Judgment Hari Lal Agrawal, J. 1. By this writ application the petitioner prays for quashing the order dated 28/7/1969 (Annexure 6), as modified by the order dated 20/9/1969 (Annexure 8), passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Santhal parganas, Dumka (respondent no.3) terminating his services and the order dated 27/10/1970 (Annexure 10) refusing to review the order on the review application filed by the petitioner as well as the order dated 25/7/1974 passed by the Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division, Bhagalpur (Respondent no.2), dismissing his appeal, a copy of which is Annexure 11 to the writ application. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a temporary lower division clerk in the Dumka Collectorate by the Deputy Commissioner (respondent no.3) on his competing at a written test examination and jointed sometime in November, 1963. He was working as a store keeper in the office of the Block Development officer at Hiranpur. On 24/4/1968, he went on casual leave for four days upto 27/4/1968 which was duly sanctioned by the Block Development Officer. He, however, did not report to duty and went on extending his leave up to 18/8/1969. The case of the petitioner is that he was suffering from intiric fever and was advised bed rest from 1/5/1968 to 18/8/1969. The certificate obtained by a doctor in support of this fact was forwarded to the authorities concerned and a copy of the same has been made (Annexure 2) to the writ application. The case of the respondents is that when the petitioner did not return to duty on 29/4/1968 (28/4/1968 being a Sunday) (after the expiry of the casual leave granted to him by the Block Development Officer, a telegram was sent to him on 1/5/1968 by the Block Development Officer reading "overstay on leave leads to suspension. Join immediately". The petitioner then sent an application for extension of the leave from 29.4.1968 on ground of his indisposition. The application for leave, however, was rejected by the Block development Officer, who by a letter dated 11.5.1968 called upon the petitioner to join his duties immediately. The petitioner instead sent another application for leave from 5/5/1968 to 12/5/1968 on the same ground, but without any medical certificate. Thereafter the petitioner did not make any application for leave and stayed at home without any information till 18/8/1969, as already said above. The petitioner instead sent another application for leave from 5/5/1968 to 12/5/1968 on the same ground, but without any medical certificate. Thereafter the petitioner did not make any application for leave and stayed at home without any information till 18/8/1969, as already said above. The Block Development Officer, Hiranpur, then submitted a report to the Sub-divisional Officer, Pakur, regarding the unauthorised absence of the petitioner by his letter dated 16/5/1968, with a copy to the petitioner as well. In these circumstances, the services of the petitioner were dispensed with by respondent no.3 for his unauthorised absence from duty for a considerable long period, by order dated 28.7.1969, a copy of which was sent to the petitioner. After the above order, the medical certificate dated 18.8.1969 was filed by the petitioner along with a petition for review his case before the deputy Commissioner, which, however, was rejected by his order dated 27.10.1970 (Annexure 10 ). 3. It appears that on receiving the report of the Block Development officer, Hiranpur, some kind of inquiry was initiated by the Deputy Commissioner and the Sub-Divisional Officer was directed to enquire into the matter. The Block Development Officer, by his letter dated 2.8.1968, a copy of which has been made (Annexure 3) to the writ application, informed the petitioner that he had to submit him his explanation in his office within three days of the receipt of the same, as directed by the Sub-divisional Officer, Pakur, and the deputy Commissioner of Santhal Parganas, Dumka, on the points raised in the "particular of charges" which was enclosed to the said letter and a copy of which was forwarded to the petitioner and has been separately marked as (Annexure 4 to the writ application. It consists of seven paragraphs. The allegations made in the charges only narrate the facts of petitioner originally going on casual leave on the ground of urgent domestic work for a period of four days on the leave being sanctioned and thereafter overstaying without proper application and his failure to join duties in spite of telegrams and repeated directions given by the Block Development Officer. By that time the petitioner had not joined his duties nor had sent any further intimation. The so-called charge, intimated the petitioner that "by taking casual leave and thereafter extending it for an indefinite period for which no leave is due at your credit is a serious offence. By that time the petitioner had not joined his duties nor had sent any further intimation. The so-called charge, intimated the petitioner that "by taking casual leave and thereafter extending it for an indefinite period for which no leave is due at your credit is a serious offence. According to rule no Government servant can be allowed to remain absent from duty on causal leave for not more than twelve days at a time. . . . . . you are guilty of grave misconduct, wilful neglect of duty, disobedience of order of superior officer and indisciplined behaviours". The petitioner was, accordingly, called upon to explain as to why he should not be dismissed or discharged or otherwise suitably punished for the aforesaid charges. It is this document which is the sheet-anchor of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that a departmental proceeding having been initiated against the petitioner by the authorities on charges of misconduct, they were bound to follow the procedure and the principles contained la article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, and on that account, the impugned orders were fit to be quashed. 4. The petitioner sent his show cause through registered post on 13.8.1968 from his village home and his case was that he did not receive any communication from the Block Development Officer and was regularly sending petitions for extension of his leave on medical grounds under Postal certificates. The show cause was forwarded by the Block Development Officer, hiranpur, to the Sub-divisional Officer, Pakur, who made his comments and while forwarding the same to the Deputy Commissioner (respondent no.3)recommended that the petitioner may be allowed to join his duties after giving him a strict warning. Respondent no.3, however, passed the order of termination of services of the petitioner by his order contained in Annexure 6, already mentioned above. 5. Respondent no.3, however, passed the order of termination of services of the petitioner by his order contained in Annexure 6, already mentioned above. 5. The case of the respondents with respect to the departmental proceeding is that it was simply in the nature of an explanation called for from the petitioner, and the learned Government Pleader No. III appearing for them in course of his argument contended before us that it was, at best, in the nature of a preliminary inquiry and not a regular departmental inquiry, and, therefore, there was no infraction of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of india ; particularly when the impugned orders did not cast any stigma on the petitioner and was an order of discharge simpliciter. A large number of authorities were cited on behalf of the petitioner in support of his contentions, which I now propose to consider. 6. As already said earlier, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on the letter dated 2.8.1968 (Annexure 3) which was sent by the Block Development Officer, Hiranpur, enclosing a copy of the "particulars of charges" to the petitioner. It is not disputed that the order of termination of services of the petitioner dated 28.7.1969 (Annexure 6) is innocuous and the petitioner being a temporary Government servant, could not have challenged the same otherwise. Therefore, it has to be seen as to what would be the effect of the letter dated 2/8/1968 (Annexure 3) issued to the petitioner. 7. It cannot be disputed and is since well settled that even temporary servants are entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) as permanent government servants, if the Government takes action against them by meting out one of the three punishments, i. e. , dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. But this protection is only available where the same is sought to be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise. It was observed long back by Das, C. J. in parshottam Lal Dhlngra V/s. Union of India, ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), which case is rightly said to be the "magna Carta of the Indian Civil Servant". I am tempted to quote the observation of Krishna Iyer, J. in Samsher Singh V/s. State of Punjab and another, ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 ), which I shall discuss in greater detail a little later. I am tempted to quote the observation of Krishna Iyer, J. in Samsher Singh V/s. State of Punjab and another, ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 ), which I shall discuss in greater detail a little later. He says that Dhingras case "has spawned diverse judicial trends, difficult to be disciplined applicable to termination of probation of into one single, simple, practical formula freshers and of the services of temporary employees. . . . . . . . In a series of case, the Court has wrestled with the problem of devising a principle or rule to determine this question ". 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance on the case in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah V/s. The Union of India, ( AIR 1964 SC 1854 ), where after enunciating the principle noticed above that temporary servants are also entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) in the same manner as permanent Government servants, if the Government takes action against them by meting out one of the three punishments, it was observed that the mere use of expressions like "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive and in spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the Court has to apply the two tests mentioned in Dhingras case, already seen above. The Court, however, held that even though misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which induces the government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service, the motive operating on the mind of the government is wholly irrelevent. It was further held that it is well known that Government does not terminate the services of a public servant, be he even a temporary servant, without reason ; nor is it usual for Government to reduce a public servant in rank without reason even though he may be holding the higher rank only temporarily. Proceeding further it was observed that the government may find it necessary to terminate the services of a temporary servant if it is not satisfied with his conduct or his suitability for the job and/or his work. This dissatisfaction with the work and/or conduct of a temporary servant may arise on complaint against him. In such cases two courses are open to Government. This dissatisfaction with the work and/or conduct of a temporary servant may arise on complaint against him. In such cases two courses are open to Government. It may decide to dispense with the services of the servant or revert him to substantive post without any action being taken to punish him for his bad work or misconduct. Or the Government may decide to punish a servant for the same, and although he may be a temporary servant, he will have the protection of Article 311 (2 ). It was further observed that even where it is intended to take action by way of punishment, what usually happens is that "something in the nature of what may be called a preliminary enquiry is first held in connection with the alleged misconduct or unsatisfactory work. In this preliminary enquiry, the explanation of the Government servant may be taken and documentary and even oral evidence may be considered", and if such enquiry makes out a prima facie case against him, he is asked to show cause. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to take aid from the above observations and contended that inasmuch as the respondents in this case framed charges against the petitioner, branding his action of staying on leave without sanction as an act of misconduct or the like, he was entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2 ). The proposition as such cannot be doubted. The facts and circumstances of this case narrated above, however, do not, in my view, warrant this protection. 10. The Supreme Court in the case of The State of Bihar and others V/s. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra, ( AIR 1971 SC 1011 ) again observed that an order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, clear from the above authorities that some kind of enquiry can be held by the superior authorities to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, and if the order visits the public servant without any evil consequences or casting any aspersion against his character or integrity, it cannot be considered to be one by way of punishment. 11. 11. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in this case regular charges were framed and an inquiry officer was also appointed and, therefore, the petitioner was entitled, as a matter of course, to protection under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, in my view, has no foundation inasmuch as the order that was ultimately passed was innocuous and did not cast any aspersion against his character or integrity. The so called charges only related to his continued absence from duty without proper leave being granted to him. It has been seen that the petitioner absented himself for sixteen months, while he had gone on leave for four days only. The work which the petitioner was to performed must have suffered on that account. In the circumstances, the employer might have decided to terminate the services of such an employee. Firstly, the enquiry in this case and the enclosure to Annexure "3" headed as "particular of charges" sent to the petitioner, as appears to me, were only loose expressions used by the Block development Officer. All that the authorities wanted to ascertain from the petitioner was as to whether there was any justifiable reason or circumstance for his continued absence from duty. The use of the expression "misconduct and wilful neglect of duty" have been similarly used. The position was clarified by the Supreme Court in Samsher Singh case (Supra) and the question of holding inquiry was held in that case to be not always conclusive. It was very clearly laid down that what is decisive is whether the order is really by way of punishment. The substance of the order, and not the form, would be decisive. Ray, C. J. (as he then was) delivering the main judgment, on review of a large number of decisions, observed that if the Government proceeds against the petitioner in the direct way without casting any aspersion on his honestly or competence, his discharge would not have the effect of removal by way of punishment, and if there is an inquiry, the facts and the circumstances of the case will be looked into in order to find out whether the order is one of dismissal in substance. Krishna Iyer, J. in his separate judgment, agreeing with the main judgment, observed that "the enquiry test" was not always conclusive and that there has been a shift from the factum of enquiry to the object of the enquiry and that distinction was membranous. The learned Judge observed that "after all, between unsuitability and misconduct, thin partitions do their bounds divide". 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon a Bench decision of this Court in Paras Nath Ojha V/s. State of Bihar, (1969 Bihar Law journal Reports 441) where the services of a temporary employee were terminated and he was held to be entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. This case is quite distinguishable inasmuch as the order that was served on the petitioner of that case contained statements against his integrity and threw aspersions on his conduct and was not innocuous. It was rightly, therefore, held that it was as a measure of punishment. 13. Having considered the various authorities of the Supreme Court on the subject, the observations of the learned Judges explaining the legal position and examining the entire circumstances under which the impugned orders were passed against the petitioner in order to find out as to whether the so-called misconduct of the petitioner was the motive or foundation for the said orders, a job very difficult, as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. . I come to the conclusion that the purported inquiry held by the respondents in this case was not a regular departmental inquiry and by the explanation, the superior authorities simply wanted to ascertain as to whether there was any just and reasonable cause for the petitioner to absent himself for such a long time to find out as to whether his services should be retained by giving him a further chance after administering admonition or the same should be terminated, and nothing beyond that. The allegations in the so-called "particular of charges" did not involve the petitioner of any moral turpitude or allege any aspersions against his integrity. The ultimate order of termination that followed also is innocuous. The misconduct and inefficiency might be only the motive for the termination of his services, but were certainly not its foundation. I do not, therefore, find any merit in this application and would dismiss the same. The ultimate order of termination that followed also is innocuous. The misconduct and inefficiency might be only the motive for the termination of his services, but were certainly not its foundation. I do not, therefore, find any merit in this application and would dismiss the same. In the circumstances of the case, however, I shall make no order as to costs. Writ application dismissed.