangaldas Someshwar and Ors. 15 G. L. R. 345. In that case it has been laid down by this High Court that till the statutory fight to purchase the land does not accrue the tenant continues to be the tenant and the liabilities of his as a tenant would continue. This particular argument has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case and despite that the decision referred to above has been reached. All that is required to be decided in this case is whether possession can be claimed under sec. 29 on any such continued liability of the tenant and this question squarely arose before the Supreme Court and came to be dealt with decisively. ( 8 ) IN above view of the matter the petition is required to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The impugned order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Annexure C is set aside and the orders at Annexures A and B passed by the Mahalkari and the Prant Officer respectively of Hansot and Broach stand reinstated. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .