JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---Some interesting questions of law have arises in this case though apparently the case itself is of little consequence. The petitioner was prosecuted in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Devgad in Criminal Case No. 46 of 1976 respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the complainant") for offence punishable under sections 504, 506 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. It has been mentioned that charge under section 506 was under the second part of that section and the case itself was tried as a warrant case. The learned trial Magistrate by his judgment and order dated 31st December, 1976 discharged the accused. Against this order of discharge, the complainant went in revision and the learned Sessions Judge of Ratnagiri heard his revision application, being Criminal Revision Application No. 7 of 1977, and allowed the same by his judgment and order dated 20th May, 1977. It must be mentioned that before the learned Sessions Judge both the parties were represented by Advocates who were seen to be present from the Rojnama of the appeal Court on the date on which the judgment was pronounced by the learned Sessions Judge. 2. The petitioner filed the present revision application on 14th November, 1977 and the application was circulated for urgent admission which took place on 17th November, 1977. On that day, Shimpi, J. issued rule and stayed further proceedings in the trial Court. When the revision application came up for hearing before me, Mr. Pandit, the learned Advocate appearing for the complainant took objection to its maintainability by pointing out that it was hopelessly barred by time and if due to inadvertence or otherwise, the delay in the filing of the criminal revision application has been condoned, that order is liable to be reconsidered at the time of final hearing. In support of this contention, Mr. Pandit relied upon (State v. Yeshwant Parashram Sawant)1, 79 Bom.L.R. 693. Wherein a Division Bench of this Court has pointed out that it is settled law that when a delay in filing is condoned ex parte that order is liable to be reviewed at the instance of the respondent who can appear at the hearing and contend, notwithstanding the order, that the appeal was barred by time. Wherein a Division Bench of this Court has pointed out that it is settled law that when a delay in filing is condoned ex parte that order is liable to be reviewed at the instance of the respondent who can appear at the hearing and contend, notwithstanding the order, that the appeal was barred by time. This judgment in fact follows the Privy Council judgment in (Krishnaswami Pandikondar v. Ramswami Chettiar)2 , 20 Bom.L.R. 541 and (Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum)3, 21 Bom.L.R. 1148. Mr. Pandit is undoubtedly on strong ground when he contends that if the delay has been codoned without notice to the other side, the other side is entitled to urge event at the time of the final hearing of the appeal or application that the delay had been wrongly condoned, because there was no sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act. 3. There are, apart from the decision referred to above several decisions which support the contention of Mr. Pandit. Indeed in one case, namely (Municipal Councillors of Puri Municipality v. Madhusundhan Das Mahapatra)4, A.I.R. 1961 Orissa 133, it was held that an ex parte order condoning the delay in the appeal in the lower Court is subject to reconsideration and is liable to be disturbed even in second appeal in the High Court. Despite the protestation of Mr. Adik, appearing for the petitioner, who contends that in the instant case delay has been condoned twice and, therefore, the revision application must be heard on merits. I must uphold the contentions of Mr. Pandit and proceed to see whether there was sufficient cause for the petitioner for not preferring the revision application with the period prescribed by law. Under Article 131 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, application to a Court for exercising the powers of revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure must be made within 90 days from the date of the order sought to be revised. 4. I have already mentioned above that the order of the learned Sessions Judge which is being challenged in this revision application was passed on 29th May, 1977 and the revision application was filed on 14th November, 1977. 4. I have already mentioned above that the order of the learned Sessions Judge which is being challenged in this revision application was passed on 29th May, 1977 and the revision application was filed on 14th November, 1977. It must also be mentioned at this stage that this revision application filed on 14th November, 1977 was not accompanied by the certified copy of the order applied against as it is required to be accompanied by Rule 30 of Chapter XXVI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules. An application for certified copy is seen to have been made on 23rd November, 1977. The certified copy which was filed in this Court on 20th March, 1978 shows that it was despatched by the Sessions Court to the petitioner on 9th December, 1977. It has not been disclosed before me when actually the certified copy was received by the petitioner. In other words, the certified copy has been filed here more than 3 months after apparently the petitioner received the same. The revision application itself had been filed four and half months after the order of the learned Sessions Judge. In the application, being Criminal Application No. 799 of 1978, which has been subsequently filed for explaining the delay of 215 days that has occurred in the correct institution of the criminal revision application, no reasons have been given except mentioning that the petitioner is 60 years old and he had called his son who was serving in Bombay to obtain a certified copy from the District Judge at Ratnagiri. This is hardly an explanation which would show sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act. On this ground the revision application will have to be dismissed. 5. It has, however, been mentioned by Mr. Adik that the revision application had been placed for orders before Naik, J. who had condoned the delay on 14th April, 1978. After going through the record, I notice that the office mistakenly treated the delayed filing of the certified copy of the judgment as one of the objections which could be condoned by the Court without notice to the other side and placed the matter for orders before Naik , J. who, as mentioned above, has condoned the delay. After going through the record, I notice that the office mistakenly treated the delayed filing of the certified copy of the judgment as one of the objections which could be condoned by the Court without notice to the other side and placed the matter for orders before Naik , J. who, as mentioned above, has condoned the delay. This again, in my opinion, is the condonation of delay on parts which is liable to be reviewed at the instance of the other party. Mr. Adik, however, contends that there is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code which requires that the revision application should be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment sought to be revised and it is only a Rule made by this Court which postulates such requirement. If, therefore, says Mr. Adik, there is a non-compliance of the Rule made by the High Court, the Court can always dispanse with the compliance or may condone the delay in the compliance since. In the instant case, the compliance has been dispensed with impliedly by the order of the condonation of delay passed by Naik, J. Mr. Adik says that I must proceed to hear the revision application on merits. This submission necessitates as examination of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. 6. Section 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with appeals and mentions that every appeal shall be made in the form of a petition in writing presented by the appellant or his pleader and every such petition shall (unless the Court to which it is presented otherwise direct) be accompanied by a copy of the judgment or order appealed against. In the said section there is no mention that the petition must be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment and/or certified copy of the order appealed against. But on analogous provisions contained in Order XLI, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court has held that when, it is mentioned that a decree or a judgment is to be filed, it must be a certified copy of the same. In (Shakuntala Devi Jain v. KuntalKumari)5, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 575, it has been pointed out that a decree and a judgment are public documents and under section 77 of the Evidence Act only a certified copy may be produced in proof of their contents. In (Shakuntala Devi Jain v. KuntalKumari)5, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 575, it has been pointed out that a decree and a judgment are public documents and under section 77 of the Evidence Act only a certified copy may be produced in proof of their contents. Interpreting Order XLI, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Supreme Court held that the memorandum of appeal is not validly presented, unless it is accompanied by certified copied, of the decree and the judgment. Section 383 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the Court in which an appeal is to be filed to direct that a copy of the judgment and order need not accompany a petition in appeal. As far as this Court is concerned, such a direction has not been made impliedly or otherwise. On the other hand, Rule 30 of Chapter XXVI, referred to above, in mandatory terms requires that every appeal or a revision application must be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment appealed against or applied against. In my opinion, therefore an appeal is not properly instituted at all unless the petition of appeal is accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment or order appealed against. 7. The question, however, is whether the same rule applies to the presentation of petitions in revision. The manner of presentation for petition has not been prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In fact the earlier Code did not make any reference impliedly or otherwise to the filing of a revision application by a party in the Court. Under the present Code section 397 deals with the powers of revision of the High Court and the Sessions Court. Sub-section (1) of the said section empowers the High Court or the Sessions Judge to call for and examine the record of may proceeding before any inferior Court for the propose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. Sub-section (3) of section 397 then mentions that if an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by either of them. In other words, the same person cannot apply twice to a Court for revision. Sub-section (3) of section 397 then mentions that if an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by either of them. In other words, the same person cannot apply twice to a Court for revision. The fact that an embargo is thus imposed upon a party from preferring a second revision application pre-supposes that a person can file a revision application. Impliedly such a thing could be done under the old Code. Now this is specifically provided in sub-section (3) of section 397. Indeed I have in (Criminal Revision Application No. 561 of 1977 decided on 13th July, 1978)6, taken a view that an application for revision can be and is made under section 397 of the Code for invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and the Sessions Court. It is true that the Court itself does not prescribe the manner of the presentation or of lodging the petition in the Court of revision and does not in fact says that the petition, must be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment or the order as mentioned in section 382 of the code. In my opinion, however this should not make any difference to the question of deciding then a revision application is properly lodged in the Court. If a rule of this Court requires that a revision application must be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment or order applied against, the presentation of the revision application without being accompanied by such certified copy will not be a proper presentation and if the office accepts such revision application, then it will not amount to a proper institution or proper lodging of the revision application. It is only when the certified copy of the judgment is filed, the lodging of the revision application must be deemed to be correct and complete. It is with reference to that date, therefore, all questions arising under the Limitation Act must be answered. In the instant case the correct date of the filing the revision application must be deemed to be 20th March, 1978, that is the date on which the certified copy of the judgment was lodged in the High Court. 8. I must now return to the other arguments of Mr. In the instant case the correct date of the filing the revision application must be deemed to be 20th March, 1978, that is the date on which the certified copy of the judgment was lodged in the High Court. 8. I must now return to the other arguments of Mr. Adik based upon certain decisions of some High Courts and the Supreme Court which, according to him, indicates that at least in Criminal cases if delay has been condoned once, the question should not be reopened. In (The State v. Dittu Ram Pritam Das)7, A.I.R. 1975 Punjab. 164, says Mr. Adik it has been held that the delay in the filing of appeals by the State should not be easily condoned, whereas the appeals preferred by the accused may be more leniently dealt with. According to him, in the present case, it is a revision application by the accused, while the complainant is the respondent and the delay which is now seen to have occurred in the revision application should be condoned. I am not satisfied that the proposition which Mr. Adik says emerges from the above mentioned decision is correct, because section 5 of the Limitation Act does not make any such distinction. In any case, even if it is held that a revision application or an appeal by the accused must be leniently dealt with, it does not mean that even if it is gross delay, it should be condoned. 9. Mr. Adik, then preferred to (Mst. Hali v. Lasai Thakur)8, A.I.R. 1968 Jammu Kashmir 19 and contended that where at the time of presentation of the appeal, the appeal is admitted by the Court and presented by the Counsel without the copy of the decree-sheet having been appended and then the Court by an Act of indulgence to the appellant gives him time to produce the decree, then the appellant is at liberty to produce the decree-sheet later. In such a case, in the words of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, "the question of condonation of delay is foreign to such a case". Apparently the Jammu and Kashmir High Court referred to and followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava)9, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 832. In such a case, in the words of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, "the question of condonation of delay is foreign to such a case". Apparently the Jammu and Kashmir High Court referred to and followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava)9, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 832. On closer examination, however, and after reading the judgment of the Supreme Court itself, I am unable to agree with the view taken by the Jammu and Kashmir High Court. 10. In (Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal)10, 68 Bom.L.R. 620 various situations arising out of the non-filing of the certified copy of the decree along with the memo of appeal were examined. It was mentioned that the requirement that certified copy of the decree should be filed along with the memorandum of appeal is mandatory, and in the absence of the decree the filing of the appeal would be incomplete, defective and incompetent. The Court under Order 41, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code has no jurisdiction to dispense with the filing of the certified copy of the decree. If this is so, I do not see how the Jammu and Kashmir High Court could come to the conclusion that the Court may allow a Counsel by showing indulgence to him to file certified copy of the decree later. That the filing of an appeal without the certified copy of the decree is illegal and incompetent has also been laid down by the Supreme Court in Shankuntala Devi Jain to which I have already made a reference earlier. If, therefore, the filing of the certified copy is compulsory either under the Code or the rules framed by the Court, then the presentation of petition without such a certified copy is legally incompetent. In Jagat Dhish Bhargavas case, as I have already mentioned above, several types of situations were examined and, in my opinion, on a proper reading of the said judgment, the following propositions emerge. (1) In cases of defective presentation of appeals, the office must carefully scrutinise at the initial stage and require the appellant to remedy the defects. In Jagat Dhish Bhargavas case, as I have already mentioned above, several types of situations were examined and, in my opinion, on a proper reading of the said judgment, the following propositions emerge. (1) In cases of defective presentation of appeals, the office must carefully scrutinise at the initial stage and require the appellant to remedy the defects. (2) If at the time when the appeal is preferred a decree has already been drawn up by the trial Court and the appellant has not applied for it in time, it would be a clear case where the appeal would be incompetent and the penalty of dismissal would be justified. (3) If at the time of appeal the decree is not drawn but the application for the same has been made, the appeal that would be preferred would be premature. (3-A) The premature appeal may be returned by the office. (3-B) If through in advertence or otherwise the premature appeal has reached the state of admission, the Court dealing with the admission may return it. (3-C) If again through overnight such an appeal is admitted, then the period of limitation shall be calculated with reference to the date on which the certified copy comes to be filed later in the light of the provisions contained in section 12 of the Limitation Act. 11. In my opinion, therefore, unless the statute or the rule otherwise permits, the filing of the certified copy of the order applied against alongwith the revision petition is mandatory and admits of no relation or exception. If such a certified copy has not accompanied the petition for revision, then that petition, if it is filed, is improperly and incompetently filed. The question of limitation will be decided with reference to the date on which the certified copy of the judgment is later filed in the light of the provision contained in section 12 of the Limitation Act. 12. Considered from any point of view, there is, in my opinion, inexcusable delay in the filing of the present petition which will have, therefore, to be dismissed. 13. Mr. Adik, however, urges that the order of the learned trial Magistrate is on merits correct and the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge in revision is unsustainable and this Court should in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction interfere with this order. 13. Mr. Adik, however, urges that the order of the learned trial Magistrate is on merits correct and the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge in revision is unsustainable and this Court should in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction interfere with this order. I am unable to accuse to this request of Mr. Adik, because I am disposing of the revision application preferred by him and while considering the question of the condonation of the delay, it is not proper, indeed it is impermissible, to look to the merits of the orders which are the subject-matter of the challenge. 14. Mr. Adik then proceeded to contend that if the remand order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is allowed to remain, it will result in a mock trial, because the allegations contained in the complaint are frivolous and the offence alleged should be treated as a trifle attracted by the provisions of section 95 of the Indian Penal Code. He sought to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf khan M. Haji Ibrahim Khan)11, for the purpose of showing that the offence alleged against the petitioner is of such a trivial nature that the Court should not take cognisance of the same. I am sure when the learned trial Magistrate takes up this case, he will properly follow the law laid down by the Supreme Court and by the High Court. 15. The following guide-lines must be now laid down for the office. (1) A criminal appeal or a revision application, if it is unaccompanied by a certified copy of the judgment or order appealed against or applied against, shall not be accepted by the office and if inadvertently accepted, no stamp number shall be given to the same. (2) If, however, on a motion for urgent circulation office is required place the matter before the Court, it shall invariably make an endorsement on the appeal or revision application, as the case may be, that the filing of the appeal or a revision application is incompetent because the certified copy of the judgment or Order has not accompanied the memo of appeal or the memo of revision application. (3) In cases where there is a delay in the filing of the appeal or revision application, the usual practice of insisting upon a separate application for condoning the delay in the filing will be followed. 16. For reasons mentioned above, i reject Criminal Application No. 799 of 1978 for condoning the delay in Criminal Revision Application No. 508 of 1977. Rule given in Criminal Revision Application No. 508 of 1977 is discharged. -----