( 1 ) THE tenant who has suffered an order of eviction under S. 21 (1) (a) and (j) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (shortly called 'the act'), has preferred this revision petition, under S. 115 C. P. C. ( 2 ) THE premises belonging to Respondent-1 are under the occupy tion of the, petitioner since 1958 on a, monthly rent of Rg. 120. The premises are admittedly not in a good condition nay in a dilapidated condition. In 1967, respondent-1 landlord, brought an action for eviction against the petitioner stating that he required, thp premises for immediate demolition and reconstruction, and also with a complaint that the tenant has sublet a portion of the premises. But he did not pursue that proceeding and withdrew the same with liberty to bring fresh action. So, in 1973 he filed another application for eviction. The application was filed under S. 21 (1), (a), (b), (c) (d), (f), (h) and; (j) of the Act. We are not concerned with all those grounds in view of the findings recorded by the Courts below and on the limited arguments addressed in this Court. ( 3 ) THE trial Court has made an order of eviction, solely on the ground that the landlord requires the premises reasonably and bona fide, for the immediate purpose of demolishing and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building. The eviction, in other words, was made under S. 21 (1) (j) of the Act. ( 4 ) TWO revision petitions were preferred against tna,t order of evic'ion; one by the tenant and another by the landlord. The tenant challenged the order of eviction on the merits. The landlord wanted, that order of eviction also on other grounds. At the first sight, it may be surprising to know why the landlord preferred that revision petition. He has his own reasons. If the order of eviction was maintained under S. 21 (1) (j) of the act as it has been ordered by the trial court, then the tenant will have a right of re-entry to the new premises as provided by Ss. 27 and 28 of the act. The landlord obviously, (never wanted, to give that benefit to the tenant. He wanted to construct a building of his choice and use it as he likes. 27 and 28 of the act. The landlord obviously, (never wanted, to give that benefit to the tenant. He wanted to construct a building of his choice and use it as he likes. The most important ground urged for the landlord before the learned district Judge relate ! to the validity of the finding recorded by the learned, Munsiff under S. 21 (1) (a ). It was urged that the tenant was in arrears of rent and did not pay the same within the statutory period provided under S. 21 (1) (a) and there was no sufficient cause for such nonpayment as provided under S. 21 (2 ). The learned District Judge accepted that contention. He found that there was no sufficient cause for the , tenant not to have paid the rent which was admittedly found to be due. Accordingly he supported the order of eviction also on the ground that the lenant was in arrears of rent. Consequently, he dismissed the revision petition by the tenant ( 5 ) HENCE this revision petition. ( 6 ) IN this Court, the tenant did not challenge the validity of the order of eviction made under S. 21 (1) (j) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner fairly submitted that having regard fo the condition, of the building a;nd the bona fide requirement of the landlord, he would not oppose the eviction made under S. . 21 (1) (j ). He, however, strongly attacked the eviction order made, under S. 21 (1) (a ). ( 7 ) THE correctness of this contention is required to be examined with reference to the pleadings and the relevant provision, of the Act. On the question of arrears, the landlord in his application for eviction has stated: "that the tenant has not paid rent for September, October, november and December 1. 972, and January to June 1973, in all 10 months, amounting to Rs. 1450. After the notice dated 11-6-1973 was given, the tenant sent Rs. 290 for the months of February and March 1973 on 14-6-1973 by M. O. Then again he gave a notice to the tenant on 2-7-1973 calling upon to pay the arrears of rent In spite of the notice, the tenant has not paid the rent upto July 1973. 1450. After the notice dated 11-6-1973 was given, the tenant sent Rs. 290 for the months of February and March 1973 on 14-6-1973 by M. O. Then again he gave a notice to the tenant on 2-7-1973 calling upon to pay the arrears of rent In spite of the notice, the tenant has not paid the rent upto July 1973. Thus he became defaulter under S. 21 ( (a) of the Act, and the petition was filed after the expiry of the legal , period. These averments have been denied by the tenant, inter alia, stating that the building was in a, dilapidated condition and that even the father of the petitioner had not made any repairs from the beginning of the tenancy and he (the tenant) himself effected repairs spending about Rs. 1,450 after giving notice to the petitioner's father. He also stated that the building needed major repairs and so he called upon the landlord, to make repairs but the landlord did not pay any heed to it. He thereupon filed a petition under S. 44 (3) of the Act which was numbered as H. R. C. 194 of 1969. When that petition was pending, the local Municipal Council issued a notice to him asking him to make necessary repairs and to keep the premises in good condition and on failure to comply with the same, he was threatened with the demolition of the building. Against the Municipality, he filed a suit O. S. No. 310 of 1969 restraining the Municipality from pulling down the building. In the meantime one of the hind rooms of the building fell down and also the western wall collapsed. Again he gave notice to the landlord on 1-9-1973 under S. 44 of the Act requesting him to effect necessary repairs to the building as the repairs involved thousands of rupees. But the landlord did not comply with the demand. So. he was forced to make the necessary repairs by spending Rs. l,730--89. With these allegations, he contended that he was entitled to deduct the amount spent towards the said repairs and therefore! not in arrears. The trial court on consideration of the evidence, observed that although the tenant was in arrears of Rs. 1,450, since hie had spent more amount towards the repairs, he had sufficient cause for not paying the arrears. With these allegations, he contended that he was entitled to deduct the amount spent towards the said repairs and therefore! not in arrears. The trial court on consideration of the evidence, observed that although the tenant was in arrears of Rs. 1,450, since hie had spent more amount towards the repairs, he had sufficient cause for not paying the arrears. But the learned District Judge, found fault with the manner in which that question was dealt by the trial court. He, however, did not reject the claim of the tenant regarding the amount spent towards repairs; but he Said that the tenant had no right to keep the rent payable by him on the so]e ground that he had spent more for repairs. According to the learned Judge, even if the tenant had, spent towards repairs; he had no right to adjust more than one month's rent for that year as required under the proviso to S. 44 (2 ). He has further observed that the tenant is not an innocent' ignorant village rustic and the attitude of the tenant deserved no sympathy of a Court of law. ( 8 ) THE aforesaid conclusion is sought to be justified before me by sri V. Tarakaram, learned counsel for the landlord. He urged that the sufficient cause for not paying the rent within the stipulated period as envisaged under S. 21 (2) should not be anything which has been expressly prohibited by the statute. According to him, the Act confers no right on the tenant to retain more than one month's rent in a year in which he has spent for repairs and therefore, that fact cannot be considered as "sufficient cause" for the default committed by the tenant. Now, let me refer to the relevant provisions in the Act. S. 21 (1) (a) provides that if the tenant has not paid or tendered the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him within two months, of the date on which a notice of payment for the arrears) of rent has been, served on him by the landlord, he would be liable for eviction. But sub-sec. (2) of S. 21 provides a concession to the tenant. But sub-sec. (2) of S. 21 provides a concession to the tenant. It provides that the Court shall not order eviction of a tenant on the ground of arrears of rent if the tenant satisfies the Court that he had "sufficient cause" for the default to pay or tender the rent, that is, within the period of two months specified under clause (a) of S. 21 (1 ). The expression "sufficient cause" is not new to the Court of law. Similar expression is found in other enactments. While dealing with the scope of that expression in S. 5 of the Limitation act, the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan (ILR 13 (1890) Mad. 269 at 271,) observed-"s 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood, tne words "sufficient Cause" receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant. "the Court while considering the cause shown by the tenant under sub-see (2) of S. 21 must first consider whether the tenant was negligent lacked bona fides. While considering these aspects, the Court must exercise the judicial power and discretion with a view to advance substantial justice for whom the Legislature intended to confer such benefit. The provision with which we are dealing, as observed by this Court in M. V. Bhaskaracharya v. A. R Siddabasaviah ( (1963) 1 Myg. L. J. 55 at 56.) embodies an equitable principle and while interpreting such a provision the Court should be guided by facts of life and not by dictum of law- Therefore, there should not be any hard and fast rule in guiding the discretion of the Court in all such cases falling under sub-sec. (2 ). It is not in dispute in the instant case that the tenant has spent for repairs more than the arrears due by him. S. 44 provides that the landlord should keep the building in reasonably good repair and if the landlord neglects within reasonable time after the notice by the tenant to repair the building which he is bound to make, the repairs himself and deduct the, cost thereof from the rent, or otherwise, recover it from the landlord. S. 44 provides that the landlord should keep the building in reasonably good repair and if the landlord neglects within reasonable time after the notice by the tenant to repair the building which he is bound to make, the repairs himself and deduct the, cost thereof from the rent, or otherwise, recover it from the landlord. In other words, he has a right to recover the entire amount spent for repairs but if he wants to deduct the cost of such repairs from the rent payable by him, proviso to sub-sec. (2) of S. 44 states that he could adjust only one months rent payable for that year. Against this legal provision, could it be said that the tenant acted negligently or without bona fides, failed to pay the arrears. The answer, in my view, should be an emphatic "no". The tenant had no alternative but to spend the amount since the landlord neglected to keep the building in a reasonably good condition. The local Municipality threatened the demolition of the building if necessary repairs were not made either by the landlord or by the tenant. The landlord did not do any such repairs in spite of the demand from the tenant. Under these circumstances, the only possible inference is that the tenant had sufficient cause for default to pay or tender the rent. ( 9 ) I will now briefly refer to the decisions on which Sri V. Tarakaram, learned counsel for the landlord depended on for his contention that the tenant should not be given any indulgence. The first case is re. Navaneethammal (AIR 1951 Mad, 343. ). In that case, the tenant pleaded that the landlord had with him an advance and therefore he could adjust it towards the arrears of rent under S. 6 (c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act, 1946 Rajamannar, C. J. , repelling that contention observed that the mere fact that the landlord had with him the advance rent does not mean that the tenant has not committed default: within the meaning of S. 7 (2) of the said Act. These observations, in my view, are of no Assistance to the cage on hand. The facts of that case are far removed from the present case. Reliance was next placed on National motor Industries Ltd. v. . Birendra Nath Mitra (4 ). These observations, in my view, are of no Assistance to the cage on hand. The facts of that case are far removed from the present case. Reliance was next placed on National motor Industries Ltd. v. . Birendra Nath Mitra (4 ). That was a, case where the tenant refused to pay the rent for failure of the landlord to pay the rent to carry out the repairs which he was bound in law to do. Das Gupta, j. , speaking for the Bench, with reference to S. 38 (3) of the West Bengal premises Rent Control, (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, observed that the landlord's failure to carry out repairs which he was bound to do under the covenant would not entitle the tenant to suspend the payment of rent. But in the, case before us the tenant has not suspended the rent on the mere ground that the landlord has failed to carry out the necessary repairs to the building. The tenant herein pleaded that he had sufficient cause for not paying the rent since he had spent much more for repairs which the landlord was bound to da it. Those observations, therefore, are clearly inapplicable to the present case. Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Sinde (5. AIR 1978 SC 955 at 960.) was the last case depended upon in this context. In that case the Supreme Court was considering the scope of s. 12 (3) (a) and, (b) of the, Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (Act No. 57 of 1947 ). The learned counsel relied upon in particular, the following passage at page 960: "if there is statutory default or neglect on the: part of the tenant,whatever may be its cause, the landlord acquires a right under S. 12 (3) (a) to get a, decree for eviction, But where the conditions; of S. 12 (3) (a) are not satisfied, there is a further opportunity given to the tenant to protect himself against eviction. Hei can comply with the conditions set out in S. 12 (3) (b) and defeat the landlord's claim for eviction. If, however, he does not fulfil those conditions, he cannot claim the protection of S. 12 (3) (b) and, in that event, there being n,o other protection available to him, a decree for eviction would have; to go against him. Hei can comply with the conditions set out in S. 12 (3) (b) and defeat the landlord's claim for eviction. If, however, he does not fulfil those conditions, he cannot claim the protection of S. 12 (3) (b) and, in that event, there being n,o other protection available to him, a decree for eviction would have; to go against him. It is difficult to see how by any judicial valour discretion exercisable in favour of the tenant ca,n be found in S. 12 (3) (b) even where the conditions laid; down by it are satisfied, to be strictly confined within the limits prescribed for their operation. "the above observations are also of no assistance to the present case as the provisions of S. 12 (3) (a) and (b) are not in pari materia with the provisions of S. 21 (2) of the Act. The Legislature by enacting S. 21 (2) evidently intended that the court shall not order eviction if the tenant, while satisfying the other conditions, shows sufficient cause for the, default committed by him. The wordings of the sub-section are in the negative terms and are therefore mandatory. The Court shall not make an order of eviction if all the conditions set out in the sub-section are satisfied by the tenant. In the instant case, however, there is no other condition to be complied with by the tenant except showing cause to the Satisfaction of the Court. ( 10 ) IN the result, the petition is allowed in part. The order of eviction made by the learned District Judge under S. 21 (1) (a) of the Act is set aside and the order made under S. 21 (1) (j) is kept undisturbed. The tenant is given four month's time to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises. The landlord shall commence the work of demolition and reconstruction with in three months after taking possession. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances, I make no order as to costs. --- *** --- .