GANGADHARAN PILLAI v. CHIDAMBARA IYER — 1978 DIGILAW 182 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the tenant-respondent in B. R. C. O. P. No. 36 of 1977 on the file of the Principal Munsiff, Trivandrum. The respondent herein filed B. R. C. O. P. No. 36 of 1977 before the Rent Control Court, (Munsiff), Trivandrum for eviction of the revision petitioner under S.11(2) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings, (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The respondent purchased the building some time prior to the above petition. The revision petitioner was a tenant of a room in the upstair portion of the building at the time of the purchase. The respondent contended that he required the above portion for his own occupation for purposes of his income-tax practice and also for the use of his family. There was also a case of arrears of rent. The tenant opposed the petition on the ground that the portion of the building already in occupation of the landlord was sufficient for his use and for the use of his family. He also contended that he was carrying on his business in the building and that it was from the income derived from his business that he was maintaining himself. The respondent let in evidence in proof of his bonafide need. A commission was also taken for reporting about the facilities available in the building. The respondent also adduced evidence to the effect that there were other vacant buildings which might be available to the petitioner for the purpose of his business. The tenant also adduced evidence. Thereafter, the case was posted for final hearing on 4-6-1977. The counsel for the revision petitioner then made an endorsement on the back of the petition that the petitioner was willing to surrender the building within six months. The offer was accepted by the respondent. The Rent Control Court held that the ground alleged in the petition stood proved and accepting the compromise, directed surrender of the building within a period of six months. The petitioner took the matter in appeal before the Sub Judge. Before the Sub Judge, it was contended that the order passed by the Rent Control Court was in contravention of the provisions of S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The petitioner took the matter in appeal before the Sub Judge. Before the Sub Judge, it was contended that the order passed by the Rent Control Court was in contravention of the provisions of S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The contention put forward was that before an order of eviction could be passed, the Rent Control Court must satisfy itself that the grounds for eviction contemplated in S.11 of the Act existed. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal (AIR. 1970 SC. 838) and Ferozi Lal v. Man Mal (AIR. 1970 SC. 794). The Appellate authority held that the ratio of those decisions had no application to the case before him and confirmed the order for eviction. The above order was concurred to by the District Judge in revision. The present revision petition is filed challenging the correctness of the orders passed by the authorities below. 2. The contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that when the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act laid down conditions under which a tenant of a building could be evicted by a landlord, it is not open to the Rent Control Court to order eviction otherwise than as provided in the Act. In other words, an order for eviction in contravention of the provisions of the Act is null and void. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions referred to in the order of the Appellate authority in support of the above position. 3. The case in Ferozi Lal v. Man Mal (AIR. 1970 SC. 794) arose under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. Eviction was sought on the ground that there was a sublease which was not permitted under the terms of the lease. Pending trial of the suit for eviction, the parties entered into a compromise. No mention was made in the compromise about the existence or otherwise of the sub-lease. A decree for ejectment was passed on the basis of the compromise. On the refusal of the tenant to act according to the compromise, the landlord took steps for enforcement of the order of eviction. The matter ultimately came before the Supreme Court. No mention was made in the compromise about the existence or otherwise of the sub-lease. A decree for ejectment was passed on the basis of the compromise. On the refusal of the tenant to act according to the compromise, the landlord took steps for enforcement of the order of eviction. The matter ultimately came before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that under the Rent Control Act, a decree for recovery of possession could be passed only if the court is satisfied that one or more of the grounds mentioned in the Act were established, to say: "Without such a satisfaction, the court is incompetent to pass a decree for possession. In other words, the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree for recovery of possession of any premises depends upon its satisfaction that one or more of the grounds mentioned in S.13(1) have been proved." 4. The decision in Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal (AIR. 1970 SC. 838) also arose under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. The Supreme Court, following an earlier decision in Bahadur Singh v. Mani Subrat Dass (1969) 1 SCWR 51) held that a decree which directed delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord against the provisions of the Act was a nullity and could not be executed. Therein also, the decree was passed on a compromise. But in both the above cases, the decree did not make mention whether the conditions required for eviction were satisfied. A different note was struck in the decision of the Supreme Court in K. K. Chart v. R. M. Sheshadri (AIR. 1973 S. C. 1311). In that case, an eviction order was passed by consent against the appellant under which he was given time till 27th January, 1969 to vacate the premises. As the respondent did not surrender possession of the premises, the appellant initiated fresh proceedings for eviction stating the purposes for which eviction was sought. The tenant opposed the application. The landlord was examined as pw.1 in the case. He produced documents in support of his case. The respondent-tenant did not cross-examine the appellant. A compromise was entered on 3Ist of March, 1969 whereunder the respondent withdrew his defence. Time was given till 5th of June, 1969 for vacating the premises. The compromise memo was accepted and a consent eviction was ordered granting time to vacate till 5-6-69. He produced documents in support of his case. The respondent-tenant did not cross-examine the appellant. A compromise was entered on 3Ist of March, 1969 whereunder the respondent withdrew his defence. Time was given till 5th of June, 1969 for vacating the premises. The compromise memo was accepted and a consent eviction was ordered granting time to vacate till 5-6-69. A contention was raised that the order of eviction was a nullity. Reference was made to the cases already referred to above. The Supreme Court observed: "The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz., the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in S.10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry." 5. In Nai Babu v. Lala Ramnarayan (AIR. 1978 SC. 22) a suit was filed by the appellant for eviction of the respondent. The tenant resisted the claim. After the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the tenant examined two witnesses, when the case stood adjourned for further evidence. A joint compromise petition was filed by the parties which was accepted by the Court and a decree for eviction was passed executable after five years. When execution was sought, the judgment debtor contended that the decree was a nullity. After the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the tenant examined two witnesses, when the case stood adjourned for further evidence. A joint compromise petition was filed by the parties which was accepted by the Court and a decree for eviction was passed executable after five years. When execution was sought, the judgment debtor contended that the decree was a nullity. The Supreme Court observed: "It is well-settled that where the Rent Control and Restrictions Act are in operation, a landlord cannot obtain eviction of the tenant unless he can satisfy the requirements of the provisions in those Acts. The general law of landlord and tenant to that extent will give way to the special Act in that behalf. It is also well-settled that if the court does not find the permissible grounds for eviction disclosed in the pleadings and other materials on the record, no consent or compromise will give jurisdiction to the court to pass a valid decree of eviction." The Court then proceeded to look into the nature of the suit and then stated: "The Court is to be satisfied whether a statutory ground for eviction has been pleaded which the tenant has admitted by the compromise. Thus dispensing with further proof, on account of the compromise, the court is to be satisfied about compliance with the statutory requirement on the totality of facts of a particular case bearing in mind the entire circumstances from the stage of pleadings upto the stage when the compromise is effected. When a compromise decree is challenged as a nullity in the course of its execution the executing court can examine relevant materials to find out whether statutory grounds for eviction existed in law. If the pleadings and other materials on the record make out a prima facie case about the existence of statutory grounds for eviction a compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid and the executing court will have to give effect to it." 6. If the executing court can look into the circumstances under which the compromise decree was passed and is competent to find out whether the conditions required under the Act are satisfied, there is no reason why the Court which passed the order of eviction, the Appellate authority or the revisional authority should not take into account the identical circumstances while accepting the compromise. In the instant case, the parties have examined witnesses. In the instant case, the parties have examined witnesses. There is the commissioner's report regarding the details of the building and its occupation. There is also evidence regarding the availability of other buildings nearby for being taken on rent by the tenant. The Rent Control Court has in its order observed that the grounds alleged in the petition stood proved and then accepted the compromise granting six months time to the tenant for possession of the building. Under the circumstances, there has been no violation of the statutory provisions contained in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act in ordering eviction of the revision petitioner. The order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court does not, therefore, call for interference. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Dismissed.