Judgment S. Ali Ahmad, J. 1. This is plaintiffs second appeal. The suit was for eviction of defendant-respondent on the ground of default in payment of rent for more than two months and also on the ground that the plaintiff appellant required the house reasonably and in good faith for his occupation. A prayer for recovery of Rs.520 on account of arrears of rent from Magh Sambat 2021 to Bhado 2022 was also made. The two courts below concurrently held that no default in payment of rent was committed by the defendant-respondent. The suit was, therefore, dismissed. 2. In order to appreciate the argument advanced in this case by learned counsel for the parties, it will be useful to keep some relevant facts in mind which are as follows : "the house in suit belonged to one Nankhur Ram and the respondent was occupying it as a tenant under him on a monthly rental of rs.65. The plaintiff purchased the house for Rs.10,000 from nankhur Ram by a registered sale-deed dated 15th January, 1965. Before the purchase by the plaintiff, the defendant respondent had filed an application before the House Controller for fixation of fair rent. After the sale Nankhur Ram filed an application before the house Controller on 18 1.1965 saying that he had sold the house to the plaintiff appellant and that he had no interest left in it. Shortly thereafter, on 10.2 1965 Nankhur Ram died and three days later, i. e. on 13th February, 1965, an order was passed fixing the fair rent at rs 30 per month. It may be mentioned that this order was passed without substituting the plaintiff appellant in place of Nankhur ram or without any notice to him. Further according to the plaintiffs case on the basis of a claim made by pro forma defendants 3 to 6 (who are not parties to the appeal), the respondent started depositing rent under section 13 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act before Controller at the rate of Rs.30 per month. Further according to the plaintiffs case on the basis of a claim made by pro forma defendants 3 to 6 (who are not parties to the appeal), the respondent started depositing rent under section 13 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act before Controller at the rate of Rs.30 per month. The grievance of the plaintiff is that the order fixing fair rent of the house at Rs.30 per month was a nullity inasmuch as it passed behind his back and also as it was passed after the death of Nankhur Ram and therefore, the deposit of rent of Rs.30 per month for eight months made him defaulter within the meaning of the Act aforesaid. Further the plaintiff claimed that he had purchased the house for his own occupation and for carrying on his business in that house. Therefore, a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the respondent terminating his tenancy with effect from 1.9.1965. But in spite of that the house was not vacated by the respondent and as such the suit had to be filed". 3. The defendant-respondent appeared and contested the suit, inter alia, on the ground that the order fixing fair rent at the rate of Rs, 30 per month was good and that he was not a defaulter. It was also said that the plaintiff appellant did not require the house for his own occupation as he was already occupying the house from where he was running his business. 4. Both the courts below have held that the order (Explanation G/1)fixing the fair rent the premises at Rs.30 per month was legal and that there was no default since the defendant had been depositing rent with the Controller at the rents fixed by him. The courts below also held that the appellant did not require the house for his own occupation. The suit and subsequently his appeal was thus dismissed. 5. Mr. Kailash Roy, learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the finding recorded by the courts below to the effect that the respondent was not a defaulter is illegal. According to him admittedly he deposited only rs.30 per month towards rent when the agreed rent was Rs.65. The suit and subsequently his appeal was thus dismissed. 5. Mr. Kailash Roy, learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the finding recorded by the courts below to the effect that the respondent was not a defaulter is illegal. According to him admittedly he deposited only rs.30 per month towards rent when the agreed rent was Rs.65. He further contended that the order (Explanation G/l) passed by the House Controller fixing fair rent of the house was nullity and, therefore, had to be ignored. If this contention of Mr. Roy is correct then certainly the finding that the respondent is not a defaulter is illegal inasmuch as his admitted case is that he deposited rent at the rate of Rs.30 per month only. Thus in course oi eight months (from the date of order fixing the fair rent and the date on which the suit was instituted), the petitioner became defaulter. Keeping these fact in backgrounds, it has, therefore, to be examined as to whether the order date 13.2.1965, was a nullity 6. It has been noticed earlier that Nankhur Ram died on 10.2.1965 whereas the order in question was passed on 13.2.1965. The courts below have held that Order XXII, rule 6 of the Code pf Civil Procedure applied to the proceeding before the House Controller and since arguments had been heard prior to the death of Nankhur Ram, his death before the order was pronounced, will not make it nullity. To counter this proposition, Mr. Kailash Roy referred to a decision in the case of The Rovala Corporation (Mad) Ltd. V/s. Sved Bawakar and Co. and others, ( AIR 1957 Mad 385 ). It has been held in this case that "though generally Controllers have been persons belonging to the judicial service they are not courts and therefore the proceedings before them will not be governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. " On the basis of this observation, learned counsel submitted that Order XXII, rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure also did not apply to the proceedings before the House Controller. The observations mentioned above were made in a different context altogether. But be that as it may, the position is now settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Ebrahim Abbobakar and another V/s. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, ( AIR 1952 SC 319 ). The observations mentioned above were made in a different context altogether. But be that as it may, the position is now settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Ebrahim Abbobakar and another V/s. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, ( AIR 1952 SC 319 ). In this case the order was written out and was signed by the Custodian General prior to the death of the party affected, hut it was actually pronounced after his death. It was urged before the Supreme Court that since order XXII, rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to the proceedings before the Custodian General, the order pronounced after the death of the party affected was a nullity. While rejecting this argument, Mahajan, J. (as he then was) held that the principles of Order XXII, rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to proceedings under the Administration of evacuee Property Ordinance. If the principle can be applicable to a proceeding under the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, I see no reason as to why it will not be applicable to the proceedings under the Act. I may also observe that the dictum that the orders passed against a dead person are nullity is based on the principle of natural justice. A party, who dies after saying all that he wanted to say, then the principles of natural justice are satisfied even though the order may he adverse to him and may come after his death. It has been held by the courts below that arguments before the house Controller were heard prior to 10.2.1965, i e. before the death of Nankhur ram. Therefore, he had full opportunity of being heard. As to whether he was actually heard or not is immaterial. For these reasons, in my view, the contention of Mr. Kailash Roy that the order fixing the fair rent was a nullity, has no substance and has to be rejected. What follows from rejection of this argument is that his plea that the respondent is a defaulter also fails. 7. Learned counsel next submitted that the finding that the appellant did not require the house for his own occupation was illegal. While stating the facts of this case, I have mentioned that the plaintiff purchased the house in January, 1965 This house admittedly is situated in a business locality. P. Ws. 7. Learned counsel next submitted that the finding that the appellant did not require the house for his own occupation was illegal. While stating the facts of this case, I have mentioned that the plaintiff purchased the house in January, 1965 This house admittedly is situated in a business locality. P. Ws. have stated that the plaintiff and his son are running business in a rented house. The plaintiff has also examined himself. He has said in his evidence that he requires the house to shift his business to the premises in suit. Courts below have not disbelieved this part of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. The plea of personal requirement has been negatived on the ground that the plaintiff is already carrying on a business in a rented house arid there is no threat of any eviction from that house. Another ground taken by the court of appeal below is that it is really the son who carries on the business and not the plaintiff and as such the requirement, if at all. is of the son of the plaintiff, and not of his own. Sec.11 (1) (c) of the Act provides that a tenant can be evicted from the premises in execution of a decree passed by the court on the ground that the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. The plaintiff certainly holds the building of the suit premises for the benefit of his son also who is looking after the business. Therefore, the plaintiff, who is the landlord requires the building for his own use. The court of appeal below, in my opinion, was not justified on this ground to negative the claim of personal requirement. 8. Another ground for refusing to accept the claim of personal necessity, as has been seen, was that the appellant was carrying on business in a rented house and was not facing any threat of eviction. The question is as to whether a person can be compelled to remain in a rented house when he himself possesses one. 8. Another ground for refusing to accept the claim of personal necessity, as has been seen, was that the appellant was carrying on business in a rented house and was not facing any threat of eviction. The question is as to whether a person can be compelled to remain in a rented house when he himself possesses one. In the case of Rustomji Dinshaw Billimoria V/s. Dosibai Rustomji Master, air 1921 Bom 34) it has been held that "ordinarily speaking, an owner of premises is entitled to use it and if he says that he wishes to use it when it amounts to his requirement. A reference to the case of Porkrakutty V/s. Attancheri velappil Mammad, (AIR 1954 Mad 38l) will show that the learned Judges hearing the case were of the view that even assuming that the landlord did not take all steps that he could have possibly taken to avoid being evicted from the rented building in which he was carrying on business this would not make his claim for eviction of a tenant from a non-residential house which the landlord has bought, a mala fid eons. This case followed with approval the principles laid down in the case reported in AIR 1921 Bom 34 (supra ). I am in respectful agreement with what has been said in the aforesaid two cases. What has to be seen in such cases is as to whether the plaintiff requires the premises reasonably and in good faith. The object of the Act is to put an end to the exploitation by the landlord. The Act certainly does not contemplate that persons owning the house should be deprived to live in it or occupy it when they so require. The plaintiff, who was carrying on the business in a rented shop, in my opinion, cannot be compelled to remain there. In this view of the matter, the finding that the plaintiff did not require the house in good faith for his own occupation is erroneous and is set aside. The plaintiff-appellant, according to me, has been successful in establishing that he needs the house for his own occupation in good faith. This is one of the grounds on which a decree for eviction under the Act, can be passed. 9. After the case was heard and I had dictated substantial part of the judgment, Mr. The plaintiff-appellant, according to me, has been successful in establishing that he needs the house for his own occupation in good faith. This is one of the grounds on which a decree for eviction under the Act, can be passed. 9. After the case was heard and I had dictated substantial part of the judgment, Mr. Belwariar, learned counsel for the respondents got up and submitted that in this case the suit itself was premature as the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by which the tenancy was purported to be terminated was illegal 1 do not think, learned counsel is entitled to raise this point at this stage. The plaint states that a notice was served on 19th august, 1965 ou the defendant terminating the tenancy with the expiry of 30th Bhado 2022 Sambat. In the written statement, service of notice on the defendant was denied. In the trial court, issue no.7 in the following term was framed :- "whether proper and valid notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was duly served upon the defendant no.1 ?" parties led evidence in support of their respective case. The trial court held that the service of notice was valid. Thereafter, in the/court below no argument relating to service or validity of the notice was advanced. After Mr. Belwariar raised this point yesterday, I asked him and Mr. Kailash Roy to come prepared on this point. Both learned counsel have argued the matter. According to mr. Roy 30th Bhado 2022 Sambat means the last day of Bhado which will fall on 10th September, 1965 whereas according to Mr Bilwariar 30 th Bhado, 2022 Sambat will fall on 26th August, 1965. The appellant in his written statement did not state that the notice was invalid. It was for the defendant to plead that the notice was bad. That was not done. AH that was argued in the trial court was that no notice at all was served. The finding was recorded against him. Then in appeal, no argument relating to the validity of notice was advanced. The respondents, therefore, in my opinion, cannot be permitted to raise this question in second appeal. 10 Since I have held that the house is required by the appellant in good faith for his own occupation, the suit has to be decreed. Then in appeal, no argument relating to the validity of notice was advanced. The respondents, therefore, in my opinion, cannot be permitted to raise this question in second appeal. 10 Since I have held that the house is required by the appellant in good faith for his own occupation, the suit has to be decreed. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above with costs. Appeal allowed.