Judgment Madan Mohan Prasad, J. 1. -this is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of quashing an order passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate reviewing his previous order by which he has rejected the nomination paper of the petitioner before him acting under rule 23 (4)of the Panchayat Election Rules (hereinafter called "the Rules) framed under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act. 2. It appears that the election to the post of the Mukhia of Saura gram Panchayat was to be held and the petitioner as well as the fourth respondent were candidates for the post and filed their nomination papers. At the scrutiny, nominations of both the candidates were accepted by the Election officer, namely, the Block Development Officer. As against this an objection petition under rule 23 (4) of the Rules was filed by the petitioner as a result of which on the 1st of May, 1978 the Sub-divisional Magistrate rejected the nomination of the fourth respondent. The said respondent then filed a petition of review before him with the result that on the 3rd of May, 1978, the subdivisional Magistrate set aside his previous order, dated the 1st of May, 1978 and held the nomination paper of the fourth respondent to be valid. Hence this application. 3. It appears next that the present writ application was filed in this court on the 16th of May, 1978 and was admitted on the 19th of May, 1978 and by an order of the same date the election of the Panchayat aforesaid was ordered to be stayed. 4. Counsel for the petitioner has urged that it is obvious that an Election officer or for the matter of that, any officer acting under the Bihar Panchayat raj Act or the Rules framed thereunder, has no power of reviewing his own order inasmuch as the Act and the Rules do not confer any such power. Secondly, it has been urged that in the present case notice had not been issued to the petitioner in the matter of the application for review and thus there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice. 5. Secondly, it has been urged that in the present case notice had not been issued to the petitioner in the matter of the application for review and thus there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice. 5. Counsel for the fourth respondent has in all fairness conceded the position in law that an Election Officer being the creature of the statute, not having been given by the statute the power of review, could not have exercised such powers. He has, however, contended that although for this reason the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate may be bad in law, it ought not to be set aside on the ground that if set aside it would have the effect of restoring an order which on the very face of it is equally illegal. 6. Taking up the first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, it must prevail. He has placed reliance on a decision for which I was responsible, in the case Bisheshwar Singh V/s. The Sub-divisional Magistrate Barn and others reported in AIR 1974 Patna, 7, a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sri Thakur Ram Chandraji and others V/s. The State af Bihar and others (1976 BBC J 647) and a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of gurdit Singh and others V/s. State of Punjab ( AIR 1974 SC 1791 ). The point does not, in my view, need further support. As 1 have held before, I still hold that an Election Officer not being a court and being a creature of statute, does not have any inherent power of review. It is also obvious that neither the Act nor the Rules aforesaid grant this power expressly or by necessary implication. There is no getting away from the fact, thus, that the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, dated the 3rd of May, 1978 was without jurisdiction. 7. The question, however, remains whether it should be set aside. In this connection, as stated earlier, counsel for the fourth respondent has urged that the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, dated the 1st of May, 1978, which would naturally hold the field if the subsequent order passed on review is set aside, itself was illegal and without jurisdiction. 7. The question, however, remains whether it should be set aside. In this connection, as stated earlier, counsel for the fourth respondent has urged that the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, dated the 1st of May, 1978, which would naturally hold the field if the subsequent order passed on review is set aside, itself was illegal and without jurisdiction. Counsel urged firstly that rule 22 of the Rules aforesaid provide that the Election Officer is to satisfy himself about the names and voters numbers of the candidate and his proposer as entered in the nomination paper with the entries in the voters list in the present case, it is "said, there was a discrepancy with regard to the name of the village and, therefore, that was not a matter relevant for consideration. Further, it has been urged that, the proviso to the rule aforesaid permits any clerical error in the nomination paper to be corrected or any clerical or printing error in the entries in the voters list to be overlooked. These facts have been stated in the counter-affidavit filed by him. What was the specific discrepancy between the voters list and the entry in the nomination paper has not been clearly stated in the order of the 1st May, 1978. It is thus said that the Sub-divisional Magistrate not having allowed such errors to be ignored, had acted without jurisdiction. In fact, counsel has urged that "the jurisdictipnal facts", to quote the words, were absent and wrongly assumed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate and in that view of the matter his order was without jurisdiction. 8. In view of the fact that the fourth respondent has already filed a writ petition which is pending in this Court, directed specifically against the order dated the 1st of May, 1978, it would not be proper and it is not necessary either to give my considered views in respect of these points. Counsel has urged about the illegality of the order of the 1st May, 1978 so as to avoid the setting aside of the order, dated the 3rd May, 1978 and the consequences thereof. Counsel has urged about the illegality of the order of the 1st May, 1978 so as to avoid the setting aside of the order, dated the 3rd May, 1978 and the consequences thereof. In this respect counsel for the Respondents also placed reliance on the decision in the case of Bisheshwar Singh (supra) where I had taken the view which supports the argument that if the effect of the issuance of writ would be to sustain an order which on the face of it is illegal, this Court would not allow that to happen. It must, however, be remembered, as has rightly been urged on behalf of the petitioner, that the order in such case must on the face of it be illegal. In the case of Bisheshwar Singh (supra) I had also said that the illegality must be apparent on the face of the order. If, however, evidence has to be taken and facts elicited in order to come to the conclusion as to whether or not the earlier order was illegal, in the absence of any writ petition filed by the person aggrieved by that order, this Court ordinarily would not go into that matter. In the present case, as stated earlier, the order, in questions does not mention the details of the discrepancies though it does mention the ground of rejection as being the discrepancy between the nomination paper and the voters list. Due to the mere absence of the details it cannot be said that the order is on the face of it illegal. Further in the case of Bisheshwar Singh (supra) the respondent had not taken recourse to his remedies as against the earlier order and thereby would have suffered substantial injustice. In the present case, the respondent no.4 having filed writ petition in this Court, cannot be set aside to be in a similar position The facts of this case are, therefore, different from those of Bisheshwar Singhs case (supra ). It does not need to be stated that the law has to be applied to different sets of facts suitably differing with the facts of each case. It does not need to be stated that the law has to be applied to different sets of facts suitably differing with the facts of each case. If the respondent had not filed the writ petition or had no other remedy available to him, then perhaps, guided by the rules of justice, this Court might have considered while hearing the present application, the propriety of even going into disputed facts or finding out facts, but the need of the situation in the present case does not justify such a course. 9. With regard to the second point regarding the violation of the principles of natural justice, the petitioner has urged in paragraph 9 of his writ petition that no notice was issued to him and an ex parte order was passed on the 3rd of May, 1978. This has, however, been controverted in the counter-affidavit of the fourth respondent. The records of the case before the Sub-divisional magistrate not being in this Court, it is difficult to say as to which statement of fact is correct. Be that as it may, it is unnecessary to go into the point in view of the clear illegality with regard to the exercisa of power of review. 10. In the result, the order contained in Annexure 3 dated the 3rd of may, 1978, passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate it set aside. Let a writ of certiorari issue accordingly. This application is thus allowed. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.