Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is this case is the Kerala State Electricity Board. The first respondent is the State of Kerala and the 2nd and 3rd respondents are the Chittoor-Thattamangalam Municipality and its Commissioner. The petitioner challenges the levy of profession tax by the 3rd respondent as being in excess of the limit prescribed by Art.276(2) of the Constitution. The petitioner was served with Ext. P1 notice to pay a total amount of Rs. 1470.50 as profession tax for the years 1971-72,1972-73 and 1973-74. The petitioner replied by Ext. P-2 requesting the 3rd respondent to reduce the levy of profession tax to Rs 250/- per annum in conformity with Art.276(2) of the Constitution. This request was rejected by Ext. P-3. Hence this writ petition. 2. The petitioner raised two points in challenge of the levy. The first ground taken is that the Electricity Board is a statutory Corporation, which is neither a company nor a person as contemplated in the Kerala Municipalities Act, 190. Levy of profession tax is provided in S.110 of the Act. The said section authorises levy of profession tax only to companies and persons and not on statutory corporations like the petitioner. Hence it is contended that Ext. P1 notice is illegal and without jurisdiction. The 2nd point urged is that the proviso to Art.276(2) of the Constitution does not apply in this case. The argument runs thus: The maximum limit of profession tax provided in Art.276(2) of the Constitution is Rs. 250/-. The proviso to the said Article, enables a Municipality, to continue to levy a higher tax if in the financial year preceding the commencement of the Constitution such a municipality was levying profession tax at a rate in excess of the limit of Rs. 250/- per annum. The 2nd respondent-Municipality was created by the Kerala Municipalities Act of 1960. There cannot be any levy of profession tax prior to the commencement of the Constitution. Therefore, the Electricity Board cannot be mulcted with a liability above the limit fixed by Art.276(2). Differently put, the argument is that no Legislature has power to pass any law authorising the levy or collection of profession tax beyond the constitutional limit of Rs. 250 per annum after the commencement of the Constitution. 3. Therefore, the Electricity Board cannot be mulcted with a liability above the limit fixed by Art.276(2). Differently put, the argument is that no Legislature has power to pass any law authorising the levy or collection of profession tax beyond the constitutional limit of Rs. 250 per annum after the commencement of the Constitution. 3. The first question was the subject-matter of a writ petition by the same petitioner before this Court Isaac J., rejected the plea that the Electricity Board is not liable to pay profession tax. In his judgment reported in 1972 KLT. 265, the learned judge held that the Electricity Board is a statutory body and is a juristic person. It was also held that the word 'person' used in the statute includes a Corporation as well as natural person. 4. Counsel for the petitioner forcefully pleaded that the case be referred to a Division Bench of this Court since the above decision needed reconsideration, I am not inclined to accept this plea. The petitioner is a statutory Corporation constituted under S.5 of the Electricity Supply Act and therefore a company as defined in the Kerala Municipalities Act. The contention that do profession tax can be levied under S.110 of the Act cannot be accepted. Even if the petitioner is not a company as defined in the Kerala Municipalities Act, it would still be a person liable to profession tax. A person as understood in law is any legal entity capable of being a right-and-duty bearing unit All entities recognised by law as capable of being parties to legal relationships can be brought within the ambit of the expression 'person'. Such persons may be natural persons like human beings and also artificial entities, which are creatures of law. The Board is clearly a person capable of possessing right, being subject to duties, capable of holding and disposing of properties, entering into contracts and to form legal relationships. Thus, the plea that the Board is not a person cannot be accepted. I hold with respect that 1972 KLT 265 lays down the correct law. 5. The second contention also must fail. The 2nd respondent-Municipality was originally constituted under and governed by the Cochin Municipal Act, Act 18 of 1113, hereinafter referred to as the 1113 Act. Under the 1113 Act, the municipality has been levying half-yearly profession tax above Rs. 250 per annum. 5. The second contention also must fail. The 2nd respondent-Municipality was originally constituted under and governed by the Cochin Municipal Act, Act 18 of 1113, hereinafter referred to as the 1113 Act. Under the 1113 Act, the municipality has been levying half-yearly profession tax above Rs. 250 per annum. The rates then prevalent continued till the commencement of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the 1960 Act. Even after the coming into force of the 1960 Act, the old rates continued. When the Constitution came into force, the 1113 Act was in force. The repeal of 1113 Act and the coming into force of the 1960 Act does not in any manner restrict the Municipality's right from levying profession tax above the Rs. 250/- limit. 6. The contention of the petitioner's counsel is that since the 1113 Act was repealed by 1960 Act, the original Municipality ceased to exist and the new Municipality should be deemed to have come into existence in 1960. If that be so, the proviso to Art.276(2) of the Constitution will not apply. This contention has to fail. The repeal of 1113 Act does not operate to efface the existence nor the continuance of the old Municipality. Its existence is continued and revived by the successor Act. Simply because a new form is given to an old Municipality or it is recognised by a new charter, even though its local limits or territory remains in tact or changes, the Municipality continues its existence. The identity, continuity or succession of a municipality or Corporation does not depend upon the change in law unless it be they are destroyed by specific provision in an enactment. In this case, the successor Act keeps alive the old municipality in tact and therefore the contention that a new Municipality came into existence in 1960 is without any substance. In reinforcement of my conclusion, I may usefully refer to the following passage in the American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn. Vol. 56 at page 54: "54. In this case, the successor Act keeps alive the old municipality in tact and therefore the contention that a new Municipality came into existence in 1960 is without any substance. In reinforcement of my conclusion, I may usefully refer to the following passage in the American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn. Vol. 56 at page 54: "54. Reorganization and its effects When a new form is given to an old Municipal Corporation, or such a Corporation is reorganised under a new charter, taking in its new organization the place of the old one embracing substantially the same corporators and the same territory, it will be presumed that the Legislature intended a continued existence of the same Corporation, although different powers are possessed under the new Charter and different Officers administer its affairs: and in the absence of express provision for their payment otherwise, it will also be presumed in such case, that the Legislature intended that the liabilities as well as the rights of property of the Corporation in its old form should accompany the Corporation in its reorganisation. The identity, continuity, or succession of a municipal corporation will not be destroyed by the repeal of its charter, by a change of its name by an increase or diminution of its territory or population, by a change in its mode of government, or by a combination of all these, if the people and territory re-incorporated constituted an integral part of the Corporation abolished. A change in the form of a Municipal Government to a more highly developed one can have no effect upon the property rights of the inhabitants, either as riparian proprietors or as owners of lands abutting upon the public ways. The reason is to be founded in the peculiar nature of such Corporations. The persons and property, and the incorporators and the territory are the essential constituents of the Corporation, and the rights and liabilities naturally adhere to them." The above extract eloquently meets the contentions raised against the continuity of the 2nd respondent-Municipality. 7. An identical point was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in M/s. Ram Krishna v. Janpad Sabha (AIR. 1962 SC. 1073). That case related to S.143(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which for all purposes is in pari materia with Art.276(2) of the Constitution. 7. An identical point was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in M/s. Ram Krishna v. Janpad Sabha (AIR. 1962 SC. 1073). That case related to S.143(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which for all purposes is in pari materia with Art.276(2) of the Constitution. In that case, the Central Provinces and Berar Local Self Government Act, 1920 was repealed and replaced by the Central Provinces and Berar Local Self-Government Act, 1948. By the amended Act, the District Councils which were the units of the local Government administration under the 1920 Act were replaced by Janpad Sabhas which comprised smaller areas. In that case, the District Council of Bhandara constituted under the 1920 Act was split into two or three units known as Janpad Sabhas. The questions related to the imposition of tax on import of beedies and beedi leaves and the rate of tax. By reason of the provisions in S.143(2) of the Government of India Act, the local authority can continue to levy the tax at the same rate. The contention raised in that case was that since the local authority which originally imposed the tax had got split up into three and lost its identity, the continuity got destroyed thus denying to the new units, a right to levy higher tax. This was repelled by the Supreme Court. I can do no better than to extract para 7 of the judgment in that case, which answers this plea against the petitioner: "The principal contention however, raised on behalf of the appellant before the High Court was based upon a denial of the identity of the authorities three Janpad Sabhas with the District Council, Bhandara which levied and collected the tax prior to April 1, 1937, The learned judges of the High Court rejected this contention and held that the Janpad Sabbas which replaced the District Council of Bhandara were in substance identical with the latter principally for the reason that the area covered by the three newly created Janpad Sabhas were the same as that for which the District Council functioned and that the purposes for which the tax collected would be utilized which are the criteria specified in S.143(2) were exactly the same. Just as it could not be disputed that if there were any change in the composition of the District Council, the identity of a local authority would not be altered for the purposes of S.143(2), the mere splitting up of that local area for being administered by a plurality of local Government units would not affect any change material for the purposes of the continued exigibility of the tax under S.143(2) The learned Attorney-General therefore very properly did not press before us this point based upon the disappearance of the District Council and its being replaced by the respondent-Sabhas as any ground for denying to the respondent-Sabhas the right to levy the tax." 8. A more or less similar question came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the decision reported in R. R. Engineering Co v. Zilla Parishad Bareilly (AIR 1970 Allahabad 316) In that case, District Boards were replaced by Zilla parishads. The successor Zilla parishads continued to levy tax on assessees at the same rate as was levied by the District Boards which was above the maximum limit of Rs. 250 per annum as provided in Art.276 (2) of the Constitution. The Zilla Parishads were larger in extent and therefore it was contended that the identity of the District Boards got lost and the new Zilla Parishads could not be equated with the District Boards. The Full Bench repelled this plea and it will be useful to extract Para.12 of the judgment by Pathak J., where the Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1962 SC 1073 also were referred: "Circumstance and property tax was levied before the commencement of the Constitution by a local authority, and Art.277 declares that it may be continued to be levied and applied to the same purposes notwithstanding that the tax now falls in the Union List until provision to the contrary it made by parliamentary law. There was considerable argument before us as to the true understanding of the Supreme Court decision in Ram Krishna Ram Nath, AIR 1962 SC 1073 (Supra). It seems to me that what was said there applies fully to the case before us. There was considerable argument before us as to the true understanding of the Supreme Court decision in Ram Krishna Ram Nath, AIR 1962 SC 1073 (Supra). It seems to me that what was said there applies fully to the case before us. On the reasoning which appealed to the Supreme Court in that case, the Zilla Parishad Bareilly can be identified with the District Board, Bareilly The area for whose benefit the tax is to be utilized and substantially the purposes for which the utilisation is to take place continued to be the same. It is true that some additional functions have been conferred upon the Zilla Parishad, but that, in my opinion is merely an extension of the functions imposed in the scope of local self-Government The rate of tax remains at the level fixed by the notification of 1933 and the incidence of tax has not been shown to have been altered in any manner. In nature and effect, it continues to be the same tax. Art.277 of the Constitution ensures the continued levy of the circumstance and property tax demanded, from the petitioner," 9. The case on hand is much stronger than the cases mentioned above. In this case, the 2nd respondent-Municipality continues as such. It has not lost its identity. Its local limits remain the same. It caters substantially to the same needs of the public within its limits. The mere coming into force of a new Act cannot destroy the continuity of the Corporation. For the completion of the discussion, I shall refer also to S.408 of the 1960 Act, which reads: "All property, all rights of whatever kind used, enjoyed or possessed by, and all interests of whatever kind owned by or vested in or held in trust by, or for. a Municipal Council, as constituted under the Travancore District Municipalities Act. 1116 (Act XXIII of 1116) or the Cochin Municipal Act, XVIII of 1113 or the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920 (V of 1920) as well as all liabilities legally subsisting against the said Council, shall pass to the Council as constituted under this Act." This section clearly lays down that all property and rights of the erstwhile Municipality shall pass to the Council as constituted under the new Act. Therefore the position obtaining is that the old Municipality continues. 10. Therefore the position obtaining is that the old Municipality continues. 10. The repeal of 1113 Act does not affect the power of the municipality to continue the levy at the higher rates provided for in the repealed Act. The new Act has sanctioned such levy by virtue of the proviso to R.19(1) of Schedule II of the Act, which is deemed to be a part of Chapter I of the Act itself. The said proviso reads as follows: "Provided that if in the financial year immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution of India any Municipality was imposing profession tax at a rate higher than two hundred and fifty rupees per annum and continued to levy the tax at such higher rate immediately before the commencement of this Act, such Municipality may continue to levy profession tax at such rate". Thus, the 2nd respondent-Municipality completely satisfies the requirements specified in the proviso and therefore is entitled to continue the levy at the higher rates. The continuance is allowed by the proviso to R.19 mentioned above and therefore is well within the benefit of the proviso to Art.276(2) of the Constitution. 11. The contention put forward that the 1960 Act being a post-Constitution enactment is not saved by the proviso to Art.276(2) has also no force. The States are conferred with Legislative power in respect of tax on professions etc. by Entry 60 in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. It is true that this Legislative power is restricted by Art.276(2), but this restriction is subject to further restriction contained in the proviso to Art.276(2). Thus, while Art.276(1) read with Entry 60 in List II of the Seventh Schedule confers legislative power on States in respect of profession tax, a fetter is placed on that power by Art.276(2). But this fetter is removed in cases falling under the provisio to Art.276(2). Therefore, there is no legislative incompetence for the levy of profession tax in cases falling under the proviso. 12. The Electricity Board can succeed in overcoming the bar under the proviso only if the Municipality had attempted to levy profession tax beyond the maximum limit of tax which it was levying before the Constitution came into force. Any alteration of the levy of profession tax below the maximum prevalent prior to the Constitution cannot be subjected to attack. 12. The Electricity Board can succeed in overcoming the bar under the proviso only if the Municipality had attempted to levy profession tax beyond the maximum limit of tax which it was levying before the Constitution came into force. Any alteration of the levy of profession tax below the maximum prevalent prior to the Constitution cannot be subjected to attack. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition has to fail and is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their costs.