JUDGEMENT P. C. Borooah, J.: The petitioners in all these Rules are being prosecuted In the court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court, Calcutta under the provisions of Ss. 14 (1A), 14 (2), 14A (1) and 14AA of the Employees' Provident Funds and Family Pension Fund Act, 1952 read with para 78 (b) of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme (hereinafter the Act and the Scheme) on the basis of complaints filed by the Provident Fund Inspector, West Bengal. 2. The common question of law which arises in all these Rules is whether a complaint can be lodged and cognizance taken after a period of one year from the date of the alleged contravention of the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the Scheme? 3. According to the complaints the first petitioner along with petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 4 who are its Directors had not paid the employer's and employees' share of the contributions and administrative charges for the different months which are the subject matter of the cases started against them. 4. In support of the Rules we have heard Mr. Bejoy Kumar Bhose. We have also permitted Mr. J. N. Ghose and Mr. D. K. Dutta to intervene as they are appearing on behalf of the petitioners in other Rules pending before us in which the aforesaid question of law also arises. 5. Mr. Bhose submitted before us that under S. 14 (2A) of the Act the maximum penalty provided for contravention or making a default in complying with any provisions of the Act is imprisonment which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to rupees one thousand or with both. Therefore, under S. 468 (2) (b) of the Cr.P.C. 1973 (hereinafter the Code), no court can take cognizance of any offence committed under the Act after the lapse of a period of one year from the date of default or contravention. As such the complaint in the cases, which are the subject matter of the Rules, having been instituted more than one year after the payments become due, the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate is without jurisdiction and has to be quashed. 6. Mr. As such the complaint in the cases, which are the subject matter of the Rules, having been instituted more than one year after the payments become due, the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate is without jurisdiction and has to be quashed. 6. Mr. J. N. Ghose submitted that under paragraph 38 of the Scheme the offence was complete on the expiry of file fifteenth day of the month following the month for which there was a default, and this default became a complete offence on and from the sixteenth day of the month, As such it was a continuing offence, 7. Mr. Dilip Kumar Dutta also submitted that under para 38 of the Scheme an employer is required within fifteen days of the close of every month to pay the necessary contributions and the administrative charges to the Fund. This according to Mr. Dutta clearly shows that if an employer makes any default and does not make the payments within fifteen days of the close of every month, on the sixteenth day the offence becomes complete and cannot be deemed to continue to be an offence from day to day. In support of his argument Mr. Dutta has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi AIR 197,3 SC 908: (1973 Cri LJ 347). 8. Mr. Dutta also drew our attention to S. 9 of the Employees' Provident Funds and Family Pension Fund (Amendment) Act, 1973 by which an explanation has been added to S. 405 I. P. C. and by which an employer is deemed to be a trustee in respect of the deductions made from the employees for credit to the Provident Fund or Family Pension Fund. In view of this amendment S. 405 I. P. C. Mr. Dutta's contention is that a defaulting employer becomes liable to prosecution under S. 406 or 409 I. P. C. and as such the default cannot be a continuing offence. 9. Mr. Birendra Nath Mitra, the learned Public Prosecutor, opposes these Rules. According to him an offence committed under the provisions of the Act and the Scheme is a continuing offence and, as such S. 472 of the Code is attracted and a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run throughout the period the offence continues. Mr. 9. Mr. Birendra Nath Mitra, the learned Public Prosecutor, opposes these Rules. According to him an offence committed under the provisions of the Act and the Scheme is a continuing offence and, as such S. 472 of the Code is attracted and a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run throughout the period the offence continues. Mr. Mitra also submitted that by S. 9 of the 1973 Amendment Act an offence under the Act and the Scheme has been made punishable under S. 409 I. P. C. which prescribes a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and as such S. 468 of the Code can have no manner of application. 10. Mr. Mitra also drew our attention to S. 14C of the Act and submitted that when an employer fails to comply with the order of the court to make good the default within a specified period, he would be in addition to being sent to prison be made liable to pay a fine extending to Rs. 100/- per day till the payments are made, and this according to Mr. Mitra goes to show that if any default is made by an employer under the provisions of the Act and the Scheme it must be a continuing offence. 11. Mr. D. N. Das appearing on behalf of the Provident Fund Inspector also submitted that an offence committed under the provisions of the Act is a continuing one because on and from the sixteenth day of a particular month when there is a default as regards the deposits to the fund relating to the previous month. the offence commenced and it continued day to day till the default was made good. In support of his argument Mr. Das drew our attention to the case of Best V. Butler and Fitzgibbon (1932) 2 KB 108 wherein it was held that the withholding of any money referred to in S. 12 of the Trade Unions Act, 1871 was a continuing offence because every day the money was wilfully withheld an offence within the meaning of section 12 was committed. Mr. Das also submitted that the Act is self contained and as there is no provision which lays down any period of limitation regarding the lodging of a complaint, S. 468 of the Code would not apply. 12. Mr. Das also submitted that the Act is self contained and as there is no provision which lays down any period of limitation regarding the lodging of a complaint, S. 468 of the Code would not apply. 12. The Supreme Court in, the case of State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi (1973 Cri LJ 347 (SC)) (supra) was dealing with a similar question. In that case the respondents were being prosecuted under S. 66 of the Mines Act. 1982 for their failure to furnish the requisite returns for a particular year on or before Jan. 21 of the succeeding year as required under regulation 3 of the India Metalliferous Mines Regulation, 1928. The question arose whether the offence in question was covered by the substantive part of S. 79 of the Mines Act or by the explanation thereto. If the substantive part applied the complaint would be time barred, but if the offence was a continuing offence the explanation to the said section would operate and no question of limitation would arise as long as the offence continued. 13. The Supreme Court in dealing with the question explained what wag a continuing offence in the following terms (at p. 348 of Cri LJ): "Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arise out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involve a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirements is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non compliance occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and therefore constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all." 14. The Supreme Court ultimately held in favour of the respondents by holding that the infringement occurred on Jan. In the case of a continuing offence there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all." 14. The Supreme Court ultimately held in favour of the respondents by holding that the infringement occurred on Jan. 21 of the relevant year and was complete on the owner failing to furnish the annual returns by that day, and as such the complaint was time barred as the offence in question fell within the substantive part of S. 79 of the Mines Act and not under the explanation attached to it. In this case the Supreme Court also considered the English Decision referred to by Mr. Das. 15. Para 38 of the Scheme requires an employer to pay to the Fund the employer's and employees' contributions together with the administrative charges within fifteen days of the close of every ,month. The infringement for the failure to do so therefore, occurs on the close of the fifteenth day of the month and is complete on the employer failing to make the payment to the Fund by that date. No provision of the Act or the Scheme lays down that if an employer makes a default in making the payment to the Fund within the stipulated time as required by para 38 of the Scheme and carries on his business, he would be guilty of an offence or that the offence would continue till the default is made good. Therefore, in the instant cases once the defaults were made the offences were committed once and for all and became complete on the close of the due date. As such there could not be any ingredient of continuance in the offence to make it a continuing one. 16. Section 14C (1) of the Act empowers a Court to make an order directing an employer to make good the default within a specified period, of within an extended period if an application be made in that behalf. In case an employer does not comply with such an order he can be made liable to the payment of a fine which may extend to rupees one hundred for every day after the expiry of such period till the default is made good. 17. In case an employer does not comply with such an order he can be made liable to the payment of a fine which may extend to rupees one hundred for every day after the expiry of such period till the default is made good. 17. Section 14C therefore provides the requisite machinery for realising from a defaulting employer the arrears payable to the Fund. Sub-sec. (2) imposes a further penalty of a day-to-day fine if an employer fails to make good the default within the time specified under sub-sec. (1). A default committed under the Act or the Scheme and a machinery provided under the Act for making good the default must be kept in separate compartments. The provision in S. 14C (2) of penalising a defaulting employer with a day-to-day fine till the default is made good does not make the initial infringement a continuing offence. 18. By virtue of the explanation to S. 405 I.P.C. which has been added by S. 9 of the 1973 Amendment of the Act, an employer can be prosecuted for the offence of criminal breach of trust. The question of non applicability of section 468 (2) (b) would only arise if complaints are lodged against an employer under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code in respect of any defaults being made under the provisions of the Act or the Scheme. 19. In view of what has been stated above, the complaints in all these cases having been filed beyond a period of one year they would be time barred in accordance with the provisions of Section 468 (2) (b) of the Code and the cognizance taken on the basis of such complaints would be without jurisdiction. 20. The Rules are accordingly made absolute and the proceedings pending against the petitioners in all the cases covered by these Rules are quashed. S. C. MAJUMDAR, J. : I agree. Rule made absolute.