Short Note : The point to be decided is whether the tenancy was yearly or monthly. The plaintiff Dwarka Prasad in his statement stated that the tenancy was granted to the defendant for sawing logs and selling saw-dust, and that the tenancy was monthly. The plaintiff has admitted that the defendant has installed a saw machine and sells timber after sawing the logs. Hansraj who is a partner of the defendant firm has examined himself as D.W.1. He stated that the open plot was given for manufacturing purposes and the buildings were given for residential purposes. Be also stated that it was agreed that six months notice will have to be given for terminating the tenancy. Held : The word "manufacture" in ordinary acceptation means making of articles, or material commercially different from the basic components, by physical labour or mechanical process; it implies bringing into existence a new substance and does not include a process by which merely some change in a substance is produced: [See S.B. Sugar Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 922 and Commr. of S.T., U.P. v. Dr. Sukh Deo, AIR 1969 SC 499 ]. In Shaw Bros. and Co. v. State of West Bengal, 14 STC 878, it has been held that sawing of logs from timber is manufacture. It has also been held that making of logs and rafters from cut trees is a manufacturing process: [See : The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Wasudeo, 6 STC 30]. On these principles, it may be true that the defendant carries on a manufacturing process. Even so, in my opinion, the tenancy was monthly tenancy in view of an agreement to the contrary. As earlier stated, the plaintiff has stated that the tenancy was monthly. This is supported from the fact that the rent was paid from month to month. Reference in this connection may be made to receipts Exs.P-5 to P-36 and Exs.D-3 to D-5. In each one of these receipts there is a printed condition on the reverse that the tenancy can be determined by a fifteen days' notice. During the entire period of tenancy, the defendant did not take any objection to this condition. Further, the defendant does not say that the tenancy was solely for manufacturing purposes. In each one of these receipts there is a printed condition on the reverse that the tenancy can be determined by a fifteen days' notice. During the entire period of tenancy, the defendant did not take any objection to this condition. Further, the defendant does not say that the tenancy was solely for manufacturing purposes. Its case in the written statement was that the plot was let out for manufacturing purposes and the buildings were let out for residential purposes. So, according to the defendant the lease was for a composite purpose. It is doubtful in such a situation that the presumption under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, about the duration of the tenancy that it was yearly, can arise. It is true that, to begin with six months rent was deposited which is shown by Ex.D-1. But it is also established that the rent was always paid monthly and that all the receipts contained a condition that the tenancy can be determined by a fifteen days' notice, which very strongly corroborates the plaintiff's case that the tenancy was monthly and that there was a contract to the contrary within the meaning of section 106. AIR 1968 SC 922 , AIR 1969 SC 499 , 14 STC 878 & 6 STC 50, relied on. Appeal dismissed.