JUDGMENT - R.M. KANTAWALA, J.:---The plaintiffs have filed this revision application against a concurrent order passed by both the courts dismissing their application for an interim injunction restraining defendants Nos. 1 to 7 from taking possession of the suit property from them. 2. The case of the plaintiffs is that one Madhavrao Joshirao was the owner of a house bearing C.T.S. No. 2728 situate at "A" Ward Kolhapur. Bapu Gopal Waikar was a tenant of the said house. The petitioners in this revision application are the heirs of Bapu. By a registered deed of mortgage dated July 7, 1926, Madhavrao mortgaged the house to Bapu Waikar to secure repayment of a sum of Rs. 1,000/-. The mortgage was a possessory mortgage. The mortgage was liable to be redeemed after a period of fifteen years. Madhavrao died sometime in the year 1927 and after his death Laxmi Bai, respondent No. 8, became the owner of the property as his only heir. She filed a regular Civil Suit No. 10 of 1943 against Bapu for redemption of the mortgage. The said suit was compromised near about the year 1947, and under the compromise decree Bapu Waikar was to give possession of a certain portion of the suit house to respondent No. 8 and was to remain in possession of the remaining portion during his life-time. Bapu Waikar did not hand over possession to respondent No. 8. She, therefore, filed another suit, being regular Civil Suit No. 548 of 1951, against Bapu Waikar for possession. The said suit was also compromised in the year 1952. Under the compromise decree Bapu Waikar accepted respondent No. 8 as the owner of the entire suit house and that he was to remain therein as a tenant during his life-time. It is also alleged that Bapu Waikar was to execute a rent-note in favour of respondent No. 8 and the rent payable was Rs. 14/- per month. Their case further is that it was also agreed that four Khans of the house should be given to respondent No. 8, as and when she comes to reside in the house and if she so comes and such possession is given to her, Waikar would not be under an obligation to pay any rent to respondent No. 8. Their case further is that it was also agreed that four Khans of the house should be given to respondent No. 8, as and when she comes to reside in the house and if she so comes and such possession is given to her, Waikar would not be under an obligation to pay any rent to respondent No. 8. However, Waikar never gave possession of the four Khans to respondent No. 8 and continued in possession of those four khans as a tenant. 3. Respondents Nos. 1 to 7 filed a Civil Suit No. 50 of 1961 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kolhapur, for possession of the suit house against respondent No. 8 and Bapu Waikar. That suit was dismissed by the trial Court inter alia holding that respondent No. 8 had become owner of the house by adverse possession. 4. Being aggrieved by the said the trial Court, respondents Nos. 1 to 7 filed an appeal, being First Appeal No. 187 of 1964, in the High Court. During the pendency of the said first appeal, Bapu Waikar died sometime on January 22, 1965. The petitioners, who are the heirs and legal representatives of Bapu Waikar, are not brought on record by respondents Nos. 1 to 7 in the said appeal. In that appeal, the High Court held that respondent No. 8 did not become the owner of the house, but she subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee and was entitled to the amount due under the mortgagee created by Madhavrao Joshirao. The High Court remanded the matter back to the trial Court for taking accounts and for finding out what was due to respondent No. 8 under the mortgage. After the order of remand was passed, respondents Nos. 1 to 7 and respondent No. 8 arrived at a compromise, whereunder respondent No. 8 was to accept Rs. 5,000/- and relinquish all rights in the house in favour of respondents Nos. 1 to 7. Ultimately, the decree for possession of the house was passed in favour of respondents Nos. 1 to 7. 5. Respondents Nos. 1 to 7 filed a Special Darkhast No. 85 of 1965 for execution of the said decree and claimed possession of the house from the petitioners and respondents Nos. 9 and 10. 6. 1 to 7. Ultimately, the decree for possession of the house was passed in favour of respondents Nos. 1 to 7. 5. Respondents Nos. 1 to 7 filed a Special Darkhast No. 85 of 1965 for execution of the said decree and claimed possession of the house from the petitioners and respondents Nos. 9 and 10. 6. In the year 1976, the petitioners filed a regular Civil Suit No. 1261 of 1976 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kolhapur, contending that Bapu Waikar was in possession of some portion of the house as a tenant of respondent No. 8 and he was unlawfully in possession of the remaining portion. It was further contended that so far as the unauthorised possession was concerned, Bapu Waikar became the owner of that much portion by adverse possession. It was also alleged that in the appeal that was pending before the High Court even though Bapu Waikar died, respondents Nos. 1 to 7 did not bring the petitioners on record as the only heirs and illegal representatives of Bapu Waikar, and as such the decree passed in Suit No. 50 of 1961 was not binding on the petitioners. The contention of the petitioner was that before his death Bapu Waikar made a will whereby he gave up his property including his rights in the house to one Ramchandra Bhosle, the husband of petitioner No. 1 and father of petitioners Nos. 2 to 6. Ramchandra died in or about the year 1961, and on his death the petitioners, as the heirs become entitled to the rights of Ramchandra. 7. Pending the disposal of the above suit, filed by the petitioners, an application for interim injunction was made before the trial Court, and an ex parte temporary injunction was granted against respondents Nos. 1 to 7. Ultimately, when the application for interim injunction came up for hearing before the Court, the trial Court by its order dated March 14 1977, set aside the ad interim injunction and dismissed the application for temporary injunction. It is against that order passed by the trial Court that the petitioners filed an appeal, being Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1977, in the Court of the Extra Assistant Judge, Kolhapur. It is against that order passed by the trial Court that the petitioners filed an appeal, being Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1977, in the Court of the Extra Assistant Judge, Kolhapur. That appeal was dismissed inter alia on the ground that under the compromise decree passed between respondent No. 8 and Bapu Waikar, Waikar was to remain in possession only during his life-time, and after his death there was no interest left behind by him in the house, and there was no question of bringing his heirs on record in the First Appeal. It is against that order that the present revision application has been filed by the petitioners. 8. It may be stated at the outset that the facts, which are recited above, are on the basis of the allegations made by the petitioners in this revision application. Whether the said facts are correct or not will have to be decided by the trial Court, when the suit is disposed of. So far as this revision applications is concerned, I am proceeding on the assumption that the said allegations are prima facie representing the case of the petitioners. 9. Mr. Paranjpe, on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that Waikar was a tenant in respect of the suit house during the life-time of Madhavrao, and as such it should he held that Waikar became the tenant of respondent No. 8 and as such had interest in the suit property after his death. Reference was also made by him to certain decisions with a view to contend that since Bapu Waikar was a tenant and the petitioners who are the heirs and legal representatives under the will of Bapu, are entitled to the protection under the Bombay Rent Act and they cannot be evicted. Mr. Paranjpe also urged that having regard to the provisions of section 76 of the Transfer of Property Act, as a tenancy was created in favour of Bapu under the various proceedings, above referred to the petitioners, who are the heirs and legal representatives of Bapu Waikar, are entitled to remain in possession and were entitled to an interim injunction against the other parties. 10. 10. At the outset, I may observe that having regard to the various allegations that have been made by the petitioners in the petition, what is really the status of the petitioners or Bapu, in view of the innumerable legal proceedings that proceeded, cannot be ascertained with definite certainty. Whatever observations I may make in this order are on the basis of the contentions urged by Mr. Paranjpe and they should not be interpreted to mean that any particular status claimed by Bapu Waikar or the petitioners as his heirs and legal representatives is prima facie accepted by me. It appears to me that almost inconsistent pleas have been adopted in the various proceedings which have taken place in the last several years and it will be only for the trial Court to decide whether the petitioner or Bapu had any particular right, and if so, of what nature. I am merely disposing of this revision application on the assumption that in deciding a prima facie fact whether having regard to the nature of the submissions made by Mr. Paranjpe, the petitioners are entitled to interim relief by way of interim injunction ? The whole basis of his submission before me was that having regard to the provisions of section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, a mortgagee in possession is enjoined to manage the mortgaged property as a person of ordinary prudence would manage it, if it were his own. His further submission was that under the mortgage, a mortgagee is even entitled to induct a tenant. He, therefore, submitted that since in prudent management Bapu was inducted as a tenant by the mortgagee, upon his death the petitioners, who claim to be his legal representatives, are entitled to be in possession of the property. Having regard to the protection given by the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. In my opinion, almost inconsistent pleas have been taken up by Mr. Paranjpe, because if his case is that Madhavrao was the mortgagor and respondent No. 8 is the heir to Madhavrao, then there cannot be a case of a mortgagee in possession of having inducted Bapu Waikar as a tenant, and a questions of claiming possession as a tenant of the mortgagee ordinarily cannot arise. Even otherwise and even assuming for the sake of argument that such a contention is permissible to Mr. Even otherwise and even assuming for the sake of argument that such a contention is permissible to Mr. Paranjpe, which, in my opinion, is extremely doubtful, still having regard to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Kamalakar Co. v. Gulamashafi lmambhai Musalman)1, 64 Bom.L.R. 554, the petitioners have no right whatsoever. The Division Bench of this Court in this case has taken the view that a monthly tenant of a mortgagee in possession inducted before the date of the suit by the mortgagor for redemption, cannot after the redemption claim protection of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, as against the mortgagor. In this case reliance was placed, on behalf of the persons claiming to be tenants on the provisions of section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. While dealing with this contention, the Division Bench held that the right of prudent management as contemplated by section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act is necessarily con-terminus with his right to continue as a mortgagee and it must come to an end as soon as his right to continue in possession ends. If during that period the mortgagee creates any leases as any other ordinary prudent person would do in respect of his own property, the mortgagor cannot make any grievance whatsoever. From this, further proposition that, if the original lease or grant was within the power of the mortgagee, then it would continue even after the redemption and would bind the mortgagor does not necessarily follow. Much would depend upon the nature of the interest created by the mortgagee. In respect of leases the rights of the parties are governed by the special provisions in the Transfer of Property Act. Section 111(c) provides that lease of immoveable property determines when the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on or his power to dispose of the same, extends only to the happening of any event by the happening of such event. This section in clear and unmistakable terms lays down that once the authority of the lessor to lease the property ends, the lease also necessarily terminates. This section in clear and unmistakable terms lays down that once the authority of the lessor to lease the property ends, the lease also necessarily terminates. The Division Bench pointed out that the mortgagees rights cannot be any higher than that of any other lessor whose rights are limited in point of time by the very nature of the relationship between the lessor and the owner. If once this position is reached, the Court must hold that the mortgagor is entitled to get possession of the property unless there is some provision in law which creates an exception to this doctrine. 11. On the basis of this decision, it is quite apparent that the petitioner cannot claim any right to possession in respect of the suit property. 12. Reliance was placed by Mr. Paranjpe upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (G. Pooniah Thevar v. Nalleyam Perumal Pillai)2, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 244. In my opinion, this decision is of no assistance whatsoever to the contention urged by Mr. Paranjpe. In the case before me respondent No. 8 is not accepting the position that she is the landlord, while in the case before the Supreme Court, having regard to the special provisions of Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (25 of 1955), the plaintiffs contended that they were the landlords. The actual definition of the word "landlord" as given in the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act differs from the definition of the word "landlord" given in the Bombay Rent Act, and this case rather than supporting the contention of Mr. Paranjpe decides on the footing that it was the case of an approach by the Court on the allegation that he was the landlord of the property and asked for the relief. 13. I may incidentally mention that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court has been referred to by the Supreme Court in the case of (Sachalmal Parasram v. Mst. Ratanbai)3, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 637, without expressing any dissent therefrom. Thus, it is not possible for me to accept the contention of Mr. Paranjpe that the view that has been taken by the Division Bench in Kamalakar Companys case has been treated as no longer good law by the Supreme Court. 14. Reliance was sought to be placed by Mr. Ratanbai)3, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 637, without expressing any dissent therefrom. Thus, it is not possible for me to accept the contention of Mr. Paranjpe that the view that has been taken by the Division Bench in Kamalakar Companys case has been treated as no longer good law by the Supreme Court. 14. Reliance was sought to be placed by Mr. Paranjpe on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of (Tajammul Husain v. Mir Khan)4, A.I.R. 1974 All. 234. I need not go into the facts of this case, since there is a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court, which is clearly binding on me. As I have indicated earlier that decision of this Court has been referred to by the Supreme Court without expressing any dissent. In that view of the matter, even on the footing of the contention urged by Mr. Paranjpe, in my opinion, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief by way of interim injunction. 15. Before passing the final order, I may repeat the caution which I have indicated earlier that having regard to the inconsistent stand adopted by Bapu as well as the petitioners as various times, this judgment should not be interpreted to mean that the status of Bapu or the petitioners in a particular capacity has been accepted by me even indirectly. 16. In the result, the revision application fails and the rule is discharged with costs. -----