Short Note : 1. The appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff-respondent against the defendant-appellants for eviction. Ejectment was sought by the plaintiff on the grounds specified in Clauses (f) and (m) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, hereinafter called the Act. The suit was resisted by the defendants and the trial Court dismissed the suit. The lower appellate Court, however, found that the plaintiff had made out a ground for ejectment under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act and, in this view of the matter, the plaintiff's suit has been decreed. The defendants have, therefore, preferred this second appeal. Held : It is not disputed that defendant No. 3, who was impleaded as respondent No. 3 before the lower appellate Court, had become a major when the appeal was filed before the lower appellate Court. It is also admitted that notice of the appeal was served on him and that he engaged a counsel and supported the judgment passed by the trial Court. Learned counsel for the appellant brought to my notice the provisions contained in O. 32, R. 3 (5) CPC. But these provisions are not attracted in the instant case. O. 32, R. 3 (5) CPC merely lays down that a person appointed to be guardian for the suit for a minor shall, unless his appointment is terminated by retirement or removal or death, continue as such throughout all proceedings arising out of the suit. Learned counsel for the appellants was unable to point out any provision of law or authority for the proposition that notice should be given to the guardian on the minor defendant attaining majority before discharging him and that the absence of such order or discharge would render the judgment of the lower appellate Court a nullity even though on the date when the appeal was filed before the lower appellate Court defendant No. 3 was admittedly a major. The contention that the appeal was not competent cannot, therefore, be upheld. 2. The rent note is also purported to have been executed by defendant No. 3 who, it is not disputed before me, was a minor at the material time. In these circumstances, there could not have been a contract of tenancy between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3. The contention that the appeal was not competent cannot, therefore, be upheld. 2. The rent note is also purported to have been executed by defendant No. 3 who, it is not disputed before me, was a minor at the material time. In these circumstances, there could not have been a contract of tenancy between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3. It was rightly contended before me on behalf of defendant No. 3 that he could not have been and was not a partner of defendant No. 1 firm. In these circumstances, no decree could have been passed against defendant No. 3, who was a minor when the contract of tenancy took place between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 acting through defendant No. 2, who described himself as a partner of defendant No. 1. Learned counsel for the respondent concedes that in view of the fact that defendant No. 3 was a minor when the contract of tenancy was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, the decree passed by the lower appellate Court against defendant No. 3 deserves to be set aside. Appeal partly allowed.