Short Note : 1. This is plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit for eviction. Ejectment was sought by the plaintiff-appellant on the ground that the suit accommodation, which was let out to the defendant for residential and non-residential purposes, was bona fide required by the plaintiff for the purpose of occupation as a residence as well as for running a hotel and that the plaintiff was not in possession of any other reasonable suitable accommodation of his own for that purpose. The suit was resisted by the defendant. The trial Court, however, found, on the basis of the evidence on record, that the plaintiff had made out a case for ejectment under the provisions of the M P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The trial Court, therefore, decided the plaintiff's suit. On appeal, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court were reversed and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The plaintiff has now preferred this second appeal. Held : This reasoning is based On misreading of the evidence on record. As I have already observed, it has come on record that the suit house was purchased by the plaintiff on 16th August 1967 and that the suit was instituted on 17th September 1968. The plaintiff, therefore, did not wait for seven years after acquisition of the suit house, in spite of there being a felt need of the suit accommodation, for commencing proceedings to evict the defendant. The lower appellate Court has then observed that after purchasing the suit house the plaintiff got a rent note executed by the defendant, who was already occupying the suit house as a tenant, but in that rent-note the plaintiff did not get a term incorporated to the effect that the suit accommodation was required by the plaintiff for his own business This conduct on the part of the plaintiff in not being able to persuade the defendant to admit in the rent note that the suit house was bona fide required by the plaintiff disentitled the plaintiff, according to the lower appellate Court, to seek eviction on that ground. It is inconceivable that the defendant would have executed a rent note in which the fact that the suit accommodation was required by the plaintiff for the purpose of carrying on his business would have been recited. It is inconceivable that the defendant would have executed a rent note in which the fact that the suit accommodation was required by the plaintiff for the purpose of carrying on his business would have been recited. The inference drawn by the lower appellate Court from the absence of this recital is such which no reasonable person would have drawn. The lower appellate Court has then referred to the fact that about a fortnight before the plaintiff was examined in the trial Court, he had got a phone connection installed at the rented shop where he was carrying on business as a goldsmith. From this fact, the lower appellate Court has drawn an inference that the need of the plaintiff to start the hotel business did not appear to be genuine. It is common knowledge that there is no legal bar to getting a phone connection transferred from one premises to another. If the plaintiff’s application for gram of a phone connection was allowed during the pendency of the suit and the plaintiff chose to avail of that grant, the plaintiff's conduct can by no stretch of imagination lead to the inference that the plaintiff's requirement of the suit accommodation was not bona fide. The lower appellate Court has further held that the plaintiff has failed to proved that he was possessed of sufficient funds to carryon hotel business. If has come on record that the plaintiff has been carrying on the business of a goldsmith for quite sometime and there is no material on record for holding that the plaintiff is not possessed of funds required for the purpose of carrying on the buniness of a hotel The lower appellate Court has then observed that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he had obtained sanction from the competent local authorities for making alterations in the suit house to suit his requirements. The question of making suitable alterations in the suit accommodation would, however, only arise after the plaintiff obtains possession thereof. The reasons given by the lower appellate Court for setting aside the finding given by the trial Court with regard to the plaintiff's bonafide requirement of the suit accommodation arc thus based on misreading the evidence on record and are such which could not have persuaded any reasonable man to reach the conclusion that the plaintiff’s requirement of the suit accommodation was not bona fide. Such a finding being perverse cannot be held to be binding in a second appeal. No valid reason has been urged before me for setting aside the finding given by the trial Court with regard to the plaintiff's bona fide requirement of the suit accommodation; I have already held that the lower appellate Court was not justified in reversing this finding. It has not been found nor has been urged before me that the plaintiff is in possession of other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own for the purpose of his residence and for starting business of running a hotel. The trial Court was, therefore, right in holding that the plaintiff had made out a case for granting the relief of ejectment. Appeal allowed.