Judgment :- 1. This is an unfortunate case in which the mother of the child of about whose custody there is dispute between the parties, died on 16th November 1973. The competition for custody is between the child's father who invoking S.8,12 and 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, approached the court for a declaration that he is the guardian of the person and property of the minor child, and for a direction to return the minor child to his custody. The application was dismissed by the learned District Judge taking the view that to direct the return of the custody of the child to the petitioner-father would not be in the interest of the child. 2. It is not disputed that the petitioner who is the father is the natural guardian of the minor child. It may not also be necessary to appoint him as guardian nor to declare him as guardian as he is according to the personal law governing the parties, who are Christians, the natural guardian of the child. The question mooted before us is as to whether so long as he is not found to be unfit to be the guardian, is he not entitled to the custody of the child in question. 3. It is necessary to mention a few facts. As already stated the mother of the child, that is, the wife of the petitioner, died on 16th November 1973. He married a second time on 27th June 1974 a woman who according to the appellant was attending to his 1st wife during her illness as a good Samaritan and according to the respondents was the maid-servant in the appellant's house. The child was in the custody of the petitioner on the date of the death of his first wife and till 27th May 1974 when the child was taken by its maternal grandmother, the 2nd respondent herein, to her house. The 1st respondent is the maternal grandfather of the child. In the second marriage a child was born to the petitioner within a month of that marriage, i. e., on 9th July 1974. As submitted at the bar before us on behalf of the respondents, the respondents have sent the child to a school and he who is now under seven years is studying in a school; and the respondents are looking after the education of the child. 4. As submitted at the bar before us on behalf of the respondents, the respondents have sent the child to a school and he who is now under seven years is studying in a school; and the respondents are looking after the education of the child. 4. Under S.25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child and that alone. This is by now well-settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Rosy Jacob v. Jacob AIR. 1973 SC. 2090 at 2098 Para.14 and 15. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision approved the observation of Maharajan, J. whose decision was reversed in appeal by the Bench in Jacob A. Chakramakkal v. Rosy J. Chaktamakkal (1972) 11 MLJ. 520 which decision was appealed against before the Supreme Court. That observation is to the effect, as extracted by the Supreme Court: "the controlling consideration governing the custody of the children is the welfare of the children concerned and not the right of their parents." The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision also said that decisions contra to the aforesaid principle are to that extent wrongly decided. Applying the above stated principle, expressed by Danckwarts, L. J. as follows in Re Adoption Application No. 41/61 (1962) 3 All E.R. 553 at 560, "But I would respectfully point out that there can only be one 'first and paramount consideration', and other considerations must be subordinate. The mere desire of a parent to have his child must be subordinate to the consideration of the welfare of the child, and can be effective only if it coincides with the welfare of the child. Consequently, it cannot be correct to talk of the pre-eminent position of parents, or their exclusive right to the custody of their children, when the future welfare of those children is being considered by the court". and overruling the argument that 'united parents' cannot be deprived of 'the care and control of their infant children' and the contention 'that in the case of what has been described as an unimpeachable parent the court must, unless in the very exceptional case, give the care and control to the parent", the House of Lords in J. v. C. 1969 (1) All. E. R.788 affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal continuing in force an order that the infant should remain a ward of court during his minority or until further order and that until further order the care and control of the infant be committed to the foster parents. In that case a home was found for the infant born in a hospital on 8th May 1958 to Spanish parents who had come to Britain to do domestic service, since the mother was found to be suffering from tuberculosis and had to remain in hospital for some considerable time. In April 1959 the mother was discharged from the hospital and thereafter the infant rejoined his parents. The Spanish family went home to Madrid in February 1960, The climate did not suit the child and he was sent back to his foster parents in July 1961. In 1963 the foster parents sent him to a school and the foster mother wrote to his mother saying that the child has become integrated with the former's family. Then started the fight for the custody of the child. 5. In the light of the above discussion there is no merit in the submission that since it has not been found that the appellant is unfit to be the guardian, he is entitled to the custody of the child. The only question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether the learned District Judge in exercising his discretionary jurisdiction applied any wrong principles or had failed to apply any correct principle. We should also bear in mind that while sitting in appeal it would not be proper on our part to interfere with the discretion exercised by the lower court if the same has been judiciously exercised. This principle has been enunciated in B. (B) v. B. (M) 1969 (1) All E. R.891 at 901 where Sir Jocelyn Simon, P referred to and quoted the following from the judgment rendered by Lord Simon in Blunt v. Blunt 1943 (2) All E.R. 76 at 79. "This brings me to a consideration of the circumstances in which an appeal may be successfully brought against the exercise of the Divorce Court's discretion. "This brings me to a consideration of the circumstances in which an appeal may be successfully brought against the exercise of the Divorce Court's discretion. If it can be shown that the court acted under a misapprehension of fact in that it either gave weight to irrelevant or unproved matters or omitted to take into account matters that are relevant, there would, in my opinion, be ground for an appeal. In such a case the exercise of discretion might be impeached, because the court's discretion will have been exercised on wronger inadequate materials. But, as was recently pointed out in this house in another connection in Charles Osenton and Co. v. Johnstan, (1941) 2 All E. R.245 at p. 250. 'The appellate tribunal is not at liberty merely to substitute its own exercise of discretion for the discretion already exercised by the Judge. In other words, appellate authorities ought not to reverse the order merely because they would themselves have exercised the original discretion, had it attached to them, in a different way. But if the appellate tribunal reaches the clear conclusion that there has been a wrongful exercise of discretion in that no weight, or no sufficient weight, has been given to relevant considerations then the reversal of the order on appeal may be justified.' Osenton's Case, (1941) 2 All E. R.245, was one in which the discretion being exercised was that of deciding whether an action should be tried by an official referee, and the material for forming a conclusion was entirely documentary was thus equally available to the appellate court. The reason for not interfering, save in the most extreme cases, with the judge's decision under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, S.4, is of a far stronger character, for the proper exercise of the discretion in such a matter (and I emphasise these following words) largely depends on the observation of witnesses and on a deduction as to matrimonial relations and future prospects which can best be made at the trial." As to what should be the consideration that ought to be taken into account in ordering custody of a child Lord Mac Dermott in J. v. C. 1969 (1) All E. R.788 at 820-821, said as follows: "The second question of construction is as to the scope and meaning of the words shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consideration'. Reading these words in their ordinary significance, and relating them to the various classes of proceedings which the section has already mentioned, it seems to me that they must mean more than that the childs welfare is to be treated as the top item in a list of items relevant to the matter in question. I think they connote a process whereby, when all the relevant facts, relationships, claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and other circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the course to be followed will be that which is most in the interests of the child's welfare as that term has now to be understood. That is the first information because it is of first importance and the paramount consideration because it rules on or determines the course to be followed. It remains to see now this 'first view', as I may call it, stands in the light of authority." 6. Considering the case on hand in the backdrop of the principles stated above it appears to us that the learned District Judge has taken into account all material considerations that ought to weigh in proceedings initiated under S.25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. It is not for us to substitute our view on this in so far as the learned District Judge has considered the relevant and material facts in exercising the discretion vested in him in deciding the question as to which would be best in the interest of the child, custody of the child by the father, the appellant, or custody by the maternal grandparents, the respondents. 7. However, we would like to mention that as to what course would be in the best interests of a child would vary from time to time and cannot be stipulated for all time till it attains majority with reference to the facts obtained at a given time. In view of that it is necessary to say that the appellant-petitioner would be free to bring to the notice of the concerned court that circumstances have changed and establish that, therefore, he is the better person to have the custody of the child. This we say only because it may not be taken that the decision herein may preclude him from approaching the court again for the custody of the child if circumstances change and the changed circumstances warrant such a course. 8. This we say only because it may not be taken that the decision herein may preclude him from approaching the court again for the custody of the child if circumstances change and the changed circumstances warrant such a course. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner submits that his client, the father of the child, is very much desirous of seeing his child and that the respondents are not giving adequate facilities for the same. On behalf of the respondents their learned counsel submits that they would only welcome the appellant-petitioner coming and seeing his child and that is what really they would relish. In view of the submissions as aforesaid it is only necessary to observe that the petitioner would be free to visit the child in the respondents' house at reasonable and convenient hours. No direction as such is called for on this aspect in the light of the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents on their behalf. The appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs. Dismissed.