Judgment :- 1. There is a tarred road 20 feet wide running north and south vested in the Tanoor Panchayat, which is the appellant. To the east of the road is a strip of land, belonging to the Panchayat, which, at the site in dispute, is 20 feet wide on the north and 191/2 feet wide on the south and 251/2 feet long south to north. For convenience I will call this strip as the road margin. Beyond this road margin, on the east is the suit property owned and occupied by the plaintiff-respondent. He started construction of a shop in this property and alleging that the Panchayat was intending to put up a building in the road margin and that the building would interfere with his right of passage through the road margin to the road, the plaintiff brought the suit seeking a permanent injunction against the construction of the building. (Although the plaintiff had alleged that the proposed construction by the Panchayat would interfere with his right of light and air, that ground was rejected by the courts below and is no longer alive in this appeal). While asserting its right to put up any building in the road margin the Panchayat stated that it was proposing to erect only a temporary shed to run a library for the benefit of the local fishermen. The Panchayat also stated that the shed would not cover the entire road margin and that even after its construction, there would be ample space left for access to the road. It was also pointed out that after the institution of the suit, the plaintiff had constructed the contemplated building in the suit property. 2. The Munsiff held that the plan Ext. C1 prepared by a commissioner snowed that even if the entire road margin was built upon, the plaintiff's right of way would not be affected as he would have a passage on the northern and southern sides. On this finding the Munsiff dismissed the suit. 3. On appeal the Subordinate Judge noted that apart from the right as a member of the public to use the road, the plaintiff, as owner of land abutting on the Toad, had a private right of access to the road from any point on his land and that the shed proposed to be constructed by the Panchayat was an obstruction to that right. He also noted that the shed would shut out the view of the plaintiff's shop and that the Panchayat has lands on the south and to the west of the road and observed that "the proposal to construct a building either temporary or permanent in this particular site cannot be said to be a bonafide one solely with a view to encourage the reading habits of fishermen folk". On these findings the Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and granted the injunction sought by the plaintiff. The Panchayat appeals. 4. The observation made by the appellate judge against the bona fides of the Panchayat is without basis and was not sought to be supported by the plaintiff and the arguments before me were centered on the respective legal rights of the I parties. The appellate judge has relied upon Damodaran v. Thirupurasundari AIR. 1972 Madras 386, for his conclusion and this was quoted before me also by the plaintiff and before considering how far it applies, it is profitable to note the nature and ambit of the right of passage of a person owning road-side property. 5. The law is stated thus in Smith's Leading Cases, Volume II, page 172 (13th Edition): "An owner of lands adjoining a highway is entitled to access to the highway at all points where his land adjoins the highway, whether or not the soil of the highway be his". And in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 19, Para.119, (3rd Edition): "An owner of land adjoining a highway is entitled to access to such highway at any point at which bis land actually touches it, even though the soil of the highway is vested in another; but he has no such right if a strip of land, however narrow, belonging to another and not subject to the public right of passage, intervenes. An adjoining owner's right of access from his premises to the highway and vice versa is a private right and is distinct from his right to use such highway as soon as he is upon it, which (at any rate if the soil of the highway is not his) he enjoys only as a member of the public." As to the width of a highway and the presumption where metalled track exists the following passages from Halsbury, Para.110 and 111 of the same volume might be read: "Apart from any special enactment, the width of a highway, that is, the extent of land subject to the public right of passage, is a question of fact. The existence of a metalled track, or via trita. does not necessarily mean that the public are confined to that track; and in many cases strips of land along side the via trita form part of the dedicated highway, and are equally subject to the right of the public. Where a metalled road crosses unenclosed land, there being no ditch or physical feature to indicate other limits to the highway, the proper inference is that the via trita alone forms the highway unless public user of adjoining land for the purposes of traffic is proved". In Municipal Board v. Mahadeoji, AIR 1965 SC 1147 = (1965) 2 SCR. 242, brought to my notice by counsel for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court discussed certain English and Indian decisions bearing on this aspect and concluded: "The width of the highway so dedicated depends upon the extent of the user. The side - lands are ordinarily included in the road, for they are necessary for the proper maintenance of the road. In the case of a pathway used for a long time by the public, its topographical and permanent land marks and the manner and mode of its maintenance usually indicate the extent of the user " The law may be briefly stated thus: An owner of land adjoining a highway is entitled as a matter of private right to access to such highway at any point at which his land actually touches it. The width of the highway, except where it is the subject of a special enactment is a question of fact. The width of the highway, except where it is the subject of a special enactment is a question of fact. The highway is not necessarily limited to the metalled or tarred track; it will include the side - lands which are necessary for its maintenance or which are proved to be used by the public for the purpose of traffic. However where a metalled or tarred road crosses unenclosed land, there being no ditch or physical feature to indicate the other limits to the highway the proper inference is that the metalled or tarred portion alone forms the highway. 6. The plaintiff is thus entitled to access to the road only at every point where the suit property which belongs to him, touches it, but as it does not touch the road at any point he has no such right of access. The eastern strip which I have called the road margin separates the road from his property and it is too wide to be treated as part of the road as necessary for its maintenance nor can it be treated otherwise as there is no proof that it is subject to the public right of passage. The plaintiff cannot therefore claim that the Panchayat should keep the road margin vacant for his use, as part of the road especially when the construction proposed by the Panchayat leaves the plaintiff ample space on its north and south for access to the road. 7. It only remains to notice Damodaran v. Thirupurasundari, AIR 1972 Madaras 386, followed by the appellate court and relied upon by the plaintiff. It was found by the first appellate court in that case (Paragraphs) that the plaintiffs were entitled to have access to the road on the east at any point where his property, item 1 touched the road and that he was therefore entitled to have an injunction for the removal of a wall erected by the defendant on item 2 which was the road frontage of item 1 blocking such access. The decision was confirmed by the High Court holding that the plaintiffs who were owners of land abutting the highway have an undoubted right of access to the street from any part of their premises. The position of the plaintiff here is different. AIR. The decision was confirmed by the High Court holding that the plaintiffs who were owners of land abutting the highway have an undoubted right of access to the street from any part of their premises. The position of the plaintiff here is different. AIR. 1972 Madras 386 can therefore afford him no support and the appellate judge was wrong in holding that it applied to the present case in all respects. I set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and dismiss the suit. The appeal is thus allowed but without costs.