Order.-The facts in this case do not admit of any controversy. Certain machineries were hypothecated to the State Bank of India by one Delican Private Limited. The said Delican Private Limited, went into liquidation. Those machineries were purchased by the petitioner from the mortgagee (the State Bank of India). There was a closure of the establishment originally run by M/s. Delican Private Limited, and after the liquidation proceedings and the purchase of the machineries which covered a period of six months and more, the petitioner with the help of the machineries and in the same premises as the business was conducted by M/s. Delican Private Limited, started afresh the business of manufacture of fruit and fruit products under the name and style of Rubka Fruit Products Private Limited. The petitioner claimed infancy protection under section 16 (1) (b) of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Family Pension Act, 1952. By the impugned order dated 24th September, 1975 it was held that such a protection would not be available to the petitioner. The reason according to the Regional Commissioner, Employees Provident Funds, is this:- "The establishment M/s. Rubka Fruit Products Private Limited did not purchase the plant, boiler, machinery etc., from the market. It purchased these from the previous employer, viz., the State Bank of India, Madras, the mortgagees in "where they were and as they were condition". The present employer has taken over the entire factory together with its premises. The closure of the establishment was only for about six months. In those circumstances, I decide that the provisions of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Family Pension Fund Act, 1952, will continue to apply to the establishment M/s. Rubka Fruit Products Private Limited, Madras-10, from the date, i.e., 10th January, 1975, from which it has taken over the previous establishment". In attacking this order, Mr. S. W. Kanakaraj, learned counsel for the petitioner, urges that this line of reasoning has been held to be wrong in several decisions including that of the Supreme Court. It cannot be said that merely "because the petitioner had purchased old machinery or was using the same premises, it is not a new establishment. The test to be applied is whether with a view to evade its liability under the Act, the claim for infancy protection is made. It cannot be said that merely "because the petitioner had purchased old machinery or was using the same premises, it is not a new establishment. The test to be applied is whether with a view to evade its liability under the Act, the claim for infancy protection is made. In support of this submission the learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision reported in the Provident Fund Inspector, Trivandrum v. Secretary, N. S. S. Co-operative Society, Chengannacheri1 , in which the decision of this Court in Vitaldas Jagannathdas v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner2 , found approval. Again the learned counsel for the petitioner presses into service the decision in Devi Press v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner3, and contends that the facts are more or less identical. Therefore, according to him, the impugned order must be quashed. 2. Miss Radha Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing for department, would, however, contend that having regard to the fact that the same machineries were purchased and the same premises is used and there had not been long interval between the ceasement of the old business and the commencement of the new business of the petitioner, it must be presumed that it is not a new establishment entitled to the infancy protection. 3. I can straightaway say that all these authorities are loaded in favour of the petitioner. The reasoning of the Regional Commissioner-respondent stated above hardly appeals to me. The correct line of reasoning in Vitaldas Jagannathdas v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner4, which found approval in the Supreme Court as seen from the Provident Fund Inspector, Trivandrum v. Secretary, N. S. S. Co-operative Society, Chengannacherri1, is what is set out:- "If, in a particular case, it appears that the new establishment is not genuinely such, but is only an old one formally resuscitated, in order to avoid the legal obligation, it is always open to the Court to hold that it is the old establishment, which is substantially continuing, and that the liability to contribute must be affixed to the apparently new form also. But where, in reality, the old establishment has come to an end, and there is a new establishment, this establishment is entitled to infancy protection in its own right, even if it happens by coincidence to have employed a large part of the personnel of the previous establishment" . But where, in reality, the old establishment has come to an end, and there is a new establishment, this establishment is entitled to infancy protection in its own right, even if it happens by coincidence to have employed a large part of the personnel of the previous establishment" . Then again in W.P. No. 1333 of 1961 on the file of this Court, Srinivasan, J., has held: "That the same premises was used does not mean that it was the same business. There is a vital distinction in law between the transfer of a business as a running concern and the transfer of a few of the assets of the business, which has been wholly ignored by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner........It must also be mentioned that in so far as the closure of the business by Narayana Aiyar was concerned, the genuineness of that closure was never in dispute. It was closed down with a view to escaping any liability which the application of the Employees’ Provident Funds Act might impose". 4. On these decisions, I have absolutely no difficulty in agreeing with the learned counsel for the petitioner and rejecting the argument advanced on behalf of the department-respondent. 5. The facts stated above would clearly show that the petitioner is not claiming any undue benefit of infancy protection. On the contrary, the earlier company went into liquidation, the machineries were brought from the mortgagee and there was an interval of six months between the closure of the old business and the commencement of the petitioner business. All these would go to show that the petitioner’s establishment is a new establishment entitled to the infancy protection under section 16 of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Family Pension Act (XIX of 1952). Hence, this writ petition will stand allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.