ORDER. -The petitioner joined the Commercial Taxes Department of the Tamil Nadu Government in the year 1944 and was promoted to the post of Assistant Commercial Tax Officer in 1953. He became Deputy Commercial Tax Officer in 1960 and after becoming a Joint Commercial Tax Officer, was promoted as a Commercial Tax Officer in May, 1975. While he was officiating as a Commercial Tax Officer, by the impugned order dated 19th September, 1975 made in G.O. Ms. No. 1113 (Commercial Taxes and Religious Endowments Department), the petitioner was compulsorily retired under rule 56 (d) of the Fundamental Rules. That order reads: “Under Fundamental Rule 56 (d) Thiru K. Venugopalan, Commercial Tax Officer, Central Intelligence Wing, Madras in the Tamil Nadu Commercial Taxes Service, shall retire from service from the date of this order. He shall be paid three months pay and allowance admissible to him on the date of retirement. (By Order of the Governor.) C. N. Raghavan, Secretary to Government” Consequent to this order, the Board of Revenue (Commercial Taxes) passed orders directing the petitioner to hand over charge immediately, which charge he handed over. Questioning the correctness and the validity of this order, the present writ petition has come to be preferred. 2. Originally the matter was heard along with similar cases by a Bench consisting of Ramaprasada Rao, J., and Ratnavel Pandian, J., Several contentions of law were urged by the petitioner and ultimately the writ petitions were relegated back to a single Judge to consider each of the writ petitions on its merits and dispose of the same in the light of their judgment. As per the judgment, the points that require to be considered are: (1) the totality of the circumstances relating to passing of the challenged order and whether there is any clinching hypothesis which would shake the conscience of the Court to find a case of non-exercise of the mind in the formation of the subjective opinion; (2) whether the Government have fully and reasonably considered the relevant material and were subjectively satisfied that in public interest, the Government servant should retire and whether such burden has been discharged; (3) whether the records disclose enough material to warrant a compulsory retirement of the petitioner; and (4) whether a stigma stems from the impugned order. 3. Mr. 3. Mr. K. K. Venugopal, learned counsel for the petitioner urges the following grounds: The first is that the recommending committee for compulsory retirement consisted of three officers, one of whom was Mr. S. Viswanathan who was inimically disposed towards the petitioner since he was labouring under a misapprehension that the petitioner was instrumental in having an article published in a newspaper containing disparaging remarks against him. Therefore, where one of the members of the Committee was biased against the petitioner, it should be held that the ultimate order passed on its recommendation is also vitiated. The recommendation is not to be treated lightly in this case since clauses 7 and 8 of G.O. Ms. No. 761, Public (Services A) Department, dated 19th March, 1973 would indicate that in all cases the recommendation is accepted as a routine. Therefore, the bias of one of the recommending authority will greatly prejudice the petitioner even though the actual order of compulsory retirement is that of the Government. As to how bias would vitiate has been clearly brought out in Partap Singh v. State of Punjab1 and again in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India2 . 4. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order of compulsory retirement itself must state that it is in public interest. Where the order does not ex facie recite, mere reference to Fundamental Rule 56 (d) cannot be held to mean that it is in public interest. Therefore the Government is duty bound to discharge the burden if the order of compulsory retirement was made in public interest. As to how such burden could be discharged has been the subject-matter of two decisions in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha3 and J. N. Sinha v. Union of India4 . In order to discharge that burden, no doubt, it will be open to the respondent to produce the relevant files before the Court and request the Court to peruse the same to see whether relevant materials exist. It is not the case of the petitioner that the Court should scrutinise those files to find out the sufficiency of the material, but only for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of the material. Nevertheless, if reliance is placed on the files without disclosing the same to the petitioner, it would constitute violation of the principles of natural justice. It is not the case of the petitioner that the Court should scrutinise those files to find out the sufficiency of the material, but only for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of the material. Nevertheless, if reliance is placed on the files without disclosing the same to the petitioner, it would constitute violation of the principles of natural justice. The normal procedure that could be expected of the respondent is that if the order of compulsory retirement does not recite public interest, the facts could be called out from the records and the material could be supplied in the counter-affidavit. Otherwise, where, as in the instant case, without disclosing those materials in the counter-affidavit, reliance is placed entirely on records to justify the order of compulsory retirement, it is but obligatory on the part of the respondent to make available the records to the petitioner. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision in M. Narayanan v. State of Kerala5 . If therefore a finding is given by the Court on the basis of certain materials produced before it, without the petitioner having a say or without the petitioner being able to assist the Court, it will be only one side of the picture and that will be illegal. In support of this submission, learned counsel relies on the decisions in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. S. J. Tribunal6, Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India7and Shankar Rao v. Government of India8 . 5. The only way in which the material could be withheld from the petitioner would be to claim privilege under section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act. Such a claim for privilege should be normally by filing an affidavit from the concerned Minister or by an affidavit of the concerned Secretary as indicated in State of Punjab v. S. S. Singh9 . So long as that privilege has not been claimed, the petitioner has every right to peruse the records and contend that what is stated in the records is either false or irrelevant etc. However incorrect the recitals may be, the Court will have to go by those entries and decide the case against the petitioner on that basis which cannot be held to be legal. The learned counsel cites Dattaram v. State of Maharashtra10in support of this submission. 6. However incorrect the recitals may be, the Court will have to go by those entries and decide the case against the petitioner on that basis which cannot be held to be legal. The learned counsel cites Dattaram v. State of Maharashtra10in support of this submission. 6. The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that inas much as the petitioner had been promoted as Commercial Tax Officer only in May, 1975 certainly within four months thereafter, it cannot be held that the petitioner should be compulsorily retired. If that were so, the petitioner would not have been promoted. 7. The learned Advocate-General would counter the arguments of Mr. K. K. Venugopal as under: It is not correct to treat a mere order of compulsory retirement as a punishment. The petitioner has the status of a civil servant. That status continues to remain under the normal circumstances so long as by way of disciplinary action his services are not terminated. Then again, he was taken into service on the specific understanding that on his attaining the age of 50 or on his putting in a qualifying service of 25 years, the Government could have a second look and prematurely retire him if public interest demands such course. Once, as in the case on hand, the order of compulsory retirement refers to Fundamental Rule 56 (d), public interest is to be presumed. But, where it does not recite, nevertheless by means of affidavit evidence, the Court could be satisfied. No doubt, in this case the counter-affidavit does not state the reasons. Nevertheless all the records including the service register of the petitioner are produced to show the existence of materials from which it could easily be held that the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner’s case was to be passed only in public interest. What is the nature of the order of compulsory retirement and how the Government could discharge its burden of proving that in public interest the order of compulsory retirement has been passed, have been clearly set out in M.R. Singh v. Chief Commissioner, Manipur1 and Tara Singh v. State of Rajasthan2 and the respondent fully relies upon these two decisions. 8. In this case, the petitioner does not and has not in fact attributed any mala fides to the Government. Even the allegations of mala fides made against Mr. 8. In this case, the petitioner does not and has not in fact attributed any mala fides to the Government. Even the allegations of mala fides made against Mr. S. Viswanathan have been stoutly denied by him in a separate counter-affidavit, notwithstanding the fact that he was not impleaded as a party. Assuming, without admitting. That he was biased against the petitioner, his bias cannot be attributed to the Government. After all, the committee was merely recommending the case of the petitioner for compulsory retirement. The Government, on an independent examination of the materials, came to the conclusion that the petitioner should be compulsorily retired and thereby concurred with the recommendation. Clauses 7 and 8 of G.O. Ms. No. 761, dated 19th March, 1973 merely set out the norms to be followed in cases of compulsory retirement. This is also the decision of the Division Bench in this very case. Therefore, it is not correct to contend that the orders of compulsory retirement are passed in a routine manner without any application of mind by the Government. The decision in Partap Singh v. State of Punjab3will be of no assistance to the petitioner. That was a case in which mala fides were proved as a fact, but it is not so here. Then again, the judgment reported in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India4, the person biased was himself a member of the committee and he was interested in seeing that he should be selected and further he should be ranked No. 1, In other words, he was the judge in his own cause and there was a conflict between duty and interest whereas in this case, no such situation arises. , It may be noted that in that ruling, the Supreme Court distinguished the judgment in W.P. No. 237 of 1966 wherein it had been held that the bias of the recommending authority would not vitiate the ultimate proceedings. In a case arising out of Land Acquisition Act, this Court held that the mala fides of a person who was instrumental in having the acquisition proceedings initiated would be of no consequence, because both under section 4 and section 6 of the Act, it is the satisfaction of the Government that is material and such mala fide intentions cannot be attributed to the Government-vide Mara Naicker v. Special Tahsildar, Pollachi1 . 9. 9. As directed by the Division Bench and also as laid down in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chandra Mohan2all that this Court can find out on a perusal of the relevant file is the existence of relevant material. In other words, the Court, cannot assess on those materials nor does the Court give a finding on those materials, but merely notes the existence of such material on which the subjective opinion was arrived at to compulsorily retire the petitioner in public interest. Only in cases where the Court is obliged to assess, the petitioner’s assistance may be required. In this case, no arguments are addressed on the basis of the materials. The files were produced which disclose the materials. That is all the limited purpose of production of the files. In fact, the purpose for which the documents were produced has been clearly set out in Sreshta v. Commissioner of Income-tax3and the respondent is entitled to rely upon the same. Merely because privilege is not claimed, it does not follow that the petitioner can look into the documents. As submitted above, the Court merely sees whether there are enough materials to warrant compulsory retirement of the petitioner in public interest. What is it that the petitioner could do especially when the order of compulsory retirement is not by way of penal action? He cannot assume the right to remain in service. As pointed out by the Supreme Court when either of the conditions contemplated under Fundamental Rule 56 (d), namely the petitioner attaining the age of 50 or his completing 25 years of qualifying service, is satisfied, the employer, namely the Government, can always consider his case for continued employment. Therefore, it is not correct to state that he has a right to remain in service until the age of superannuation. Only if he has a right to so remain, it will be open to him to show that the persons with less meritorious record are retained. Whatever it may be, in the instant case, a mere perusal of the record would disclose that there exists very relevant material from which subjectively it could be held that the petitioner could be compulsorily retired in public interest. There is no need to claim any privilege. Whatever it may be, in the instant case, a mere perusal of the record would disclose that there exists very relevant material from which subjectively it could be held that the petitioner could be compulsorily retired in public interest. There is no need to claim any privilege. But that does not mean the petitioner could gain a right to see the records and plead to the contrary than what is contained in the records. 10. The mere ‘fact that the petitioner was promoted in May, 1975 does not mean that he cannot be compulsorily retired. Totally different considerations apply in the case of promotion as against the compulsory retirement. In fact, this Court in W.P. No. 7244 of 1975 rejected a similar contention. Lastly, it is submitted that the order ex facie does not cast any stigma and such a stigma cannot be spelt out by delving into the records. 11. First, I will take up the question of mala fides. Mala fides means bad faith. In Short v. Poole Corporation4 it has been held at page 85 as "corruptly", bribery, mala fide. This is in contra distinction to bona fide as held at page 87 "in contrast to what is authorised by the Legislature". In Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council5in dealing with this aspect, it has been stated at pages 770 and 771 as follows: "Mala fides is a phrase often used in relation to the exercise of statutory powers. It has never been precisely defined as its effects have happily remained mainly in the region of hypothetical cases. It covers fraud or corruption. As the respondents have moved before the bad faith has been particularised, one must assume the worst“. ”In Demetriades v. Glasgow Corporation1the plaintiff complained of acts done on his land after requisition. He alleged, inter alia, that trees had been unlawfully cut. If there had been mala fides the cutting would, as I follow it, have been unlawful, but the House would not consider the possibility of bad faith in the absence of an express averment. This is stated by Lord Normand at the end of his opinion. He alleged, inter alia, that trees had been unlawfully cut. If there had been mala fides the cutting would, as I follow it, have been unlawful, but the House would not consider the possibility of bad faith in the absence of an express averment. This is stated by Lord Normand at the end of his opinion. My noble and learned friend, Lord Morton of Henryton said this: ‘The position would be different if there were any allegation of fact that the competent authority, through his agents, the respondents, had acted in bad faith and with some ulterior motive in carrying out this work on the trees. The truth or falsity of such allegation could be investigated by a Court of law“. This is a case in which Mr. S. Viswanathan, one of the members of the Review Committee, which is the Committee for recommending compulsory retirements, is stated to have been actuated by mala fides since an article appeared in a newspaper containing disparaging remarks about him thereby indicating that in the case of transfer of the petitioner, bribe was demanded. Therefore he was nurturing a grievance against the petitioner. The counter-affidavit of Mr. S. Viswanathan, on this aspect is to the following effect: ”The petitioner refers to an alleged article that had appeared in a Tamil Journal “Sigappu Nada” and consequently it is alleged that I have been nurturing ill-will against the petitioner. It is respectfully submitted, that I am neither a subscriber of the said journal “Sigappu Nada” nor have I perused that issue or come across that alleged article. I have not read the article referred to by the petitioner. This being the truthful position the surmises of the petitioner that on reading that alleged article I have nurtured ill-will against him and therefore I have recommended to Government for his compulsory retirement is only a figment of his imagination, meticulously repeated by some other petitioners as well. The other allegations in the affidavit are baseless and deserve to be rejected“. So, there is a stout denial of mala fides. Nevertheless, it is contended by Mr. K. K. Venugopal that the bias of one of the recommending authority would vitiate the ultimate decision of the Government, since, according to him, under clauses (vii) and (viii) of G.O. Ms. No. 761, dated 19th March, 1973 the recommendations are accepted by Government without much application of the mind. Nevertheless, it is contended by Mr. K. K. Venugopal that the bias of one of the recommending authority would vitiate the ultimate decision of the Government, since, according to him, under clauses (vii) and (viii) of G.O. Ms. No. 761, dated 19th March, 1973 the recommendations are accepted by Government without much application of the mind. This makes me necessary to refer to clauses (vii) and (viii) of the G.O. "(vii). Once it is decided to retain an officer beyond the age of 50 years, he should be allowed to continue upto the normal age of retirement, viz., 55 years without any fresh review unless this is justified for any exceptional reasons, such as his subsequent work or conduct or the state of his physical health which may necessitate his earlier retirement. (viii). If, on the result of the review, the name of a Government Servant is recommended for compulsory retirement, he should be given three months’ notice in writing, or three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice before retiring him“. A reading of that would show that there is nothing to suggest that the recommendation is accepted in a routine fashion. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench in dealing with this aspect of the matter held: "On a fair reading of the Government orders, it is clear that the review committee is merely a recommendatory . Authority and certain guidelines have been set before it to review the cases of Government servants for retirement. Clause (9) in Annexure II makes it clear that the orders compulsorily retiring a Government servant will be issued by the administrative department of the Government. Such being the case, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is an abdication of power by the Government and that the Government were only mechanically accepting it does not appeal to us. Though clause (viii) does not contemplate any independent scrutiny by the Government of the recommendations made by the review committee. Clause (ix) refers to it. A casual examination of certain files placed before us taken at random made it clear that the Government did not pass the challenged orders as a matter of course. The complaint is that the orders are cyclostyled. This by itself does not raise the presumption that the Government were led by the review committee and they did not independently exercise their mind“. The complaint is that the orders are cyclostyled. This by itself does not raise the presumption that the Government were led by the review committee and they did not independently exercise their mind“. Therefore, Annexure II containing clauses (vii) and (viii) of the G.O. merely has laid down the norms relating to compulsory retirement. In this situation, the relevant authority, in my view is, that which was distinguished in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India1 , namely Sumer Chand Jain v. Union of India3 . Dealing with that in paragraph 22 at page 157 it was laid down: "It was next urged by the learned Attorney-General that the mere fact that one of the members of the Board was biased against some of the petitioners cannot vitiate the entire proceedings. In this connection he invited our attention to the decision of this Court in Sumer Chand Jain v. Union of India2 . Therein the Court repelled the contention that the proceedings of a Departmental Committee were vitiated as one of the members of the Committee was favourably disposed towards one of the selected candidates. The question before the Court was whether the plea of mala fides was established. The Court came to the conclusion that on the material on record it was unable to uphold that plea. In that case there was no question of any conflict between duty and interest nor any member of the departmental promotion committee was a judge in his own case. The only thing complained of was that one of the members of the promotion committee was favourably disposed towards one of the competitors. As mentioned earlier in this case we are essentially concerned with the question whether the decision taken by the board can be considered having been taken fairly and justly". A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India1 , is a case in which there was a conflict between interest and duty in that Naquishbund was not only a member of the committee, but he was anxious to have him selected and further he was anxious that he should be ranked No. 1, so that he could be selected to All India Forest Service. In such a case, the principle that no person should be a judge in his own cause was applied and ultimately the entire selection was set aside, notwithstanding the fact that the committee of which the said Naquishbund was a member was merely a body which could prepare the panel for selection. In dealing with a similar contention, this is what I held in W.P. No. 596 of 1976: "I will now turn to A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India1 . In that case, some of the gazetted officers serving in the Forest Department of the State of Jammu and Kashmir were aggrieved by the selections made from among the officers serving the forest department. A selection board was set up for selecting officers to the Indian Forest Service. One of the members of the selection board was Naquishbund, the Acting Chief Conservator of Forests of Jammu and Kashmir. Naquishbund’s name was placed at the top of the list of the selected officers. 12. Naquishbund had been promoted as Chief Conservator of Forests in 1964, but he had not been confirmed. G. R. Basu, Conservator of, Forests in the Kashmir Forest Service, who was admittedly senior to Naquishbund had appealed to the State Government against his supersession and that appeal was pending with the State Government at the time of the impugned selections. M. I. Baig and A. N. Kaul, Conservators of Forests also claim that they were seniors to Naquishbund. Kaul had also appealled to the State Government against his supersession. 13. Naquishbund was also one of the candidates seeking to be selected to the All India Forest Service. He did not sit in the selection board at the time when his name was considered for selection. But, admittedly he sat in the Board and participated in its deliberations when the names of Basu, Baig and Kaul, his rivals were considered for selection. It is further admitted that he did participate in the deliberations of the board while preparing the list of selected candidates in order of preference. It was held under those circumstances in paragraphs 15 and 16 as ‘follows: "It is unfortunate that Naquishbund was appointed as one of the members of the selection board. It is true that ordinarily the Chief Conservator of Forests in a State should be considered as the most appropriate person to be in the selection board. It was held under those circumstances in paragraphs 15 and 16 as ‘follows: "It is unfortunate that Naquishbund was appointed as one of the members of the selection board. It is true that ordinarily the Chief Conservator of Forests in a State should be considered as the most appropriate person to be in the selection board. He must be expected to know his officers thoroughly, their weaknesses as well as their strength. His opinion as regards their suitability for selection to the All India Service is entitled to great weight. But then under the circumstances it was improper to have included Naquishbund as a member of the selection board. He was one of the persons to be considered for selection. It is against all canons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true. That he did not participate in the deliberations of the committee when his name was considered . But then the very fact that he was a member of the selection board must have had its own impact on the decision of the selection board. Further admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the selection board when the claims of his rivals particularly that of Basu was considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selection candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the selection board there was a conflict between his interest and duty (Italics applied). Under those circumstances it is difficult to believe that he could have been impartial. The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. We agree with the learned Attorney-General that a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct. It was in the interest of Naquishbund to keep out his rivals in order to secure his position from further challenge. Naturally he was also interested in safeguarding his position while preparing the list of selected candidates. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct. It was in the interest of Naquishbund to keep out his rivals in order to secure his position from further challenge. Naturally he was also interested in safeguarding his position while preparing the list of selected candidates. The members of the selection board other than Naquishbund each one of them separately, have filed affidavits in this Court swearing that Naquishbund in no manner influenced their decision in making the selection. In a group deliberation each member of the group is bound to influence the others, more so, if the members concerned is a person with special knowledge. His bias is likely to operate in a subtle manner. It is no wonder that the other members of the selection board are unaware of the extent to which his opinion influenced their conclusions. We are unable to accept the contention that in adjudging the suitability of the candidates the members of the board did not have any mutual discussion. It is not as if the records spoke of themselves. We are unable to believe that the members of selection board functioned like computers. At this stage it may also be noted, that at the time the selections were made, the members of the selection board other than Naquishbund were not likely to have known that Basu had appealed against his supersession and that his appeal was pending before the State Government. Therefore, there was no occasion for them to distrust the opinion expressed by Naquishbund. Hence the board in making the selections must necessarily have given weight to the opinion expressed by Naquishbund“. 14. In the case on hand, there is no conflict between interest and duty and not a word of mala fide is attributed to the Central Government. 15. This ruling applies on all fours to the cases on hand. Be it noted that not a word of mala fides is alleged against the Government. In a case arising under Land Acquisition Act, Ismail, T., held in Mara Naicker v. Special Tahsildar Pollachi1 , that the bad faith of the person who was instrumental in acquiring the land of the petitioner will not vitiate the satisfaction of the Government. Be it noted that not a word of mala fides is alleged against the Government. In a case arising under Land Acquisition Act, Ismail, T., held in Mara Naicker v. Special Tahsildar Pollachi1 , that the bad faith of the person who was instrumental in acquiring the land of the petitioner will not vitiate the satisfaction of the Government. It was held: ”It is really the Government which ultimately applies its mind and decides upon acquiring the property, and so long as there is no allegation of mala fides made against the Government the fact that somebody else had been responsible for initiating the proceeding or inducing the Government to take the acquisition proceedings will not really affect the validity of the acquisition proceedings“. For these reasons, I have no hesitation to reject the plea of mala fides. 16. Before I go to the second contention, it is necessary for me to note what is the right of a civil servant in matters of this kind. That has come to be laid down in State of U.P. v. Chandra Mohan2 . Therein a similar order as in the case on hand, namely an order of compulsory retirement simpliciter was passed. It was held: "The correct position that emerges from rule 16 (3) read with the procedural instructions is that the Central Government, after consultation with the State Government, may prematurely retire a civil servant with three months’ previous notice prior to his attaining 50 years or 55 years as the case may be. The only exception is of those cases which had to be examined for the first time after amendment of the rule substituting 50 years for 55 where even officers, who had crossed the age of 50 years, even before reaching 55, could be for the first time reviewed. Once a review has taken place and no decision to retire on that review has been ordered by the Central Government, the Officer gets a lease in the case of 50 years upto the next barrier at 55 and, if he is again cleared at that point, he is free and untrammelled upto 58 which is his usual span of the service career. This is the normal rule subject always to exceptional circumstances such as disclosure of fresh objectionable grounds with regard to integrity or some other reasonably weighty reason. This is the normal rule subject always to exceptional circumstances such as disclosure of fresh objectionable grounds with regard to integrity or some other reasonably weighty reason. Under Article 310, Government Servants, high or low, hold service during the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, subject to two well-known limitations namely, that they shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which they were appointed and secondly, that they shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry into the charges clearly levelled against them and affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges. We need not refer to the proviso to Article 311 (2) which deals with certain exceptional cases. Thus the pleasure doctrine under Article 310 is conditioned by constitutional restrictions under Article 311. Under Article 309, the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment and conditions of service and until so done the President or his delegate and the Governor or his delegate may make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service. The Act passed by the appropriate Legislature and the rules made under Article 309 will however, be subject to the provisions of the Constitution which include Article 311 and certainly the fundamental rights. The pleasure doctrine under Article 310 is in a way unoffendingly resuscitated with appropriate vigour towards the tail-end of the career of a Government servant under rule 16 (3) in the public interest. Compulsory retirement under the service rules is not by way of punishment, as understood in service jurisprudence, however unsavoury it may be otherwise. During the entire tenure of Government servants from the date of temporary or probationary appointment till termination or retirement as the case may be, there is an undoubted security for them against dismissal, removal or reduction in rank except in the manner laid down under Article 311 (2), read with relevant laws or rules made under Article 309". In order to pass the test of constitutionality, rule 16 (3) must needs be safeguarded by reasonable procedural guidelines in order that there may be no scope for arbitrariness or discrimination. That is how rule 16 (3) being silent, instructions speak and do vitiative service in a vacuous field. In order to pass the test of constitutionality, rule 16 (3) must needs be safeguarded by reasonable procedural guidelines in order that there may be no scope for arbitrariness or discrimination. That is how rule 16 (3) being silent, instructions speak and do vitiative service in a vacuous field. The material procedure under the instructions, as if inter-woven in rule 16 (3) can on no account be held invalid or impermissible. Compulsory retirement under rule 16 (3) is a salutary safeguard in the armoury of the> Government for maintenance of the services in trim and fitness. Rule 16 (3) is a constant reminder to the slacker, the sluggish and the inefficient, not to speak of those who may be dishonest or unscrupulous by reputation beyond redemption. At a reasonable point of service a stage is reached when the Government reserves its undoubted right to have a second look at the officers whether their retention in employment would be useful in the public interest. That is the role of rule 16 (3). Rule 16 (3) with the instructions, is a warning poster for every Government servant to conduct himself properly, diligently and efficiently throughout his service career. The Government has advanced the time of the first review by amendment of rule 16 (3). As stated earlier, there are now two stages in a service career, namely, at the age of 50 or 55, for the Government to take a decision to refurbish, invigorate and stimulate the service and with that sole object a decision has to be fairly taken well in time under rule 16 (3) in accordance with the published procedure". I may also refer to the decision in Tara Singh v. State of Rajasthan1. In paragraph 24 it was stated thus: "The right to be in public employment is a right to hold it according to rules. The right to hold is defeasible according to rules. The rules speak of compulsory retirement. There is guidance in the rules as to when such compulsory retirement is made. When persons complete 25 years of service and the efficiency of such persons is impaired and yet it is desirable not to bring any charge of inefficiency or incompetency. The Government passes orders of such compulsory retirement. The Government servant in such a case does not lose the benefits which a Government servant has already earned. When persons complete 25 years of service and the efficiency of such persons is impaired and yet it is desirable not to bring any charge of inefficiency or incompetency. The Government passes orders of such compulsory retirement. The Government servant in such a case does not lose the benefits which a Government servant has already earned. These orders of compulsory retirement are made in public interest. This is the safety value of making such orders so that no arbitrariness or bad faith creeps in“. From the above, it follows that the Government servants hold service during the pleasure of the President or the Governor and the umbrella of protection is afforded by Article 311. Nevertheless, under Fundamental Rule 56 (d) when an order of compulsory retirement is passed, it cannot and should not be equated to a penal action. On the contrary, the employer, namely the Government has a second look at the Officer whether be should be continued in employment even after attaining the age of 50 years or having put; in 25 years of qualifying service. This background must be kept in view, since throughout Mr. Venugopal was tending to argue as if the order of compulsory retirement was one by way of punishment. The order which I have extracted above does not cast a stigma on the petitioner. No doubt, the reasons for compulsory retirement could have been set out in the counter-affidavit. But an argument was sought to be made that inasmuch as the reasons culled out from the records have been incorporated in the counter-affidavit, the order though simple in its terms, the compulsory retirement should be held to be by way of punishment. This is the reason why the grounds on which the ultimate order had come to be passed are not stated in the counter-affidavit, according to the learned Advocate-General. I see some force in this contention. Whatever it is, certainly though the reasons are not stated in the counter-affidavit, yet the Court can, more so when the Division Bench has directed to that effect, look into the files to see whether there are relevant materials to warrant compulsory retirement of the petitioner in public interest. In M. R. Singh v. Chief Commissioner, Manipur1in paragraph 15 it is stated: ”The affidavit evidence is that the order of compulsory retirement was made in public interest. In M. R. Singh v. Chief Commissioner, Manipur1in paragraph 15 it is stated: ”The affidavit evidence is that the order of compulsory retirement was made in public interest. The absence of recital in the order of compulsory retirement that it is made in public interest is not fatal as long as power to make compulsory retirement in public interest is there and the power in fact is shown in the facts and circumstances, of the case to have been exercised in public interest.“ In this case paragraphs 3, 6 and 15 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated as follows: ”3. As for the averments in paragraphs 2 to 4 of the affidavit it is submitted that the fact that he had been promoted temporarily to the post of Commercial Tax Officer does not mean that no action can be initiated under Fundamental Rule 56 (d) when the Government is of the opinion that the time has come for the petitioner to be relieved of the post in public interest.“ ”6………The petitioner had nowhere in the affidavit alleged any mala fides against the Government. The opinion that is to be formed under the Rules is that of the Government and it is open to them on a consideration of the materials placed before and in the public interest, to retire a Government, servant in invoking their powers under Fundamental Rule 56 (d). That being so, no motive or mala fide intentions having been attributed by the petitioner against the Government the impugned order is valid and is not vitiated by any mala fides whatsoever.“ ”15. As for the contention that three months’ salary must be paid before the Government servant is compulsorily retired, it is submitted that what is contemplated under rule 56 (d) is that, on being relieved in public interest the Government servant would be entitled to 3 months’ salary is not a condition precedent before issue of orders. This non-payment will not invalidate the impugned order, since when action is initiated in public interest and that too without permitting the concerned officer to be in service for 3 months the order has to be instantaneous and the concept of computing and tendering payment by Government cannot be imported into rule 56 (d) of the Fundamental Rules……….." Therefore, there is the affidavit evidence that the order is made in public interest. 17. 17. As to the duty of the Government to produce the files when allegations of mala fides are made against the Government it had come to be laid down in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chandra Mohan1. In paragraph 36, it is stated: “The learned Solicitor-General next submitted that the High Court was not right in going behind the order of compulsory retirement and delving into the files of the Government to see for itself whether the order could be sustained. We find that the records of service of the respondent and other papers were produced by the learned Advocate-General before the High Court without any objection and without claiming any privilege with regard to those documents. That being the factual position, we are not inclined to consider whether the course adopted by the High Court in this case is open to objection. It will, however, be proper to observe that when an order of compulsory retirement is challenged as arbitrary or mala fide by making clear and specific allegations, it will then be certainly necessary for the Government to produce all the necessary materials to rebut such pleas to satisfy the Court by voluntarily producing such documents as will be a complete answer to the plea. It will be for the Government also to decide whether at that stage privilege should be claimed with regard to any particular document. Ordinarily, the service record of a Government servant in a proceeding of this nature cannot be said to be privileged document which should be shut out from inspection. In this case, I have already noted that no allegations of mala fides have been made against the Government. Nevertheless, the records are produced to satisfy the Court that there does exist relevant materials to warrant the compulsory retirement of the petitioner in public interest. Mr. K. K. Venugopal relies on the decision in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha2 , and the passage in paragraph 8, namely, - ”Now coming to the express words of Fundamental Rule 56 (j), it says that the appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire a Government servant if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. The right conferred on the appropriate authority is an absolute one. The right conferred on the appropriate authority is an absolute one. That power can be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the rule, one of which is that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so. If that authority bona fide forms that opinion, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before Courts. It is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision“. Therefore, according to him, if the materials are produced without disclosing the same to the petitioner, it will constitute violation of principles of natural justice.. In support of this contention, he relies on the decision in Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala3and the passage occurring in paragraph 14 to the following effect: ”Even so, the fact remains that the learned Judge acted upon a document filed by the respondent without giving an opportunity to the appellant to file objections or to contest its reliability. We think the principles of natural justice require that no Court shall give a finding whether on ‘fact or law and particularly on facts without giving an opportunity to all the contesting parties, “ If the Court therefore were to rely upon these materials, the petitioner will have no opportunity to assist the Court, and state whether the decision has been arrived at arbitrarily or not. I am afraid that the arguments of Mr. K. K. Venugopal proceed upon a misapprehension as if the Court is rendering a finding whether compulsory retirement could be ordered or not. Certainly, I am not giving any finding. On the contrary, I only note the existence of relevant materials. Therefore, the petitioner has no right to peruse the record. It may be stated here that Mr. K. K. Venugoal very fairly concedes that the Court cannot look into the sufficiency of the materials. Therefore, neither of these cases affords any assistance to the petitioners. 18. The decision in Shankar Rao v. Government of India1is very much pressed. That was also a case of compulsory retirement. It may be stated here that Mr. K. K. Venugoal very fairly concedes that the Court cannot look into the sufficiency of the materials. Therefore, neither of these cases affords any assistance to the petitioners. 18. The decision in Shankar Rao v. Government of India1is very much pressed. That was also a case of compulsory retirement. In the counter-affidavit, in justification of the retirement of the petitioner, the reason given was that there were grave doubts on the petitioner’s integrity and even the judgment of this Court had not absolved the officer of his guilt completely. On that the learned Judges held as follows: "It is clear from the above discussion that the reasons given by the first respondent in its counter-affidavit have ho existence in the eye of the law. This means that the order was based on no reason whatever. It would also mean that the Central Government did not apply their mind to the case. This means that the order of the Central Government was really arbitrary and, according to the principles already explained, the order must be set aside." Then again in paragraph 36, it has been held: "We have also looked into it, but it will be seen that we are not basing our conclusion to any extent on what we saw in the file. However, was may add that the file also confirms our interpretation of paragraph 3 of the further counter-affidavit and shows that the action of the Government of India was based only on their grave doubts on the petitioner’s integrity as a result of his conduct in valuing the trees…." In paragraph 38, it has been held: "The words ‘reasonable cause to believe’ have a definite meaning in law. There must exist some facts or reasons as a result of which they could have cause to believe that the officer was lacking in integrity. Mere suspicion would not do. Applying these standards, the impugned order would not satisfy this criterion". The basis of the decision being ‘grave doubts’ however strong those doubts were, they could not take the place of proof and hence it was held that there were no reasons for compulsory retirement. But the position here is totally different. The learned Advocate-General, without claiming any privilege, had produced all the files including the personal file of the petitioner, each one of which I have carefully perused. But the position here is totally different. The learned Advocate-General, without claiming any privilege, had produced all the files including the personal file of the petitioner, each one of which I have carefully perused. Without any hesitation, I can state there are enough relevant materials to warrant the compulsory retirement of the petitioner in public interest. What is contended by Mr. Venugopal is that the petitioner has an unblemished record and merely on materials which either do not exist nor shown to him, if a contrary opinion is formed that would be illegal. He relies upon the decision in J. N. Sinha v. Union of India2, which case was taken up for consideration pursuant to the review allowed by the Supreme Court on 18th of November, 1970. It was held at page 482 as follows: "As the petitioner has challenged the impugned order as being arbitrary and the matter has to be scrutinised by the Court, it is incumbent upon the concerned authority to indicate the reason or ground on which the retirement of the petitioner was considered to be in the public interest. As pointed out above, the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 does not mention any such reason or ground. Thus, the position is that the averments and the documents mentioned in the writ petition show that the petitioner had an unblemished service record, and that the counter-affidavit filed in opposition to the writ petition does not contain any suggestion as to why the retirement of the petitioner was considered to be in the public interest. In the circumstances, it has to be held that the opinion formed and the decision taken by the concerned authority was wholly arbitrary. It follows that the impugned order (Annexure ‘K’) is liable to be quashed on that ground". In the instant case, I have already held that there are enough materials. As a matter of fact, a mere perusal of the file will be enough to overrule this contention of the petitioner. Then again, the decision in Dattaram v. State of Maharashtra1 , is relied upon to urge the contention that the State cannot claim privilege under section 123 of the Evidence Act. In the instant case, no such privilege is claimed. Then again, the decision in Dattaram v. State of Maharashtra1 , is relied upon to urge the contention that the State cannot claim privilege under section 123 of the Evidence Act. In the instant case, no such privilege is claimed. That is why the learned Advocate-General very correctly states that the records are produced only to satisfy the Court that there does exist enough materials and not for the purpose of any assessment. 19. Mr. Venugopal urges that inasmuch as the petitioner was promoted only in May, 1975 as Commercial Tax Officer, certainly within the short period of four months, the order of compulsory retirement could not have ensued. Therefore, this again will show that the decision to compulsorily retire is arbitrary. First of all, the petitioner was promoted purely temporarily. Even otherwise, considerations for promotion and for compulsory retirement vary very much. In W.P. No. 7244 of 1975, I negatived a similar contention. In that case I have held as follows: "In dealing with Fundamental Rule 56 (j) an Officer can be retired in public interest. It was held in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha2, as follows: ‘Because of his compulsory retirement he does not lose any of the rights acquired by him before retirement. Compulsory retirement involves no civil consequences’. Not only that. There are very many considerations which may weigh with the Government while passing an order of compulsory retirement. Not that he may not be inefficient, but there may be others more efficient that the particular officer who is sought to be compulsorily retired. Again, it may be for the improvement of the administration. That is why the Supreme Court said at page 43 of the above decision: "Various considerations may weigh with the appropriate authority while exercising the power conferred under the rule. In some cases, the Government may feel that a particular post may be more usefully held in public interest by an officer more competent than the one who is holding. It may be that the Officer who is holding the post is not inefficient but the appropriate authority may prefer to have a more efficient officer. It may further be that in certain key posts public interest may require that a person of undoubted ability and integrity should be there. It may be that the Officer who is holding the post is not inefficient but the appropriate authority may prefer to have a more efficient officer. It may further be that in certain key posts public interest may require that a person of undoubted ability and integrity should be there. There is no denying the fact that in all organisations and more so in Government organisations, there is a good deal of dead wood. It is in public interest to chop off the same. Fundamental Rule 56 (j) holds the balance between the rights of the individual Government servant and the interests of the public. While a minimum service is guaranteed to the Government servant, the Government is given power to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those who in its opinion should not be there in public interest. Viewed at from this angle, certainly it cannot be contended that while passing an order of confirmation in the I.P.S., the same criteria would be applied. The learned Advocate-General is correct when he submits that the mind of the Central Government does not work in the same way while compulsorily retiring an officer as when passing an order of confirmation." Hence, this contention of Mr. Venugopal also fails. In the result, I conclude (1). On the totality of the circumstances, when examined in the light of the relevant files, the Government had arrived at the subjective opinion on relevant materials that in public interest, the petitioner should be compulsorily retired. (2) The burden that it has been so done has been fully discharged by the production of all the relevant materials to satisfy the Court. (3) A mere perusal of the records will show that the order of compulsory retirement is fully justified. (4) The actual order of retirement being plain in terms, no stigma arises from the impugned order. 20. For all these reasons, I dismiss the writ petition. However, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.