JUDGEMENT 1. This application is directed against the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, dated May 27, 1977, passed under S. 133 Cr. P. C. and directing the petitioner company to stop the excavation in the mining area, so as to prevent any danger to the lives of the inmates. The order reads as under:- "ORDER UNDER S. 133 Cr. P. C. Whereas it has been made to appear to me that you are excavating a pit in mining area of Pali-Ambegal in such a way that the hutments where 19 workers are staying may collapse endangering the life of the inmates of those huts. I do hereby direct and require you within 5 days to stop the excavation in the area so as to prevent any danger to the life of the inmates or to appear at 10-30 a.m. in this Court on the 6th day of June 1977 next, and to show cause why this order should not be enforced. The names of the workers affected are given below: ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... …….. ……… …….. …….. …….. …….. …….. …….. …….. ……" 2. The order is assailed on various grounds which I shall examine in detail. The records of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate regarding these proceedings are before me. A copy of the Police Report which according to the petitioner forms the basis of the order has been placed on file of this case by the petitioners. There is no other report either from the Police or from any other authority which would cause the Magistrate to form an opinion. The learned Magistrate does not state that it appeared to him that there was a reason for the issuance of the order. What he states at the beginning of the order is that, it has been made to appear to him and in the absence of any other documents on the file it can safely be concluded, as alleged by Shri Kakodkar on behalf of the petitioner, that it was the Police Report that made him pass the impugned order. The report is in the form of a complaint signed by someone and countersigned by the P.S.I. Bicholim, who forwarded it to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (S.D.M.), the respondent No. 20, with a request that action under S. 133 Cr. P. C. be taken. The said information was throughout treated as a report. The report is in the form of a complaint signed by someone and countersigned by the P.S.I. Bicholim, who forwarded it to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (S.D.M.), the respondent No. 20, with a request that action under S. 133 Cr. P. C. be taken. The said information was throughout treated as a report. It is evident from the report that there was a dispute between the petitioner and 162 labourers including the first 19 respondents regarding leave, wages and bonus for the period they worked, and so on; that the claims of 25 labourers were rejected and of the remaining were granted; that the successful labourers and some of the unsuccessful ones left but the first 19 respondents continued to occupy the hutments in question; that the petitioner then constructed some quarters at some other place for these respondents but they refused to move to the new quarters. It was stated that the hutments in question had to be demolished before the rainy season, to avoid danger to the lives of the first 19 respondents; that the case of the respondents is one regarding leave, wages and not the right to live in company quarters. It was prayed by the complainant in the report that the respondents be ordered to vacate the hutments. It is on the basis of such information or report forwarded by the Police that action under S. 133 was taken, not for demolishing the hutments which were in danger, but to stop the mining operations. The impugned order commands the petitioner to stop the operation within 5 days. The order is dated 26-5-77, and is stated to have been served on the petitioner on 4-6-77, 9 days after the order. It is pointed out to me by Shri Kakodkar that the provisions of Art. 133 require that the court should fix a time within which the order is to be complied with and that this requirement was not satisfied by the order. It is argued that the requirement must be strictly complied with. Reliance is placed on a passage of the AIR Commentaries on the Cr. P. C., 1973 (2 of 1974) Vol. 1, by Chitaley and Rao, at page 834. The commentary is based on a decision reported in (1872) 1 Bom PJ 283. 3. It is argued that the requirement must be strictly complied with. Reliance is placed on a passage of the AIR Commentaries on the Cr. P. C., 1973 (2 of 1974) Vol. 1, by Chitaley and Rao, at page 834. The commentary is based on a decision reported in (1872) 1 Bom PJ 283. 3. Next it is argued by Shri Kakodkar that an order under S. 133 must specify clearly the grounds on which it is based and which are mentioned in cls. (a) to (f) of sub-section (1) of S. 133 Cr. P. C. The failure to specify the clause, Shri Kakodkar states, does pet se show non-application of mind on the part of respondent No. 20. Raimohan Karmokar v. Emperor, AIR 1917 Cal 207 : (17 Cri LJ 409) is cited in support of this contention. Indeed it is so. If the order could be fitted into any of the clauses, the irregularity might be considered as cured. On examination of the clauses, I find that the facts of this case cannot fit in any clause. Cl. (a) speaks of an unlawful obstruction. Cl. (b) of the conduct of trade or occupation, injurious to physical comfort. Cl. (c) refers to construction of any building. Cl. (d) to any building, tent, structure or tree, Cl. (e) to fencing of any tank, well or excavation adjacent to a public place and Cl. (f) to dangerous animals, Cls. (a), (c), (d), (e) and (f) are irrelevant for the case in hand. The only clause that has to be examined in detail is the cl. (b) which states that if the Magistrate considers that the conduct of any trade or occupation is injurious to physical comfort of the community and that in consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited, the Magistrate may make a conditional order requiring the person to desist from carrying on such trade or occupation. In Murlidhar Bhila Patil v. Onkar Vyankat Patil, AIR 1961 Bom 263 : (1961 (1) Cri LJ 641), the words "is injurious to physical comfort" have been held to require that the injury should be in praesenti and not contingent or possible. My attention is drawn to the words 'may collapse' occurring in the first para of the order. I agree that the order in the present case does not express any urgency enabling the respondent No. 20 to assume jurisdiction. My attention is drawn to the words 'may collapse' occurring in the first para of the order. I agree that the order in the present case does not express any urgency enabling the respondent No. 20 to assume jurisdiction. In AIR 1961 Bom 263 : (1961 (1) Cri LJ 641), the order stated that the operation of a flour mill created vibrations and that those vibrations were likely to cause danger to the people residing nearby. It was held that immediate danger was not found. What was found is only a possibility of danger. 4. The most important ingredient that is missing according to Shri Kakodkar, and I agree with him in this regard, is that the mining operations are not injurious to the physical comfort of the community. It is strenuously contended that 19 workers residing in a hutment for the purpose of work do not constitute 'community'. They do not constitute a sizable section of the public. The rule in Emperor v. Fazal Din, (1911) 12 Cri LJ 146 (Punjab Chief Court) applies. I would also rely on Dwarika Prosad v. B. K. Roy, AIR 1950 Cal 349 : (51 Cri LJ 1315). The mining operation had to be injurious to the public at large or to the residents of the community as whole and not to a few individuals residing in some hutments in a mining locality. 5. As the report on which the impugned order is passed, clearly indicates there appears to be a dispute between the petitioner and the first 19 respondents. The provisions of S. 133 Cr. P. C. should not be availed of to settle such disputes. If any support is necessary for this proposition, the ruling in State of Mysore v. Venkatramana Manjanath Hegde, 1973 Cri LJ 369 (Mys) provides it. Further the area was a mining area and mining operations can certainly be expected to be carried on there without any hindrance. 6. Shri Ashraf Aga contends that the order had given an alternative to the petitioner to appear before the respondent No. 20, but even to require the appearance of the respondents before him, the S.D.M. had to possess jurisdiction under S. 133 Cr. P. C. The facts of the case do not permit him in any way to bring the case within the purview of S. 133 Cr. P. C. The facts of the case do not permit him in any way to bring the case within the purview of S. 133 Cr. P. C. In disputes of this type the Magistrate should not interfere. He should allow them to be decided by a civil or a criminal court. The Magistrate did well in not taking action under Section 133 Cr. P. C. in favour of the petitioner as the Police Officer wanted him to do. The complaint which was submitted as a report by the Police to the respondent No. 20, prayed for action against the respondents to compel them to demolish the hutments which were running the risk of collapsing due to the normal minor operations in a mining area. Nothing therefore warranted any action by an Executive Magistrate in a case of this type. I am unable to accede to the request of Shri Aga to remand the case to the Magistrate since I have held that the executive Magistrate had no jurisdiction in the present case. It is stated by Shri Aga that the petitioners could move a Court to vacate the first 19 respondents or a tribunal to settle the labour dispute. The labour dispute had already been settled by the competent tribunal, but even if it had not been settled, that dispute could not be converted into a case for inviting action of a Magistrate under S. 133 Cr. P. C. It was strenuously argued by Shri Aga that the Police Report should be discarded. I am also of that opinion and if that is done, it cannot be said that there was any material left on which the Magistrate could be made to form an opinion to act under S. 133 Cr. P. C. The Magistrate can form an opinion either on a Police Report or other information If the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is challenged on the ground that there was no material whatsoever before him to enable Mm to arrive at a conclusion that any facts spoken of in Cls. (a) to (f) exist, this Court has to examine the material, if any, which is on record, I have no hesitation in stating that in the present case there is no material whatsoever enabling the respondent No. 20 to assume jurisdiction under S. 133 Cr. P. C. 7. In the circumstances, the Criminal Miscellaneous Application is allowed. (a) to (f) exist, this Court has to examine the material, if any, which is on record, I have no hesitation in stating that in the present case there is no material whatsoever enabling the respondent No. 20 to assume jurisdiction under S. 133 Cr. P. C. 7. In the circumstances, the Criminal Miscellaneous Application is allowed. The order of the respondent No. 20 dated May 26, 1977 is set aside. Application allowed.