Judgment :- 1. The revision petitions are filed by the Cheramangalam Financing Institution, the plaintiff in two Small Cause suits disposed of by the Munsiff, Parappanangadi. The suits were filed for realisation of subscriptions in a kuri conducted by the petitioner. The defendants in both the cases admitted having bid the kuri, but disputed the correctness of the amounts due. They also claimed benefits under the Kerala Debt Relief Ordinance I of 1977 (for short, 'the Ordinance'). The trial court held that the amount claimed in the plaint was correct. As regards the claim under Ordinance 1 of 1977, neither the plaintiff nor the defendants adduced any evidence. The court held that since the plaintiff had failed to discharge the burden cast upon him under S.9 of the Ordinance the defendants were entitled to have their liability declared as discharged The suits were accordingly dismissed without costs. The revision petitions are filed challenging the dismissal. 2. Pending revision, the Ordinance was repealed by Ordinance 9 of 1977 which in turn was replaced by Act 17 of 1977, (for Short'the Act'). As a result of the saving provisions in the later Ordinance and the Act, anything done and any action taken under the Ordinance would be deemed to have been done or taken under the Act. S.9 of the two Ordinances and S. 19 of the Act are couched in identical language. The question to be considered in the revision petitions is whether the trial court was justified in dismissing the suits on the ground that the plaintiff did not adduce evidence and did not discharge the burden cast upon him under S.9 of Ordinance I of 1977. If the answer is in the negative, the dismissal of the suits has to be set aside and the suits may have to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions contained in Act 17 of 1977. 3. S.9 of the Ordinance and the corresponding provision in the Act read: "Burden of proof. If the answer is in the negative, the dismissal of the suits has to be set aside and the suits may have to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions contained in Act 17 of 1977. 3. S.9 of the Ordinance and the corresponding provision in the Act read: "Burden of proof. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, in any suit or other proceeding, the burden of proving that a debtor is not entitled to protection under the provisions of this Ordinance shall be on the creditor." The trial court understood the above provision to mean that it is for the creditor to establish that a person who claims relief under the Ordinance is not entitled to get the same. The court seems to have overlooked the impact of the word "debtor" in the above section. The learned Munsiff would have been correct in his application of S.9, if instead of the word "debtor", the word "person" or some other like term had been used therein. The word 'debtor' has a special connotation in the section in view of the definition thereto given in the Statute. S.2 (6) of the Ordinance reads: "debtor" means any person whose annual income does not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees, from whom any debt is due and includes (a) a and less labourer; (b) an artisan; and (c) a kudikidappukaran, but does not include The latter portion of the definition may not be relevant for the disposal of these petitions. From the definition, it is seen that for a person to he a debtor (1) his annual income should not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees and (2) a debt must be due from him. The term 'debt' is defined in S.2 (5) S.2 (5) reads: "(5) "debt" means any liability in cash or kind, whether secured, or unsecured, due from or incurred by a debtor on or before the date of commencement of this Ordinance, whether payable under a contract, or under a decree or order of any court, or otherwise, and subsisting on that date, but does not include The unskilful drafting and the loose way in which the words "debt" and "debtor" are used in the definition clauses pose a conundrum to the lawyer. To find out who is a debtor, he has to ascertain if the person concerned owes any debt and to find out whether a particular liability is a debt, he has to check whether it was incurred by a debtor. Recourse will naturally have to be made to the armoury of the lawyer for the application of well-known rules of interpretation of Statutes 4. Ordinarily words in a Statute are to be given their plain natural meaning. But when a word is defined in a Statute, the presumption is that it is used therein in the sense contained in the definition. But the application of this rule in construing the definition clauses, S.2(5) and S.2(6) of the Ordinance would, as noted earlier, lead to manifest confusion. It is. therefore, reasonable to infer that the words "debtor" in S.2(6) and 'debt' in S 2(5) are used in their plain and natural meanings That this is so is made clear from the use of "any" preceding debt in S.2(6). In other words, the word 'debtor' in the definition of debt need not mean a debtor as defined in the Ordinance and vice-versa. But there is no justification in holding that the words "debt" and "debtor" are used in the operative portions of the Statute also in their plain natural meaning because that will make the definition unnecessary and functionless. It follows that the word "debtor" in S 9 is used in the sense it is defined in S 2(6) and a person who claims benefit of the Act should satisfy that he is a "debtor" i.e., his annual income does not exceed Rs. 2400/- and that be owes a debt (in the ordinary sense) or that he is a landless labourer or an artisan or a Kudikidappukaran as defined in the Statute. Once it is proved that he is a debtor the burden of proof is on the creditor to make out that he is not entitled to protection under the Statute. 5. 2400/- and that be owes a debt (in the ordinary sense) or that he is a landless labourer or an artisan or a Kudikidappukaran as defined in the Statute. Once it is proved that he is a debtor the burden of proof is on the creditor to make out that he is not entitled to protection under the Statute. 5. It may be recalled in this connection that under S.101 of the Indian Evidence Act, whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependant on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those tacts exist S.102 casts the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. S.103 states that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. Reference may also be made to S.106 which states that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. These provisions are not mere technical rules of procedure but are the products of sound commonsense, supported by reasons and are in consonance with the principles of natural justice. If the above principles are to govern in the instant case, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish that he is a debtor as defined in the Ordinance and that the liability incurred by him falls under the definition of debt. He should fail if no evidence is adduced by him. It is by virtue of S.9 that the above rules of evidence are given the go-by and the burden is cast on the creditor to show that a person who owes him amounts is not entitled to relief under the Ordinance Prima facie, it looks unfair and inequitable that a person who claims that he has been conferred some privilage under a Statute can sit mum and call upon his opponent to adduce evidence to the contra and on matters which are exclusively within the knowledge of the former. No doubt, if the language of the Statute is clear and unambiguous, Courts are bound to administer its provisions. No doubt, if the language of the Statute is clear and unambiguous, Courts are bound to administer its provisions. But when there is scope for doubt, it is the duty of Courts to presume that the Legislature did not intend that unjust and absurd consequences should flow as a result of a Statute enacted by it. 6. Kerala Ordinances 1 and 9 of 1977 and their successor Act are, no doubt, social and beneficial legislations intended to relieve the poorer sections of the society from the burden of discharging debts incurred by them probably for the necessaries of life. The construction put to such Statutes should effectuate the intention of the Legislature and promote the purpose of the legislations. But that does not mean that the benefits of the Statutes should be conferred on ineligible persons. It should be borne in mind that the Statutes are expropriatory in character in that they trench on contractual rights and, therefore, require strict interpretation. The provisions should be interpreted in such a manner as to impose the minimum, burden on the expropriated creditor Courts have a duty to see that ineligible persons do not take advantage of the Statute. It is, therefore, only proper that a person who claims benefits under the Statute satisfies the Court that be is a debtor as defined therein. Such a course, if followed, will not amount to violation of S 9 7. The trial court was, therefore, not justified in dismissing the suits on the ground that the plaintiff did not adduce evidence to prove that the defendants are not debtors entitled to benefits of the Act. The revision petitions are, therefore, allowed. The decrees dismissing the suits are set aside and the suits are remanded to the Court for fresh disposal according to law. I make no order as to costs. Allowed.